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 A. Introduction and 
background

“The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effec-
tive supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted […] to the diligence of the 
Commission and the Member States.”1
 1.1. The vigilance of individuals: context
 1.1.1. The creation of a private enforcement model
1. In the Van Gend en Loos judgment of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (‘Court of Justice’), dating from over half a century ago, it was held 
that the entry into force in 1958 of the Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community (‘EEC’), which has since become the European Union 
(‘EU’), had led to the creation of a new legal order.2 This judgment made it 
clear that this new legal order is not exclusively a matter that concerns the 
Member States on the one hand and the EU institutions and other bodies 
that had been established on the other hand. The relationship is rather 
essentially triangular in nature, in that private parties can also have a legal 
position under EU law. This means that EU law can not only create obliga-
tions for these private parties, but that it can also confer rights on them, even 
where that is not expressly stated, as long as the provision in question is 
sufficiently clear and unconditional. In other words, EU law constitutes “a 
direct source of rights and duties for all those affected thereby, whether Member 
States or individuals, who are parties to the legal relationships under [EU] law”.3 
As is well-known, Van Gend en Loos thus articulated the principle of direct 
effect of EU law. Equally well-known is that shortly afterwards the Court of 
Justice confirmed the existence of the principle of primacy of EU law over 
national law.4 Together these principles constitute the “essential characteris-
tics” of the EU legal order.5
1 CoJ case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, p. 13.
2 Ibid.
3 CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal, para. 15.
4 CoJ case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, pp. 593-594.
5 CoJ Opinion 1/91, EEA Agreement, para. 21.
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2. By insisting that private parties can in principle directly exercise and 
enforce the rights that they derive from EU law, the Court of Justice laid the 
foundations for what has become known as the private enforcement model of 
EU law.6 This model ensures the possibility for the private parties concerned 
to initiate legal proceedings for alleged infringements of their rights under 
EU law. Not only does this serve the interests of those parties themselves, it 
can also contribute to the supervision exercised by especially the European 
Commission (‘Commission’) as regards the compliance with EU law. 
Indeed, as the above quote from Van Gend en Loos demonstrates, the notion 
that legal actions brought by private parties can be instrumental in strength-
ening compliance with EU law is as old as the very foundations of that law. 
This implies that private parties can be recruited as the EU’s ‘private attor-
neys general’7 or ‘private policemen’.8 That means in turn that “the vast 
potential resources of the general European population [are] enlisted to supplement 
the Commission in its efforts to secure the uniform and effective application of [EU] 
law”.9 Implicit in this private enforcement model is that these proceedings 
are to be brought before the competent courts of the Member States. All this 
was, and continues to be, of importance, for several reasons.
3. In the first place, the scope for enforcement of EU law at the central, 
European level, i.e. before the EU courts in Luxembourg, is limited for legal 
reasons. The main mechanisms designed to ensure such supervision and 
enforcement at that level, to which reference was made in Van Gend en Loos, 
are infringement proceedings. The relevant Treaty provisions, i.e. Articles 
258 and 259 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (‘TFEU’), allow both Mem-
ber States and the Commission to bring a case before the Court of Justice 
when they consider that a Member State has infringed EU law. Private par-
ties can neither initiate these proceedings, nor can they be taken to court in 
this context.10 Infringement proceedings thus remain an affair from which 
private parties are largely excluded.11
It is of course true that the EU Treaties allow private parties to initiate 
‘direct actions’ before the EU courts. But these actions can only be brought in 
a limited number of circumstances. In particular, in order to have legal 
standing (locus standi, i.e. the legal capacity to bring an action before the 
court) under Article 263 TFEU a private party must demonstrate that it is 
directly and individually concerned by the act that is the object of the legal 
action in question. As construed by the EU courts, this threshold can be 
6 Kilpatrick (2000), p. 1.
7 Ibid., p. 2.
8 Drake (2006), p. 843, with reference to Weiler (1981), p. 273.
9 Dougan (2004), p. 76.
10 Cf. e.g. GC Order case T-532/12, Morea, para. 7.
11 On these infringement proceedings and the role of private parties in this regard, see fur-
ther subsection 2.4.1 below.
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notoriously difficult to overcome.12 The amendment of the relevant Treaty 
provision in 2009 (Treaty of Lisbon) has relaxed this test somewhat in certain 
cases. This has however not fundamentally altered the restrictive approach 
with respect to the private party’s possibility to bring these direct actions 
before the EU courts.13 Direct actions are moreover limited to contesting the 
legality of acts, or failures to act, of the institutions and other bodies of the 
EU, as well as claims in connection to the EU’s contractual or non-contractu-
al liability.14 No such actions can be brought against Member States, let 
alone against other private parties.15
Under Article 267 TFEU the Court of Justice can furthermore give pre-
liminary rulings in proceedings that private parties brought before the 
courts of the Member States, in cases where there is uncertainty as to the 
interpretation or validity of provisions of EU law. Those rulings clarify the 
law as it ought to have been understood from its entry into force and as such 
they are also of relevance to other legal relationships than those between the 
parties to the case at hand.16 The preliminary reference procedure has been 
held to be “essential for the preservation of the [EU] character of the law estab-
lished by the [EU] Treaties”17 and an element of the “complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of [those] 
acts”.18 These characteristics have led some to call it the ‘infringement proce-
dure for private parties’.19 Yet also in this case there are certain limits. In 
particular, the preliminary reference system establishes in essence a form of 
direct cooperation between the national courts and the Court of Justice.20 
Procedurally speaking, such a reference it is no more than a side-step in the 
proceedings before the former.21 Where the Court of Justice has issued a 
12 E.g. CoJ case 25/62, Plaumann, pp. 106-107; CoJ case C-50/00 P, UPA, para. 32-46. See also 
Opinion AG Jacobs case C-50/00 P, UPA, para. 36-99. See further e.g. Ward (2009), 
pp. 343-347.
13 Notably it follows from the fourth subparagraph of Art. 263 TFEU, as amended, that, 
where regulatory acts that do not entail implementing measures are concerned, a private 
party-applicant is no longer required to demonstrate individual concern. See e.g. CoJ 
case C-583/11 P, Inuit, para. 45-62 and 68-77. See further e.g. Ward (2009), pp. 357-359; 
Craig (2010), pp. 129-132; Kornezov (2014), p. 251; Van Malleghem &. Baeten (2014), 
p. 1187.
14 See Articles 263, 265 and 340 TFEU respectively. Cf. e.g. GC Order case T-635/13, 
Aćimović, para. 6.
15 E.g. CoJ case 175/84, Krohn, para. 18; CoJ case C-407/04 P, Dalmine v, para. 62; GC Order 
case T-469/11, Al Qadhafi  v. France, para. 8; GC Order case T-311/13, FQ.
16 E.g. CoJ case 61/79, Denkavit, para. 16; CoJ case C-231/96, Edis, para. 15.
17 CoJ Opinion 1/09, Patent Court Agreement, para. 83.
18 CoJ case C-583/11 P, Inuit, para. 92.
19 Pescatore, cited in Micklitz (2012), p. 393.
20 E.g. CoJ Opinion 1/09, Patent Court Agreement, para. 84; CoJ case C-416/10, Križan, 
para. 66.
21 Cf. the standard phrase used by the CoJ in relation to the allocation of costs associated 
with preliminary references, according to which “these proceedings are, for the parties to the 
main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court”. See e.g. CoJ case 
C-416/10, Križan, para. 117.
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preliminary ruling, it remains for the national court concerned to apply that 
ruling to the case at hand.22 Moreover, while EU law can require the nation-
al court seised by a private party to make a preliminary reference, the deci-
sion whether or not to do so is, as a matter of EU law, taken independently 
from the acts or views of the parties to the proceedings.23
4. In the second place, there are practical considerations that limit the scope 
for enforcement of EU law at the central, European level. To begin with, in 
practice the Member States seldom use the abovementioned powers to initi-
ate infringement proceedings against their peers .24 The Commission, as the 
‘guardian’ of the EU Treaties,25 is in contrast generally willing to use its 
powers in this regard where it deems this necessary. The Commission’s 
resources are however limited, in terms of information gathering capacity, 
manpower as well as financial means. This was the case already in the early 
days of the process of European integration, but it arguably carries even 
more weight today, in an EU that has been enlarged to 28 Member States 
and over 500 million citizens and that is moreover involved in many differ-
ent fields of law. As a consequence, in its own words, the Commission can-
not act as “a kind of ‘super enforcement authority’”.26
Similar considerations apply to the EU judiciary. The EU courts have 
over the decades been confronted with a virtually permanently increasing 
number of cases brought before them. By means of an illustration, the pub-
lished case law of the Court of Justice for 2001 alone takes up the same shelf 
space as that for the first 19 years of case law up to 1972.27 And whereas in 
2000 around 900 new cases were brought before the EU courts (with approx-
imately 1450 cases pending), ten years later this number had risen to around 
1250 new cases per year (with approximately 2100 cases pending),28 i.e. an 
increase of almost 40%. As a result the EU courts regularly struggle with 
their workload. Structural and organisational changes have been enacted, 
most notably the creation of (what is now) the General Court in 1988. More 
recently the Court of Justice, which is charged inter alia with ruling on pre-
22 E.g. CoJ case 51/74, Van der Hulst, para. 12; CoJ joined cases C-175/98 and C-177/98, 
Lirussi, para. 38.
23 E.g. CoJ case 70/77, Simmenthal, para. 10; CoJ case C-2/06, Kempter, para. 41-42; CoJ case 
C-137/08, Pénzügi Lízing, para. 28-29; CoJ case C-561/11, Fédération Cynologique Internati-
onale, para. 30. This is not to say that the parties to the proceedings before a national court 
may not suggest making a preliminary reference, in accordance with the applicable 
national procedural rules. Some also link the preliminary reference procedure to the prin-
ciple of effective judicial protection, discussed in subsection 2.3 below. See e.g. Opinion 
AG Léger case C-224/01, Köbler, para. 147; Opinion AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer case 
C-14/08, Roda Golf, para. 29.
24 Only four such cases were been brought in the period up until 2012. See Lock (2012), 
p. 1677.
25 Cf. Art. 17 TEU.
26 Commission, Communication on public procurement in the EU, COM(1998) 143, p. 13.
27 Jacobs (2004a), p. 823.
28 See CoJ, Annual reports 2000 and 2010 respectively.
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liminary references and in infringement proceedings, has been able to cut 
back the length of the proceedings before it. However especially the General 
Court, which acts mainly as the first instance court for direct actions, contin-
ues to struggle with its workload and the resulting long delays. Indeed, the 
length of the proceedings before this latter court has already several times 
been held to have exceeded a reasonable time period.29 Discussions on 
reforms therefore continue.30
 5. Lastly, as a general rule, EU law is implemented by the Member States.31 
This implementation therefore takes place primarily at national level. It fol-
lows that there is also considerable potential for the enforcement of EU law 
at that level, i.e. before the competent national courts.32 The abovemen-
tioned finding in Van Gend en Loos that under certain conditions EU law 
confers rights on private parties on which these parties can rely directly in 
legal proceedings allowed the unleashing of this potential for decentralised 
enforcement, particularly in combination with the principle of primacy of 
EU law.33 Indeed, after that judgment it did not take the Court of Justice 
long to clarify that “every time a rule of [EU] law confers rights on individuals, 
those rights, without prejudice to the methods of recourse made available by the 
Treaty, may be safeguarded by proceedings brought before the competent national 
courts”.34 Earlier it had already held that “it may generally be assumed that a 
substantive right has as its corollary that it provides the person in whose interest it 
operates with the means of enforcing it himself by proceedings before the courts 
rather than the intervention of a third party”.35
 Since Van Gend en Loos, which concerned a provision of the EU Trea-
ties, it has been made clear that the principle of direct effect extends to 
potentially all EU legal acts. Provided that they are sufficiently clear and 
unconditional, provisions of regulations and decisions can also be directly 
29 E.g. CoJ case C-40/12 P, Gascogne, para. 102; CoJ case C-243/12 P, FLS Plast, para. 142.
30 On the functioning and workload of the EU courts as well as past and possible future 
reforms, see further e.g. Rasmussen (2000), p. 1071; Schiemann (2008), p. 3; Forwood 
(2008), p. 34; Meij (2013), p. 3.
31 Cf. Art. 291(1) TFEU. See e.g. also CoJ case C-201/04, Molenbergnatie, para. 52: “according 
to the general principles on which the [EU] is based and which govern the relations between it and 
the Member States, it is for the MemberStates, under Article [4(3) TEU], to ensure that [EU] 
rules are implemented on their territories”.
32 Cf. CoJ case 294/83, Les Verts, para. 23.
33 For, whereas direct effect can be understood as meaning that EU law is to be considered 
as the ‘law of the land’, it is the combination with the principle of primacy that ensures 
that EU law is also the ‘higher law of the land’. See Weiler (1991), p. 2415.
34 CoJ case 28/67, Firma Molkerei, p. 153.
35 CoJ case 6/60, Humblet, pp. 571-572. This case relates to the European Coal and Steel 
Community (‘ECSC’) and not to the EU Treaties, but considering its principled nature 
and the similarity of the relevant provisions at issue there appears to be no reason why 
this statement would not be equally applicable as a matter of EU law. That is confi rmed 
by the reference to this case made in CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, 
para. 36.
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effective.36 The same applies to directives, but only in ‘vertical’ legal rela-
tionships, i.e. in actions between a private party on the one hand and a 
Member State (including its decentralised entities and semi-public bodies) 
on the other hand.37 The Court of Justice has consistently held that direc-
tives have no ‘horizontal’ direct effect. This means that, in and by them-
selves, provisions of directives cannot impose obligations on private parties 
and cannot be invoked and enforced in legal relationships between private 
parties.38 The effects of this position tend to be moderated somewhat by the 
fact that the concept of a ‘State’ – and therefore that of a vertical relationship 
– is a rather wide one in this connection. The capacity in which the latter acts 
is not of relevance. Provisions of directives that are capable of having direct 
effect may therefore be relied upon against any body, whatever its legal 
form, which has been made responsible pursuant to a measure adopted by 
a Member State for providing a public service under the control of the State 
and which has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result 
from the normal rules applicable in relations between private parties.39 But 
for instance an association governed by private law with a social objective 
does not meet these conditions.40 This absence of horizontal direct effect fur-
thermore does not mean that the application of a directly effective provision 
of EU law in a vertical context cannot, indirectly, have certain adverse reper-
cussions for another private party or have ‘collateral effects’ in horizontal 
legal relationships.41 Having said that, the fact remains that the Member 
States first need to transpose a directive into national law for the rules of EU 
law in question to have effect in ‘truly’ horizontal legal relationships.42
The aforementioned potential is reinforced by other ‘weapons’ that pri-
vate parties can use in proceedings before national courts where claims 
based on EU law are at stake. Of particular importance is the principle of 
consistent interpretation, also known as ‘harmonious interpretation’ or 
‘indirect effect’. Under this principle, as construed by the Court of Justice, 
national law must be interpreted, in so far as possible, in light of the word-
ing and the purpose of the EU law at issue.43 This means that national courts 
36 CoJ case 9/70, Grad, para. 5; CoJ case 39/72, Commission v. Italy (slaughtered cows), 
para. 17.
37 CoJ case 41/74, Van Duyn, para. 12.
38 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer, para. 108; CoJ case C-282/10, Domin-
guez, para. 37 and 42.
39 E.g. CoJ case C-282/10, Dominguez, para. 38-39; CoJ case C-425/12, Portgás, para. 24-26.
40 CoJ case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, para. 37.
41 E.g. CoJ case C-443/98, Unilever, para. 49-51; CoJ case C-201/02, Wells, para. 57. See fur-
ther Prechal (2005), pp. 255-270.
42 Cf. Art. 288 TFEU, pursuant to which a directive is “binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed”, while leaving “to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods”.
43 E.g. CoJ case 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, para. 13-14; CoJ case C-106/89, Marleasing, 
para. 8; CoJ joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer, para. 118; CoJ case C-42/11, Lopes 
Da Silva Jorge, para. 54-56; CoJ case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, para. 38-39. 
See further Prechal (2005), pp. 180-215; Craig & De Búrca (2011), pp. 200-207.
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must do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of 
national law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods 
recognised by it, with a view to ensuring that the rule of EU law in question 
is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective 
pursued by it. The principle of consistent interpretation finds its limits how-
ever in the general principles of law that form part of the EU legal order, in 
particular those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity, which can thus con-
stitute a bar to incurring criminal liability and preclude an interpretation 
 contra  legem. Given the aforementioned absence of horizontal direct effect of 
directives, the principle of consistent interpretation is particularly relevant 
in actions between private parties concerning rights and obligations derived 
from directives, especially where they have not been transposed into nation-
al law in a correct and timely manner. Other such ‘weapons’ at the disposal 
of private parties seeking to assert their rights derived from EU law before 
the courts of the Member States are the principle of Member State liability 
and the (nascent) principle of private party liability. Pursuant to these latter 
two principles, which are discussed in further detail below, infringers must 
compensate for the harm caused as a consequence of their breaches of EU 
law.44
1.1.2. EU involvement with private enforcement at national level
6. In light of the foregoing one could say that in the EU legal system the 
enforcement possibilities on the central, European level are not as triangular 
in nature as the distribution of rights is. Instead the enforcement by private 
parties of the rights granted to them by EU law generally takes place before 
national courts. From the viewpoint of these parties these latter courts are 
thus the primary venue for asserting their rights vested in EU law.45 When 
considering and deciding those cases, the national courts seised do not act 
in a purely national capacity. They rather act, in effect, as a judicial organ 
of a unitary EU judicial power.46 As the Court of Justice put it, the courts 
of the Member States are, together with the Court itself, the “guardians of 
[the EU] legal order and the judicial system of the European Union”, as it is for 
them to “ensure that the full application of [EU] law in all Member States and to 
ensure judicial protection of a [private party’s] rights under that law”.47 As such 
these national courts are the “’ordinary’ courts within the European Union legal 
order”.48
44 See section 2.5 below.
45 Cf. Tridimas (2006), p. 419.
46 GC case T-51/89, Tetra Pak, para. 42; Opinion AG Cosmas case C-83/98 P, France v. Lad-
broke Racing and Commission, para. 92.
47 CoJ Opinion 1/09, Patent Court Agreement, para. 66 and 68.
48 Ibid., para. 80.
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7. This crucial role of the national courts in the EU legal order makes it all 
the more remarkable that there are comparatively few EU rules that regulate 
the proceedings before those courts involving the enforcement of EU law. 
EU law typically defines the rights and obligations of private parties, but it 
generally does not provide for the remedies and procedural rules that are 
necessary for their enforcement at national level.49
This certainly holds true where primary EU law is concerned, i.e. the 
rules laid down in the EU Treaties. While primary EU law, as interpreted by 
the EU courts, is often generous in conferring rights on private parties,50 it is 
largely silent on the remedies and procedures necessary to enforce them.51 
In fact, primary EU law contains only one explicit reference to the term 
‘remedies’, namely in Article 19(1) Treaty on European U nion (‘TEU’).52 Tell-
ingly this reference was only introduced in 2009 (Treaty of Lisbon). Even 
more tellingly perhaps, this provision recalls that it is for the Member States 
– and therefore in principle not for the EU – to provide “remedies sufficient to 
ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law”. Article 19(1) TEU 
thus essentially confirms and formalises the dominant pattern of decentral-
ised judicial review, discussed above.53 As such it ensures the observance of 
the fundamental right to effective judicial protection within the EU.54
The picture has to a large extent long been comparable if we look at sec-
ondary EU law, i.e. the rules laid down in legal acts adopted by the EU legis-
lature on the basis of the EU Treaties, such as regulations and directives.55 
Especially in the early days of EU law common rules in this regard were 
almost completely lacking.56 As is shown in the remainder of this study, sig-
nificant developments have taken place since. Nonetheless to date there is 
still no generally applicable set of rules laid down in secondary EU law 
obliging Member States to harmonise their respective national rules relating 
to the remedies and procedures that apply to the proceedings initiated by 
private parties before their national courts concerning the enforcement of 
rules of substantive EU law.
49 Cf. Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 214.
50 See also para. 446 below.
51 Cf. Whish (1994), p. 3.
52 Cf. Komninos (2008), p. 149 (n. 52).
53 Tridimas (2006), p. 420 (regarding the corresponding article in the draft EU Constitution-
al Treaty, which, via the Treaty of Lisbon, later became Art. 19(1) TEU). Cf. CoJ Opinion 
1/09, Patent Court Agreement, para. 66; CoJ case C-583/11 P, Inuit, para. 101.
54 See e.g. CoJ case C-418/11, Texdata, para. 78; CoJ case C-583/11 P, Inuit, para. 100. On the 
right to effective judicial protection set out in Art. 47 Charter, see further section 2.3 
below. Cf. Opinion AG Jääskinen case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, para. 47, where it is 
argued that Art. 19(1) TEU supplies a supplementary guarantee to the ‘Rewe-principle’ of 
effectiveness, discussed in subsection 2.2.2 below.
55 Cf. Art. 288 TFEU.
56 For an overview, see subsection 1.1.3 below.
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8. It is important to note that all this is not a matter of mere formalities. 
Attention may often tend to focus on the substantive provisions conferring 
rights on the private parties that are subject to EU law, yet the importance of 
remedial and procedural rules can hardly be overstated. As the Commission 
put it, “rights which cannot be enforced are worthless”.57 Formulated somewhat 
more elegantly, it has been said that (civil) procedural law serves “to infuse 
life into all other areas of the law, to bring into actual being and to give reality and 
effect to all the legal rights and duties of every person and body in society”.58 Reme-
dial and procedural rules may in practice often be at least as important for 
the private parties concerned as their abstract substantive entitlements 
under EU law.59 Without having legal standing, for instance, a private party 
cannot bring an action before the competent national court in the first place. 
Similarly rules on issues such as access to evidence, the burden of proof, 
causality and legal costs tend to determine to a high extent whether there is 
any point in bringing such a claim and, when it is brought, whether it will 
be successful. The applicable rules on remedies and procedures can there-
fore have a substantial impact on the effectiveness of the substantive EU law 
at stake. In addition the predominant reliance on the laws of the Member 
States to regulate remedial and procedural matters related to the enforce-
ment of EU law before national courts inherently also implies that differ-
ences can and do exist in this respect across the EU, both as regards the 
manner in which this enforcement takes places and the outcomes to which it 
may lead. A system of decentralised judicial enforcement that principally 
relies on national law for the adjudication of private enforcement actions 
can thus also lead to inconsistencies and unequal treatment.60
1.1.3. EU legislative action
9. As is discussed in further detail in the following chapter, over the 
decades important steps have been set in the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice that mitigate the effects of the general absence of EU rules in the field 
of remedies and procedures applicable in proceedings before the national 
courts concerning the enforcement of rights vested in EU law.61 In so doing, 
that EU institution has corrected to some extent the apparent imbalance, 
referred to above, between on the one hand the heavy reliance on enforce-
ment of EU law at the national level and on the other hand the general lack 
of common remedial and procedural provisions. However such interven-
tion can “by the nature of things only alleviate, but not eliminate the problem”.62 
57 Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective redress, 
SEC(2011) 173, p. 2.
58 Jacob (1987), p. 63.
59 Flynn (2008), p. 245.
60 Cf. Bridge (1984), pp. 32-36; Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 198.
61 See in particular sections 2.1 and 2.2 below.
62 Toth (1978), p. 187.
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Crucial as this case law surely has been, and indeed continues to be, for prin-
cipled as well as practical reasons there are limits to what can be expected 
from the judiciary in this respect. The EU courts may be obliged to do justice 
in the cases brought before them,63 but it is nonetheless primarily for the EU 
legislature to address these issues in a more systematic and general matter.64 
While that holds true generally, it  arguably applies even more so in the spe-
cific context of EU law. For where the EU courts come close to, or are seen as 
overstepping, the line between the resolution of concrete cases and laying 
down quasi-legislative measures, they become vulnerable to ‘accusations’ of 
judicial activism.65 All this applied in 1979, when Advocate General Warner 
noted that the Court of Justice “cannot create [EU] law where none exists: that 
must be left to the [EU]’s legislative organs”.66 And it still applies today, as is 
illustrated by Advocate General Trstenjak’s observation thirty years later 
that the EU courts “may not assume the role of the [EU] legislature if a gap in the 
law can be filled by the [EU] legislature”.67
10. While highlighting especially the (potential) differences in treatment of 
private parties resulting from the lack of uniformity in this respect, the 
Court of Justice therefore spoke in 1980 of a “regrettable absence” of EU law 
provisions on the remedies and procedures regarding the enforcement of 
EU law at national level.68 It held that “[i]t is not for the Court to issue general 
rules of substance or procedural provisions, which only the competent institutions 
may adopt”.69 Particularly from the 1980s onwards and increasingly through-
out the 1990s, this barely disguised call for EU legislative action on these 
matters also started to resonate in the legal literature, often as part of broad-
er concerns relating to the effectiveness and practical effects of EU law in the 
Member States.70 Gradually the EU legislature started responding to these 
calls for EU legislation to be established on the matters at issue here. As is 
illustrated in the following, especially since the mid-1980s and even more so 
in the following decades, a range of EU legislative measures were adopted 
63 Cf. Art. 19(1) TEU, where it is stipulated that the EU courts “shall ensure that in the interpre-
tation an application of the [EU] Treaties the law is observed”. Specifi cally in relation to the 
preliminary reference procedure set out in Art. 267 TFEU, it is settled CoJ case law that 
“where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of [EU] law, the Court is in principle 
required to give a ruling”. See e.g. CoJ case C-416/10, Križan, para. 53.
64 See further subsection 9.3.1 below.
65 Cf. Garben (2013), p. 15. Regarding the discussion on judicial activism in relation to the 
EU courts more generally, see e.g. Tridimas (1996), p. 199; Craig & de Búrca (2011), 
p. 63-66; Dougan (2012a), p. 113.
66 Opinion AG Warner case 265/78, Ferwerda, p. 640.
67 Opinion AG Trstenjak case C-101/08, Audiolux, para. 107.
68 CoJ case 130/79, Express Dairy Foods, para. 12. See e.g. also CoJ case 54/81, Fromme, 
para. 4.
69 Ibid., para. 12. See e.g. also CoJ joined cases 205/82 to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor, 
para. 24.
70 E.g. Bridge (1984), p. 41; Steiner (1995), p. 60; Neville Brown (1997), p. 71; Himsworth 
(1997), p. 292. On the said broader concerns, see e.g. Snyder (1993), p. 19.
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that aim to facilitate the enforcement by private parties of their rights vested 
in EU law before national courts. Broadly speaking, it is this legislative 
action that forms the subject of this study.71 
11. Such involvement from the side of the EU legislature with issues of 
private enforcement is not an entirely recent phenomenon. Early examples of 
EU legislative action in this regard can be traced back as far as the 1960s.72 It 
is however appropriate to consider the late 1970s as the period in which the 
EU legislature set the first, hesitant steps in establishing rules on the private 
enforcement of EU law before national courts.73 Most notably in 1976 in the 
field of gender equality Directive 76/207 was adopted, which has been later 
recast in Directive 2006/54 (‘Gender Equality Directive’).74 This directive 
requires measures to be taken at national level to ensure effective review 
possibilities through judicial and administrative procedures, touching upon 
issues such as compensation for damage, legal standing and the burden of 
proof. Another early approach can be found in Directive 85/374 (‘Product 
71 See also subsection 1.2.1 below.
72 E.g. Art. 12 Directive 65/65/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products, OJ 1965, 
22/369. This directive has since been replaced by Directive 2001/83/EC on the Commu-
nity code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ 2001, L 311/67. Another 
example is Art. 7 Directive 64/221/EEC on the co-ordination of special measures con-
cerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justifi ed on grounds 
of public policy, public security or public health, OJ 1964, 56/850. This directive has since 
been replaced by Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ 
2004, L 158/77.
73 Apart from the legislation referred to above, see e.g. also the (rather rudimentary) provi-
sions on civil liability in Directive 77/91/EEC on coordination of safeguards which, for 
the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of 
companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in 
respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and 
alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, OJ 1977, L 
26/1 (Art. 18); Directive 78/855/EEC based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty concerning 
mergers of public limited companies, OJ 1978, L 295/36 (Art. 20-21). These directives 
have since been replaced by respectively Directive 2012/30/EU on coordination of safe-
guards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by 
Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in respect of the formation of pub-
lic limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a 
view to making such safeguards equivalent, OJ 2012, L 315/74 (‘Public Limited Liabilities 
Companies Directive’); Directive 2011/35/EU concerning mergers of public limited lia-
bility companies, OJ 2011, L 110/1.
74 Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions, OJ 1976, L 39/40. See also Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of 
proof in cases of discrimination based on sex, OJ 1980, L 14/6. These two directives have 
since been replaced by Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of 
equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment 
and occupation, OJ 2006, L 204/23.
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Liability Directive’).75 To protect consumers this directive establishes the 
principle of civil liability in damages without fault of producers for defec-
tive products. It also addresses a number of related issues such as the avail-
able heads of damages and the limitation periods that apply in legal pro-
ceedings brought under this directive.
12. Over time the EU’s legislative involvement with private enforcement-
related matters became more intense, especially in the 1990s and the 2000s. 
The adoption at EU level of specific provisions relating to remedies and pro-
cedures available to private parties in proceedings before their national 
courts became increasingly common. These provisions were often part of 
legal acts setting out substantive rules. Examples can be found in fields as 
diverse as the protection of personal data, e-commerce and the environ-
ment. As to the former, Directive 95/46 (‘Data Protection Directive’) and 
Directive 2002/58 (‘E-Privacy Directive’) follow an approach that is essen-
tially based on establishing a right to effective redress and to reparation in 
damage for persons having suffered injury.76 Directive 2000/31 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services (‘E-Commerce Directive’) 
encourages out-of-court settlements, stipulates that rapid court actions, 
including interim measures, must be available to terminate infringements 
and prevent further impairment of the interests involved, and contains cer-
tain exemptions from liability.77 And, while Directive 2004/35 on environ-
mental liability (‘Environmental Liability Directive’) is not concerned with 
civil liability, it nonetheless includes noteworthy rules on legal standing for 
private parties, including parties not representing strictly individual inter-
ests, such as non-governmental organisations.78 Concerning environmental 
impact assessments, common rules on review were inserted in 2003 in (what 
is now) Directive 2011/92 (‘Environmental Impact Assessment Directive’), 
inter alia on legal standing and legal costs.79
75 Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ 1985, L 
210/29.
76 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data and of the free movement of such data, OJ 1995, L 281/13; Directive 2002/58/
EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the elec-
tronic communications sector, OJ 2002, L 201/37.
77 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particu-
lar electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ 2000, L 178/1.
78 Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and rem-
edying of environmental damage, OJ 2004, L 143/56.
79 Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private proj-
ects on the environment, OJ 2012, L 26/1. This directive is a codifi cation of Directive 
85/337/EEC on the assessments of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment, OJ 1985, L 175/40. It has been amended in 2014, which amendment is to be 
transposed into national by May 2017. See Directive 2014/52/EU amending Directive 
2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment, OJ 2014, L 124/1.
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Around the same period the EU legislature also took more ambitious 
action, in the sense that it adopted broader, self-standing legal acts that are 
exclusively concerned with setting out measures aimed at facilitating the 
private enforcement of the substantive EU rules in a given sector. Early 
examples are the twin Directives 89/665 and 92/13 relating to EU public 
procurement law (‘Procurement Remedies Directives’).80 These directives 
stipulate that effective and rapid remedies should be available to aggrieved 
private parties. They also contain specific rules on legal standing, forum, 
interim relief and actions for damages. Similarly Directive 2004/48 (‘IPR 
Enforcement Directive’) is dedicated specifically to the private enforcement 
of intellectual property rights.81 To this aim it harmonises national remedial 
and procedural rules on matters such as legal standing, evidence, interim 
relief, injunctions, damages and legal costs. Furthermore Directive 98/27, 
later codified in Directive 2009/22 (‘Consumer Injunctions Directive’), seeks 
to protect consumers’ interests by specifying rules on legal standing and 
providing for certain specific remedies, most notably injunctive relief.82
13. More recent developments indicate that legislative measures of the type at 
issue here continue to be considered, proposed and adopted at EU level. 
Indeed, it is noticeable that many of the pressing current-day EU level chal-
lenges are addressed by an approach that involves a private enforcement 
element. For instance, the EU’s response to the economic crisis included an 
amendment to Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (‘Credit Rat-
ing Agencies Regulation’), which established a strengthened regime on the 
civil liability in damages of those agencies.83 In the area of free movement of 
persons and employment, Directive 2014/54 (‘Free Movement of Workers 
Enforcement Directive’) requires judicial procedures to be made available to 
EU citizens who exercise their rights in this regard and who are confronted 
with unjustified restrictions and discrimination.84 These procedures are also 
to be made available to certain associations acting on behalf or in support of 
the private parties concerned. A comparable approach can be found in 
80 Directive 89/665/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provi-
sions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and 
public works contracts, OJ 1989, L 395/33; Directive 92/13/EEC coordinating the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of rules on the pro-
curement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecom-
munications sectors, OJ 1992, L 76/14.
81 Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ 2004, L 
195/45.
82 Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, OJ 1998, L 
166/51; Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, 
OJ 2009, L 110/30.
83 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, OJ 2009, L 302/1, as amended by 
Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies, OJ 2013, L 146/146. On these liability rules, see further Haar (2014), p. 315.
84 Directive 2014/54/EU on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on work-
ers in the context of freedom of movement for workers, OJ 2014, L 128/8.
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Directive 2014/67 (‘Posting of Workers Enforcement Directive’).85 While this 
latter directive mainly strengthens public enforcement, it also requires the 
Member States to ensure that affected private parties as well as certain third 
parties, such as trade unions, can initiate legal proceedings at national level 
to safeguard the rights vested in EU law in this domain. Yet another politi-
cally charged topic is the protection of personal data. The proposed strength-
ening of the EU’s regime in this regard includes more elaborate provisions 
on the right of redress of the private parties concerned.86 Reference can also 
be made to developments in the area of passengers’ rights, where acts such 
as Regulation 261/2004 (‘Air Passengers’ Rights Regulation’) and Regula-
tion 1371/2007 (‘Rail Passengers’ Rights Regulation’) require the compensa-
tion of passengers in certain cases.87 Last but not least, although at the time 
of writing it still awaits adoption and publication, which is expected to take 
place before the end of 2014, in the spring of 2014 political agreement was 
reached on the Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the Union (‘Competition Damages Directive’).88
14. A final and separate issue that merits attention when discussing EU 
rules relating to proceedings brought by private parties before national 
courts concerns another ‘branch’ of EU legislative activity, namely judicial 
cooperation in civil matters. While historically this subject-matter received 
comparatively little attention at EU level, more recently it has been rising up 
the agenda.89 Indeed, especially in the course of the 2000s a considerable 
body of secondary EU law has been established in this domain.90 Prime 
examples are Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
85 Directive 2014/67/EU on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information 
System, OJ 2014, L 159/24.
86 Commission, Proposal for a regulation on the protection of individuals with regards to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM(2012) 11.
87 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules in compensation and assistance 
to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of fl ights, 
OJ 2004, L 46/1; Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations, 
OJ 2007, L 315/14. In 2013 the Commission proposed amending the former regulation. 
See Commission, Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 
establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of 
denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of fl ights and Regulation (EC) No 
2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of passengers and their baggage 
by air, COM(2013) 130.
88 For the text on which political agreement was reached, see European Parliament, Legisla-
tive resolution on the proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, P7_TA(2014)0451. 
That text is the basis for the further discussion of this (draft) directive in the following, 
whereby it is assumed, as seems likely, that it will be adopted in its current form.
89 Hodges (2011), p. 448.
90 For an overview of the legislation and other developments in this fi eld, see e.g. Storsk-
rubb (2008); Storskrubb (2011), p. 299.
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enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters91 (‘Brussels I 
Regulation’), Regulation 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of 
the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters92 
(‘Evidence Regulation’), Directive 2003/8 concerning legal aid in cross-bor-
der disputes93 (‘Legal Aid Directive’), Regulation 861/2007 establishing a 
European small claims procedure94 (‘Small Claims Regulation’) and Regula-
tion 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations95 (‘Rome 
II Regulation’).
15. The foregoing overview is by no means meant to be complete and 
exhaustive. It rather serves to illustrate three main points. First, despite a 
late and somewhat hesitant start, over the past decades the EU legislature 
has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness and ability to adopt private 
enforcement-related legislation where this was considered appropriate. Sec-
ond, the above overview highlights that the relevant provisions are not lim-
ited to specific sectors or fields of EU law. They can be found scattered across 
the body of EU law (acquis communautaire). The need to facilitate legal 
actions brought by private parties before their national courts to address 
infringements of EU law can thus be felt in many different areas. Third, even 
though these legislative measures tend to have certain common characteris-
tics, the diversity is significant. The arrangements sometimes consist of only 
one article, whereas in other instances a more elaborated regime or even a 
self-standing legal act is provided for. The level of detail also tends to vary 
considerably. Moreover these rules may or may not contain certain provi-
sions on specific issues such as the burden of proof, legal standing, actions 
for damages and alternative dispute resolution.
91 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2001, L 12/1. As per January 2015, this regula-
tion is replaced by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2012, L 351/1 (‘New Brus-
sels I Regulation 1215/2012’). On this new regulation and the changes it entails, see fur-
ther Nielsen (2013), p. 502.
92 Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States 
in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, OJ 2001, L 174/1.
93 Directive 2003/8/EC to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing 
minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes, OJ 2003, L 26/41.
94 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 establishing a European small claims procedure, OJ 2007, L 
199/1. In 2013 the Commission proposed an amendment to this regulation. See Commis-
sion, Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 establishing a 
European small claims prrocedure and Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 creating a Euro-
pean order for payment procedure, COM(2013) 794 fi nal.
95 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, OJ 
2007, L 199/40.
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 1.2. The vigilance of individuals: aim and content of the study
In the foregoing section the issues and developments that constitute the 
background of the present study have been sketched. In this section it is 
explained in further detail what this study entails. That is done by setting 
out the main research question and its relevance and by explaining which 
choices have been made in answering this question in terms of selection, 
approach and methodology. Although the relevant definitions and specifica-
tions of the terms used in this study have mostly been included throughout 
this study, a number of general definitions as well as certain editorial 
remarks are also set out here. Finally, the remainder of this study is outlined.
1.2.1. Main research question and relevance
16. The present study is essentially concerned with the EU’s law-making 
activities of the sort outlined above that are related to the establishment of 
EU legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law before national 
courts.96 More specifically, the main research question is what such legislation 
entails, particularly in terms of remedies and procedures enacted, and how 
it is to be understood more generally, notably as regards its typical charac-
teristics, its underlying objectives as well as the advantages and drawbacks 
of and the limits to the choices made by the EU legislature in this connec-
tion. In a nutshell, under consideration is the how, when and why of the said 
legislation.
Accordingly it is determined in the context of the first part of the above 
question which types of EU legislative measures have been considered and 
enacted in which situations. It is thus assessed what the perceived problem 
is that the EU legislation under consideration aims to address and which 
legislative means have been employed to reach those aims. Where relevant, 
this includes a consideration of the reasons underlying the choices made, 
the options that were discarded in the process of preparing and establishing 
that legislation and the evolution over time in this regard. On that basis the 
second part of the above question involves an analysis of how EU legislation 
facilitating the private enforcement of EU law is to be understood at a more 
fundamental level. This includes an assessment of both the legislative tech-
niques used and the philosophy underlying this legislation. That allows in 
turn for more general conclusions to be drawn as to the EU’s scope to exer-
cise its law-making powers to facilitate the private enforcement of EU law at 
national level, including the possible future developments in this regard.
96 For a defi nition of the term ‘private enforcement’ for the present purposes, see para. 22 
below.
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17. It is true that the decentralised enforcement of EU law by private par-
ties and the related impact of EU law on national rules on remedies and 
procedures have not been lacking attention in the legal literature. But earlier 
studies into this subject-matter generally focus on the case law of the EU 
courts.97 The relevant legislative developments are typically mentioned only 
in passing, if at all. This predominant focus on the case law may have been 
understandable and indeed appropriate some time ago, because this was 
where most relevant developments took place.98 However, even if such jur-
isprudential developments continue to be of great importance, this is con-
siderably less evident today. In many respects the EU’s legislative involve-
ment with private enforcement-related issues is now such that it is well 
worthy of further study in a more detailed and structured manner.
Further, whereas the above questions can naturally only be answered 
having regard to the legislative measures that have been adopted and sub-
sequently applied in a particular context and at a particular point in time, 
the resulting findings can nonetheless be expected to have broader implica-
tions, especially for any possible future legislative action related to the pri-
vate enforcement of EU law. That is the case, in the first place, because the 
relevant requirements, limitations and preferences of a legal nature identi-
fied in this study often apply more broadly. Especially where certain issues 
have been regularly or even consistently encountered in the (recent) past, for 
instance because they stem from primary EU law or the interaction with 
certain aspects of the domestic legal systems of the Member States, the same 
or similar issues can be expected to emerge in the future. Therefore, for legal 
reasons of an essentially ‘horizontal’ nature, options that are theoretically 
conceivable or desirable may have to be discarded or, on the contrary, there 
may be reasons to apply certain specific law-making approaches more gen-
erally. In addition, even apart from these possible legal constraints or imper-
atives, path dependency is a well-documented phenomenon in EU decision-
making processes.99 It implies that already the simple fact that at an earlier 
stage certain steps were set in a particular direction may well elicit addi-
tional moves in that same direction along similar lines. Although at every 
step along the way there remain choices to be made, there can thus be a sort 
of self-reinforcing mechanisms at work at the level of EU policy and law-
making.100 Consciously or not, the actors involved in EU legislative activi-
ties on the matters under consideration here may therefore be inclined to 
copy, extend or build on already existing legal instruments and approaches 
of the kind assessed in this study.
97 E.g. Lonbay & Biondi (1997); Kilpatrick, Novitz & Skidmore (2000); Dougan (2004); Lind-
holm (2007); Galetta (2010); Micklitz & De Witte (2012).
98 In addition there may also be some truth in the suggestion that “lawyers tend to like cases 
more than legislation”. See Craig (2012a), p. 25.
99 E.g. Kay (2003), p. 405; Ackrill & Kay (2006), p. 113; Greer (2008), p. 219; Giandomenico 
(2009), p. 89.
100 Kay (2003), p. 406.
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1.2.2. Selection, approach and methodology
18. It logically follows from the foregoing that the questions under consid-
eration in this study are to be answered primarily on the basis of an analysis 
and comparison of the available EU legislation and related official docu-
ments.101 However, as was already noted above, the number and types of 
legal acts and the fields of law that may be of interest here are very broad 
and diverse.102 Largely in light of practical considerations only a limited 
number of legal acts and fields of EU law can be analysed with a sufficient 
degree of detail in the present context. The following four fields of EU law 
and the related legislation and official documents have therefore been select-
ed, for the reasons set out below.
The first field is public procurement law. As was noted above, the two Pro-
curement Remedies Directives that were adopted in this field provide an 
early and important example of two (very similar) self-standing EU legal 
acts that address, with a certain level of detail, the issues under consider-
ation here. As such they are obvious candidates for further in-depth analy-
sis. These directives have moreover been in force for a considerable period 
of time. This means that experience has been gained as regards their appli-
cation in practice and that relevant case law has been generated. Further-
more these directives were substantially revised in 2007, which means that 
their analysis does not only offer an insight in the choices at the time of their 
adoption (i.e. around 1990), but also those made roughly a decade and a half 
later. The Procurement Remedies Directives have over the years also attract-
ed considerable attention in academic literature.
Second, the IPR Enforcement Directive relating to intellectual property law 
has been selected for more in-depth analysis. The reasons for selecting this 
directive are largely similar to those set out above. That is to say, also this 
directive concerns a specialised, self-standing EU legal act. It sets out a 
broad range of relatively detailed rules relating to remedies and procedure 
designed to facilitate the enforcement by private parties of intellectual prop-
erty rights before national courts. This directive has also been applicable for 
a number of years, allowing for the generation of practical experience, case 
law and academic publications. The more recent assessment of the function-
ing of this directive and reflections on possible amendments reveal the evo-
lution in the thinking in this regard.
The third field addressed is that of consumer protection law. Also in this 
field various relevant private-enforcement related provisions of EU law can 
be found. The situation here is somewhat different from the two abovemen-
101 The term ‘offi cial document’ refers to a formally adopted and publicly available or acces-
sible document that is not legally binding in nature, issued by an EU institution or body, 
which expresses its position, interpretation or intentions. Examples are white papers, 
green papers, communications, staff working documents, consultations, resolutions and 
opinions.
102 See subsection 1.1.3 above.
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tioned fields however, in that there is not one single legal act that is con-
cerned with the issues that are of interest for the present purposes. The rel-
evant provisions are rather mostly spread over a considerable number of 
directives. This therefore necessitates a somewhat broader assessment. 
While not overlooking other provisions that may be of interest, attention 
therefore focuses, in the first place, on the abovementioned Consumer 
Injunctions Directive. This is also a self-standing directive of broader appli-
cation, even if it is limited in various respects. The relevant provisions on 
contractual remedies, primarily those found in the Directive 93/13 on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts (‘Unfair Terms Directive’), are also analysed.103 
That is followed by an assessment of the Product Liability Directive, which 
focuses on civil liability in damages in relation to defective products. The 
topic of collective redress is also addressed here.
Fourth and finally, the relevant developments in the field of competition 
law are assessed. Two types of EU legislative measures are analysed in par-
ticular. It concerns in the first place the contractual remedy set out in Article 
101(2) TFEU, pursuant to which forbidden anticompetitive agreements are 
automatically void. In addition the Competition Damages Directive is an 
important recent example of an act of secondary EU law relating to private 
enforcement. While there is at present no practical experience with, nor case 
law relating to, this directive, this is compensated for by the case law of the 
Court of Justice predating the directive that relates to similar matters, as 
well as the extensive studies, official documents, consultations, academic 
publications and debates that preceded and accompanied it, which provide 
important indications as to the coming into being and the understanding of 
a directive such as this one.
19. A particular challenge in a study such as this one is finding the appro-
priate balance between ‘width’ and ‘depth’. On the one hand the above leg-
islation can only be properly understood in its broader context. This study 
therefore pays particular attention to three additional elements. In the first 
place, there are several relevant principles of EU law, most notably the prin-
ciples of national procedural autonomy, equivalence, effectiveness and 
effective judicial protection. The said legislation came into being, and con-
tinues to operate, against the background of a legal environment that is to a 
large extent ‘shaped’ by these principles. They not only define the status quo 
ante, but they also play an important role in the interpretation of this legisla-
tion. For essentially the same reasons several key rulings of the Court of 
Justice related to the enforcement of EU law at national level are also 
assessed in some detail, as they establish a number of fundamental con-
cepts, in the context of which the EU legislation of the type under consider-
ation in this study should be understood and without which such legislation 
would arguably hardly be conceivable. In the second place, the applicable 
103 Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ 1993, L 95/29.
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public enforcement framework is considered, as the legislation under con-
sideration co-exists and to some extent interacts with the relevant rules on 
the enforcement of EU law by the competent EU and national public author-
ities. Lastly, although this study is concerned first and foremost with devel-
opments at EU level, at times attention is also paid to certain relevant devel-
opments at national level. Given the nature of the subject-matter under 
consideration, one can hardly consider the abovementioned EU legislation 
in complete isolation from its impact on, and other relevant developments 
at, national level. Such references to developments at national level are how-
ever meant as illustrations; this study does not seek to provide a complete 
and exhaustive sketch of the state of play in the Member States where the 
private enforcement of EU law is concerned.
On the other hand certain limits must evidently be set, if only for practi-
cal reasons. Despite the selection made, the issues under consideration in 
this study are clearly still rather broad and diverse. They relate to a consid-
erable number of legal acts and official documents, regarding various fields 
of EU law and numerous specific subject-matters. PhD theses could be, and 
indeed often have been, written on each of them individually. The aim here 
is not to assess these issues for their own sake. The intention is instead to 
consider them in sufficient detail to come to a meaningful analysis for the 
purposes of answering the abovementioned research question. Making a 
selection in addition implies ‘posteriorisation’ as much as it implies prioriti-
sation. That is to say, there are certainly also other EU legal acts and devel-
opments that can be of interest in the present context, which have neverthe-
less mostly been left aside here. The Gender Equality Directive, the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and the principle of Member 
State liability are but three examples thereof. While the focus of this study 
remains firmly on the four selected fields of law, they are occasionally taken 
into account in the latter part of this study, where this is considered helpful 
to sketch the broader context or to illustrate a particular point emerging on 
the basis of the analysis related to the selected fields.
20. Finally, in terms of the approach and methodology, in analysing the 
abovementioned legislation particular attention is paid to the aims that they 
seek to achieve, their relevant background and context, the adoption process 
as well as the remedial and procedural means eventually selected by the EU 
legislature in order to achieve the said aims. Naturally account is also taken 
of the interpretation of this legislation by the Court of Justice where appro-
priate, as well as of secondary sources. The latter concerns especially the 
available legal literature, mainly in English, but occasionally also in French 
and Dutch, regarding both the said legislation and the issues under consid-
eration more generally. The law is stated as on 1 October 2014. The relevant 
websites were also last visited on that date. 
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1.2.3. Definitions and editorial remarks
21. It follows from the foregoing that this study is in large part concerned 
with issues of rights, remedies and procedures. It is therefore important to 
clarify at the outset what is meant by these terms. As regards the concept of 
a ‘right’ in EU law, it has often been noted that this is an ambiguous concept 
in EU law.104 This is probably not in small part due to the significant varia-
tions between the domestic legal systems of the Member States in what is 
understood by this term.105 A (tentative) definition holds that a rights refers 
to “a legal position which a person recognized as such by the law […] may have and 
which in its normal state can be enforced by that person against […] others before a 
court of law”.106 This is also how this concept is understood here.
The enforcement of these rights happens by means of one or more reme-
dies. Again what is understood by this term may well vary, both across the 
EU and depending on the context in which it is used. In this study the term 
‘remedies’ refers, broadly speaking, to classes of actions intended to make 
good infringements of the right at issue.107 Put differently, it concerns in 
essence the instrument with which that right can be enforced.108 One can 
think in particular of actions aimed at obtaining damages awards, actions for 
injunctions,109 actions aimed at invalidating or otherwise making ineffective 
contractual arrangements (‘contractual remedies’) and interim relief.110 
These classes of actions are brought in accordance with certain procedures, 
i.e. the rules governing the exercise of remedies that are intended to make 
them operational.111 In this study the terms ‘procedure’ and ‘procedural’ are 
used somewhat loosely, essentially referring to any of the private enforce-
ment-related measures under consideration other than remedies. This 
includes measures on issues as diverse as legal standing, time limits, forum 
(i.e. the body competent to rule on the private enforcement claim in ques-
104 E.g. Van Gerven (2000), p. 507; Eilmansberger (2004), p. 1199; Prechal (2006), pp. 303-304; 
Nazzini (2009), pp. 403-404.
105 Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), pp. 187-188. See further e.g. Prechal (2005), pp. 98 and 102-
104; Van Dam (2006), pp. 129-131.
106 Van Gerven (2000), p. 502.
107 Ibid.
108 Cf. Peyer (undated), p. 5. Note that the term ‘remedy’ is sometimes also understood in a 
broader sense, i.e. not corresponding to a particular class of action, but rather to redress 
more generally. See Prechal (2005), p. 145 (n. 99). Cf. Art. 19(1) TEU. In the present study 
the term ‘remedy’ is in principle understood in the former, more specifi c sense however.
109 As is further discussed in para. 284 below, in this study the term ‘injunctive relief’ refers 
to the granting of a court order that either prohibits a private party from acting in a par-
ticular manner (prohibitive injunctions) or that obliges a private party to act in a particular 
manner (mandatory injunctions).
110 As is further discussed in subsection 8.2.1 below, proceedings for interim relief are char-
acterised by the provisional nature of the resulting measures (typically injunctions). 
These proceedings thus contrast with the defi nitive resolution of the dispute at hand 
through proceedings on the merits of the case.
111 Van Gerven (2000), p. 502.
p. 24 A. Introduction and background para. 22
tion), the internal organisation of the judiciary, rules of evidence, burden of 
proof, etc.
Taken together, the issues under consideration here can thus extend 
beyond what in many national jurisdictions is normally understood by the 
term ‘procedural law’. This study is in effect concerned with almost all legal 
means available to private parties under the EU legislation in question for 
the enforcement of the substantive rules of EU law at issue.
22. The concept of ‘private enforcement’ is evidently also central to this study. 
As used here, it refers to legal actions brought by a private party before a 
national court with a view to enforcing its rights based on EU law.112 The 
claims concerned are normally of a civil law nature. But that is not necessar-
ily the case; they may also involve actions that in a national legal system are 
qualified as being covered by administrative law. Indeed, qualifications as 
‘civil’, ‘administrative’ or ‘criminal’ law tend to differ depending on the 
national jurisdiction concerned. This cannot in itself be decisive as a matter 
of EU law. As the Court of Justice has held, “[t]he effectiveness of [EU] law can-
not vary according to the various branches of national law which it may affect”.113
The foregoing also implies that the term ‘court’ is understood broadly, 
in the sense that it is not dependent on the term or categorisation used in 
national law. Its precise meaning can vary in function of the specifications 
set out in the EU legal acts at issue, as further discussed in the following.114 
Suffice to note for the present purposes that the term ‘court’, as it is used 
here, broadly corresponds with the term ‘court or tribunal of a Member 
State’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU on the preliminary reference 
procedure. That implies in a nutshell that it is an independent and perma-
nent body, established by law with compulsory jurisdiction, which applies 
rules of law on the basis of inter partes proceedings.115 Although in certain 
cases arbitration bodies may also meet these conditions, this excludes, as a 
general rule, alternative dispute resolution bodies.116
As regards the parties initiating the legal actions referred to above, the 
terminology used in this study is somewhat loose. In the case law of the EU 
courts reference is normally made to ‘individuals’. The legislation and offi-
cial documents under consideration tend to use a relatively broad range of 
specific terms, such as ‘undertaking’, ‘person’, ‘rightholder’ or ‘consumer’. 
112 For other, mostly comparable defi nitions, see e.g. Betlem (1999), p. 391; Komninos (2008), 
p. 2; Zippro (2009a), p. 223; Hodges (2011), p. 437. See Commission, Green paper on dam-
ages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672, p. 3. On the term ‘pri-
vate enforcement’, see also para. 440 below.
113 Cf. e.g. CoJ case 82/71, Sail, para. 5. See e.g. also CoJ case 29/76, LTU, para. 5.
114 See in particular subsection 9.2.1 below.
115 E.g. CoJ case 246/80, Broekmeulen, para. 18; CoJ case C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, para. 23; 
CoJ case C-136/11, Westbahn Management, para. 27; CoJ joined cases C-58/13 and 
C-59/13, Torresi, para. 17-19.
116 Cf. e.g. CoJ case 102/81, Nordsee, para. 9-16; CoJ Order case C-555/13, Merck Canada, 
para. 17-25.
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The general term used here to cover all these categories of persons is ‘pri-
vate parties’. This term can encompass legal as well as natural persons.117 
In certain cases it also covers public authorities, where the latter do not act 
in a public capacity.118 The aforementioned more specific terms are none-
theless occasionally used where it is considered necessary to stress a par-
ticular characteristic of the private party in question. For instance, the term 
‘undertaking’ highlights that it concerns a private party which is engaged in 
economic activity, offering goods or services on a given market.119 The term 
‘rightholder’ similarly indicates that the private party at issue is the holder 
of an intellectual property right. And the term ‘consumer’ refers specifically 
to a natural person acting for purposes falling outside his trade, business, 
craft or profession.120
Private enforcement, as defined above, contrasts with ‘public enforce-
ment’. The latter refers to the range of coercive measures and mechanisms at 
the disposal of public authorities of the EU and of the Member States, acting 
in a public capacity, with a view to ensuring compliance with and the 
enforcement of EU law. Public enforcement can involve, as the case may be, 
the imposition of administrative sanctions, such as fines, but also criminal 
law sanctions, such as imprisonment.
23. Finally, concerning the EU institutional level, references made in this 
study to the EU legislature should, unless specifically indicated otherwise, 
be understood as references to the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting jointly on the basis of a legislative proposal by the Commission in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.121 Reference is further 
made to the ‘Court of Justice’, or simply ‘the Court’, on the one hand and the 
General Court (‘GC’) on the other hand, which (together with the special-
ised courts, notably the Civil Service Tribunal (‘CST’)) jointly constitute the 
‘Court of Justice of the EU’. These courts are referred to here collectively as 
the ‘EU courts’ or the ‘EU judiciary’. Over the decades the relevant EU insti-
117 Cf. Prechal (2005), p. 238.
118 Public authorities do not to act in a public capacity where they do not exercise public 
powers derogating from the rules of law applicable to relations between private individ-
uals, but instead act in accordance with these latter rules. Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-167/00, Hen-
kel, para. 30.
119 In EU competition law the term ‘undertaking’ refers to any entity, regardless of its legal 
status or the way it is fi nanced, engaged in economic activity, i.e. offering goods or servic-
es on a given market. See further para. 199 below. In EU public procurement law reference 
is generally made to ‘economic operators’. In EU consumer protection law various terms 
are used, such as ‘seller or supplier’ and ‘producer’. Although each of these terms has its 
own distinct meaning, these differences are of limited relevance for the present purposes. 
The term ‘undertaking’ is therefore in principle used throughout this study, except where 
it is considered appropriate to use one of the aforementioned more specifi c terms.
120 The precise defi nition of the term ‘consumer’ can differ somewhat between the various 
EU consumer protection directives considered in this study. The above defi nition is most 
commonly used however. See further para. 151 below.
121 Art. 289 and 294 TFEU.
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tutions and other bodies, treaties and treaty articles have several times 
changed name and numbers respectively. For reasons of readability and 
ease of understanding, this study refers only to the current names and num-
bers, unless explicitly indicated otherwise. The designations TEU and TFEU 
(referred to collectively as the ‘EU Treaties’) are thus used also in relation to 
periods preceding the entry into force of these treaties. The same applies as 
regards the current numbering of their articles. In citations this is indicated 
by using square brackets. In a similar manner reference is consistently made 
to the current names of the EU and its institutions and other bodies.122
 1.2.4. Outline of the study
24. This study consists of four parts. Part A introduces the subject-matter 
under consideration and sketches the relevant background and context. In 
addition to the present chapter this part also consists of chapter 2. The latter 
first introduces the principles of national procedural autonomy, equiva-
lence, effectiveness and effective judicial protection. Where possible, the 
emphasis is placed on the practical implications of these principles, so as to 
best connect this part with the subsequent chapters. This is followed by an 
outline of the general public enforcement context and some remarks on the 
interaction between public and private enforcement. Finally, five rulings by 
the Court of Justice that are of particular importance in a private enforce-
ment context are discussed and analysed, first separately and then jointly.
Part B analyses in turn the EU legislation and relevant official docu-
ments relating to the four field of EU law, mentioned above. Accordingly 
chapter 3 is concerned with EU public procurement law and more in par-
ticular the Procurement Remedies Directives. Chapter 4 deals with EU intel-
lectual property law, with particular regard to the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive. Chapter 5 focuses on EU consumer protection law, most notably the 
Consumer Injunctions Directive, the Unfair Terms Directive and the Product 
Liability Directive. In chapter 6 attention turns to the relevant developments 
relating to the private enforcement of EU competition law and especially the 
Competition Damages Directive.
Part C aims to build on the findings of the two foregoing parts. It analy-
ses the legislation and other developments that have been considered in part 
B in a comparative and contextual manner, with particular emphasis on the 
relevant provisions on remedies and procedures. This part consists of three 
chapters. Chapter 7 and 8 are concerned with the available remedies. In the 
former actions for damages and for injunctions are assessed, whereas the lat-
ter concentrates on contractual remedies and the other remedies provided for.
122 The term ‘EU institutions and other bodies’ is used in this study to refer to the full range 
of entities established as part of the EU’s institutional framework. This can thus include 
the EU’s seven institutions (see Art. 13 TEU), its advisory bodies (see Art. 300 TFEU) and 
its specialised bodies, offi ces and agencies (referred to in Art. 263 TFEU).
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Chapter 9 subsequently analyses the procedural provisions and related 
issues that are of broader interest. 
Building on these findings, the final part D of this study then essentially 
seeks to address a number of more general aspects related to EU legislation 
facilitating the private enforcement of EU law. Chapter 10 first sets out to 
answer a set of questions that can be summarised as the ‘how’, ‘when’ and 
‘why’ of this legislation. Chapter 11 then seeks to place the phenomenon of 
private enforcement generally and EU legislating thereon specifically in a 
broader perspective. It concentrates on two such perspectives, namely the 
perspective of effectiveness and what is called the ‘horizontalisation’ per-
spective. Finally, chapter 12 summarises the main findings of this study and 
sets out the conclusions.

As has been explained in the foregoing, this study focuses on EU legislative 
measures facilitating the private enforcement of EU law. However these 
measures cannot be properly understood without assessing a number of key 
principles of EU law, as mostly developed in the case law of the Court of 
Justice. It concerns in the first place the principles of national procedural 
autonomy, equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial protection. These 
principles are introduced and outlined in the first three sections below. They 
embody what can be called the ‘default’ situation, i.e. they constitute the 
requirements of primary EU law in situations where no specific secondary 
EU law applies. As such they also ‘shaped’ the EU legislative measures and 
other developments under consideration in part B as well as the legal envi-
ronment in which these measures are ‘embedded’. The fact that secondary 
EU law has been adopted in certain fields does not mean that they are no 
longer of relevance. Account should also be taken of the relevant public 
enforcement mechanisms. The possibilities and obligations under EU law 
for EU and national public authorities to bring legal actions to ensure com-
pliance with and the enforcement of that law are therefore briefly assessed 
in the fourth section below. At the very end of this chapter attention turns to 
five key judgments of the Court of Justice that are of particular importance 
in connection to the private enforcement of EU law.
2.1. Principle of national procedural autonomy
 The principle of national procedural autonomy is of obvious importance in 
a study concerned with litigation brought by private parties before the 
courts of the Member States for infringements of EU law. After a general 
introduction of this principle, below a number of more specific remarks are 
made on the meaning and importance of this principle.
2.1.1. National procedural autonomy: introduction
25. The principle of national procedural autonomy is understood to mean 
that, as a general rule, the remedies and procedural rules needed at the 
domestic level in order to enforce EU law are to be provided for by national 
law, rather than by EU law. In other words, it implies that the Member States 
 2. Key principles, public enforcement 
and case law
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have in principle an autonomous choice of means in remedial and procedur-
al matters where the enforcement of EU law at national level is concerned.1
26. The ‘classical’ articulation of the principle of national procedural 
autonomy can be found in the Court of Justice’s ruling in Rewe, which dates 
from 1976.2 This case related to charges for phytosanitary inspection on the 
importation of apples, which had already been held to be equivalent to cus-
toms duties and therefore contrary to EU law. The applicant in the main 
proceedings had therefore requested a refund, but this was initially rejected 
due to the non-observance of a time limit provided for under national law. 
The question then arose whether this was in conformity with EU law. The 
Court of Justice ruled as follows:
“Applying the principle of [sincere] cooperation laid down in [Article 4(3) 
TEU], it is the national courts which are entrusted with ensuring the legal 
protection which citizens derive from the direct effect of the provisions of 
[EU] law.
Accordingly, in the absence of [EU] rules on this subject, it is for the domes-
tic legal systems of each Member State to designate the courts having juris-
diction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law 
intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from the 
direct effect of [EU] law, it being understood that such conditions cannot be 
less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature.
Where necessary, Articles [114 to 117 and 352 TFEU] enable appropriate 
measures to be taken to remedy differences between the provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States if they are 
likely to distort or harm the functioning of the internal market.
In the absence of such measures of harmonization the right conferred by 
[EU] law must be exercised before the national courts in accordance with the 
conditions laid down by national rules”.3
In Rewe the Court thus highlighted the central role of national courts in 
ensuring the legal protection of private parties in cases where their rights 
derived from EU law are infringed, a topic which has already been touched 
upon earlier.4 Moreover the above citation makes clear that it is, in principle, 
for the domestic legal system of each Member State – and thus not for the 
EU – to designate the courts that are competent to rule in those cases and 
to establish the applicable procedural rules that apply to the legal proceed-
ings in question. As the Court of Justice noted in 1981, and has repeated 
since, the EU Treaties are not intended to create new remedies before the 
1 Cf. Galetta (2010), p. 12.
2 CoJ case 33/76, Rewe. See also CoJ case 45/76, Comet. For an earlier reference, see e.g. CoJ 
case 13/68, Salgoil, p. 463.
3 CoJ case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5.
4 See also subsection 1.1.1 above.
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national courts to ensure the observance of EU law, other than those already 
provided under national law.5 This can be otherwise only if the structure of 
the domestic legal system is such that it is not possible, even indirectly, to 
ensure respect for the rights that private parties derive from EU law.6
27. As regards the origin and philosophy underlying this approach relying 
primarily on the domestic legal systems of the Member States, it is impor-
tant to note at the outset that this is the general point of departure in the EU 
legal order. That is to say, as was noted earlier, it is in principle for the Mem-
ber States to implement EU law.7 When doing so, in so far as EU law does 
not set out common rules, they are to act in accordance with the procedural 
and substantive rules of their own national law.8 Under the broader princi-
ple of institutional autonomy, it is primarily for the Member States, within 
the limits set by EU law, to decide which bodies are charged with fulfilling 
the obligations that EU law imposes on them and how those bodies are 
structured and organised, including the means that these bodies have at 
their disposition and the rules applicable to them.9
Having said that, several (interrelated) factors are likely to play a role 
when seeking to explain why, while over the decades the EU has adopted 
common rules on so many issues of substantive law, the abovementioned 
general point of departure remains to a considerable extent intact where 
remedial and procedural matters are concerned. They include consider-
ations of a pragmatic nature. Issues of remedies and procedures were prob-
ably not at the forefront of the parties concerned when the foundations were 
laid of a new legal order that was primarily designed to further economic 
(and, indirectly, political) integration in Europe. Indeed, it would not seem 
unreasonable that an early stage of the process of European integration 
attention largely focused on substantive issues, especially reducing the 
existing barriers to trade and creating an internal market. Deliberate or not, 
the resulting reliance on national law where remedial and procedural mat-
ters are concerned may also have helped furthering the ‘embedment’ and 
acceptance of EU law at national level.10
5 CoJ case 158/80, Rewe-Handelsgeschellschaft Nord, para. 44; CoJ case C-432/05, Unibet, 
para. 40; CoJ case C-583/11 P, Inuit, para. 103. This ‘no new remedies’ rule can be traced 
back to CoJ case 34/67, Lück.
6 CoJ case C-432/05, Unibet, para. 41; CoJ case C-583/11 P, Inuit, para. 104. See also CoJ case 
C-562/12, Liivimaa Lihavei, para. 71.
7 See para. 5 above.
8 See e.g. CoJ joined cases 205/82 to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor, para. 17; CoJ case 
C-201/04, Molenbergnatie, para. 52.
9 See e.g. CoJ case C-389/08, Base, para. 26. Cf. Prechal (2005), pp. 317-318.
10 Bridge (1984), p. 31; Prechal (2005), p. 134; Storskrubb (2008), p. 18. On the effects at 
national level of the EU legislative measures of the type at issue here, see also subsection 
10.4.2 below.
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Furthermore, while it is not uncommon for courts to apply foreign sub-
stantive law, if and when they do so, the procedural rules of the forum nor-
mally apply.11 Procedural law thus typically ‘travels less’ and is more terri-
torially grounded than substantive law.12 Also from this perspective it is 
understandable that, at least initially, matters of remedies and procedures 
applicable to proceedings before the courts of the Member States were most-
ly left unregulated at the time of the drafting of the EU Treaties. There also 
appears to have been – and to some extent continues to be – a general 
assumption that the remedies and procedural rules provided for by national 
law normally suffice to ensure that EU law is effective and can effectively be 
enforced at national level by the parties concerned.13 All Member States are 
after all subject to the rule of law; according to the EU Treaties, this is a value 
common to the Member States and one of the central values on which the 
EU is founded.14
In any case, given the resulting lack of any explicit arrangement on these 
matters in primary and at least initially also secondary EU law, the EU 
courts had little choice but to mostly continue to rely on national law in this 
respect.15
28. The principle of national procedural autonomy – or at least the term 
itself – is not uncontroversial however. Many commentators have noted that 
the term suggests a degree of ‘autonomy’ on the side of the Member States 
that in reality does not exist. One of the most far-reaching criticisms is that 
this term completely misrepresents reality, because national procedural law 
is in fact applied ancillary to EU law and thus merely “serves” EU law.16 Pro-
cedural law of course always ‘serves’ substantive law. The point here is 
however that it serves first and foremost substantive EU law, as opposed to 
substantive national law. Others have argued that this term tends to exagger-
ate the room for manoeuvre available to Member States.17 Alternative terms 
have therefore been suggested, such as ‘procedural competence’ of the 
Member States or ‘a combination of national procedural competence and 
European procedural primacy’.18
11 Cf. Storme (1994), p. 43.
12 Kilpatrick (2000), pp. 17-18.
13 Cf. Opinion AG Jacobs joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 29-30. 
See e.g. also Lindholm (2007), p. 100.
14 Art. 2 TEU. See also CoJ case 294/83, Les Verts, para. 23. Respecting the rule of law is a 
precondition for becoming a Member State (Art. 49 TEU), whereas a serious breach there-
of by a Member State can lead to the suspension of its rights under the EU Treaties (Art. 7 
TEU).
15 Jacobs (1997), pp. 25-26; Dougan (2004), p. 19.
16 Kakouris (1997), p. 1408. In a similar sense, see e.g. Milutinovic (2010), p. 308; Bobek 
(2012), p. 305.
17 E.g. Lindholm (2011), p. 472.
18 See Van Gerven (2000), p. 502; Delicostopulos (2003), pp. 599-613, respectively.
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Crucially this criticism highlights that the ‘autonomy’ of the Member 
States is in fact more limited than this very term might suggest, a theme to 
which we shall return below.19 For now suffice to note that this term has not 
been laid down expressly in the EU Treaties. In fact, it even entered the 
Court of Justice’s vocabulary only comparatively recently.20 It has since been 
used rather frequently. Just to give one example of a phrase typically used 
by the Court in this connection, in 2010, in relation to the question of 
enforceability obligations provided for in civil law contracts, it was held that 
“in the absence of rules provided for under [EU] law, and in accordance with the 
principle of procedural autonomy, the detailed rules governing implementation of 
those obligations are a matter for national law”.21 There are no clear indications 
that this more recent explicit use of this term has had implications for the 
substance of the Court’s rulings. In that connection one can also point to the 
use of the word “detailed” in relation to the national rules that typically 
accompanies it. This certainly does not appear to signal a particular willing-
ness to leave the Member States a greater margin of manoeuvre than before.
Such criticism notwithstanding, this recent and frequent use by the 
Court of Justice, as well as in the legal literature, of the term (national) pro-
cedural autonomy seems sufficient reason for the continuous use of this 
term. It is therefore also used in this study.22
2.1.2. National procedural autonomy: further remarks
29. A first additional remark to be made in relation to the principle of 
national procedural autonomy is that in the Rewe ruling, cited above, the 
Court of Justice identified the principle of sincere cooperation as its (primary) 
legal foundation.23 Pursuant to that principle, laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, 
“the [EU] and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in 
carrying out tasks which flow from the [EU] Treaties. The Member States shall take 
any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obliga-
tions arising out of the [EU] Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of 
the [EU]. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the [EU]’s tasks and 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the [EU]’s objec-
tives.”
19 See subsection 7.3.2 below.
20 Namely in 2004. See CoJ case C-201/02, Wells, para. 65. Cf. Schebesta (2010), p. 857.
21 CoJ case C-451/08, Müller, para. 62.
22 The EU courts tend to refer to ‘procedural autonomy’. As is generally the case in the legal 
literature, in this study the word ‘national’ is added so as to clarify that it is the Member 
States that possess this ‘autonomy’.
23 See para. 26 above. Cf. Temple Lang (2008), p. 76. Other authors have suggested that a 
(further) basis is to be found in the principle of primacy of EU law or the principle of 
effective judicial protection. See Jacobs & T. Deisenhofer (2003), p. 217; Dougan (2004), 
p. 54, respectively.
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The absence of an explicit legal basis for the principle of national proce-
dural autonomy in the EU Treaties, as mentioned above, combined with this 
origin in the very broadly formulated principle of sincere cooperation, 
implies that the obligations of the national authorities in this respect are not 
clearly described. That means in turn that the Court of Justice is left with a 
significant margin of discretion in determining just how far these obliga-
tions extend. According to some, such discretionary appreciation on the part 
of the Court brings with it the “seeds of intrusion”.24 Others have rightly not-
ed that it will depend on one’s point of view whether the resulting rather 
obscure delineation of the boundaries between EU and national law in mat-
ters relating to remedies and procedures is seen as inevitable, harmful, 
desirable or simply the lesser of two evils.25 In any case the view that there 
is a degree of unpredictability and uncertainty in the case law of the EU 
courts on these matters is broadly shared.26
 30. A second observation is that, as the Court of Justice highlighted in 
Rewe, this autonomy of the Member States is only relevant in the absence of 
EU rules on the subject-matter in question.27 Consequently, to the extent that 
there are such specific EU rules, this principle does not apply. In addition 
the Court implied in that judgment that harmonisation in the field of proce-
dures and remedies is possible in principle, provided that the conditions of 
the relevant legal basis have been met.28 In other words, the original EEC 
Treaty – on the basis of which Rewe was decided – already contained a 
potentially sufficient legal basis for harmonisation in this field. Much of the 
abovementioned criticism of the term national procedural autonomy should 
be understood against this background, as this implies that there is no actu-
al ‘autonomy’ for the Member States in this regard. It is instead principally a 
question of the EU having not (yet) made use of its potential competences, 
subject to restrictions that the EU Treaties impose in this connection.
There is moreover no reason to believe that the insertion in 2009 (Treaty 
of Lisbon) of Article 19(1) TEU on Member States’ obligations to provide 
sufficient remedies substantially into the EU Treaties alters this point of 
departure. Quite to the contrary, as was noted above, this provision seems to 
primarily confirm and formalise the responsibilities of the Member States in 
ensuring effective judicial protection.29 It is therefore not concerned with the 
distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States.30 This 
latter issue has been addressed elsewhere in the EU Treaties, also since 
24 Szyszczak & Delicostopoulos (1997), p. 143.
25 Tridimas (2006), p. 422.
26 See e.g. Prechal (2001), p. 43; Himsworth (1997), p. 310; Dougan (2011), p. 420; Lindholm 
(2011), p. 482.
27 See para. 26 above.
28 On legal basis issues, see further subsection 10.1.1 below.
29 See para. 7 above.
30 Cf. Komninos (2008), p. 149; Komninos (2009), pp. 374-375.
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2009.31 Neither the provisions of the EU Treaties concerned, nor the relevant 
case law of the Court of Justice contains any indication that these more 
recent amendments to the EU Treaties should lead to a reconsideration of 
the Court’s well-established Rewe case law.
31. A third point to notice is that the reference in Rewe to “rights derived 
from the direct effect” of the relevant provisions of substantive EU law is not 
always apparent in later case law. Often (although by no means in all cases) 
reference is made to “rights which individuals derive from [EU] law”.32 In the 
present context it is the existence of a right that is the central element.33 The 
question whether or not a provision of EU law satisfies the conditions for 
being of direct effect is, in and by itself, not decisive.34 In its earlier case law, 
the Court of Justice sometimes seemed to treat direct effect and the conferral 
of rights on private parties basically as one and the same thing.35 From the 
finding that a provision of EU law is directly effective it was almost ‘auto-
matically’ deduced that that provision creates rights for private parties.36 
Subsequently both issues ‘grew apart’ to some extent however.37 That is to 
say, the direct effect of a provision of EU law on the one hand and the cre-
ation of rights through that provision on the other hand still often coincide, 
but that is not necessarily the case.38 The key difference between both con-
cepts is that “the question whether a provision creates individual rights is a matter 
of its content; the question whether a provision has direct effect relates to the qual-
ities ascribed to it, namely whether it can be invoked by those concerned within the 
national legal system”.39 Put differently, as it stands, the conferment of rights 
can be a consequence of direct effect, but is not identical to it.40
31 See Title I of Part One TFEU and in particular Art. 3-5 TFEU. Concerning matters relating 
to the EU’s competence to act in this regard, see further subsection 7.1.3 below.
32 See e.g. CoJ joined cases C-279/96, C-280/96 and C-281/96, Ansaldo, para. 27; CoJ case 
C-224/01, Köbler, para. 46; CoJ joined cases C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, 
para. 28.
33 On the concept of a ‘right’, see para. 21 above.
34 Lenaerts, Arts & Maselis (2006), p. 83 (n. 385).
35 For an overview of the discussions on the scope and meaning of the principle of direct 
effect and further references, see Craig & De Búrca (2011), pp. 180-199.
36 E.g. CoJ case 13/68, Salgoil, pp. 460-461; CoJ case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5.
37 Cf. e.g. CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, discussed in para. 59 below, illus-
trating that a rule of EU law that is not directly effective can still create rights (or at least 
have been intended to do so).
38 Prechal (2006), p. 305.
39 Ibid. For a more detailed discussion, see Prechal (2005), pp. 99-106. As is noted in this lat-
ter contribution (p. 100), therefore, should one wish to describe direct effect in terms of 
rights, it could at most be said that this is a sort of procedural right, namely the ‘right’ to 
invoke EU law. Cf. CoJ case C-426/05, Tele2 Telecom, para. 33.
40 Jacobs (2004b), p. 306. See also Prechal (2005), p. 102. An alternative approach that touch-
es essentially upon the same issue is to distinguish between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
direct effect, discussed in Van Gerven (2000), p. 506.
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32. Fourth and finally, when used in the context of the principle of national 
procedural autonomy, the term ‘procedural’ is understood in a very broad 
sense. This term should not primarily be understood with reference to cate-
gories of national law. As is already evident from the above citation from 
Rewe, and as is further illustrated below, it covers in principle rules relating 
to the organisation of judicial remedies as well as those on the jurisdiction of 
the courts.41 The principle of procedural autonomy can thus in effect cover 
virtually all remedial and procedural rules, mechanisms and arrangements 
available in legal proceedings before the courts of the Member States that 
are concerned with the enforcement of EU law.42
2.1.3. Summary
33. The principle of national procedural autonomy expresses the general 
point of departure that in EU law it is primarily for the Member States – and 
not the EU – to designate the competent courts and to establish the remedial 
and procedural rules necessary for the enforcement by private parties of 
their rights vested in EU law before those courts. As was explained in the 
Court of Justice’s 1976 Rewe judgment, this principle is based on the Mem-
ber States’ obligation of sincere cooperation, set out in Article 4(3) TEU. 
However, even if the EU courts nowadays regularly use this term, it is 
important to note that there is no full and proper ‘autonomy’ for the Mem-
ber States in this respect. For one thing, the principle of national procedural 
autonomy only comes into play in the absence of specific EU rules on the 
issues concerned. For another thing, the Member States’ scope for autono-
mous decision-making is conditioned by the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness, discussed in the following subsection.
2.2. Principles of equivalence and effectiveness
In Rewe the Court not only laid the basis for the principle of national proce-
dural autonomy. It also made it clear there that this autonomy of the Mem-
ber States is by no means unrestricted. The Member States’ scope for auton-
omous decision-making in this respect is constrained in particular by two 
EU law requirements, namely the principles of equivalence and effective-
ness.43 This section subsequently introduces these two principles, which in 
41 See para. 26 above and subsection 2.2 below. In the same sense, see Opinion AG Jacobs 
joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 14. It follows that, in this specifi c 
context, the meaning of the term ‘procedural’ is wider than the definition set out in 
para. 21 above, as it effectively encompasses rules on remedies as well as on procedures.
42 Cf. Komninos (2009), p. 372. Some distinguish a separate doctrine of ‘remedial autono-
my’. See Trstenjak & Beysen (2011), pp. 104-109.
43 Occasionally the CoJ assesses national procedural rules under other rules or principle of 
EU law, such as the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality (Art. 
18 TFEU). See e.g. CoJ case C-323/95, Hayes. Cf. Dougan (2004), pp. 20-23.
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practice are often applied jointly. Especially in relation to the principle of 
effectiveness the emphasis is placed on the concrete applications thereof in 
the Court’s case law.44
2.2.1. Principle of equivalence
34. The phrase “it being understood that such conditions cannot be less favour-
able than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature” in Rewe contains 
the essence of the principle of equivalence. As the Court of Justice later clar-
ified, this is “in fact simply the expression of the principle of equal treatment, 
which is one of the fundamental principles of [EU] law”.45 It essentially requires 
that the national remedial or procedural rule at issue is to be applied without 
distinction, regardless of whether the alleged infringement is of EU law or of 
national law, where the purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics 
are similar.46 This principle applies in relation to all such rules, regardless of 
whether they are judicial or administrative in nature.47
35. Although it can be of considerable importance in individual cases, 
from the viewpoint of EU law generally the principle of equivalence tends 
to play a rather modest role.48 This is in part due to the fact that, as a general 
rule, it is for the national courts to verify whether this principle has been 
complied with. As the Court of Justice has often noted, only these national 
courts have after all direct knowledge of the remedial and procedural rules 
governing actions in the relevant fields.49 At the same time this primary role 
of the national courts in applying this principle does not necessarily stop the 
Court of Justice from issuing “guidance” in specific cases.50 This may involve 
it, to a varying degree, assessing the relevant national rules and giving its 
views on what could be considered an equivalent action or what would be 
likely to violate this principle.51 Still this guidance is often far from compre-
hensive, in that it does not cover the full scope and the precise application of 
this principle in concrete cases.52
44 Evidently this application in concrete cases is generally closely linked to the specifi c cir-
cumstances of the cases at hand. The examples given below and the rules deducted there-
from should therefore be understood and applied with some caution.
45 CoJ case C-34/02, Pasquini, para 70. Cf. Opinion AG Kokott case C-268/06, Impact, 
para. 67.
46 E.g. CoJ case C-326/96, Levez, para. 41; CoJ case C-78/98, Preston, para. 49 and 55; CoJ 
case C-63/08, Pontin, para.45; CoJ case C-177/10, Rosado Santana, para. 90.
47 CoJ case C-34/02, Pasquini, para. 62.
48 Cf. Prechal (1998), p. 687.
49 E.g. CoJ case C-326/96, Levez, para. 43; CoJ case C-78/98, Preston, para. 49; CoJ case 
C-177/10, Rosado Santana, para. 90.
50 CoJ case C-78/98, Preston, para. 50. See further Craig & De Búrca (2011), p. 238.
51 E.g. CoJ case C-78/98, Preston, para. 50-53; CoJ case C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World, 
para. 105-108; CoJ joined cases C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 29-32.
52 Dougan (2004), p. 25.
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36. The Court of Justice has clarified that, when applying this principle, 
national courts must take into account the role played by the allegedly simi-
lar provision in the procedure as a whole, as well as the conduct of that 
procedure and any specific features.53 The various aspects of these rules 
should be examined not in isolation, but in their general context, and this 
should be done in an objective manner, rather than subjectively.54
The principle of equivalence cannot be put into effect and will thus be 
deemed not to have been infringed where no sufficiently similar national 
action can be established.55 This conclusion also follows where the situations 
under consideration are different, to the extent that these differences pro-
vide an objective justification for the difference in treatment of the claim at 
issue.56 It has further been held that this principle does not mean that the 
Member States are obliged to extend their most favourable national rules to 
the EU law-based action concerned.57
2.2.2. Principle of effectiveness
37. While highlighting in Rewe the important role of the Member States’ 
legal systems in remedial and procedural matters, the Court of Justice add-
ed in that same judgment that “the position would be different only if the condi-
tions and time-limits made it impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the 
national courts are obliged to protect”.58 In so doing, it laid the foundation of 
the principle of effectiveness. The Court later clarified that this principle also 
covers situations where it is virtually impossible or excessively difficult – and 
thus not merely ‘impossible in practice’ – to exercise the rights concerned.59 
This widened test not only raised the ‘effectiveness threshold’, it also gave 
the Court of Justice greater discretion in assessing whether it has been 
respected in a concrete case.60
The principle of effectiveness can be seen as a principle of minimum 
protection, as it merely lays down the lower limit.61 But this does not mean 
that it is necessarily easily complied with. The importance that the Court of 
Justice attaches to the principle of effectiveness has tended to differ over 
time. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish a prudent initial phase in the 
case law (up to the early 1980s), followed by a significantly bolder period 
(mid 1980s-early 1990s), which was subsequently followed by a last phase 
53 E.g. CoJ case C-326/96, Levez, para. 43-44; CoJ case C-63/08, Pontin, para.45; CoJ case 
C-177/10, Rosado Santana, para. 90.
54 CoJ case C-78/98, Preston, para. 62; CoJ case C-63/08, Pontin, para.46.
55 CoJ case C-261/95, Palmisani, para. 39.
56 CoJ case C-132/95, Jensen, para. 50-51.
57 CoJ case C-326/96, Levez, para. 42; CoJ case C-63/08, Pontin, para. 45.
58 CoJ case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5.
59 This broader formulation was fi rst used in CoJ case 199/82, San Giorgio, para. 14.
60 Trstenjak & Beysen (2011), pp. 101-102.
61 Prechal (2001), p. 40.
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(mid 1990s onwards) that is characterised by a more balanced and selective 
approach.62
38. Notwithstanding this evolution over time and its inherent case-by-case 
character, as compared to the principle of equivalence, the Court of Justice 
often gives considerably more detailed and ‘intrusive’ guidance where the prin-
ciple of effectiveness is concerned. While the Court typically refers to both 
principles in cases that touch upon remedial and procedural issues under 
national law (pursuant to the principle of national procedural autonomy), it 
is the principle of effectiveness that tends to receive most attention and that 
is most likely to lead to the conclusion that the national rule at issue infring-
es EU law.63 It has therefore been called “the most volatile weapon in the Court’s 
armoury”.64 The following examples are just four illustrations of the range of 
situations covered and the impact that this principle can have in individual 
cases before the courts of the Member States.
First, this principle can come into play in relation to the national rules 
designed to encourage out-of-court settlements. For instance, in Alassini the 
Court of Justice highlighted that a national legal system that entailed man-
datory prior recourse to such procedures affected the exercise of the rights of 
private parties based on EU law.65 It found that the said principle had not 
been infringed in light of the specifics of the arrangement in question (no 
binding outcome, no substantial delay, suspension of time limits, no fees or 
significant costs), subject to electronic means not being the only means of 
access to that procedure as well as interim measures being available where 
necessary. In Evans a situation where the applicable EU law required Mem-
ber States to establish a simple redress mechanism was assessed.66 Here the 
Court held that the national system at issue, which consisted of several 
phases and concerned a combination of administrative review, arbitration 
and appellate judicial review, did not as such infringe the principle of effec-
tiveness. Again the emphasis was on the practical consequences of the pro-
cedural arrangement in question for the private party concerned, in particu-
lar its advantages in terms of speed and legal costs.67
62 For an overview, see Dougan (2004), pp. 29-30; Craig and De Búrca (2011), pp. 223-237; 
Dougan (2011), pp. 412-421.
63 Flynn (2008), pp. 245-258.
64 Dougan (2004), p. 27.
65 CoJ joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini, para. 52-60.
66 CoJ case C-63/01, Evans, para. 44-58.
67 See e.g. also CoJ case C-268/06, Impact, para. 51-53. In this case it was found that, where a 
Member State designates specialised courts to rule on certain claims while for other 
claims separate actions needed to be brought before the ordinary courts, such an arrange-
ment can lead to an infringement of the principle of effectiveness, to the extent that it 
results in procedural disadvantages for the private parties concerned in terms of inter alia 
costs, duration and rules on representation that make it excessively diffi cult to exercise 
their rights.
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A second example concerns the standard of judicial review to be applied 
by the national court in cases where rights vested in EU law are at stake. The 
relevant case law suggests that the principle of effectiveness does not neces-
sarily require a ‘full’ review, at least not where the action rests on a complex 
assessment.68 This means that the national court does not necessarily need 
to be empowered, as a matter of EU law, to substitute its own assessment of 
the facts and of the scientific evidence relied on for the assessment made by 
the competent national authorities. A review limited to examining the accu-
racy of the findings of fact and law, as well as on points of manifest error, 
misuse of powers or excess of the bounds of discretion, appears to suffice in 
such cases.
Third, the principle of effectiveness can have an impact on the applica-
ble rules related to evidence. Even if it is generally for the Member States to 
establish rules of this kind, those rules may not make the exercise of the 
rights vested in EU law virtually impossible or excessively difficult.69 
Accordingly this principle can preclude the application of national rules 
establishing an unjustified presumption to the applicant’s disadvantage or 
setting out special limitations concerning the form of the evidence to be 
adduced, such as the exclusion of all evidence other than documentary evi-
dence.70 It can also have consequences for the question which party carries 
the burden of proof.71 In addition this principle can imply that a national 
court must ensure that the applicant can benefit from an exceptional proce-
dure provided for under national law permitting witness evidence.72 Simi-
larly the Court of Justice has held that a national court may be required, in 
light of the burden of proof upon the applicant and the evidence that may 
not be in the latter’s possession, to order the necessary measures of inquiry 
provided for under national law, such as obliging the other party to the pro-
ceedings or a third party to produce a particular document.73 It can also 
entail adjusting or lightening the burden of proof.74
Finally, this principle has regularly been applied to national rules setting 
limitation periods for initiating legal proceedings before national courts for 
alleged infringements of EU law. The question of the admissibility of such 
time bars was already addressed in the aforementioned Rewe judgment 
itself.75 There the Court essentially ruled that the principle of effectiveness 
did not stand in the way of imposing a reasonable limitation period, because 
68 CoJ case C-120/97, Upjohn, para. 30-37; CoJ case C-55/06, Arcor, para. 170.
69 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-242/95, GT-Link, para. 25-26; CoJ case C-340/99, TNT Traco, 
para. 60-61.
70 CoJ case 199/82, San Giorgio, para. 11-15; CoJ case C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World, 
para. 113-114; CoJ case C-129/00, Commission v. Italy, para. 35-40.
71 CoJ case C-72/12, Altrip, para. 52.
72 CoJ case C-228/98, Dounias, para. 71.
73 CoJ case C-526/04, Laboratoires Boiron, para. 55. See also CoJ case C-264/08, Direct Parcel, 
para. 35.
74 CoJ case C-479/12, Gautzsch, para. 43.
75 See para. 26 above.
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this concerns an application of the principle of legal certainty. In subsequent 
judgments this rule has been repeatedly upheld and applied. It has thereby 
been highlighted that such limitation periods must be reasonable.76 They 
should be established in light of inter alia the significance for the parties con-
cerned of the decisions to be taken, the complexities of the procedures and 
of the legislation to be applied, the number of persons who may be affected 
and any other public or private interests which must be taken into consider-
ation.77 It follows that whereas in some situations a 15-day period can for 
instance be sufficient, in other cases it may not.78 Moreover, even when a 
limitation period may seem reasonable in and by itself, specific circumstanc-
es can lead to the conclusion that its application in a particular case infringes 
the principle of effectiveness.79 That can occur where there was deceit on the 
side of the defendant,80 or lack of timely implementation of a directive by a 
Member State that deprived the private party-applicant of any opportunity 
to rely on its rights.81
39. The Court of Justice’s more recent case law is characterised by the 
application, where relevant, of a balancing test. This approach was most 
clearly articulated in the 1995 Van Schijndel ruling.82 As in Rewe and Comet 
before them, these two cases were issued on the same day and in virtually 
the same wording. In a nutshell, Van Schijndel concerned a preliminary refer-
ence asking, in the context of a dispute on the compulsory membership of 
an occupational pension scheme, to which extent there could be an obliga-
tion under EU law for the competent national court to consider of its own 
motion (ex officio) the compatibility of a rule of national law with the EU 
competition rules. In answering the questions referred the Court of Justice 
held that “each case which raises the question whether a national procedural provi-
sion renders application of [EU] law impossible or excessively difficult must be ana-
lysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its 
special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In the light 
of that analysis the basic principles of the domestic judicial system […] must, where 
76 E.g. CoJ case C-30/02, Recheio, para. 17-22 (regarding the question whether a 90-day 
period is reasonable); CoJ joined cases C-392/04 and C-422/04, i-21 Germany, para. 58-64 
(regarding the period available for fi ling an appeal).
77 CoJ case C349/07, Sopropé, para. 40; CoJ case C-63/08, Pontin, para. 48; CoJ case C-177/10, 
Rosado Santana, para. 93.
78 CoJ case C349/07, Sopropé, para. 41; CoJ case C-63/08, Pontin, para. 60-67.
79 CoJ case C349/07, Sopropé, para. 44.
80 CoJ case C-326/96, Levez, para. 32.
81 CoJ case C-208/90, Emmott, para. 23.
82 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel. See also CoJ case C-312/93, 
Petersbroeck. This balancing approach can however be traced back further. See e.g. CoJ 
case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5, where the CoJ balanced the need to ensure the effectiveness of 
EU law with the requirement of legal certainty.
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appropriate, be taken into consideration”.83 It has since referred back to this 
phrase on many occasions.84
The Court thus balanced the EU law interest related to the principle of 
effectiveness on the one hand and the aims pursued by certain basic prin-
ciples of the national judicial system on the other hand. This approach has 
been called a ‘procedural rule of reason’85 or a form of an ‘objective justifica-
tion’ approach.86 One of these basic principles is the principle of legal cer-
tainty.87 A specific expression thereof is a rule preventing the re-opening of 
administrative or judicial decisions that have become final (res judicata). In 
this respect it has been held that “[EU] law does not require a court to disapply 
domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a decision, even if to do so would 
enable it to remedy an infringement of [EU] law by the decision at issue”.88 Other 
such basic principles include preventing unjust enrichment,89 the rights of 
defence90 and the proper conduct of procedure.91 These latter two princi-
ples can find a concrete expression in the passive role of national courts in 
civil proceedings, as was at issue in the aforementioned Van Schijndel rul-
ing. There the Court of Justice clarified that the principle of effectiveness 
does not preclude a national provision which prevents courts from raising 
of their own motion (ex officio) the issue of whether a provision of EU law 
has been infringed, where examination of that issue would oblige them to 
abandon their passive role by going beyond the ambit of the dispute defined 
by the parties and relying on facts and circumstances other than those on 
83 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 19.
84 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 33; CoJ case C-63/08, 
Pontin, para. 47; CoJ case C-177/10, Rosado Santana, para. 92.
85 Prechal (2001), p. 46; Prechal (1998), p. 691.
86 Dougan (2011), p. 419. Considering the particular emphasis that is placed in Van Schijndel 
on the context in which the national rule at issue operates, this is sometimes also referred 
to as the ‘contextual approach’. See Schebesta (2010), p. 859.
87 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 19. See also CoJ case 
33/76, Rewe, para. 5.
88 CoJ case C-234/04, Kapferer, para. 21. This case concerned judicial decisions. In that con-
nection see e.g. also CoJ case C-2/08, Olimpiclub, para. 29-30. In relation to arbitration 
award proceedings, see CoJ case C-126/97, Eco Swiss, para. 46-47. In relation to adminis-
trative decisions, see CoJ case C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, para. 24; CoJ joined cases 
C-392/04 and C-422/04, i-21 Germany, para. 51 and 57. In this regard the situation con-
cerning the recovery of unlawfully granted state aid is a somewhat special case, in par-
ticular in light of the exclusive nature of the Commission’s supervisory powers in this 
domain. See e.g. CoJ case C-24/95, Alcan, para. 24-25; CoJ case C-199/05, Lucchini, 
para. 62-63. See further Nebbia (2008a), p. 427.
89 E.g. CoJ case 199/82, San Giorgio, para. 13; CoJ case C-309/06, Marks & Spencer, para. 41.
90 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 19; CoJ joined cases 
C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 33.
91 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 21; CoJ joined cases 
C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 35.
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which the party with an interest in the application of those provisions has 
based its claim.92 There are however certain exceptions to this rule.93
This balancing approach does not mean that a mere abstract reference to 
any of the abovementioned basic principles suffices to ‘counter balance’ the 
working of the principle of effectiveness. In the case law emphasis is often 
placed on the practical application of these basic principles, on the basis of a 
case-by-case assessment.94 That means that the Court’s assessment can still 
be as ‘intrusive’ as was the case under its earlier case law.95 In other words, 
in its more recent case law the Court of Justice may tend to follow an 
approach that is more nuanced and ‘respectful’ where basic principles of 
national law truly are at stake, but it also guards against creating a general 
loophole that would put at risk the interests that it has long sought to pro-
tect through the application of the principle of effectiveness.
2.2.3. Summary
40. The application of the EU law principles of equivalence and effective-
ness can substantially affect the Member States’ procedural autonomy. The 
former principle is a concrete expression of the general EU law principle of 
equal treatment. It implies that the national rules on remedies and proce-
dures are to be applied without distinction, regardless of whether the 
alleged infringement is of national law or of EU law, where the purpose, 
cause of action and essential characteristics are similar. National courts gen-
erally play an important role in applying this principle. The Court of Justice 
tends to give more detailed and occasionally more ‘intrusive’ guidance 
where the principle of effectiveness is concerned. Pursuant to this latter 
principle the national rules at issue may not make it virtually impossible or 
excessively difficult for a private party to exercise its rights vested in EU 
law. It can affect national rules on for instance out-of-court settlement proce-
dures, the standard of judicial review, rules relating to evidence and limita-
tion periods. Powerful as this ‘weapon’ may be, this principle is not abso-
lute. In particular, in concrete cases there can be reason to balance it with the 
basic principles of the Member States’ legal systems. It follows that, even 
where a given national remedial or procedural rule negatively affects the 
possibilities for a private party to enforce its rights based on EU law, that 
rule can at times nonetheless be upheld, for example because it ensures legal 
certainty, the rights of defence or the proper conduct of proceedings.
92 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 20-22. See also CoJ joined 
cases C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 33.
93 E.g. CoJ case C-312/93, Petersbroeck, para. 16-21; CoJ joined cases C-222/05 and C-225/05, 
Van der Weerd, para. 39-40. See also subsection 9.2.4 below.
94 Cf. CoJ case C-473/00, Cofi dis, para. 37.
95 Dougan (2004), pp. 31-32.
p. 44 A. Introduction and background para. 42
2.3. Principle of effective judicial protection
After having introduced in the foregoing the principle of national proce-
dural autonomy, as conditioned by the principles of equivalence and effec-
tiveness, the fourth principle that is of particular importance here, i.e. the 
principle of effective judicial protection, is introduced below. A general 
introduction of this principle, including an assessment of its relationship to 
the ‘Rewe-principle’ of effectiveness, is followed by an illustration of its prac-
tical expressions on several private enforcement-relates issues.96
2.3.1. Effective judicial protection: introduction
 41. The origins of the principle of effective judicial protection, as it emerg-
es in EU law, can be traced back as far as 1968.97 It is however only since the 
1980s that the EU courts properly “discovered” this principle,98 in that it has 
taken an increasingly prominent position in the case law on matters of rem-
edies and procedures in proceedings both before these EU courts and before 
national courts in cases involving the application of EU law.
42. The increased prominence of the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion is in part due to it having the character of a fundamental right. The 
Court of Justice has long held that as such it is to be considered a general 
principle of EU law.99 It underlies the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States and has also been enshrined in the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’), 
notably its Articles 6 and 13.100 These latter two articles respectively provide 
for a fundamental right to a fair trial and to an effective remedy.101 In the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘Court of Human Rights’), 
the Strasbourg-based court that is charged with interpreting the ECHR, it is 
Article 6 that typically receives most attention in this connection. This article 
96 Again the proviso should be made that this application in concrete cases is generally 
closely linked to the specifi c circumstances of the cases at hand. The examples given here 
and the rules deducted therefrom should therefore be understood and applied with some 
caution.
97 CoJ case 13/68, Salgoil, pp. 462-463.
98 Prechal (2001), p. 40.
99 E.g. CoJ case 222/84, Johnston, para. 18; CoJ case C-55/06, Arcor, para. 174.
100 The ECHR and the ECtHR have been established under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe, an international organisation separate from the EU. See www.hub.coe.int. On the 
ECHR and its application by the ECtHR, see further e.g. Mowbray (2012).
101 In this particular context the meaning of term ‘remedy’ is thus broader than the defi nition 
otherwise used in this study, as here it essentially corresponds with redress generally. See 
para. 21 above.
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often ‘absorbs’ Article 13, given that the requirements under the latter article 
are generally less strict than under the former.102
 43. In recent years the importance of this principle has been reaffirmed and 
increased by its inclusion in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU (‘Charter’). There it appears in the form of the ‘right to an effective 
remedy and a fair trial’. Since 2009 (Treaty of Lisbon) the Charter expressly 
has the same legal value as the EU Treaties .103 It has thus become the main 
point of reference for the EU courts when assessing the respect for funda-
mental rights in relation to EU law. It is therefore also the main point of ref-
erence in this respect in the present study.
The Court of Justice held that Article 47 Charter “secures in EU law the 
protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR”, for which reason it can suffice 
to only refer to this former provision .104 That is not to say however that the 
ECHR, and the corresponding case law of the Court of Human Rights, are no 
longer of relevance. In so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond 
to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of these rights is 
the same as those laid down in the ECHR.105 This implies that the Court of 
Justice has particular regard to the case law of the Court of Human Rights 
on these matters.106 The ECHR also remains relevant for two other reasons. 
102 E.g. ECtHR case 6289/73, Airey v. Ireland, para. 20-35; ECtHR case 12964/87, De Geouffre 
de la Pradelle v. France, para. 27-37. This does not mean that Art. 13 ECHR cannot have an 
independent meaning however. See e.g. ECtHR case 5029/71, Klass v. Germany, 
para. 61-75; ECtHR case 21987/93, Aksoy v. Turkey, para. 88-100.
103 Art. 6(1) TEU. As was noted in para. 7 and 30 above, from that same moment onwards, 
Art. 19(1) TEU requires the Member States to “provide remedies suffi cient to ensure effective 
legal protection in the fi elds covered by [EU] law”. As such both Art. 47 Charter and Art. 19(1) 
TEU give expression to the adagio that each right conferred must be accompanied by a 
corresponding remedy ensuring its enforcement (ubi ius, ibi remedium). The CoJ has clari-
fi ed that Art. 19(1) TEU serves to ensure the observance of Art. 47 Charter within the EU. 
See CoJ case C-418/11, Texdata, para. 78; CoJ case C-583/11 P, Inuit, para. 100-101.
104 CoJ case C-199/11, Otis, para. 47. In the same sense, see CoJ case C-386/10 P, Chalkor, 
para. 51; CoJ case C-439/11 P, Ziegler, para. 126. See also Opinion AG Cruz Villalón case 
C-69/10, Samba Diouf, para. 38-44. The Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights, OJ 2007, C 303/2, clarify that the fi rst subparagraph of Art. 47 Charter is based 
on Art. 13 ECHR (although it is more extensive in that it guarantees an effective remedy 
before a court), whereas the second subparagraph of Art. 47 corresponds with Art. 6(1) 
ECHR (although again its scope is wider, as it is not confi ned to disputes relating to civil 
law rights and obligations) and the third subparagraph of Art. 47 is based on the ECtHR 
case law on the latter article. See e.g. ECtHR case 6289/73, Airey v. Ireland. Art. 48 Charter 
corresponds in turn with Art. 6(2) and (3) ECHR. Pursuant to Art. 6(1) TEU and Art. 52(7) 
Charter the said explanations have to be taken into consideration for the interpretation of 
the Charter.
105 Art. 52(3) Charter. This is subject to the possibility to provide for more extensive protec-
tion in EU law.
106 E.g. CoJ case C-506/04, Wilson, para. 51; CoJ case C-279/09, DEB, para. 35-37; CoJ case 
C-399/11, Melloni, para. 50. See further Douglas-Scott (2006), p. 629.
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First, the EU is to accede to the ECHR.107 Second, the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR, together with those resulting from the constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States, continue to constitute gen-
eral principles of EU law and are as such to be applied by the EU courts.108
It is further to be noted that the field of application of the Charter is not 
unlimited. There can be no doubt that the Charter applies to the acts of the 
institutions and other bodies of the EU. However, in as far as the Member 
States are concerned, pursuant to its Article 51(1) their acts are only covered 
where the criterion has been met that “they are implementing [EU] law”.109 
The Court of Justice has made clear that this essentially means that the fun-
damental rights in question are applicable in all situations governed by EU 
law, but not outside such situations.110 The applicability of EU law thus 
entails the applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Char-
ter .111 Specifically with regard to Article 47 of the Charter, given its character 
of a sort of ‘meta-right’, this provision is likely to be interpreted in such a 
manner that it covers essentially all situations where rights granted by EU 
law are affected.112 As to the personal scope of the Charter, whereas there 
may well be a need to differentiate between the various rights set out therein 
in certain cases,113 the available case law suggests that Article 47 Charter 
covers in principle natural as well as legal persons.114
107 Art. 6(2) TEU. In April 2013 a draft Agreement on the accession of the European Union to 
the European Convention on Human Rights was agreed. For the text of that draft agree-
ment, see www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/accession/meeting_
reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf. A request for an opinion by the CoJ on the compati-
bility of this draft agreement with the EU Treaties pursuant to Art. 219(11) TFEU is 
currently pending; see CoJ Opinion 2/13, ECHR. See further e.g. Lock (2010), p. 777; 
Craig (2013), p. 1114; Gragl (2014), p. 13.
108 Art. 6(3) TEU.
109 See also Protocol No 30 TFEU as to the application of the abovementioned criterion with 
respect to the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and Poland, as clarified in CoJ joined cases 
C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., para. 119-120. See further Craig (2010), pp. 237-240; Laden-
burger (2012), pp. 28-31.
110 CoJ case C-617/10, Åklagaren, para. 19. See e.g. also CoJ joined cases C-411/10 and 
C-493/10, N.S., para. 64-69; CoJ case C-370/12, Pringle, para. 179-180; CoJ case C-206/13, 
Siragusa, para. 24-34.
111 CoJ case C-617/10, Åklagaren, para. 21; CoJ case C-418/11, Texdata, para. 73.
112 This seems implicit in CoJ case C-399/11, Melloni, para. 49. See Explanations relating to 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 2), where it is stated that 
“Article 47 applies to the institutions of the [EU] and of Member States when they are implemen-
ting [EU] law and does so for all rights guaranteed by [EU] law”. In a similar sense, see Opin-
ion AG Cruz Villalón case C-69/10, Samba Diouf, para. 38-44; Iglesias Sánchez (2012), 
p. 1586 (n. 111); Ladenburger (2012), pp. 20-21.
113 Certain rights laid down in the Charter are inherently not applicable to legal persons, 
such as the right to life (Art. 2(1)), whereas certain other rights expressly apply also to 
legal persons, such as the right to access to documents (Art. 42 Charter). Yet for most 
rights the situation is less clear. See further Oliver (2011), pp. 2028-2037.
114 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-275/06, Promusicae, para. 61-70; CoJ case C-279/09, DEB, para. 36-62; 
GC case T-496/10, Bank Mellat, para. 36 (appeal pending; see CoJ case C-176/13, Bank 
Mellat. See also the ECtHR case law cited in Oliver (2011), p. 2030 (n.. 29).
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44. As is illustrated by the examples discussed in the following subsection, 
there can be a noticeable overlap between the principle of effective judicial 
protection on the one hand and the principle of effectiveness that was estab-
lished in the Rewe case law, discussed earlier, on the other hand.115 Both 
principles generally appear to fulfil a similar function in ensuring that rights 
of private parties vested in EU law can be effective enforced.116 The rise to 
prominence of the former principle is such, that it has to some extent 
eclipsed the principle of effectiveness. Indeed, in some respects the latter 
principle seems to have been entirely ‘absorbed’.117 Many consider the prin-
ciple of effective judicial protection as the over-arching principle.118 This 
view certainly finds some support in especially the more recent case law. For 
instance, the Court of Justice has repeatedly held that “the requirements of 
equivalence and effectiveness embody the general obligation on the Member States 
to ensure effective judicial protection of an individual’s rights under [EU] law”.119 
In this connection it can also be recalled that the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness apply only “in the absence of [EU] rules”.120 The granting of 
legally binding force to the Charter, and thus also its Article 47, means that 
the principle laid down therein is now a rule of (positive) EU law. In addi-
tion to its status as a fundamental right, this may help explain why this 
principle generally obtains most attention.
115 See subsection 2.2.2 above.
116 Cf. Opinion AG Poiares Maduro joined cases C-222/05 to C-225/05, Van der Weerd, 
para. 16. For a different view, see Prechal & Widdershoven (2011), p. 46. These authors 
argue that the main concern underlying the principle of effectiveness is in essence the 
effective application and enforcement of EU law per se, rather than the protection of the 
rights of private parties. On this latter distinction, see further subsection 11.1.1 below.
117 E.g. CoJ case C-279/09, DEB, para. 27-29. Here the referring court had posed a prelimi-
nary question to the CoJ regarding the application of the ‘Rewe-principle’ of effectiveness. 
The CoJ restated the question however and answered it as one concerning the application 
of the principle of effective judicial protection.
118 Van Gerven (2004a), p. 515; Dougan (2004), p. 4; Drake (2005), p. 332-335; Prechal (2005), 
p. 144; Tulibacka (2009), p. 1537; Reich (2010), p. 132; Arnull (2011), p. 55; Oliver (2011), 
pp. 2037-2039. See also Opinion AG Trstenjak case C-411/10, NS, para. 161. Note that, 
although these authors all essentially identify effective judicial protection as the over-
arching concept, their views differ signifi cantly as to why that is the case, which nuances 
should be acknowledged and which consequences should be drawn therefrom. For 
another view, see e.g. Opinion AG Kokott case C-75/08, Mellor, para. 28, where it is held 
that, conversely, the principle of effective judicial protection is an expression of the ‘Rewe-
principle’ of effectiveness.
119 CoJ joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini, para. 49. In a similar sense, see CoJ case 
C-268/06, Impact, para. 47; CoJ case C-63/08, Pontin, para. 44. See also CoJ case C-55/06, 
Arcor, para. 190, where reference is made to “the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of 
judicial protection”.
120 CoJ case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5. See para. 26 and 30 above.
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Having said that, as the law stands at present it cannot be said with cer-
tainty that both principles neatly coincide and that one has ‘absorbed’ the 
other.121 In particular, there is also case law suggesting that, ‘post-Lisbon’, 
both principles continue to fulfil an independent role, in the sense that the 
Court of Justice assessed them separately.122 It is therefore not always evi-
dent through which lens a particular question relating to national rules on 
remedies and procedures will be assessed. It appears that further clarifica-
tion needs to be awaited before firm conclusions can be drawn on the pre-
cise relationship and interaction between the two abovementioned princi-
ples. It is moreover uncertain to what extent, if at all, any of this translates 
into a difference in practice. There can be no doubt that the application of 
the principle of effective judicial protection can have significant consequenc-
es for the national rules in question.123 However, as has been seen earlier, the 
same can be said of the ‘Rewe-principle’ of effectiveness.124 The Court of 
Justice arguably tends to motivate its more intense scrutiny preferably with 
reference to the former principle.125 If so, this may be linked to the positive 
formulation of that principle (effective judicial protection must be ensured), 
as compared to the negative formulation of the principle of effectiveness 
(national procedural rules may not make the exercise of rights virtually 
impossible or excessively difficult).126
2.3.2. Effective judicial protection: application
45. The principle of effective judicial protection comprises various ele-
ments.127 One of them is the right of access to court. This latter right in turn 
encompasses a range of more specific issues. It implies for instance that the 
competent court must be independent and impartial. That means that it must 
be protected against external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise the 
independent judgment of its members. It also implies that there must be a 
‘level playing field’ for the parties to the proceedings and their respective 
interests, requiring objectivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome 
of the proceedings on the side of the members of the courts, apart from the 
strict application of the rule of law. The applicable rules, for example on the 
121 In a similar sense, see Iglesias Sánchez (2012), p. 1579; Prechal & Widdershoven (2011), 
p. 31; Parret (2012), p. 159. In the latter two publications it is argued, while acknowledg-
ing the overlap and similarities between both principles, that they serve different pur-
poses and are driven by different rationales and should thus be distinguished. On the 
meaning and signifi cance of the concept of effectiveness in the present context, see also 
section 11.1 below.
122 CoJ case C-12/08, Mono Car Styling, para. 49; CoJ joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, 
Alassini, para. 52-66. Cf. also CoJ case C-276/01, Steffensen, para. 66-80.
123 See subsection 2.3.2 below.
124 See subsection 2.2.2 above.
125 Cf. Prechal (2001), p. 40. See also Prechal & Widdershoven (2011), pp. 38-40.
126 Cf. Dougan (2011), p. 413.
127 CoJ case C-199/11, Otis, para. 48.
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composition of the courts and on the appointment and dismissal of its mem-
bers, must be such as to dismiss any reasonable doubt in the minds of the 
parties concerned as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors 
and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it.128 This right does not 
necessarily entail a certain number of levels of jurisdiction however.129
The right of access to court also implies certain requirements in terms of 
the standard of judicial review exercised.130 As the Court of Justice has clari-
fied, for a court to be able to determine a dispute concerning rights or obli-
gations arising under EU law in accordance with Article 47 Charter, (at least) 
in proceedings where penalties were imposed, it must be empowered to 
consider all questions of fact and law that are relevant to the case before it.131 
Accordingly the courts must verify inter alia whether the evidence relied on 
is factually accurate, reliable and consistent. They must also establish 
whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into 
account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.132
The right of access to court can also have implications for rules on legal 
standing and time limits. The Court of Justice has held that it is, as a general 
rule, for national law to determine a private party’s standing in initiating 
legal proceedings, as long as these rules do not undermine the right to effec-
tive judicial protection.133 It is not necessarily required that a direct, free-
standing action is available to contest a rule of national law that allegedly 
infringes EU law. The availability of an indirect remedy may suffice, for 
instance in the form of a damages claim or the possibility to contest the mea-
sures enacted on the basis of the allegedly infringing provision.134 In that 
sense the Court assesses the remedies in their totality.135 Depending on the 
circumstances the right of access to court might however be prejudiced 
where it is made conditional upon a preceding mandatory attempt to settle 
the dispute in question.136 As regards the applicable time limits, notably 
limitation periods for initiating legal proceedings, it has been held that the 
128 CoJ case C-506/04, Wilson, para. 46-53. In this case the CoJ also clarifi ed that the concept 
of a ‘court or tribunal’ used here corresponds to that referred to in Art. 267 TFEU on pre-
liminary references.
129 CoJ case C-69/10, Samba Diouf, para. 69.
130 For an overview of the (nuanced) assessment under Art. 6(1) ECHR, see ECtHR cases 
32181/04 and 35122/05, Sigma Radio Television, para. 126-127 and 147-157.
131 CoJ case C-199/11, Otis, para. 49.
132 CoJ case C-386/10 P, Chalkor, para. 53-67. See also CoJ case C-501/11 P, Schindler, 
para. 33-38. These rulings relate to the judicial review exercised by the EU courts regard-
ing Commission decisions for infringements of EU competition law. On that review, see 
further Nazzini (2012), p. 971.
133 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-87/90 to C-89/90, Verholen, para. 24.
134 CoJ case C-13/01, Safalero, para. 54-56; CoJ case C-432/05, Unibet, para. 40-42.
135 This corresponds with the approach followed by the ECtHR under Art. 13 ECHR. See e.g. 
ECtHR case 9248/81, Leander v. Sweden, para. 84; ECtHR case 46477/99, Edwards v. UK, 
para. 101.
136 CoJ joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini, para. 62.
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period prescribed must be sufficient in practical terms to enable the appli-
cant to effectively prepare and bring a case. This does not exclude that 
account is taken of the nature of the procedure at issue.137
46. Another element of the broader right of effective judicial protection 
concerns the rights of defence. This includes a duty for the competent author-
ities to state reasons for their decisions, in a specific and concrete manner.138 
This should allow the private party concerned to defend its rights on the 
best possible conditions and ensure that this party has the possibility of 
deciding, with a full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether or not there is 
any point in him applying to the courts.139 It also serves to ensure that the 
court is fully in a position to review the lawfulness of the contested deci-
sion.140 The rights of defence in addition imply a right to be heard for the 
private parties concerned. Thus in all proceedings that are liable to culmi-
nate in a measure adversely affecting a party every party must be given the 
opportunity to make known its views effectively before the adoption of a 
decision, even where the applicable legislation does not expressly provide 
for such a procedural requirement.141 It also requires the authorities to pay 
due attention to the observations submitted by the private party concerned, 
as well as examining carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the 
individual case.142
The rights of defence, including the right to be heard, do not only apply 
in respect of decisions of EU or national administrative authorities. They 
also apply in relation to decisions by a court in proceedings between private 
parties, in particular where the court raises an issue of its own motion.143 
This is closely related to the right to adversarial proceedings.144 That latter right 
aims to prevent a court from being influenced by arguments that the parties 
have been unable to discuss.145 As interpreted by the Court of Human 
Rights it ensures that the parties to the proceedings have the opportunity to 
make known any evidence needed for their claims to succeed and to have 
knowledge of, and comment on, all evidence adduced or observations filed, 
with a view to influencing the court’s decision.146
137 CoJ case C-69/10, Samba Diouf, para. 66-67.
138 CoJ case 222/86, Heylens, para. 15; CoJ case C-104/91, Borell, para. 15; CoJ case C-277/11, 
M.M., para. 88.
139 CoJ case C-239/05, BVBA Management, para. 36; CoJ joined cases C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P, Kadi, para. 336-337; CoJ case C-75/08, Mellor, para. 59.
140 CoJ joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi, para. 337.
141 CoJ case C349/07, Sopropé, para. 37-38; CoJ case C-277/11, M.M., para. 82 and 85-87.
142 CoJ case C-277/11, M.M., para. 88.
143 CoJ case C-89/08 P, Commission v. Ireland, para. 51-57; CoJ case C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank, 
para. 29.
144 Cf. CoJ case C-89/08 P, Commission v. Ireland, para. 58.
145 CoJ Order case C-17/98, Emesa Sugar, para. 18.
146 ECtHR case 21497/93, Mantovanelli v. France, para. 33; ECtHR case 32106/96, Komanicky 
v. Slovakia, para. 46.
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47. The principle of equality of arms is another important element of the 
broader right of effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 Char-
ter.147 This principle aims to ensure a fair balance between the parties to the 
dispute. It implies that each party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present its case, including its evidence, under conditions that do not place it 
at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis their opponent.148 The principle of 
equality of arms (as well as the aforementioned right to adversarial proceed-
ings) can thus for instance have a bearing on national rules of evidence. On 
the one hand it is principally for the national courts to assess the evidence 
brought before them and the relevance of any evidence that a wishes to pro-
duce.149 On the other hand, at least under Article 6(1) ECHR, the fairness of 
the proceedings must be considered as a whole, i.e. including the manner in 
which evidence was taken.150 It must therefore be ensured that a party has a 
real opportunity to examine and challenge any such evidence, particularly 
where the evidence pertains to a technical field of which the judges have no 
knowledge and it is likely to have a preponderant influence on the assess-
ment of the facts by the court.151 A rule of national law that a particular 
document issued by the national authorities is to be treated as conclusive 
evidence can therefore be contrary to this principle where it deprives a party 
of the possibility of asserting its rights by judicial process.152
2.3.3. Summary
48. The principle of effective judicial protection has received increasing 
attention in the case law on matters of remedies and procedures in relation 
to EU law. That applies in particular since the Charter became legally bind-
ing in 2009. Article 47 thereof sets out the right to an effective remedy and a 
fair trial. This principle appears to have eclipsed at least to some extent the 
‘Rewe-principle’ of effectiveness, even if the precise relationship between 
both principles remains to be clarified. The broad banner of effective judicial 
protection covers various elements, such as the right of access to court, the 
rights of the defence and the principle of equality of arms. As such its appli-
cation can affect national rules on a range of issues. Examples include the 
independence and impartiality of the courts, the standard of judicial review, 
legal standing, limitation periods and rules of evidence.
147 E.g. CoJ case C-199/11, Otis, para. 48; CoJ case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo, para. 48.
148 E.g. CoJ case C-199/11, Otis, para. 71-72. See e.g. also ECtHR case 14448/88, Dombo Beheer 
BV v. Netherlands, para. 33; ECtHR case 62543/00, Gorraiz Lizarraga v. Spain, para. 56.
149 CoJ case C-276/01, Steffensen, para. 75. See e.g. also ECtHR case 21497/93, Mantovanelli v. 
France, para. 34; ECtHR case 32106/96, Komanicky v. Slovakia, para. 47.
150 ECtHR case 21497/93, Mantovanelli v. France, para. 34; ECtHR case 32106/96, Komanicky 
v. Slovakia, para. 47.
151 CoJ case C-276/01, Steffensen, para. 76-77; CoJ case C-199/11, Otis, para. 72.
152 E.g. CoJ case 222/84, Johnston, para. 20. This case was decided on the basis of the princi-
ple of effective judicial protection generally, i.e. without any further specifi cation of a 
particular element thereof.
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2.4. Public enforcement
Private enforcement cannot be properly understood without having regard 
to the public enforcement context. This section therefore briefly outlines the 
main public enforcement mechanisms that exist under EU law. A distinction 
is made between infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice on 
the one hand and other forms of public enforcement on the other hand. Both 
forms are subsequently discussed below. On that basis several observations 
are then made on the interaction of these public enforcement mechanisms 
with private enforcement.
2.4.1. Infringement proceedings
49. One of the most important means of public enforcement in an EU law 
context is enforcement through infringement proceedings, as provided for in 
Articles 258 and 259 TFEU.153 These proceedings, which are to be brought 
before the Court of Justice, can be initiated by either the Commission or a 
Member State when they consider that a Member State has failed to fulfil its 
obligation under the EU Treaties. Those obligations include compliance with 
secondary EU law. Not only the acts and omissions of a Member State’s cen-
tral government are concerned here, but also those by its regional or local 
governments and specific branches, such as the judiciary. These infringe-
ment proceedings can result in the Court of Justice declaring that the Mem-
ber State in question has failed to fulfil its obligations. That Member State is 
then required to correct the situation so as to ensure conformity with EU 
law.154 Where this has been applied for, the Court of Justice can impose a 
lump sum or a penalty payment on the Member State concerned in case of 
non-compliance. However, apart from certain special cases, under Article 
260 TFEU the Commission first needs to initiate additional, separate pro-
ceedings before these latter measures can be imposed.155 As has been noted 
earlier, in practice infringements proceedings initiated by the Commission 
far outnumber the actions brought by Member States.156 These proceedings 
are thus principally a matter between the Commission and the Member 
State allegedly having infringed EU law.
50. That is not to say however that private parties cannot play a role in this 
context. In particular, they can file complaints to the Commission on alleged 
infringements of EU law by the Member States. For these private parties this 
can be a cheap and easy means of exposing (alleged) non-compliance. One 
153 See further e.g. Rawlings (2000), p. 267; Prete & Smulders (2010), p. 9.
154 Art. 260(1) TFEU.
155 Art. 260(2) TFEU. The said special cases concern the situation where the Member States 
have failed to notify measures transposing a directive into national within the set time 
period (see Art. 260(3) TFEU).
156 See para. 4 above.
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could say that it allows them to enforce their rights in an indirect manner. 
For the Commission these complaints are an important means of informa-
tion-gathering. As is the case with the Commission’s own initiative investi-
gations, only a small minority of all complaints received actually leads to the 
Commission actually bringing an infringement action before the Court of 
Justice. Not only does it not act upon all complaints received, the Commis-
sion and the Member State concerned also often prefer negotiating a solu-
tion ‘in the shadow of the law’ rather than having the matter settled by the 
Court.157 Yet the fact remains that a significant amount of the infringement 
cases that are actually brought before the Court of Justice find their origin in 
such complaints.158 In this manner private parties can thus play significant 
role in this context.
But that role only goes that far. Whether initiated as a consequence of a 
complaint or otherwise, in essence infringement proceedings are firmly 
‘public-public’ in nature. Most notably a private party-complainant never 
becomes a party to these proceedings. The Commission moreover enjoys 
full discretion as to whether or not it wishes to initiate or terminate them. A 
private party cannot force the Commission to act in a certain manner in this 
respect, nor can it stop the Commission from acting in the manner that the 
latter deems appropriate. Put in legal terms, both an action for the annul-
ment of a Commission decision as to whether or not it wants to initiate 
infringement proceedings and an action against the Commission for failure 
to act upon a complaint received brought by a private party will normally be 
dismissed.159 As the Court of Justice has held, “the Commission is not bound to 
commence [infringement proceedings], but in this regard has a discretion which 
excludes the right for individuals to require that institution to adopt a specific 
position”.160 The private party-complainants’ rights are essentially only pro-
cedural, in particular with regard to them being kept informed as to the 
decision taken in relation to their complaint.161 At most one could therefore 
speak of ‘privately-triggered public enforcement’.162
157 In 2012 the Commission received more than 2800 complaints. Over 600 of these led to 
discussions being opened with the Member State concerned. In that year more than 1000 
infringement cases were closed before or shortly after the proceedings reached the stage 
of litigation before the CoJ, while the CoJ delivered 46 judgments in infringement cases. 
See Commission, 30th Annual report on applying EU law (2012), COM(2013) 726, pp. 6- 9.
158 Namely 53% in 2009 and 40% in 2010. See Commission, 28th Annual report on monitoring 
the application of EU law (2010), COM(2011) 588, p. 3 (no such data can be derived from 
more recent reports).
159 E.g. CoJ case 48/65, Lütticke, p. 27; CoJ case 247/87, Star Fruit Company, para. 11-12.
160 CoJ case 247/87, Star Fruit Company, para. 11.
161 Cf. Commission, Communication on updating the handling of relations with the com-
plainant in respect of the application of Union law, COM(2012) 154.
162 Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 197.
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2.4.2. Other forms of public enforcement
51. EU law also foresees also other forms of public enforcement. Unlike the 
infringement proceedings discussed in the previous subsection, these other 
forms are ‘public-private’ in nature, rather than a ‘public-public’. These lat-
ter public enforcement mechanisms thus essentially entail supervision exer-
cised by public authorities concerning the compliance with EU law by private 
parties. In this connection one can distinguish essentially two types of situa-
tions as far as the Member States’ obligations under EU law are concerned.
52. In the first type of situation no explicit provision as regards the public 
enforcement of the applicable rules of substantive EU law has been set out 
as a matter of EU law. This is thus the ‘default’ situation, which is regulated 
by primary EU law. The EU Treaties do not contain any detailed provisions 
of a general nature imposing on the Member States an express obligation to 
ensure the compliance with and enforcement of EU law within their respec-
tive jurisdictions. Nonetheless under the principle of sincere cooperation 
laid down in Article 4(3) TEU Member States are required to take all appro-
priate measures to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of EU 
law. The Court of Justice has interpreted this principle in such a manner, that 
it not only entails obligations by the Member States to ensure respect for EU 
law where their own acts are concerned, but also as regards acts by private 
parties falling within their jurisdictions.
The Court addressed this issue most notably in the 1989 Greek maize 
case.163 This case concerned fraud to the detriment of the financial interests 
of the EU with agricultural levies. The Commission brought infringement 
proceedings in light of the failure by Greece to penalise the persons involved 
in this fraud. The Court clarified that the said principle implies that Member 
States must take “all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effec-
tiveness of [EU] law”.164 To that aim, they must ensure that infringements of 
EU law are penalised “under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which 
are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature 
and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive. Moreover, the national authorities must proceed, with respect to 
infringements of [EU] law, with the same diligence as that which they bring to bear 
implementing corresponding national laws”.165 These references to analogous 
conditions and the same diligence clearly echo the principle of equiva-
lence.166 The reference to effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties 
similarly recalls the principle of effectiveness.167 In Greek Maize it was fur-
ther noted that the said obligation to take all necessary measures applies 
163 CoJ case 68/88, Commission v. Greece (Greek maize).
164 Ibid., para. 23.
165 Ibid., para. 24.
166 See subsection 2.2.1 above.
167 See subsection 2.2.2 above.
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(only) where EU legislation does not specifically provide any penalty for an 
infringement, nor refers for that purpose to national law.168 This recalls the 
reference to the absence of specific EU rules in relation to the principle of 
national procedural autonomy, discussed earlier.169 Indeed, it has been 
observed that the Court increasingly tends to treat the Member States’ obli-
gations in this regard as virtually interchangeable with a private party’s 
right to an equivalent and effective remedy under its Rewe case law.170
In the 1993 Spanish strawberries case it was found that France had not 
fulfilled its obligations under EU law by “manifestly and persistently [abstain-
ing] from adopting appropriate and adequate measures to put an end to the acts of 
vandalism which jeopardise the free movement on its territory of certain agricul-
tural products originating in other Member States and to prevent the recurrence of 
such acts”.171 The contested acts in question consisted of the interception of 
lorries, the destruction of their loads and violence towards their drivers, as 
well as threats to and the damaging of goods of wholesalers and retailers, 
taking place regularly for more than ten years. Although these acts had been 
committed by private parties, the Court of Justice condemned France for not 
having taken the necessary preventive and penal measures to remedy the 
resulting obstruction of intra-EU trade. Also in this case the obligation to 
take such action was based on the principle of sincere cooperation, in casu 
read together with the EU law principle of free movement of goods.
Consequently, where EU law contains no specific rules in this respect, 
national public authorities are under an obligation to take the necessary 
steps against private parties so as to ensure the proper application of the 
rules of EU law at issue.172 But the Court has also consistently held that in 
such a case the precise choice of penalties remains, as a general rule, for the 
Member States.173 These penalties can therefore in principle be administra-
tive, civil or criminal in nature.174
53. The second type of situation is one whereby EU law does provide for 
an explicit obligation for certain public authorities to enforce the substantive 
EU rules in question. This is for instance the case in the field of competition 
law. In that field both the Commission and the competent national competi-
tion authorities are charged with ensuring the compliance with the EU com-
petition rules. To this aim these authorities are inter alia empowered to 
168 CoJ case 68/88, Commission v. Greece (Greek maize), para. 23.
169 See para. 26 and 30 above.
170 Dougan (2010), pp. 106-107. See also Dougan (2004), pp. 39-40.
171 CoJ case C-265/95, Commission v. France (Spanish strawberries), para. 65.
172 See e.g. also CoJ case C-112/00, Smidberger.
173 E.g. CoJ case 68/88, Commission v. Greece (Greek maize), para. 24 and 26; CoJ case C-265/95, 
Commission v. France (Spanish strawberries), para. 34; CoJ case C-617/10, Åklagaren, 
para. 34 and 36.
174 Cf. e.g. CoJ case 14/83, Van Colson, para. 28; CoJ case C-326/88, Hansen, para. 15-19; CoJ 
case C-7/90, Vandevenne, para. 16-17.
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impose fines on undertakings that have been found to infringe these rules.175 
Although perhaps most well-known, this is however by no means the only 
field where public enforcement-related requirements are explicitly provided 
for as a matter of EU law. Relevant provisions can for instance be found in 
other fields of EU law as diverse as fisheries,176 the protection of personal 
data177 and transport.178 In those fields the public enforcement obligations at 
issue are typically on the Member States alone, and not (also) on the Com-
mission.
The tasks and powers of the various public authorities concerned under 
such measures of secondary EU law can differ significantly, both between 
the various fields of EU law and between the Member States. Not one, uni-
form model of public enforcement exists. On the whole the degree of details 
provided for as a matter of EU law is rather limited however. This implies 
that also in these cases considerable discretion tends to be left to the Mem-
ber States as regards the precise structure, powers and functioning of the 
national public enforcement authorities in question. For instance, under the 
Railway Passengers’ Rights Regulation the Member States are obliged to 
designate a body responsible for the enforcement of the rules at issue.179 It 
specifies that this body must be independent and that it must take the mea-
sures necessary to ensure that the rights of railway passengers are respected. 
Yet it is further left to the Member States to define the powers of that body.180 
The obligations on the Member States in this respect can also involve pro-
viding for a possibility for the private parties concerned to file complaints.181
By means of a codification of the aforementioned Greek maize case law, 
the public enforcement obligations on the Member States often also include 
a requirement to provide for penalties for infringements of the rules of sub-
stantive EU law at issue that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
This has in fact become a standard phrase that can be found in many acts of 
secondary EU law.182 The Court of Justice has clarified that it follows from 
this requirement that the severity of the penalties provided for under nation-
al law must be commensurate with the seriousness of the infringement at 
issue, in particular by ensuring a genuinely dissuasive effect, while respect-
ing the general principle of proportionality.183 Having said that, as is the 
175 On the public enforcement of EU competition law, see further subsection 6.4.2 below.
176 Art. 5 Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 establishing a Community control system for ensur-
ing compliance with the rules of the common fi sheries policy, OJ 2009, L 343/1 (‘Fisheries 
Control Regulation’).
177 Art. 28 Data Protection Directive 95/46; Art. 15a(2)-(4) E-Privacy Directive 2002/58.
178 Art. 16(1) Air Passengers’ Rights Regulation 261/2004; Art. 30 Railway Passengers’ 
Rights Regulation 1371/2007.
179 Art. 30 Railway Passengers’ Rights Regulation 1371/2007.
180 Cf. CoJ case C-509/11, ÖBB-Personenverkehr, para. 59-66.
181 E.g. Art. 28(4) Data Protection Directive 95/46; Art. 16(2) Air Passengers’ Rights Regula-
tion 261/2004.
182 E.g. Art. 15a(1) E-Privacy Directive 2002/58; Art. 32 Railway Passengers’ Rights Regula-
tion 1371/2007; Art. 90(2) Fisheries Control Regulation 1224/2009.
183 E.g. CoJ case C-565/12, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais, para. 44-45.
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case under the case law discussed above, these are still rather broad param-
eters. They continue to leave the Member States – and the national courts – 
considerable discretion. Although the Court of Justice sometimes gives 
guidance, it has also emphasised that it is for the national court seised to 
determine whether the abovementioned requirements are fulfilled in indi-
vidual cases.184 It is only in exceptional cases that the EU legislature goes 
beyond merely providing for the said standard phrase so as to require for 
example that criminal penalties must be provided for.185
2.4.3. The interaction between public and private enforcement
54. Turning to the interaction between public and private enforcement in an 
EU law context, a first point to note is that, where public enforcement takes 
the form of infringement proceedings, both forms of enforcement are in 
principle distinct. That is to say, as was noted in the introduction to this 
study, the Court of Justice has long seen private enforcement (‘the vigilance 
of individuals’) as a possible complement to this form of public enforce-
ment.186 But that does not mean that it considers them to be interchangeable. 
As the Court noted as far back as in 1968, “the guarantees given to individuals 
under the Treaty to safeguard their individual rights and the powers granted to the 
[EU] institutions with regard to the observance by the [Member] States of their 
obligations [under EU law] have different objects, aims and effects”.187 Here it was 
added that legal actions brought by private parties are “intended to protect 
individual rights in a specific case, whilst intervention by the [EU] authorities has 
as its object the general and uniform observance of [EU] law”.188
Thus the fact that an allegedly infringed provision of EU law is directly 
effective and that at national level remedies are available to the private party 
concerned by that alleged infringement is generally not a relevant argument 
in the context of infringement proceedings.189 Conversely, for a private par-
ty to be able to successfully bring an action for damages for an infringement 
of EU law against a Member State,190 it is not required that the Court of Jus-
tice first establishes in the context of infringement proceedings that there is 
such an infringement, although such an earlier ruling by the Court can of 
course be an important factor in this respect.191 On a similar note the Court 
184 E.g. ibid., para. 50-54.
185 Cf. Commission, Communication towards an EU criminal policy, COM(2011) 573. See 
further Dougan (2012b), p. 74.
186 See subsection 1.1.1 above.
187 CoJ case 28/67, Firma Molkerei, p. 153.
188 Ibid.
189 E.g. CoJ case 29/84, Commission v. Germany, para. 29; CoJ case C-508/03, Commission v. 
UK, para. 71.
190 On these actions for damages pursuant to the principle of Member State liability, see 
para. 59 below.
191 CoJ case C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, para. 37-39. See e.g. also CoJ case 39/72, Commission 
v. Italy (slaughtered cows), para. 11. Cf. Craig & De Búrca (2011), pp. 414-415.
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has held more recently that proceedings that permit an undertaking that has 
been fined by the Commission for a competition law infringement to contest 
that penalty do not serve to facilitate the bringing of claims for damages by 
private parties for that same infringement.192 Even if in practice the finding 
in one proceeding may well have a bearing on another, in procedural terms 
public and private enforcement thus largely remain two separate worlds.
55. At first sight it may seem that this conclusion is put in doubt, where the 
obligations of the Member States in terms of public enforcement are con-
cerned, by the Court of Justice’s 2008 ruling in Parmesan cheese.193 This case 
concerned infringement proceedings, brought by the Commission, for Ger-
many’s alleged infringement of an EU regulation on the protection of desig-
nations of origin. It will be recalled that, due to the nature of a regulation, 
private parties can rely on its provisions before their national courts without 
any transposition to national law being required.194 The Commission argued 
that Germany had failed to take the administrative and penal measures nec-
essary to reach that regulation’s objectives. In its judgment the Court of Jus-
tice first noted that the rights of private parties to rely on the provisions of a 
regulation before their national courts cannot release the Member States 
from their duty to ensure a regulation’s full application. However it also 
found that the domestic legal system at issue provided legal instruments 
designed to ensure the effective protection of the rights which private par-
ties derive from the regulation in question. The Court observed that these 
possibilities of taking legal action were moreover not reserved solely to the 
legitimate user of the designation of origin, as they were also open to com-
petitors, business associations and consumer organisations. It further estab-
lished that the regulation in question entailed no (express) obligation for 
Member States to penalise infringements on their own initiative. The regula-
tion did provide for certain inspections, but these concerned the Member 
State from which the protected designation of origin came (in casu Italy). In 
other words, it was found that the Member State of the producer was respon-
sible for monitoring compliance and not the Member State of the consumer. 
Given that the infringements proceedings had been initiated against the lat-
ter and not the former, the case was dismissed.
This case could thus be read as suggesting that less is expected from a 
Member State in terms of public enforcement where private enforcement is a 
realistic possibility for the private parties concerned. No suggestions to this 
effect were made in cases such as Greek Maize and Spanish strawberries, dis-
cussed above, however.195 It would seem that several factors could explain 
192 CoJ case C-596/11 P, Schenker, para. 23.
193 CoJ case C-132/05, Commission v. Germany (Parmesan cheese), para. 68-81.
194 Art. 288 TFEU.
195 See para. 52 above.
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this difference.196 The main explanation may well lie in the specifics of this 
case. For one thing, there are no indications that in Parmesan cheese the Com-
mission had invoked the principle of sincere cooperation, which is central 
to the Greek maize case law. For another thing, this latter line of case law only 
applies where EU law does not contain any specific rules. The regulation 
at issue in Parmesan cheese did set out certain public enforcement obliga-
tions; these were addressed to another Member State than the one against 
which the infringement proceedings were brought. In combination with the 
finding that the national legal system of this latter Member State allowed 
a range of potentially interested private parties to seek redress themselves 
if necessary, this appears to have been sufficient for the Court of Justice to 
conclude that more was not required from the Member State in question in 
that particular case. It thus appears that it cannot be concluded on the basis 
of this case that, in general, the Member States are deemed to have complied 
with their public enforcement obligations only by ensuring the availability 
of adequate private enforcement opportunities.
2.4.4. Summary
56. Public enforcement can take various forms in EU law. First, there is the 
possibility of infringement proceedings being brought before the Court of 
Justice. These proceedings, in practice mostly brought by the Commission, 
relate to infringements of EU law by the Member States. Private parties regu-
larly play a role in this respect by drawing the Commission’s attention to 
alleged infringements. But these parties play no formal role in this respect. 
Second, secondary EU law sometimes explicitly charges Member States (and 
in exceptional cases also the Commission) with ensuring compliance with 
and enforcement of EU law with respect to private parties. Also where such 
an obligation is not set out explicitly, under the principle of sincere coopera-
tion the Member States are required to take all necessary measures to guar-
antee the application and effectiveness of EU law. As was clarified in the 
Greek maize case law, they must penalise infringements of EU law under con-
ditions which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national 
law of a similar nature and importance. These penalties must in any event 
be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. As to the interaction between 
public and private enforcement, it is clear that the availability of certain 
remedies at the national level, available to the private parties that are nega-
tively affected by the infringement, plays in principle no role in the context 
of infringement proceedings. Neither does this generally seem to discharge 
the Member States from their public enforcement obligations.
196 See Prete & Smulders (2010), p. 23. These authors suggest that a pragmatic acknowledg-
ment on the side of the CoJ that it may be impossible for the Member States to act of their 
own motion against all possible infringements occurring in their territory may (also) 
have played a role here.
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2.5. Key case law relating to private enforcement
In this final section of chapter 2 attention turns to five rulings of the Court of 
Justice, i.e. namely Simmenthal, Factortame, Francovich, Courage and Muñoz. 
Even if they are not all concerned with private enforcement of EU law as 
such, they are considered to be of particular importance in this connection, 
as they set out some key aspects relating to the enforcement of EU law at 
national level. Although many will be familiar with these landmark cases, 
their importance for the present purposes justifies recalling and assessing 
them in some detail here, including some subsequent rulings where rele-
vant. After having introduced first the three former rulings and then the two 
latter ones, they are also considered jointly, with the emphasis on Courage 
and Muñoz and their possible broader implications.
2.5.1. Simmenthal, Factortame and Francovich
 57. The Court’s ruling in Simmenthal dates from 1978.197 This case con-
cerned a company that had imported beef from France to Italy. A fee had 
been charged for the veterinary and health inspection of the beef. Earlier it 
had already been decided that this charge was contrary to EU law.198 The 
national court therefore ordered its repayment. The national authorities con-
cerned contested this order, arguing in essence that pursuant to a (subse-
quent) national law only the national constitutional court – and not the low-
er court at issue – could set aside the national law that prevented this 
repayment. The Court of Justice did not accept this argument however. After 
having recalled the importance of the principles of direct effect and primacy 
of EU law, it held that the abovementioned rule of national law would both 
amount to a denial of the effectiveness of the EU law obligations of the 
Member State in question and endanger the effectiveness of the preliminary 
reference procedure.199 It noted in this connection that “every national court 
must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply [EU] law in its entirety and protect 
rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any 
provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to 
the [EU] rule. […] Accordingly, any provision of the national legal system and any 
legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness 
of [EU] law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply 
such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to 
set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent [EU] rules from hav-
ing full force and effect, are incompatible with those requirements which are the very 
essence of [EU] law”.200
197 CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal.
198 See CoJ case 35/76, Simmenthal.
199 CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal, para. 14-20.
200 Ibid., para. 21-22.
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58. A second case that is of particular relevance here is Factortame, dating 
from 1990.201 The dispute before the national court concerned the compati-
bility with EU law of a national law which was designed to prevent fishing 
vessels from other Member States from being registered, where that registra-
tion was considered to be merely meant to evade rules on fishing quotas. As 
in Simmenthal, the referral did not concern the question of compatibility as 
such, but rather the question which consequences a national court is to draw 
from the finding that the national law in question is contrary to EU law. 
More specifically, the central question referred to the Court of Justice was 
whether a national court must be able to grant interim relief where it consid-
ers that a rule of national law is contrary to EU law, even if under national 
law that remedy is not available in that particular case.
Referring to Simmenthal and the principle of sincere cooperation, the 
Court recalled the need for national courts to ensure the legal protection that 
private parties derive from the direct effect of provisions of EU law. It also 
stressed the risks to the effectiveness of EU law if national law were to pre-
vent those courts from setting aside rules of national law “which might pre-
vent, even temporarily, [EU] rules from having full force and effect”.202 It was then 
added that “the full effectiveness would be just as much impaired if a rule of 
national law could prevent a court seised of a dispute governed by [EU] law from 
granting interim relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be 
given on the existence of the rights claimed under [EU] law. It follows that a court 
which in those circumstances would grant interim relief, if it were not for a rule of 
national law, is obliged to set aside that rule”.203 This interpretation was rein-
forced, the Court noted, by the preliminary reference system set out in Arti-
cle 267 TFEU, if there were no possibility of granting interim relief in attend-
ing a preliminary ruling.204 In subsequent rulings the Court has regularly 
highlighted the importance of the availability of interim relief in cases where 
EU law is infringed. The most notable example is Unibet.205 In that case it 
was clarified that this need not necessarily be a free-standing action. It was 
also held there that the applicable conditions are to be determined by 
national law, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.206
A distinct yet related question is whether national courts can grant inter-
im relief where the validity of an act of secondary EU law is in question (as 
opposed to a rule of national law, as was the case in Factortame and Unibet), 
pending a preliminary ruling on the matter. The Court has answered this 
question essentially answered in the affirmative. In particular, in Atlanta it 
was found that the interim legal protection offered to private parties under 
201 CoJ case C-213/89, Factortame.
202 Ibid., para. 18-20.
203 Ibid., para. 21.
204 Ibid., para. 22.
205 CoJ case C-432/05, Unibet, para. 67. See e.g. also CoJ case C-226/99, Siples, para. 19.
206 Ibid., para. 71-73 and 79-82. On the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, see further 
section 2.2 above. See e.g. also CoJ case C-530/11, Commission v. UK, para. 67.
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national law should not depend on whether a national measure is contrary 
to EU law or whether an act of secondary EU law is contrary to EU law of a 
higher order.207 The Court nonetheless attached rather strict conditions, 
derived from the case law on when interim measures are to be granted in 
legal proceedings before the EU courts themselves.208
 59. In the third place, regard should be had of the Court of Justice’s 1991 
Francovich judgment.209 This case concerned the lack of timely transposition 
by Italy into national law of a directive, thus adversely affecting a private 
party. Although unconditional and sufficiently precise to be directly effec-
tive, the rights concerned could nonetheless not be enforced before a nation-
al court without the required national measures. The Court of Justice found 
that under these circumstances a Member State could be held liable by a pri-
vate party for the loss and damage resulting from this breach of the Member 
State’s obligations under EU law. It reached this conclusion after recalling, 
first, the finding in Van Gend en Loos that the EU Treaties had created a new 
legal order that is also intended to give rise to rights for individuals and, 
second, that, as had already been made clear in Simmenthal and Factortame, 
national courts must ensure that EU rules take full effect and must protect 
the rights of individuals.210  On that basis the Court of Justice ruled that the 
“full effectiveness of [EU] rules would be impaired and the protection of the rights 
which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress 
when their rights are infringed by a breach of [EU] law for which a Member State 
can be held responsible”.211 Therefore it found that “it is a principle of [EU] law 
that the Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage caused to indi-
viduals by breaches of [EU] law for which they can be held responsible”.212
 This judgment thus established the principle of Member State liability for 
breaches of EU law. The Court considered this principle to be inherent in the 
system of the EU Treaties, while finding a further basis in the principle of 
sincere cooperation, which implies an obligation to nullify the unlawful con-
sequences of an infringement of EU law.213  It added in subsequent cases, 
most notably in Brasserie du Pêcheur, that “the right to reparation is the neces-
sary corollary of the direct effect of the [EU] law provision whose breached caused 
the damage sustained” and that there is a “general principle familiar to the legal 
systems of the Member States that an unlawful act or omission gives rise to an obli-
207 CoJ case C-465/93, Atlanta, para. 28.
208 Ibid., para. 51. The conditions referred to above are: (i) the existence of serious doubts as 
to the validity of the act in question; (ii) urgency, i.e. a necessity with a view to avoiding 
serious and irreparable damage; (iii) due account being taken of the interests of the EU; 
and (iv) respect for earlier decisions by the EU courts on the matter. On the possibility of 
interim relief before the EU courts, see Art. 279 TFEU.
209 CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich.
210 Ibid., para. 31-32.
211 Ibid., para. 33.
212 Ibid., para., para. 37.
213 Ibid., para. 35-36.
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gation to make good the damage caused”.214 In so doing, the Court drew an anal-
ogy with the rules on the non-contractual liability of the EU provided for in 
Article 340 TFEU.215 Those rules require the EU, in accordance with the gen-
eral principles common to the laws of the Member States, to make good any 
damage caused by its institutions and its servants.
In Brasserie du Pêcheur the Court also clarified the conditions that must be 
fulfilled to incur Member State liability.216 These conditions depend on the 
nature of the breach of EU law at issue. They must also in principle corre-
spond to those applicable to the aforementioned non-contractual liability of 
the EU. Therefore, in areas where the Member State has a wide discretion, 
these conditions are that: (i) the rule of law infringed must be intended to 
confer rights on private parties; (ii) the infringement must be sufficiently 
serious; and (iii) there must be a direct causal link between the infringement 
and the damage sustained by the injured parties. Reparation for the conse-
quences of the loss and damage caused must further be made in accordance 
with the domestic rules on liability, subject to the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness.217 In its subsequent case law the Court of Justice expand-
ed in particular on the application of this principle to the various decentral-
ised or functional bodies of a Member State,218 the applicable conditions219 
and the aforementioned analogy with the non-contractual liability of the 
EU.220
214 CoJ joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 22 and 29 respectively.
215 Ibid., para. 28-29 and 40-42.
216 Ibid., para. 38-51. In Francovich the CoJ had already touched upon these conditions, but 
there no analogy had been drawn with the non-contractual liability of the EU under Art. 
340 TFEU. There these conditions had moreover been formulated somewhat differently 
(although this does not entail a difference in substance; see CoJ joined cases C-178/94, 
C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94, Dillenkofer, para. 23).
217 Ibid., para. 67. See also CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, para. 41-43. On 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, see further section 2.2 above.
218 E.g. CoJ case C-302/97, Konle (regarding Member States with a federal structure); CoJ 
case C-224/01, Köbler (regarding breaches of EU law by the national judiciary).
219 E.g. CoJ case C-4/94, Hedley Lomas (regarding situations where there is signifi cantly 
reduced or no discretion); CoJ case C-222/02, Paul (regarding the conferral of rights to 
private parties); CoJ case C-118/08, Transportes Urbanos, para. 38 (regarding the fact that 
no earlier fi nding by the CoJ in a preliminary ruling procedure of a breach of EU law is 
required).
220 E.g. CoJ case C-352/98 P, Bergaderm (regarding the application of the conditions set out in 
Brasserie du Pêcheur in cases of the non-contractual liability of the EU). On both above-
mentioned types of liability, as well as on the extent to which these have converted, see 
further e.g. Tridimas (2006), pp. 477-547; Wakefi eld (2009), p. 390; Gutman (2011), p. 695; 
Aalto (2011).
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2.5.2. Courage and Muñoz
60. A fourth judgment that is of particular importance in the present con-
text is Courage.221 This ruling was issued roughly a decade after Francovich, 
i.e. in 2001. Two private parties had entered into a contract liable to restrict 
or distort competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. One of 
these parties later initiated civil proceedings, claiming compensation for dam-
ages from its contract partner. Under national law this claim was barred on 
the basis that a party cannot rely on its own illegal actions to obtain dam-
ages. One of the questions referred to the Court of Justice was whether such 
an absolute bar is compatible with EU law. In its judgment the Court first 
restated, with reference to Van Gend en Loos and Francovich, that the EU Trea-
ties created a new legal order and that EU law is intended to give rise to 
rights for private parties. In addition the fundamental importance of the 
prohibition of Article 101 TFEU was underlined. The Court highlighted that 
agreements caught by that prohibition are automatically void and that this 
automatic nullity can be relied on by anyone. It further recalled that the said 
article produces direct effects in relations between private parties and cre-
ates rights that national courts must safeguard.222
On the basis of those considerations, it was held that “any individual” can 
rely on a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU before a national court, even where he 
is a party to a contract that is liable to restrict or distort competition within 
the meaning of that provision.223 Concerning the possibility of seeking com-
pensation for loss caused by infringements of that article, the Court of Justice 
repeated, with reference to Simmenthal and Factortame, that it is task of the 
national courts to “ensure that [the rules of EU law at issue] take full effect and [to] 
protect the rights which they confer on individuals”.224 Accordingly it was held 
that “[t]he full effectiveness of Article [101 TFEU] and, in particular, the practical 
effect of the prohibition laid down [therein] would be put at risk if it were not open to 
any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct 
liable to restrict or distort competition. Indeed, the existence of such a right strength-
ens the working of the [EU] competition rules and discourages agreements or prac-
tices, which are frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. 
From that point of view, actions for damages before the national courts can make a 
significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the [EU]”.225 
The Court thus found that there cannot be an absolute bar to the bring-
ing of such an action by a party that itself might have violated the EU com-
petition rules. As was the case in Francovich, reference was made to the 
domestic legal system of the Member States for the designation of the com-
221 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage. For a more detailed analysis of this ruling, see para. 213 
below.
222 Ibid., para. 19-23.
223 Ibid., para. 24.
224 Ibid., para. 25.
225 Ibid., para. 25-27.
para. 61 Chapter 2. Key principles, public enforcement and case law p. 65
petent courts and the applicable detailed procedural rules, subject to the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness. It was added however that EU 
law does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the 
protection of rights guaranteed by EU law does not entail the unjust enrich-
ment, nor does it preclude national law from applying the principle that a 
litigant should not profit from its own unlawful conduct.226 Also in this case 
the Court subsequently expanded on and further refined this landmark 
judgment in its later case law, most notably in Manfredi, which is further 
discussed below.227
 61. Finally, the ruling Muñoz appeared one year after Courage.228 This case 
concerned two regulations setting out common quality standards for certain 
agricultural products. Also in this preliminary reference the point of depar-
ture was that a private party had infringed the provisions of these regula-
tions. The question referred to the Court of Justice was in essence whether 
another private party could bring a civil action to address this non-compli-
ance. The Court answered by outlining a number of relatively straightfor-
ward steps. It noted that, owing to their very nature and place in the system 
of sources of EU law, regulations operate to confer rights on individuals. 
National courts have a duty to protect these rights and to ensure that they 
take full effect. Furthermore it was established that the common quality 
standards at issue served to keep products of unsatisfactory quality off the 
market, to guide production to meet consumers’ requirements and to facili-
tate trade relations based on fair competition.229 
 The Court therefore concluded in Muñoz that the said regulations should 
be interpreted as meaning that compliance with the provisions concerned 
must be capable of enforcement by means of civil proceedings instituted by 
a trader against a competitor.230 In reaching that conclusion it held that “the 
full effectiveness of the rules on quality standards and, in particular, the practical 
effect of the obligation laid down [in the provisions of EU law under consideration], 
imply that it must be possible to enforce that obligation by means of civil proceed-
ings instituted by a trader against a competitor”.231 Apparently echoing Cour-
age (yet without making an explicit reference), the Court further found that 
“[t]he possibility of bringing such proceedings strengthens the practical working of 
the [EU] rules on quality standards. As a supplement to the action of the authori-
ties designated by the Member States to make the checks required by those rules it 
helps to discourage practices, often difficult to detect, which distort competition. In 
that context actions brought before the national courts by competing operators are 
226 Ibid., para. 28-35.
227 See in particular CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, discussed in para. 214 
below.
228 CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz.
229 Ibid., para. 27-29.
230 Ibid., para. 32.
231 Ibid., para. 30.
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particularly suited to contributing substantially to ensuring fair trading and trans-
parency of markets in the [EU]”.232
2.5.3. Comparison and assessment
62. When comparing the five key cases discussed above, there are a num-
ber of evident similarities. In particular, it is clear that the reasoning and con-
cepts used in Courage and Muñoz resemble to a significant extent the line 
followed in Francovich. The latter builds in turn on Simmenthal and Factor-
tame. Generally speaking, the importance of ensuring that private parties 
can effectively enforce their rights based on EU law before their respective 
national courts emerges as a crucial consideration in the Court’s reasoning. 
Apart from the need to safeguard these rights, the full effectiveness and the 
practical effects (effet utile) of the EU rules at issue typically take central 
stage. To these aims all five rulings highlight the importance of the avail-
ability of certain remedies in cases of conflicts between EU law and national 
law, i.e. the ‘general’ remedy of the setting aside of national law in Simmen-
thal, interim measures in Factortame, actions for damages against Member 
States in Francovich, actions for damages against private parties in Courage 
and civil proceedings generally in Muñoz.233 As such these cases can be seen 
as exceptions to the ‘no new remedies’ rule formulated by the Court of Jus-
tice234 (although it is also possible to see them as involving extensions of 
remedies that already existed under national law, rather than the creation of 
new remedies235). In any case it is evident that the EU’s involvement with 
the remedies and procedures available in proceedings before the national 
courts that concern rights granted by EU law can be very substantial indeed.
63. Zooming in on the three more recent rulings, it is noticeable that, 
unlike Courage and Muñoz, Francovich is not expressly framed in terms of 
‘dual vigilance’.236 That is to say, in the two former cases the Court of Justice 
emphasized that legal actions brought by private parties for breaches of EU 
law serve a valuable purpose in supplementing public enforcement of EU 
law. In the latter judgment this was not the case. The Court later clarified 
that the purpose of Member State liability is not punishment or deterrence, 
but rather ensuring that thee parties having suffered damage are compensat-
ed.237 Nonetheless the dominant view in the legal literature is that the estab-
lishment of the principle of Member State liability should be understood 
232 Ibid., para. 31.
233 Cf. Van Gerven (2000), p. 503.
234 See para. 26 above.
235 See Van Gerven (2000), p. 517; Prechal (2005), pp. 169-170. As the latter author points out, 
this may also depend on whether the term ‘remedy’ is understood in its wide or rather in 
its more narrow sense (see para. 21 above).
236 Weatherill (2000), p. 92; Tridimas (2006), p. 546.
237 CoJ case C-470/03, AGM-COS.MET, par. 88. This position seems in line with the case law 
regarding the non-contractual liability of the EU. See Wakefi eld (2009), p. 398.
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against the background of an ‘enforcement deficit’, originating in the lack 
of adequate implementation of EU law by the Member States.238 It is further 
evident that Francovich concerns the liability of a Member State for infringe-
ments of EU law, while Courage and Muñoz concern the liability of a private 
party for such infringements. Whereas the former established the principle of 
Member State liability, the latter thus established a principle of ‘individual’239 
or ‘private party liability’.240 It is common ground that, although the context 
and certain details may differ, there is an analogy between both principles.241 
Indeed, Courage has been called a “private Francovich”.242
64. Nonetheless several issues remain to be clarified. One of them is wheth-
er this nascent principle of private party liability, as articulated in Courage 
and Muñoz, is in all respects an autonomous course of action, i.e. a remedy that 
is inherent in the EU Treaties and founded directly on EU law and that as 
such is not dependent on national law. Where the principle of Member State 
liability is concerned, as was noted above, the Court of Justice made clear 
statements to this effect in Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur. Although less 
explicitly, similar conclusions have been drawn for instance in relation to the 
remedy of interim relief under the aforementioned Factortame and Atlanta 
case law.243 The question whether the possibility of claiming damages or 
bringing other civil proceedings for a breach of EU law by a private party is 
also a proper ‘EU law remedy’ must probably be answered in the affirmative. 
While it could be argued that the rulings in both Courage and Muñoz are not 
entirely conclusive in this regard, their wording does not appear to allow 
for too narrow a reading. Indeed, it is broadly agreed that the principle of 
private party liability is founded on EU law itself.244 Therefore not too much 
weight should arguably be attached to the absence, at present, of an explicit 
statement regarding this principle’s foundation directly in EU law.245
238 E.g. Steiner (1995), p. 21; Dougan (2002), pp. 170-171; Tridimas (2006), p. 500; Rebhalm 
(2008), pp. 184-185; Biondi & Farley (2009), p. 13; Craig & De Búrca (2011), p. 243; Aalto 
(2011), pp. 154 and 197. See also Lock (2012), p. 1675.
239 Drake (2005), p. 344.
240 Leczykiewicz (2010a), p. 257.
241 E.g. Van Gerven (2004a), p. 522; Komninos (2009), p. 383; Reich (2010), pp. 114-115; Stuyck 
(2011), p. 524. See e.g. also Opinion AG Kokott case C-557/12, Kone, para. 24.
242 Dougan (2011), p. 430.
243 See e.g. ibid., pp. 426-427.
244 See Opinion AG Jacobs joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOB 
Bundesverband, para. 104; Opinion AG Kokott case C-557/12, Kone, para. 24. See also e.g. 
Van Gerven (2003a), p. 407; Drake (2006), pp. 849-850; Eilmansberger (2007), p. 433; 
Komninos (2009), p. 378; Nazzini (2009), p. 405; Milutinovic (2010), pp. 83, 91 and 93; 
Dougan (2011), p. 430.
245 Indeed, there are other examples where the CoJ only at a later stage acknowledged that a 
key doctrine of EU law that had already been established earlier was “inherent in the sys-
tem of the [EU] Treaties”. See e.g. CoJ joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer, para. 114 
(concerning the principle of consistent interpretation, discussed in para. 5 above). Con-
versely, the CoJ was initially not entirely clear in holding that the principle of Member 
State liability is founded directly in EU law. See e.g. CoJ case 60/75, Russo, para. 9; CoJ 
case 101/78, Granaria, para. 14.
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This discussion is certainly not without practical relevance. Admittedly it 
may well be that whether or not the principle of private party liability is 
based directly on EU law is less crucial in practical terms than was the case 
with the principle of Member State liability. For, unlike the state of play at the 
national level ‘pre-Francovich’, all Member States already provide for the for-
mer possibility under national law in one form or another.246 However recog-
nising a remedy as being based directly on EU law can still have important 
practical implications, in particular as regards the conditions that apply in this 
connection. The issue here is especially whether these conditions are (exclu-
sively) a matter of EU law, or (also) of national law.247 In this connection it has 
been suggested drawing a distinction between the ‘constitutive’ conditions, 
i.e. regarding the EU remedy as such, and ‘executive’ remedial rules, i.e. the 
applicable procedures to give effect to this remedy.248 Under this logic these 
constitutive conditions – being closely related to the underlying right found-
ed in EU law – must be uniform across the EU. They should therefore be set 
exclusively by EU law. The executive rules could in contrast be left to nation-
al law, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. However, 
appealing as this approach may be for its analytical clarity and logic, it 
should not be mistaken for an accurate description of the law as it stands. 
That is to say, certainly (but not only249) where the nascent principle of pri-
vate party liability is concerned, the Court of Justice has to date not set out 
the applicable (‘constitutive’) conditions in an unambiguous and detailed 
manner.250 Further clarification on this point is therefore to be awaited.
65. Different views can be taken as to the respective significance of Courage 
and Muñoz. On the one hand Courage can be seen as having the strongest 
claim to being the main landmark case in this respect, if only because it pre-
dates Muñoz. The former is moreover formulated in a rather sweeping man-
ner, whereas the latter is remarkably short and straightforward.251 In addi-
246 Drake (2006), p. 855. In a similar sense, see Eilmansberger (2007), p. 434.
247 Cf. Komninos (2009), pp. 391-399.
248 Van Gerven (2000), pp. 525-527. Cf. Opinion AG Kokott case C-557/12, Kone, para. 23.
249 See the discussion in subsection 2.5.1 above. As was shown there, in its Francovich case 
law the CoJ has set what could perhaps be called the ‘constitutive’ conditions for incur-
ring Member State liability. However that is not the case in its Factortame case law relating 
to interim relief. In the Atlanta case law these conditions were set, but, even if both Fac-
tortame and Atlanta concern interim relief, the situations addressed by both sets of case 
law are to be distinguished, as was also explained in the said discussion.
250 Arguably a fi rst step in this direction was set in CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, 
Manfredi. Still this step seems a hesitant one when compared to the considerably more 
detailed approach set out in in the Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur case law. Indeed, 
some deduce from this lack of details that it is, as yet, too early to speak of a principle of 
private party liability that is comparable to the principle of Member State liability. See 
e.g. Leczykiewicz (2010a), p. 257.
251 Cf. by contrast Opinion AG Geelhoed case C-253/00, Muñoz, where issues such as the 
creation of rights for, the direct (economic) interests of and the legal standing of the pri-
vate party-applicants are discussed in much greater detail.
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tion, as was noted above, the rule laid down in Courage has at least to some 
extent been further fleshed out in later case law. That has so far not been 
the case for Muñoz; in fact, this latter judgment is referred to only rarely.252 
Another difference is that in Courage it is stated that “any individual” can 
rely on a breach of the provision concerned and can thus claim damages.253 
In contrast in Muñoz the Court of Justice seemed careful to specify that the 
applicant was a competitor.254
On the other hand in certain other respects Muñoz has, at least poten-
tially, broader implications than Courage. The former relies less on the fun-
damental importance of the provisions of EU law at issue. Indeed, most 
people would probably not consider common quality standards for agricul-
tural products to be of fundamental or otherwise exceptional importance, 
even if they also affected to some extent the competition between undertak-
ings. Also, unlike the EU competition rules at issue in Courage, the applica-
ble rules were laid down in secondary – and not primary – EU law. Those 
provisions may therefore be difficult to distinguish from other provisions of 
EU law that seek to ensure fair trading and transparency of the market. That 
suggests that the logic of the Muñoz ruling might be applied more broad-
ly.255 At the very least it highlights that the principle of private party liability 
can also apply outside the field of EU competition law (stricto sensu). Muñoz 
furthermore does not merely concern the permissibility of a bar for civil 
proceedings by a specific party in a situation where such proceedings where 
generally already possible under national law, as was the case in Courage. 
Rather it provides that such proceedings should be made possible in a situ-
ation where they were not possible at all under the national law as it stood. 
Nor is Muñoz restricted to actions for damages. It instead concerned the 
bringing of civil proceedings to address an infringement of EU law by a pri-
vate party generally. All this implies a substantial step into the realm of the 
Member States’ procedural autonomy. Indeed, a reference to the principle of 
national procedural autonomy is notably absent in Muñoz.
252 Most notably the private parties in CoJ case C-432/05, Unibet, sought to invoke this rul-
ing. This claim was not explicitly addressed by the CoJ, but the AG rejected it, based on a 
rather narrow reading of Muñoz. See Opinion AG Sharpston case C-432/05, Unibet, 
para. 53.
253 This statement was subsequently complemented in CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to 
C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 61, where it was held that “any individual can claim compensation 
for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or 
practice prohibited under Article [101 TFEU]”. See further para. 214 below.
254 See further para. 343 below.
255  In a similar sense, see Betlem (2003), p. 213.
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66. Finally, concerning the interaction between public and private enforce-
ment, it is noticeable that both in Courage and in Muñoz certain public 
enforcement mechanisms were in place.256 Yet neither of these judgments 
contains any indication that this given plays a particular role in relation to 
the acceptance of the principle of private party liability (other than that the 
latter can complement the former). These cases rather suggest that private 
parties must be able to enforce their rights before the national courts, regard-
less of whether EU or national law provides for a certain form of public 
enforcement of the EU rules in question. In other words, there is no ‘enforce-
ment monopoly’ on the side of public authorities.257 Both Courage and 
Muñoz thus appear to confirm that EU law arrangements on public and pri-
vate enforcement mainly function independently from each other.258
2.5.4. Summary
67. Above the Court’s landmark rulings in Simmenthal, Factortame, Fran-
covich, Courage and Muñoz have been outlined and analysed. Although 
they concern different remedies (setting aside, interim relief, Member State 
liability in damages, private party liability in damages, private party civil 
liability generally), these rulings evidently build on each other. Notably each 
time the importance of private parties being able to effectively enforce their 
rights vested in EU law before national courts, as well as the need to ensure 
the effectiveness and practical effects of EU law generally, takes central 
stage in justifying the EU interference with national law on remedies and 
procedures. Of particular relevance here is the parallel that can be drawn 
between the principle of Member State liability, set out in Francovich, and 
the nascent principle of private party liability, provided for in Courage and 
Muñoz, for infringements of EU law, even if it remains to be clarified how far 
this parallelism goes exactly. There are certain differences between Courage 
and Muñoz, and various questions still remain to be answered as to their 
broader significance, especially where the conditions under which private 
party liability can be incurred are concerned. These two rulings nonetheless 
underline the central importance that is attached in EU law to facilitating (or 
at least not barring) the private enforcement of that law before the national 
courts. They underline that this serves not only the individual interests of 
the parties concerned, but also that this helps to ensure the effectiveness of 
the EU rules at issue per se. In other words, they both rest on a ‘dual vigi-
lance’ logic.
256 In Courage this is not expressly mentioned, but that being a case involving EU competi-
tion law there can be no doubt that specifi c public enforcement mechanisms were in 
place (see further subsection 6.4.2 below). In Muñoz (para. 16 and 19) it is expressly stated 
that public enforcement penalties could be imposed, but that the competent national 
authority refused to act upon the complaints. See also Opinion AG Geelhoed case 
C-253/00, Muñoz, para. 50-55. See also Betlem (2003), p. 213.
257 Cf. Opinion AG Geelhoed case C-253/00, Muñoz, para. 55.
258 See also subsection 2.4.3 above.
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This second part of the study focuses on the selected EU legislation and 
other relevant developments related to EU legislation on private enforce-
ment. It consists of four chapters, each chapter being dedicated to a particu-
lar field of EU law. The present chapter is concerned with the Procurement 
Remedies Directives relating to EU public procurement law. The first section 
below introduces these directives by sketching their background and con-
text. The following two sections then focus more in detail on the content of 
the Procurement Remedies Directives. The remedies set out therein are first 
outlined and analysed, followed by a discussion of the most important pro-
cedural provisions. In the final section attention is paid to other enforcement 
issues, notably certain alternative mechanisms to ensure compliance and 
settle disputes as well as the public enforcement mechanisms.
3.1. Introduction
The first subsection below briefly sketches the background of the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives, with particular regard to the ‘substantive’ EU 
rules on public procurement.1 In the following subsection these directives 
themselves are introduced, particularly by explaining the process leading to 
their adoption and their objective. Next the 2007 revision of the Procurement 
Remedies Directives is discussed, together with the 2014 amendment of the 
EU’s substantive public procurement regime. Finally, three additional gen-
eral remarks are made as regards the broader context in which these direc-
tives operate.
3.1.1. Background and substantive law
68. The economic importance of public procurement is significant. Spend-
ing by public authorities in the EU on the procurement of works, services 
and supplies has been estimated to account for around over 18% of EU’s 
1 The term ‘substantive’ is used here so as to distinguish the rules in question from the 
enforcement-related rules laid down in Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 
92/13. All public procurement rules are however in a sense inherently procedural, in that 
they are in essence concerned with the process of selecting an undertaking for the award 
of a public contract.
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accumulated gross domestic product.2 Traditionally many governments 
used public procurement, to various degrees and in various manners, to 
favour domestic undertakings or to achieve certain national policy objec-
tives. This is clearly often difficult to reconcile with the EU’s efforts to estab-
lish an internal market. Therefore, as from 1971, the EU has stepped in to 
regulate this field. In that year it adopted a first directive on public work 
contracts.3 Over the following decades the EU public procurement regime 
has been replaced, expanded and updated several times.
69. At present there are two general, substantive EU directives on public 
procurement in force. The first is Directive 2004/18 on public procurement 
in the so-called ‘public’ sector (‘Public Sector Procurement Directive’).4 This 
directive covers what could be called ‘regular’ public contracts awarded by 
national, regional or local authorities and semi-public entities of the Member 
States. Typical examples of the types of contracts covered include the con-
struction of a public library, the supply of computers to a municipality or 
the provision of accounting services to a national ministry.5 In addition since 
1990 the substantive EU public procurement regime has been extended so as 
to cover also the ‘utilities’ sectors. To that effect a separate directive has been 
adopted, which is now Directive 2004/17 (‘Utilities Procurement Directive’).6 
The latter covers essentially the same sort of contracts as the Public Sector 
Procurement Directive, but it applies where the contracts are awarded by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors. 
Since 2009 the two abovementioned directives (collectively: ‘Substantive 
Procurement Directives’) are complemented by Directive 2009/81 on pub-
lic procurement in the fields of defence and security (‘Defence Procurement 
Directive’).7
The two Substantive Procurement Directives only apply to contracts the 
estimated value of which exceeds certain threshold values. These thresholds 
are adjusted at regular intervals and vary somewhat between both direc-
tives. At present the thresholds for awards under the Public Sector Procure-
ment Directive stand at approximately € 5 million for public works contracts 
2 Commission, Proposal for New Public Sector Procurement Directive 2014/24, COM(2011) 
896, p. 2.
3 Directive 71/305/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, OJ 1971, L 185/5.
4 Directive 2004/18/EC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supplies contracts and public service contracts, OJ 2004, 
L 134/114.
5 Pursuant to Annex II to Public Sector Procurement Directive 2004/18 not all services are 
fully covered.
6 Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in 
the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ 2004, L 134/1.
7 Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works 
contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in 
the fi elds of defence and security, OJ 2009, L 216/76. On this directive, see further Trybus 
(2013), p. 3.
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and approximately € 130.000 (central government) or € 200.000 (other con-
tracting authorities) for supply and services contracts.8 In practice this latter 
directive is often the more important one. It accounts for around 80% of the 
(published) contract awards, expressed in terms of value.9
70. The Substantive Procurement Directives are largely similar in terms of 
content. As was noted above, they should be understood as part of a broad-
er effort to establish the EU’s internal market. They give concrete expression 
to the ‘fundamental freedoms’ set out in the EU Treaties, in particular the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services relating to the 
exercise of economic activity in another Member State on a permanent and 
a temporary basis respectively.10 Accordingly they have been adopted on 
the basis of Articles 53, 62 and 114 TFEU. In essence these directives seek to 
eliminate barriers to the exercise of the said freedoms, ensure the develop-
ment of effective competition in the award of public contracts and, in so 
doing, to protect the interests of private parties that wish to offer goods or 
services to contracting authorities established in another Member State.11 As 
such the provisions of these directives are in many cases directly effective 
and confer rights on the private parties concerned, as they are intended to 
protect undertakings against arbitrary behaviour on the side of the contract-
ing authority.12
The basic idea is that the contracting authorities covered by these direc-
tives must publish a notice, containing information on the contract that they 
intend to award and inviting interested undertakings to submit a bid. The 
directives further lay down rules for the subsequent contract award proce-
dure, relating inter alia to the applicable times periods, the (pre-)selection of 
tenderers and the criteria to be used for awarding the contract. On the whole 
the Utilities Procurement Directive tends to leave contracting authorities13 
8 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1336/2013 amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/
EC and 2009/81/EC in respect of the application thresholds for the procedures for the 
award of contracts, OJ 2013, L 335/17.
9 Commission, Annual public procurement implementation review 2012, SWD(2012) 342, 
p. 10.
10 Cf. Drijber & Stergiou (2009), p. 805.
11 CoJ case 31/87, Beentjes, para. 21 and 42; CoJ case C-433/93, Commission v. Germany, 
para. 19; CoJ joined cases C-20/01 and C-28/01, Commission v. Germany, para. 35; CoJ case 
C-507/03, Commission v. Ireland, para. 27-28.
12 See e.g. CoJ case C-433/93, Commission v. Germany, para. 18; CoJ case C-54/96, Dorsch 
Consult, para. 44-45. As noted by Prechal (2005), pp. 110 and 122, this appears to come 
close to a statement that they confer rights. See also Opinion AG Bot case C-19/13, Fast-
web, para. 43. See further Fernández Martín (1996), pp. 200-201; Arrowsmith (2005), 
pp. 161-162 and 1393; Trepte (2007), p. 537; Pijnacker Hordijk, Van der Bend & Van 
Nouhuys (2009), pp. 20-21. On the relationship between direct effect and the conferral of 
rights more generally, see para. 31 above.
13 ‘Contracting authority’ is the term used in Public Sector Procurement Directive 2004/18 
(Art. 1(9)). Utilities Procurement Directive 2004/17 refers to ‘contracting entities’ (Art. 2). 
For practical reasons the former term is used in this study to indicate all bodies covered 
by the substantive EU procurement rules.
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somewhat more flexibility in this respect than its sibling, the Public Sector 
Remedies Directive.
3.1.2. Procurement Remedies Directives: proposals, adoption and objective
71. Having adopted substantive rules on public procurement at EU level 
at a relatively early stage, over the years it became clear that compliance with 
these rules left much to be desired. In concrete terms infringements of these 
rules can take many forms. A public contract can for instance be awarded 
directly, i.e. without any prior publication and competition, contrary to 
what is required as a general rule under the Substantive Procurement 
Directives. Other infringements can consist of the preferential treatment of 
certain tenderers, for example by providing them with more information, 
ranking their bids higher without objective justification or the unjustified 
exclusion of an undertaking from the contract award procedure. The Com-
mission’s 1985 white paper on completing the internal market observed 
that the application of substantive EU law on public procurement was 
“minimal”.14 Moreover it also appeared that the private parties affected by 
such infringements only sparsely took legal action to remedy the conse-
quences thereof.15
72. Therefore in 1987 the Commission published a proposal for a directive, 
which it amended a year later.16 Here it expanded on the general lack of 
compliance with the substantive EU public procurement rules. It noted that 
“both national and [EU] monitoring arrangements are unable to ensure strict com-
pliance with the [Substantive Procurement Directives], in particular before viola-
tion of those rules becomes irreparable”.17 The Commission also highlighted 
the particular challenges encountered in a public procurement context. It 
stated that “infringements […] generally occur before the definitive award of the 
contract. Since contract award procedures are of short duration – a decision being 
taken within a few weeks – any failure to comply with the [EU] rules in question 
needs to be dealt with urgently and rapidly. Further, most such infringements dif-
fer from other types in that the irregularity committed is procedural. A procedural 
irregularity may be enough to exclude an enterprise from a given award procedure, 
and this encourages discriminatory practices”.18 In conclusion it was said that, 
“with a view to the optimal functioning of the internal market and in order for 
the [EU] rules on the award of public contracts to have real impact and change 
mentalities”, it must be ensured that the private parties concerned have easy 
14 Commission, White paper on completing the internal market, COM(85) 310, p. 25.
15 Cf. Study Cleary Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton (1988).
16 Commission, Proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, COM(87) 134; Com-
mission, Amended proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, COM(88) 733.
17 Commission, Amended proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, COM(88) 
733, p. 6.
18 Ibid., p. 7.
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access to effective remedies at the national level.19 To this end the proposed 
directive aimed to “ensure minimum coordination and strengthen national pro-
cedures by the courts […] so as to ensure that the rules of public contracts are cor-
rectly applied”.20
This Commission’s proposal was not uncontroversial however. In the 
course of the law-making process it was the object of rather intense and 
lengthy discussions in Council (which at the time was the sole legislator) 
and it underwent considerable modifications.21 Member States objected for 
instance to the proposed powers for the Commission to intervene directly at 
national level in cases of alleged infringements of the EU procurement rules, 
further discussed below.22 Another controversial issue was the fear that the 
proposed review procedures might lead to abuses by ‘cowboy tenderers’ 
without a meritorious claim.23
73. This proposal nonetheless eventually led to the adoption in 1989 of the 
Public Sector Remedies Directive.24 It applies to contracts in the ‘public’ sec-
tor, as described above.25 Having adopted a substantive directive relating to 
the utilities sector in 1990, it was furthermore clear to the Commission that 
“[t]he availability of adequate remedies and control procedures is as important in 
the hitherto ‘excluded sectors’ as it is in the general field of public procurement”.26 
In that same year it therefore submitted a proposal for a second directive to 
complement the Public Sector Remedies Directive.27 After its adoption in 
1992 this became the Utilities Remedies Directive.28 The latter covers contracts 
awarded by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal ser-
vices sectors.
The Utilities Remedies Directive seeks to take account of the particu-
lar characteristics of the entities operating in the utilities sectors that it 
covers.29 For that reason it contains a number of specific provisions that 
generally allow for more flexibility, as compared to its sibling, the Public 
Sector Remedies Directive.30 The two above directives (collectively: ‘Pro-
curement Remedies Directives’) are however similar in many respects.31 
19 Ibid., p. 8.
20 Ibid., p. 10.
21 Fernández Martín (1996), p. 206. As regards the legislative history of this directive more 
generally, see Hebly (2011), pp. 5-262.
22 See para. 104 below.
23 Gormley (1997), p. 157.
24 Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665.
25 See para. 69 above.
26 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, p. 8.
27 Ibid.
28 Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13.
29 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, p. 9.
30 The same can be said of the remedies regime set out in Defence Procurement Directive 
2009/81.
31 Cf. CoJ case C-455/08, Commission v. Ireland, para. 26.
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They are therefore treated jointly in this study; they are distinguished only 
where there is a particular reason for doing so, notably where one of them 
contains a provision that has not been included in the other directive.32 
Both directives were adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, i.e. the pro-
vision of the EU Treaties that allows for the adoption of secondary EU law 
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.33
74. The Procurement Remedies Directives provide that the existing 
arrangements at national and EU level for ensuring the “effective application” 
of the Substantive Procurement Directives are “not always adequate to ensure 
compliance”, which in turn could deter undertakings from other Member 
States from participating in contract award procedures.34 These directives 
therefore seek to ensure that “effective and rapid remedies” are available in 
case of infringements.35 As the Court of Justice has clarified, the objective of 
the Procurement Remedies Directives is “to guarantee the existence of effec-
tive remedies for infringements of [EU] law in the field of public procurement or of 
the national rules implementing that law, so as to ensure the effective application 
of the [Substantive Procurement Directives]”.36 At other occasions the Court 
formulated this objective somewhat differently however, namely “to ensure 
that unlawful decisions taken by the contracting authorities may be reviewed effec-
tively and as rapidly as possible”.37
3.1.3. Revisions
75. In 2007 the two Procurement Remedies Directives were substantially 
revised, which resulted in their amendment through Directive 2007/66 (‘Pro-
curement Remedies Amending Directive’).38 This time the legislative pro-
32 For the same reasons the case law cited in this study, which typically relates to only one of 
these two directives, is ‘generalised’, in the sense that it is also understood to relate to the 
other directive. Where the numbering of the articles is different in these two directives, 
this is specifi cally indicated in the footnotes.
33 On Art. 114 TFEU and legal basis generally, see further subsection 10.1.1 below.
34 Recitals 1, 2 and 4 Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665. See also recitals 1-3 Utilities 
Remedies Directive 92/13.
35 Recital 3 Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665. See also recital 6 Utilities Remedies 
Directive 92/13.
36 CoJ case C-406/08, Uniplex, par 26. See e.g. also CoJ case C-392/93, British Telecom, 
para. 26; CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz, para. 33, 39 and 43.
37 CoJ case C-455/08, Commission v. Ireland, para. 26; CoJ case C444/06, Commission v. Spain, 
para. 44; CoJ case C-100/12, Fastweb, para. 25.
38 Directive 2007/66/EC amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with 
regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of pub-
lic contracts, OJ 2007, L 335/31. On this revision, see further Wilman (2008), p. 115; Bel 
(2008), p. 106; Golding & Henty (2008), p. 146; Williams (2008), p. NA19.
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cess was on the whole relatively swift.39 This revision generally aimed to 
“give greater encouragement to [EU] enterprises to tender in any Member State of 
the [EU] by providing them with the certainty that they can, if need be, effectively 
seek effective review if their interests seem to have been adversely affected in proce-
dures for awarding contracts”, with a view to “prompt[ing] awarding authorities 
to adopt better publication and tendering procedures for the benefit of all 
involved”.40 It follows that the overall objective of the Procurement Remedies 
Directives remained essentially unchanged after their revision. As was the 
case when the first of these directives was adopted, the possibility of an 
increase in ‘nuisance actions’ was also considered in relation to this revision. 
The Commission considered this risk to be limited however.41 The amend-
ments proposed by the Commission as part of this revision were rather nar-
rowly focused. The precise amendments finally adopted are discussed in 
further detail in the following. Suffice to note here that this amendment 
essentially sought to address the following two main shortcomings.42
The first was the problem of ‘illegal direct awards’. This refers to the situ-
ation where a public contract is awarded, contrary to the Substantive Pro-
curement Directives, to an undertaking without any preceding publication 
and competition having taken place.43 The Court of Justice had earlier iden-
tified this as the most serious type of infringement of EU public procure-
ment law.44 Such infringements are often difficult to detect, both for the 
Commission and for a private party that might wish to contest the decision 
to ‘directly’ award the contract. After all no publication or other form of 
transparency has taken place. The second main shortcoming identified was 
the so-called ‘race to signature’. This refers to the situation where, upon the 
completion of a contract award procedure, an aggrieved private party has 
brought or intends bringing a case, for instance challenging the decision to 
award the contract at issue to a competitor, but the contract is concluded 
anyhow before that dispute is resolved. Before the 2007 revision of the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives, in most Member States concluded contracts 
were in principle to be respected, even where they were the result of a con-
tract award procedure that was not compliant with EU public procurement 
39 Agreement between the co-legislators was reached in fi rst reading of the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure. At the outset the Commission had noted that “virtual consensus” existed 
among Member States and interested parties alike at least as regards the main problems 
to tackled. See Commission, Proposal for Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 
2007/66, COM(2006) 195, p. 4. The Commission’s proposal has been criticised in the legal 
doctrine however for imposing an unnecessary and inappropriate degree of uniformity. 
See e.g. Arrowsmith (2005), p. 1438. As regards the legislative history of this directive 
more generally, see further Hebly (2011), pp. 543-860.
40 Commission, Proposal for Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66, 
COM(2006) 195, p. 2.
41 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, p. 30.
42 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
43 See para. 75 above.
44 CoJ case C-26/03, Stadt Halle, para. 37.
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law.45 And even where national law allowed for the setting aside of con-
cluded contracts, claims to this effect were still found to be often rejected on 
the basis of a balance of convenience test applied by the national court 
seised. As a consequence in such a case the contract award decision can in 
effect not be reviewed – and annulled where necessary – at the pre-contrac-
tual stage. All that then remains for the aggrieved private party concerned is 
the possibility of bringing an action for damages.
76. In addition in 2011 the Commission published proposals for another 
revision, this time of the Substantive Procurement Directives.46 This led in 
2014 to the adoption of two new substantive directives, i.e. Directive 2014/24 
on public procurement (‘New Public Sector Procurement Directive’) and 
Directive 2014/25 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors (‘New Utilities Procurement Direc-
tive’). These two new directives, which are to be transposed into national 
law by April 2016, repeal and replace the abovementioned current Substan-
tive Procurement Directives.47
For the present purposes three points are of importance in this connec-
tion. First, while these new directives imply certain significant changes to 
the substantive rules in question, the main structure and objective of those 
rules, outlined above, remains unaltered. Second, an entirely new directive 
was also adopted, i.e. Directive 2014/23 on the award of concession con-
tracts (‘Concessions Awards Directive’).48 This latter directive is concerned 
with the award of a particular type of public contracts that had hitherto 
largely remained unregulated as a matter of secondary EU law. Not only 
does this imply a widening of the scope of the EU legislation in this regard, 
the Concessions Awards Directive also involves an amendment of the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives so as to adapt the latter to the amended sub-
stantive regime, bringing also infringements of the Concessions Awards 
Directive within their scope.49 Lastly, while (apart from the aforementioned 
amendment) this revision of the EU’s substantive rules on public procure-
45 As was e.g. the case in the Netherlands pursuant to national case law (HR case 16747, 
Uneto v. De Vliert).
46 See Commission, Proposal for New Utilities Procurement Directive 2014/25, COM(2011) 
895; Commission, Proposal for New Public Sector Procurement Directive 2014/24, 
COM(2011) 896; Commission, Proposal for Concessions Awards Directive 2014/23, 
COM(2011) 897. On this revision and the resulting proposals, see further Commission, 
Green paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy, COM(2011) 15; 
Kotsonis (2011a), p. NA51; Williams (2012), p. NA101.
47 Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement, OJ 2014, L 94/65; Directive 2014/25/EU 
on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors, OJ 2014, L 94/243. On the latter directive, see further Kotsonis (2014), p. 169.
48 Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts, OJ 2014, L 94/1. On this 
directive, see further Craven (2014), p. 188.
49 See Art. 46 and 47 Concessions Awards Directive 2014/23.
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ment expressly leave the Procurement Remedies Directives unaffected,50 the 
new directives acknowledge that “there is still considerable room for improve-
ment in the application of the [EU] procurement rules”.51 Against this back-
ground they contain certain public enforcement-related provisions, which 
are further discussed below.52
3.1.4. Additional general remarks
77. A first additional remark concerns the fact that the Procurement Rem-
edies Directives provide for common rules on review procedures for public 
procurement disputes inevitably implies that the Member States’ scope for 
autonomous decision-making is reduced in this respect. Where necessary, 
Member States had to amend their existing national laws so as to ensure 
compliance with these directives. Nevertheless efforts were made to respect 
existing national practices as much as possible.53 As the Commission high-
lighted in 1990, “[c]onsiderable flexibility is left for the Member States to imple-
ment the directive’s requirements in accordance with their particular approaches to 
administrative and judicial review, including the procedural and other conditions 
applying to such remedies [so as to] facilitate the insertion of the new remedies into 
existing national structures”.54 Similarly at the time of the 2007 revision it stat-
ed that “Member States will retain their power to appoint bodies responsible for the 
review procedures and to maintain the national procedural rules applicable to such 
reviews (respect for the Member States’ procedural autonomy)”.55
On many points this translates into the wording of the Procurement 
Remedies Directives. For example, as is discussed in further detail below, a 
significant number of the measures provided for are merely optional or can 
be implemented in various manners.56 Accordingly, as the Court of Justice 
noted, these directives leave “Member States discretion in the choice of the pro-
cedural safeguards it provides, and the formalities relating thereto”.57 The har-
monisation established is thus ‘partial’; it does not entail ‘complete’ (or 
‘maximum’) harmonisation.58 That means inter alia that, without prejudice 
to their obligations to comply with the requirements of these directives and 
50 Recital 122 New Public Sector Directive 2014/24; recital 128 New Utilities Procurement 
Directive 2014/25.
51 Recital 121 New Public Sector Directive 2014/24; recital 127 New Utilities Procurement 
Directive 2014/25.
52 See para. 105 below.
53 Cf. Commission, Report on the impact and effectiveness of EU public procurement legis-
lation, SEC(2011) 853, p. 73. See also Weiss (1993), p. 104; Bovis (2007), p. 370; Trepte 
(2007), pp. 530 and 544.
54 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, p. 15.
55 Commission, Proposal for Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66, 
COM(2006) 195, p. 7.
56 See e.g. Art. 1(4), 1(5), 2b, 2d(2) and 2d(3) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 
92/13.
57 CoJ case C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker, para. 57.
58 CoJ case C-570/08, Simvoulio, para. 37.
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to respect EU law generally, Member States are entitled to lay down further-
going rules on the issues covered by these directives.
78. Certain particularities of public procurement law and the disputes relat-
ing thereto should also be highlighted. An obvious point is that, although 
there are certain limited exceptions,59 this field of law concerns rules that 
regulate the relationship between a (semi-)public body on the one hand and 
one or more private parties (undertakings) on the other hand. In many 
national jurisdictions such relationships are subject to a particular legal 
regime, which can however differ considerably in terms of content and char-
acter across the EU.60 In particular, in many Member States, such as Ger-
many, France, Spain and Belgium, this field of law is regulated by a mixture 
of administrative and civil law. This typically means that decisions up to 
and including the stage of the award of the contract are subject to review by 
the administrative courts, while disputes related to the execution of the con-
tract, liability and claims for damages are subject to civil law. But there are 
also jurisdictions, for instance in England and the Netherlands, where 
review is in principle exercised only by the civil courts.
Disputes relating to contract award procedures furthermore generally 
concern more than two parties. The very aim of these procedures is after all 
to have several undertakings competing for the public contract at issue. This 
implies that in many disputes account must also be taken of the legitimate 
interests of third parties, normally the other (potential) tenderers whose bid 
was either not successful or who were not allowed to submit a bid in the 
first place. Speed is often also a key concern.61 Swift resolution of public 
procurement disputes, notably before the conclusion of the public contract 
at issue, means that the aggrieved undertaking or undertakings can still 
have a chance to win the contract. It also means that the contract award pro-
cedure – and consequently the award and execution of the contract – is not 
too much delayed because of the dispute, which is generally in the interest 
of all parties concerned. There will moreover normally be a public interest of 
some sort at stake in the execution of the contract. One could think of the 
interests related to the timely completion of public infrastructural works or 
the timely supply of certain goods to a hospital or a school. This circum-
stance may have an important impact on the outcome of a case, in particular 
where a balance of convenience test is applied, as the public interests of this 
kind could quickly be seen as outweighing the ‘individual’ interests of the 
aggrieved private parties concerned.
59 Substantive Procurement Directives 2004/17 and 2004/18 sometimes also cover private 
undertakings. See e.g. Art. 56 Public Sector Procurement Directive 2004/18 on conces-
sionaires and Art. 2(2)(b) Utilities Procurement Directive 2004/17 on undertakings oper-
ating on the basis of special or exclusive rights.
60 See further Bovis (2007), pp. 381-397; Hebly, De Boer & Wilman (2007), p. 155; Treumer & 
Lichère (2011), pp. 105-328. See also Study Italian Authority for the Supervision of Public 
Contracts (2010).
61 See also para. 78 above.
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79. The EU’s Procurement Remedies Directives should further be under-
stood in their international context. This context consists in particular of the 
relevant instrument of the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) in this field, 
i.e. the Agreement on Government Procurement (‘GPA’). The GPA is an 
international agreement to which, besides countries such as the United 
States, Canada, South Korea and Switzerland, both the EU and its Member 
States are a party.62 It is the successor of an earlier agreement concluded in 
1979 in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(‘GATT’).63 Negotiations on the new agreement started in 1986 and were 
concluded in 1994.64 The GPA entered into force in 1996.65 The main objec-
tives and means of the substantive procurement rules set out in the GPA are 
comparable to those of the EU.
Most importantly for the present purposes, the GPA also contains spe-
cific provisions on so-called ‘challenge procedures’.66 It thus also gives pri-
vate parties a role in enforcing the substantive rules at issue. This character-
istic sets this international agreement apart from its predecessor and most 
other WTO agreements.67 This GPA framework for challenge procedures 
could be called a slimmed-down version of the EU’s regime established in 
the Procurement Remedies Directives. It leaves the countries concerned sig-
nificant space to provide for a system that is consistent with their respective 
legal, constitutional and administrative traditions.68 Nonetheless it lays 
down a number of key obligations. There is a general obligation to “provide 
non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and effective procedures enabling suppliers 
to challenge alleged breaches of the [GPA] arising in the context of procurements in 
which they have, or have had, an interest”. The GPA also clarifies that limitation 
periods can be set for undertakings that wish to make use of these proce-
dures, with a minimum length of 10 days. Such disputes must either be 
dealt with before a court or an impartial and independent review body. In 
terms of remedies, “rapid interim measures to correct breaches of the [GPA] and 
to preserve commercial opportunities” must be made available under the GPA. 
62 Given the diverging range of obligations and its optional nature under WTO law, the 
GPA is effectively rather a series of bilateral treaties than a single multilateral arrange-
ment. See Arrowsmith (2005), p. 1330.
63 Decision 80/271/EEC concerning the conclusion of the Multilateral Agreements result-
ing from the 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations, OJ 1980, L 71/1.
64 See Decision 94/800/EC concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Commu-
nity, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay 
Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994), OJ 1994, L 336/1.
65 In March 2012 agreement was reached on the revision of the GPA. Pursuant to this revi-
sion some of the GPA provisions referred to above are clarifi ed, but not substantially 
altered. On this revision, see further Zhang (2011), p. 483; Anderson (2012), p. 83; Wil-
liams (2014), p. NA 29.
66 Art. III and XX GPA. These challenge procedures apply in addition to the ‘regular’ WTO 
dispute settlement regime, which is essentially an intergovernmental affair, provided for 
in Art. XXII GPA.
67 Arrowsmith (2003), p. 385.
68 Ibid.
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Here it is added that “[s]uch action may result in suspension of the procurement 
process”, although “[o]verriding adverse consequences for the interests concerned, 
including the public interest may be taken into account in deciding whether these 
measures should be applied”. The remedies further include “correction of the 
breach of the [GPA] or compensation for the loss or damages suffered, which may be 
limited to costs for tender preparation or protest”.
3.2. Remedies
Having sketched the background of the Procurement Remedies Directives 
in the foregoing section, attention now turns to their content. As their (short-
hand) name indicates, a set of remedies lies at the heart of the Procurement 
Remedies Directives. The relevance of these remedies depends in particular 
on the stage that the contract award procedure is in, especially whether or 
not that procedure has already led to the conclusion of the public contract at 
issue. The first subsection below concentrates on the remedies relating to the 
pre-contractual stage, i.e. interim measures and the setting aside of unlawful 
decisions. The following two subsections subsequently discuss two reme-
dies that are primarily of relevance in the stage after the conclusion of the 
contract, namely actions for damages and a contractual remedy that can 
lead to concluded public contracts being considered ineffective.
3.2.1. Interim measures and setting aside injunctions
80. Concerning the pre-contractual stage, the two Procurement Remedies 
Directives provide that the competent national courts (or the other review 
bodies designated by the Member State concerned69) must, in the first place, 
have the power to take “at the earliest opportunity and by way of interlocutory 
procedures, interim measures with the aim of correcting the alleged infringements 
or preventing further damage to the interests concerned”. These interim measures 
do not finally determine the legal situation, but rather provide for a provi-
sional arrangement.70 Pursuant to the directives this power must include in 
any case the possibility to suspend on-going contract award procedures or 
the implementation of any decision taken by the contracting authority.71
69 On these directives’ rules on the forum before which applications for review must be 
brought, see further para. 98 below. For reasons of simplicity, in the above reference is 
made only to ‘courts’.
70 Cf. CoJ case C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker, para. 61.
71 Art. 2(1)(a) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. Cf. Art. 2(4) Public Sec-
tor Remedies Directive 89/665 and Art. 2(3a) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/12, which 
provide that the initiation of review procedures generally need not necessarily have auto-
matic suspensive effect.
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The directives further expressly provide that a balance of interests test is 
permissible in this connection.72 Accordingly, when deciding on an applica-
tion for interim measures, account may be taken of the probable conse-
quences of these measures for all interests likely to be harmed as well as the 
public interest. Where the negative consequences could exceed the benefits, 
it may be decided not to grant the measures, without prejudice to any other 
claim that the private party-applicant in question may bring. The applica-
tion of this test can be problematic in practice however, in the sense that the 
national courts seised can tend to give greater weight to the public interests 
that may be at stake (related to not endangering or delaying the completion 
of the public contract in question) than to the ‘private’ interests of the pri-
vate party-applicant.73 In 1996 an EU-wide study found that this could be an 
important impediment to the availability of this remedy.74 The Commission 
noted a similar tendency in the context of the 2007 revision, without how-
ever proposing addressing this concern through legislative amendments.75
The Court of Justice has clarified that it is in principle permissible for a 
national court to take account of the chances of success of an action on the 
merits when deciding an application for interim measures under the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives, in light of the absence of any express EU 
rules on this matter and the EU law principle of effectiveness.76 On the other 
hand, it has held that an application for interim measures cannot be made 
dependent on the applicant previously having brought proceedings on the 
merits, even where the latter is a mere formality.77
81. In the second place, under the Procurement Remedies Directives the 
competent courts must be empowered to set aside unlawful decisions of the 
contracting authority. One could think of a decision to award the contract to 
a particular party, or to exclude a tenderer, in violation of the Substantive 
Procurement Directives. These directives specify that this power to set aside 
unlawful decision includes the possible removal of discriminatory technical, 
economic or financial specifications in the tender documents.78 This addi-
tion can be of significant relevance in practice. For the setting of such speci-
fications can be an (indirect) means to prevent undertakings from other 
Member States from participating or having a fair chance in a contract 
award procedure. Examples of such unlawful specifications include the 
specification in the tender documents of the name of a particular product or 
72 Art. 2(5) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665; Art. 2(4) Utilities Remedies Directive 
92/13.
73 See also para. 78 above.
74 Study Herbert Smith (1996), pp. 10-11.
75 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, p. 15.
76 CoJ Order case C-424/01, CS Communications, para. 26-33.
77 CoJ case C-214/00, Commission v. Spain, para. 99-100. See also CoJ case C-236/95, Commis-
sion v. Greece, para. 11.
78 Art. 2(1)(b) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
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the requirement of a particular environmental certificate, without making it 
clear that equivalent products or certificates are also allowed.79
82. Lastly, the Utilities Remedies Directive – but not the Public Sector Rem-
edies Directive – offers the Member States an alternative for the two above-
mentioned remedies, i.e. interim measures and the setting-aside of unlawful 
decisions. Instead of these two remedies Member States may provide for the 
power to take “other measures” with the aim of correcting any identified 
infringement and preventing injury to the interests concerned. This could 
concern making an order for the payment of “a particular sum” in cases 
where the infringement has not been corrected or prevented.80 This arrange-
ment has been introduced because the aforementioned remedies were con-
sidered to directly affect the decision-making of the entities operating in the 
utilities sector covered by this directive. That was seen as unacceptable, 
given the autonomy that these entities enjoy in the legal systems of certain 
Member States.81
The Commission’s proposal originally stipulated that the amount of this 
sum should be not less than 1% of the value of the contract at issue, so as to 
ensure a minimum level of deterrence. However this suggestion was reject-
ed by the Council.82 Instead a more general provision has been included, 
which states that this sum should be set “at a level high enough to dissuade the 
contracting entity from committing or persisting in an infringement”.83 The Court 
of Justice later clarified that a Member State could decide to leave it to its 
judiciary to set this sum on a case-by-case basis.84
3.2.2. Actions for damages
83. The Procurement Remedies Directives also provide for two forms of 
relief that are of particular relevance in the post-contractual stage, i.e. after 
the contested contract has been concluded. One of these is the possibility for 
the competent court to award damages. To this end the directives quite sim-
ply state that Member States must ensure that the measures taken concern-
ing the review procedures include provision for powers to “award damages to 
79 CoJ case C-359/93, Commission v. Netherlands, para. 28; CoJ case C-368/10, Commission v. 
Netherlands, para. 70.
80 Art. 2(1)(c) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13.
81 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, pp. 11-12; 
Commission, Amended proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(91) 158, 
pp. 6 and 8.
82 Council, doc. 7333/91, p. 5.
83 Art. 2(5) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13. At the time of the adoption of this directive 
the Council and the Commission stated that payment of this sum to an entity that is 
directly or indirectly linked to the contracting authority through a common budget is not 
to be considered dissuasive. See Council, doc. 7250/91, p. 3.
84 CoJ case C-225/97, Commission v. France, para. 23-28.
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persons harmed by an infringement”.85 While this provision is common to both 
directives, there is a difference between them where actions for damages are 
concerned.
84. On the one hand the Public Sector Remedies Directive contains no further 
guidance on issues such as the heads of damages to be compensated, the 
procedures to be followed or the criteria to be applied. The Commission had 
made a (modest) suggestion in its initial proposal for this directive in 1987. 
It mentioned as heads of damages ”costs of unnecessary studies, foregone profits 
and lost opportunities”.86 But this part of the proposal was not retained by the 
EU legislature (at that time only the Council).
85. On the other hand the situation is to some extent different under the 
Utilities Remedies Directive, which, as was noted above, was adopted a few 
years after the Public Sector Remedies Directive. In addition to the above-
mentioned general provision on damages claims, it is specified there that, 
where a claim is made for damages representing the costs of preparing a bid or 
of participating in an award procedure, the applicant shall be required “only 
to prove an infringement of [EU] law in the field of procurement or national rules 
implementing that law and that he would have had a real chance of winning the 
contract and that, as a consequence of that infringement, that chance was adversely 
affected”.87 The industrial and commercial public service character of the 
utilities was deemed to make it more difficult for private parties to obtain 
the pre-contractual forms of relief discussed in the previous subsection. As 
the Commission explained in its proposal, the above provision on bidding 
costs therefore seeks to ensure that in all Member States claims for damages 
are a practical proposition and thus a genuine incentive to compliance.88 The 
essence is that aggrieved private parties need not to proof that they would 
have been awarded the contract but for the infringement in order to receive 
compensation for their bidding costs.89 Providing such proof was consid-
ered extremely difficult in many cases. Instead these private parties must 
‘only’ demonstrate that they had a real chance of winning the contract at 
issue in order for them to be awarded damages.
85 Art. 2(1)(c) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665; Art. 2(1)(d) Utilities Remedies 
Directive 92/13. Pursuant to Art. 2(6) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665 and Art. 
2(1) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13 the Member States may further provide that, 
where damages are claimed on the grounds that a decision was taken unlawfully, the 
contested decision must fi rst be set aside.
86 Commission, Proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, COM(87) 134, p. 7 
(Art. 1(3)). This aspect of the proposal was not explained in the explanatory memoran-
dum. It was not retained in the amended proposal.
87 Art. 2(7) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13.
88 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, pp. 12-13.
89 Cf. the statement made to this effect by the Council and the Commission, laid down in 
Council, doc. 7250/91, p. 4.
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In its proposal for the Utilities Remedies Directive the Commission had 
originally proposed going a step further, by specifying that the amount of 
these bidding costs would be deemed to be at least 1% of the value of the 
contract.90 It had called this “a limited step designed to ensure that in all Member 
States claims for damages are a realistic possibility”. According to the Commis-
sion, this would be sufficient to meet the EU’s immediate objectives in this 
field. It acknowledged that claims for other losses not covered here, such as 
lost profits, raise “complex issues” and would “for the time being” continue to 
be resolved under national law. It further stated that a high level of har-
monisation of the quantification of damages would “certainly encounter dif-
ficulties” and therefore was “an unrealistic objective”, at least at that stage (i.e. 
in 1990), while adding that in the longer term it would have to be considered 
whether further action at EU level would be necessary. Even this limited 
step as regards the ex ante quantification of certain damages proved to be a 
bridge too far however. It was deleted in the amended Commission pro-
posal at the request of the European Parliament.91 The latter argued that the 
amount of damages should be determined in each individual case, as bid-
ding costs cannot be linked to the value of the contract at issue.92
86. In its 1996 green paper on public procurement in the EU the Commis-
sion returned to the issue of actions for damages for infringements of EU 
public procurement law under the Procurement Remedies Directives.93 Cer-
tain discrepancies and shortcomings were noted as regards the relevant provi-
sions of national law implementing the directives. In particular, the green 
paper pointed to diverging rules and difficulties in practice as regards the 
provision of proof and the quantum of damages. National courts were said 
to sometimes only award symbolic damages or compensation of the bid-
ding costs. The Commission therefore floated the idea of making provision 
for “liquidated damages of a sufficiently dissuasive sum, exceeding the damage 
suffered”. Yet in its 1998 follow-up communication it did not further elab-
orate on this these issues,94 despite the fact that around the same time a 
study, prepared at the Commission’s request, had found that “no more than 
a handful” of damages cases had arisen in the Member States.95 That was 
found to be the case even in Member States where other forms of public 
procurement-related litigation was not unusual. This general lack of actions 
for damages under the Procurement Remedies Directives was attributed to 
90 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, pp. 13 and 
19.
91 See Commission, Amended proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(91) 
158, p. 19. Here it is simply stated that the extent of damages payable is to be determined 
by national law.
92 See European Parliament, Opinion on the proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 
92/13, OJ 1991, C 106/82.
93 Commission, Green paper on public procurement in the EU, COM(96) 583, pp. 15 and 19.
94 Commission, Communication on public procurement in the EU, COM(1998) 143.
95 Study Herbert Smith (1996), p. 18. See also Brown (1998), p. 93; Treumer (2006), p. 159.
para. 87 Chapter 3. Public procurement law p. 89
several factors, i.e.: the fact that such proceedings tend to be formalised, 
costly and time-consuming; the out-of-court settlement of such disputes; 
uncertainty especially as regards the quantification of damages; and the dif-
ficulty of proving that, but for the infringement, the applicant would in all 
likelihood have won the contract, as required in some jurisdictions.
On the whole it appears that in public procurement litigation private 
party-applicants prefer the remedies that are available at the pre-contractual 
stage, discussed in the previous subsection (interim measures and setting-
aside injunctions). A relevant factor in this regard is likely to be that, as is 
widely acknowledged, undertakings are mostly interested in winning the 
contract, rather than engaging in lengthy legal proceedings or obtaining 
damages awards.96 The aforementioned remedies are generally better suited 
from that perspective. Another relevant factor is that the chances of success 
of damages claims are generally considered to be rather limited and, where 
such a claim is successful, the amount of damages awarded is often seen as 
too low to offset the damage actually suffered and the legal costs incurred.97 
It has further been suggested that the generally limited manner in which the 
Procurement Remedies Directives’ provisions on damages claims have been 
transposed into national law by the Member States also plays a role in this 
respect.98 Against this background, legal scholars and practitioners alike 
have over the years called for including more detailed provisions in these 
directives.99
87. In the context of the aforementioned 2007 revision of the Procurement 
Remedies Directives the Commission once more assessed the existing 
regime as regards actions for damages for infringements of EU public pro-
curement law.100 It noted that the numbers of actions for damages brought 
remained very low, certainly when compared to the other available remedies. 
Although there can be notable differences between the various jurisdictions, 
and more recently there appears to have been a modest increase, other 
reports largely confirm this assessment.101 Here the Commission took the 
view that these actions suffer from certain inherent limits. It pointed, among 
other things, to the lack of real corrective effects. This refers to the fact that, 
96 Commission, Amended proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(91) 158, 
p. 13. See also Fernández Martín (1996), p. 213; Trepte (2007), pp. 562-563; Bowsher & 
Moser (2006), p. 196; Caranta (2011a), p. 87; Fairgrieve & Lichère (2011), p. 193.
97 Cf. Commission, Responses to the consultation on the operation of national review pro-
cedures in the fi eld of public procurement, 2004 (undertakings and lawyers). See e.g. also 
Fairgrieve & Lichère (2011), pp. 192-194.
98 Treumer (2006), p. 162. On the situation in several Member States, see Bowsher & Moser 
(2006), p. 195; Lichère (2006), p. 171; Ruch-Larsen (2006), p. 179; Slavicek (2006), p. 223; 
Fairgrieve & Lichère (2011).
99 E.g. Fernández Martín (1996), pp. 213-215; Treumer (2006), p. 164; Trepte (2007), p. 558.
100 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, pp. 12-14 and 16-17. On this revision, see also para. 75 above.
101 Caranta (2011a), pp. 87-88; Fairgrieve & Lichère (2011), p. 192; Treumer (2011a), pp. 149-
150. As regards the Netherlands, see also Hebly & Wilman (2010), p. 326.
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even if the claim is successful, the private party concerned will still not win 
the contract. These private parties may moreover feel – correctly or not – 
that they would compromise their future business relationship with the con-
tracting authority concerned if he were to initiate legal action (‘don’t bite the 
hand that feeds you’; fear of ‘blacklisting’).102 The fact that this would evi-
dently be at odds with the EU procurement rules does not necessarily make 
this fear less real in practice, as is widely acknowledged both in reports 
based on field research103 and in the legal literature more generally.104 In its 
assessment the Commission noted that this fear limits the deterrent effect of 
actions for damages. It further acknowledged the practical difficulties asso-
ciated with bring this type of actions, such as the aforementioned compara-
tively low chances of success and modest amounts awarded. In this connec-
tion it observed that under most national laws applicants must prove that 
they either would have won, or at least had a serious chance of winning, the 
disputed contract. Providing such proof is often difficult.105 These problems 
may be even more pressing in cases of illegal direct awards, given the inher-
ent lack of transparency in those cases.106 It was further noted that damages 
claims constitute actions on the merits, to be brought before ordinary courts. 
As such, unlike actions for most actions for interim relief, they can last for 
years and incur high legal costs.
That being so, the Commission considered that “damages, in the specific 
context of public procurement procedures, present a less attractive or efficient means 
of sanction than pre-contractual remedies”.107 It added that making actions for 
damages a realistic and deterrent ‘threat’ for contracting authorities would 
involve a rather far-going overhaul of the Procurement Remedies Directives. 
This could be achieved by removing or relaxing the conditions as regards 
private parties proving that they had a serious chance of winning the con-
tract. In the Commission’s view, “this would directly touch upon the basic 
national principles governing contractual liability (i.e. the rules on compensation 
where loss of a chance has to be proved by the plaintiff) with few benefits (i.e. no cor-
rective effects on the award procedure and the contract signed)”. It also pointed to 
the possible costs for taxpayers associated with the payment of damages by 
contracting authorities, which are mostly (semi-) public bodies. The option 
102 See e.g. also Commission, Amended proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 
89/665, COM(88) 733, p. 10.
103 Cf. the study by the UK Department of Trade and Industry, referred to in Arrowsmith, 
Linarelli & Wallace (2000), pp. 759-760 and the study carried out for the Netherlands’ 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, published as Hebly, De Boer & Wilman (2007), p. 145.
104 Fernández Martín (1996), p. 212; Bovis (2005), pp. 138-139; Arrowsmith (2005), pp. 1435-
1436; Trepte (2007), p. 553; Brown (1998), pp. 93-94; Treumer (2011b), p. 29; Caranta 
(2011a), pp. 81-82; Treumer (2011a), p. 157.
105 Cf. Dahlgaard Dingel (1999), p. 239; Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace (2000), pp. 752 and 
759-760; Bovis (2007), pp. 438-439; Trepte (2007), p. 559; Caranta (2011b), p. 175.
106 See para. 75 above.
107 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, p. 12.
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of reinforcing private parties’ possibilities to claim damages for infringe-
ments of EU public procurement law under the Procurement Remedies 
Directives was therefore discarded at an early stage of the revision pro-
cess.108 The above considerations were at the same time apparently no rea-
son to delete the already existing provisions on damages, discussed above; 
these were left untouched.
 88. The foregoing does not mean however that no damages cases are 
brought before the national courts under the Procurement Remedies Direc-
tives. Especially in more recent years a number of these cases have led to 
preliminary references. The resulting rulings by the Court of Justice shed 
light on the provisions of these directives at issue. The first such case is the 
Court’s 2003 ruling in GAT, issued pursuant to an Austrian preliminary ref-
erence.109 In this case a tenderer had been excluded, allegedly for unlawful 
reasons, from a contract award procedure for the supply of road sweeping 
vehicles. That private party therefore sought compensation in damages. In 
the following process of judicial review the court seised observed however 
that there had been another infringement of the applicable public procure-
ment rules. If this court were to raise this point of its own motion (ex officio), 
as it was required to do under national law, this could imply that the appli-
cant would have suffered damage anyway. That, in turn, would mean that 
the damage resulting from the allegedly unlawful exclusion would not need 
to be compensated. The Court was therefore asked whether the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives precluded a rule of national law providing for an 
obligation of own motion judicial review. In its reply it held that it is for the 
domestic law of each Member State to determine whether, and in which 
circumstances, the competent court may raise of its own motion an infringe-
ment of the applicable EU law. Neither the objective of these directives, nor 
any of their specific provisions was considered to preclude such a rule of 
national law. The Court added however that under the Procurement Reme-
dies Directives an action for damages could nonetheless not be dismissed on 
the ground, raised of a national court’s own motion, that the contract award 
procedure had been anyway been unlawful. For this would be incompatible 
with the directives’ objective of ensuring rapid and effective review for an 
aggrieved party.
The second case is the Court’s 2010 judgment in Combinatie Spijker, which 
concerned a dispute relating to a public works contract for the renewal of 
two bridges in the Netherlands.110 The dispute led to a string of litigation 
before various national courts regarding both the decision to award the con-
tract to a particular tenderer and a subsequent claim for damages. As regards 
the latter, the Court of Justice was asked whether EU law determines the 
108 Ibid., p. 26. For amendments that could conceivably have been made in light of the above-
mentioned diffi culties, see Reich & Shabat (2014), p. 50.
109 CoJ case C-315/01, GAT, para. 46-55.
110 CoJ case C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker, para. 85-92.
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criteria for the determination of the damage and if so, what these criteria are. 
The Court first observed that the abovementioned provisions on damages 
claims laid down in the Procurement Remedies Directives contain no state-
ment either as to the conditions under which a contracting authority may be 
held liable or the amount of the damages it may be ordered to pay. Second, it 
clarified that these provisions are an expression of the principle of Member 
State liability for loss and damage caused as a result of breaches of EU law 
for which a Member State can be held responsible, as set out in its Francovich 
case law.111 This means that the conditions for such liability apply in this con-
nection (i.e. the rule of EU law infringed must be intended to confer rights on 
private parties, the infringement must be sufficiently serious and there must 
be a direct causal link between the infringement and the damage suffered). 
Third, it was noted that, in the absence of EU law provisions in this area, also 
after the 2007 revision, it is for the internal legal order of each Member State 
to determine the applicable criteria once these conditions have been com-
plied with, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.112
Third and finally, of relevance is the Stadt Graz case, which also dates 
from 2010.113 At issue here was a contract award procedure for a contract to 
supply asphalt to the city of Graz in Austria. An unsuccessful tenderer dis-
puted that the winning undertaking had complied with all the relevant 
requirements. The contract having been awarded to the latter, the applicant 
claimed damages from the contracting authority. National law made such 
claims dependent on the contracting authority being at fault, whereby a 
rebuttable presumption that this was the case was provided for. In its judg-
ment, the Court of Justice started by noting that the implementation of the 
directives’ provision on damages in principle comes under the procedural 
autonomy of the Member States. However it found the rule of national law 
at issue nonetheless to be precluded. It observed that the wording of the 
directives did not establish a connection between the right to damages and 
a requirement of fault, a conclusion that it considered to be borne out by the 
general context and aim of the remedy of damages as provided for in these 
directives.114 The Court added that it makes little difference in this respect 
that in the case at hand national law provided for a rebuttable presumption 
of fault, as it nonetheless creates the risk that a private party is deprived of 
the right to damages or at least that it is only belatedly being able to obtain 
such compensation. This was seen as incompatible with the effective and 
rapid judicial remedies that the Procurement Remedies Directives seek to 
guarantee.
111 CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, discussed in para. 59 above. Such a link 
between these two directives and the principle of Member State liability had already 
been suggested earlier in the legal literature. See e.g. Leffl er (2003), p. 154; Arrowsmith 
(2005), p. 1425; Treumer (2006), pp. 161 and 165.
112 On these two latter principles, see further section 2.2 above.
113 CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz, para. 34-43.
114 See also CoJ case C-275/03, Commission v. Portugal, para. 37.
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3.2.3. Contractual remedy
89. It has been seen in the previous subsection that in the context of the 
2007 revision of the Procurement Remedies Directives their provisions on 
actions for damages were left untouched. By contrast that revision did lead 
to the introduction of an entirely new contractual remedy, i.e. a class of action 
intended to make good infringements of EU law by seeking to nullify or to 
otherwise make ineffective the contractual arrangements entered into by the 
parties concerned. The introduction of this new remedy should be seen 
against the background of the case law of the Court of Justice. In particular, 
initially the Court had held that under the Procurement Remedies Directives 
as they stood before the revision the fate of concluded contracts was essen-
tially a matter for national law.115 This was in line with an express provision 
in these directives according to which the effects of the exercise of the pow-
ers of the courts after the conclusion of the contract were to be determined 
by national law and that gave the Member States the possibility to limit 
these powers to awarding damages.116 Most Member States used this latter 
possibility.117 Many believed this to be in conformity with the Procurement 
Remedies Directives.118
This belief appeared to have been put in doubt however by subsequent 
case law, in particular the Court’s 2007 ruling in Commission v. Germany.119 
The latter case was a follow-up to an earlier decision by the Court in 
infringement proceedings brought by the Commission that Germany had 
not respected its EU law obligations, because two German local govern-
ments had each concluded a contract with an undertaking in violation of EU 
public procurement law.120 Subsequently one of the two disputed contracts 
was not terminated. The Commission therefore brought a second case, now 
seeking a declaration by the Court of Justice that Germany had not com-
plied with the earlier judgment. In the latter case it was held that, as long as 
the disputed contract remains in force, the infringement of EU public pro-
curement law continued. The Court dismissed Germany’s arguments based 
on the aforementioned specific provision of the Procurement Remedies 
Directives on concluded contracts, the legitimate expectations of the private 
parties with whom the contract had been concluded and the principles of 
pacta sunt servanda and legal certainty, as these can play no role in infringe-
115 CoJ case C-314/01, ARGE, para. 40 and 48-50.
116 Art. 2(7) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665 and Art. 2(6) Utilities Remedies Direc-
tive 92/13, as they stood before the 2007 amendment. Subsequently these provisions 
have been retained in an amended form, clarifying that they are subject to the directives’ 
provisions on ineffectiveness.
117 See para. 75 above.
118 See Treumer (2011b), pp. 32-33, with further references.
119 CoJ case C-503/04, Commission v. Germany, para. 33-36. See also CoJ case C-125/03, Com-
mission v. Germany, para. 15. In addition see CoJ case C-81/98, Alcatel, discussed in 
para. 97 below.
120 CoJ joined case C-20/01 and C-28/01, Commission v. Germany, para. 36-39.
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ment proceedings, which are essentially a matter between the Commission 
and the Member State concerned.121 This largely leaves open the question 
what importance should be attached (if any) to those arguments in proceed-
ings initiated by a private party before a national court. The introduction of 
the new contractual remedy of ineffectiveness, discussed in further detail 
below, is therefore not merely a codification of the above case law.122 None-
theless it evidently put the issue of how to deal with contracts concluded in 
violation of EU public procurement law firmly on the legislative agenda.
90. Since 2007 both Procurement Remedies Directives stipulate that Mem-
ber States must ensure that “a contract is considered ineffective” by the compe-
tent national court.123 This remedy must be made available in relation to 
what are considered the most serious infringements of substantive EU public 
procurement law.124 It concerns in particular the illegal direct award of con-
tracts (i.e. without any prior publication and competition in violation of the 
applicable EU public procurement rules) and the conclusion of a contract 
during a mandatory standstill period that is meant to allow the other private 
parties concerned to challenge the contract award decision.125
The logic behind this is that the ineffectiveness of a contract will nor-
mally mean that (the remainder of) the contract will be put out to (re-)ten-
der. That implies that all interested parties have in principle a new and fair 
chance of winning it. Consequently competition is restored.126 This can be 
an important incentive for private parties to apply for this remedy. As was 
noted above, they are often more interested in winning contracts than 
obtaining damages awards.127 The risk of a public contract being considered 
ineffective, as well as the subsequent obligation to (re-)start a contract award 
procedure, is moreover likely to be an unattractive outcome for contracting 
authorities, if only because of the delays this would involve. As such it can 
act as a deterrent for those authorities.
91. Concerning the precise legal effects of this new remedy, the recitals of the 
Procurement Remedies Amending Directive clarify that this ineffectiveness 
should not be ‘automatic’. Instead it is to be ascertained by, or the result of, 
121 See further subsection 2.4.1 above.
122 That is illustrated by the timing of the relevant events. The Commission’s proposal for 
the amendment dates from May 2006 and political agreement was reached by June 2007, 
whereas the above judgment was rendered in July 2007. In this sense, see also Pries & 
Friton (2011), pp. 523-524. For another view, see Caranta (2011), p. 77.
123 Art. 2d(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
124 Art. 2d(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. As regards the position of 
contract having been concluded pursuant to other infringements of EU public procure-
ment law than the ones mentioned above, see para. 304 below.
125 Concerning these illegal direct awards and standstill periods, see para. 75 above and para 
97 below respectively.
126 Recital 14 Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66.
127 See para. 87 above.
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a decision by a court.128 For that reason the provision in question speaks 
of the contract being “considered” ineffective, rather than it ‘being’ ineffec-
tive. The recitals state that the term ‘ineffectiveness’ implies that “the rights 
and obligations of the parties under the contract […] cease to be enforced and 
performed”.129 The Court of Justice has further held that, in the situations 
contemplated in this provision on ineffectiveness, the measures that may 
be taken are to be determined solely by the rules laid down in these direc-
tives.130
Other than that Member States are however generally left considerable 
flexibility as to how to give effect to this provision in their respective domes-
tic legal systems. In particular, the directives stipulate expressly that the con-
sequences of a contract being considered ineffective are provided for by 
national law.131 They specify that national law may either provide for the 
retroactive cancellation of all contractual obligations (i.e. ex tunc) or limit the 
scope of the cancellation to those obligations which still have to be per-
formed (i.e. ex nunc). It appears that in practice good use has been made of 
this flexibility. For instance, German law provides for ineffectiveness ‘from 
the beginning’, which is presumed to refer to ex tunc effects, while Roma-
nian law relies on the concept of nullity which also presupposes retroactive 
effects.132 By contrast in Denmark the main rule is ex nunc with the possibil-
ity of imposing ex tunc effects in certain specific cases and in England the 
national legislature opted instead for ‘prospective ineffectiveness’, i.e. the 
possibility of nullifying only those contractual obligations that are still to be 
performed.133 In Italy and France the court seised may hold the contract to 
be ineffective even where the applicant did not make an express request to 
this effect.134
This flexibility is nonetheless limited under the Procurement Remedies 
Directives in that, where the national legislator opts for ex nunc effects, cer-
tain ‘alternative penalties’ must also be imposed. In a separate provision 
these directives further expand on what these penalties entail.135 To begin 
with, they must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. More specifical-
ly, the directives stipulate that they can consist of the imposition of fines or 
the shortening of the duration of the contract. A damages award does not 
qualify as such however. It is also explicitly stated in the directives that 
review bodies may be conferred broad discretion to take into account all 
relevant factors in this regard.
128 Recital 13 Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66.
129 Recital 21 Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66.
130 CoJ case C-19/13, Fastweb, para. 42.
131 Art. 2d(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. Cf. CoJ case C-19/13, 
Fastweb, para. 52.
132 Burgi (2011), p. 138; Dragos, Neamtu & Veliscu (2011), pp. 191-193.
133 Treumer (2011c), p. 279; Trybus (2011), p. 222.
134 Comba (2011), p. 249; Lichère & Gabayet (2011), p. 319.
135 Art. 2e(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
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The margin of manoeuvre that is thus left to the Member States is great-
er than what the Commission had originally proposed. For the latter had 
suggested using the term ‘invalid’ rather than ‘ineffective’.136 In addition, 
pursuant to the Commission’s proposal it would have been for the national 
courts to “draw all the consequences on the illegal contract, such as those con-
cerning the recovery of any sums which may have been paid by the awarding 
authority”.137 No reference to national law was provided for in this respect. 
Quite to the contrary, implicit in this proposed approach was that, as a gen-
eral rule, the contracts at issue would not have effects either between the 
parties concerned or with regard to third parties.138 The fact that during the 
legislative process amendments were made on these points can, just as the 
aforementioned rather narrow scope of this remedy (in that it is limited to 
only the most serious infringements), largely be ascribed to the reservations 
of at least some Member States in relation to EU involvement with matters 
of contract law.139
92. The Procurement Remedies Directives allow for certain exceptions to be 
made in relation to the foregoing. These come in various forms. One such 
exception is the possibility for contracting authorities to publish a notice of 
its intention to ‘directly’ award the contract, including a justification of why 
this is deemed compatible with the EU public procurement rules, followed 
by a standstill period of at least 10 days before actually concluding the con-
tract in question.140 The idea is that this allows potentially interested under-
takings to be aware of the intended direct award and the underlying rea-
sons, so that they can contest it before the courts should they wish to do so. 
Where such ‘voluntary’ ex ante transparency has been ensured, the resulting 
contract can, after the expiry of the standstill period and in the absence of a 
legal challenge, no longer be considered ineffective under these directives. 
That means that the Member States are precluded from enacting any other 
rule, pursuant to which the effects of the contract would still not be main-
tained in a situation, even though the above requirements were met.141
136 Commission, Proposal for Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66, 
COM(2006) 195, p. 24 (Art. 2f(2)).
137 Ibid., p. 12 (recital 13).
138 See ibid., p. 24 (Art. 2f(3)).
139 E.g. Council, doc. DS 650/07. In this document three Member States argue that “[t]he basis 
of validity and effectiveness of contracts belong to the sphere of civil law, which belongs exclusively 
to the competence of the Member States”. See e.g. also Council, doc. DS 703/06; Council, doc. 
DS 802/06. Cf. Art. 73 New Public Sector Procurement Directive 2014/24 and Art. 90 
New Utilities Procurement Directive 2014/25 on the possible “termination” of concluded 
contracts during their term in certain cases, “under the condition determined by the applicable 
national law”.
140 Art. 2d(4) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
141 CoJ case C-19/13, Fastweb, para. 33-54.
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The Member States further have the option under these directives of 
providing that the national court seised may decide to dismiss the applica-
tion for ineffectiveness where there are “overriding reasons relating to a general 
interest”.142 Also in that case provision must be made for ‘alternative penal-
ties’ of the type discussed in the previous paragraph. The directives stipu-
late that economic interests in the effectiveness of the contract only qualify 
as such overriding reasons if, in exceptional circumstances, ineffectiveness 
would lead to disproportionate consequences. Economic interests directly 
linked to the contract can in any case not be overriding reasons for the pres-
ent purposes. Examples of the latter are cited, namely the costs resulting 
from the delay of the execution of the contract, the launching of a new pro-
curement procedure, the change of economic operator performing the pub-
lic contract in question or the legal obligations resulting from that contract. 
It has been noted that this possibility of exceptions in the general interest 
might become a loophole.143 This fear seems on the one hand all the more 
realistic, given the experiences gained in relation to the balance of interests 
test that can be applied in relation to actions for interim measures, discussed 
earlier.144 On the other hand the provision in question seeks to reduce this 
risk as much as possible through the rather restrictive formulation of this 
exception, as set out above. Indeed, it has also been argued that this provi-
sion now seems to have been formulated so restrictively that it might be 
difficult to give examples of considerations that could fall under the scope of 
this exception.145 All in all the idea has clearly been leave a degree of flexibil-
ity and discretion to the courts when applying this remedy, while at the 
same time seeking to minimise the risk of abuse.
93. Finally, practical experience with the contractual remedy of ineffective-
ness is so far limited as a consequence of its relatively recent introduction. 
There are reasons to believe that this remedy could prove a valuable private 
enforcement instrument. The possibility of being awarded the contested 
public contract can act as an important incentive to potential applicants, 
which are generally undertakings that are interested in that contract. For the 
contracting authorities concerned it can also have an important deterrent 
effect, given that the negative consequences of a contract being considered 
ineffective can be considerable (delays, extra costs, possible political fall-out, 
etc.).
Yet there are also several factors that might mean that the system created 
under these directives will be less frequently and successfully used than 
intended. In particular, its potential importance appears to be restricted by 
the aforementioned limitation to the most serious infringements, the consid-
erable leeway left to the Member States as regards the precise effects of this 
142 Art. 2d(3) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
143 Cf. e.g. Caranta (2011), p. 77; Trybus (2011), p. 224.
144 See para. 80 above.
145 Treumer (2011b), p. 36.
p. 98 B. Selected EU legislation para. 94
remedy, the various exceptions, as well as the relatively strict limitation 
periods that can apply.146 On a more practical level, it remains to be seen 
whether, especially in cases of illegal direct awards, (potential) applicants 
will be able to obtain sufficient evidence and information so as to be in a 
position to bring a case and if so, whether the said incentives to sue are suf-
ficient to overcome any hesitations that aggrieved bidders often have.147 The 
practical use of this remedy has therefore sometimes been questioned in the 
legal literature.148
3.3. Procedural provisions and related issues
The above remedies are complemented by a number of provisions of a pro-
cedural nature, the most important of which are assessed in this section. 
First, the rules on the directives’ scope and on legal standing are discussed. 
This is followed by an assessment of the rules on limitation periods and 
standstill periods. Finally, the provisions on forum, procedure and what is 
referred to here as the ‘general rules’ are considered.
3.3.1. Scope and legal standing
94. The scope of the Procurement Remedies Directives essentially coincides 
with the Substantive Procurement Directive to which they relate.149 Accord-
ingly a contract that is covered by the Public Sector Procurement Directive is 
also covered by the Public Sector Remedies Directive. The same parallelism 
applies as regards the Utilities Procurement Directive and Utilities Reme-
dies Directive in relation to contracts in the utilities sector.150 In this manner 
the two Procurement Remedies Directives thus cover in principle all deci-
sions that are taken by contracting authorities concerning contract award 
procedures falling under the EU’s Substantive Procurement Directives. As 
was noted earlier, under the new substantive EU public procurement regime 
this logic is retained, subject to a widening of the scope of the Procurement 
Remedies Directive so as to cover also infringements of the substantive rules 
set out in the more recently adopted Concessions Awards Directive.151 
In this context the term ‘decision’ is to be interpreted broadly. It covers any 
act of a contracting authority adopted in relation to a public contract which 
falls within the material scope of one of the Substantive Procurement Direc-
tives and which is capable of producing legal effects, regardless of whether 
that act is adopted outside a formal contract award procedure or as part 
146 On these limitation periods, see para. 96 below.
147 See para. 87 above.
148 E.g. Lichère & Gabayet (2011), p. 317; Trybus (2011), p. 224; Reich & Shabat (2014), p. 65.
149 Art. 1(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
150 Cf. CoJ case C-214/00, Commission v. Spain, para. 50 and 79.
151 See para. 76 above.
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thereof.152 This means that a decision not to initiate such a procedure can 
also be covered. The scope of the Procurement Remedies Directives is there-
fore rather wide.
However that evidently does not mean that there are no limits to these 
directives’ scope. Two such limits stand out. To begin with, not all infringe-
ments of the rules of substantive EU public procurement law are covered. In 
particular, the Procurement Remedies Directives do not cover infringements 
of the Defence Procurement Directive. This latter directive contains a set of 
enforcement-related provisions of its own.153 Although there are certain dif-
ferences, which generally provide for additional flexibility, these provisions 
of this latter directive are largely similar to those of the Procurement Reme-
dies Directives. In addition only contracts covered by substantive EU law on 
public procurement are covered by these directives. Contracts covered by 
‘purely’ national public procurement rules, notably national rules other than 
those transposing the Substantive Procurement Directives, are not covered. 
The Commission had originally proposed to include the latter rules as 
well.154 This would have meant that the Procurement Remedies Directives 
also apply for instance to disputes relating to public contracts of a value 
below the thresholds set out in the Substantive Procurement Directives, but 
which are nonetheless subject to national public procurement rules. The EU 
legislature (at the time only the Council) rejected this aspect of the Commis-
sion’s proposal however. In the Procurement Remedies Directives this issue 
is now merely addressed in an indirect manner, in that it is stipulated that 
there should be no discrimination between undertakings claiming harm in 
the context of a procedure for the award of a contract as a result of the dis-
tinction made by these directives between national rules implementing EU 
law and other (‘purely’) national rules.155
95. Under the Procurement Remedies Directives the Member States must 
further ensure that review procedures are available “under detailed rules 
which the Member States may establish, at least to any person having or having 
had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being 
harmed by an alleged infringement”.156 Through this rule it is thus established 
which private parties have legal standing (locus standi) before the courts des-
152 CoJ case C-26/03, Stadt Halle, para. 34-35. See also CoJ C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure, 
para. 48-52.
153 Art. 55-64 Defence Procurement Directive 2009/81.
154 See Commission, Proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, COM(87) 134, 
p. 6 (Art. 1).
155 Art. 1(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
156 Art. 1(3) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. In addition, at the time of 
the aforementioned revision Art. 2a(2) was inserted, clarifying in which cases a private 
party is “concerned” by a particular provision of these directives. This is no rule on legal 
standing proper. However it indirectly establishes which private parties are entitled to 
contest an alleged infringement, given that a party that is not ‘concerned’ in the above-
mentioned sense will normally not have a suffi cient interest.
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ignated by the Member States. In essence under this provision any – legal 
or natural157 – person that has, or has had, a legitimate interest in the out-
come of the award procedure is entitled to bring legal proceedings.158 The 
requirement of a (legitimate) interest, which is common to the laws of most 
Member States, was inserted in the text of this provision by the Council.159 
The Commission had proposed to grant legal standing to any person entitled 
to tender for the award at issue. The eventual wording, which is somewhat 
more restrictive, has been designed to allow any private party concerned 
to institute a review procedure under these directives, without however 
“jeopardising” the procedural laws of the Member States as they stood.160 
It follows that the Member States are not required to allow any private party 
to bring legal proceedings under these directives.161
The Court of Justice has clarified that the above provision ensures legal 
standing for the aggrieved private parties bringing a claim, but that it does 
not necessarily extend to the defendants, i.e. the contracting authorities that 
allegedly infringed the EU procurement rules and which may wish to 
appeal a decision taken in first instance (although Member States are not 
precluded from ensuring legal standing also for these latter parties on the 
basis of national law).162 It further appears that persons invoking merely a 
general or public interest or making an obviously unmeritorious claim can 
be barred.163 Similarly a tenderer that has had its own bid declared invalid, 
and therefore is no longer a participant in the contract award procedure, can 
be held to have insufficient interest in having subsequent decisions taken in 
the context of that procedure reviewed, provided however that this party 
has been in a position to previously contest the decision as regards its own 
bid.164 On the other hand the Court has held that the interest of a private 
party in initiating legal proceedings cannot be made conditional on a prior 
referral to a non-judicial conciliation committee.165 Nor can the formal 
capacity of tenderer or candidate be required. Thus, a private party which 
157 CoJ case C236/95, Commission v. Greece, para. 11.
158 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, p. 17.
159 Cf. Commission, Communication on the Council’s position on the proposal for Public 
Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, SEC(89) 1196, p. 7. See also Fernández Martín (1996), 
p. 207.
160 Council, doc. 7834/89 ADD 1, p. 7. See also the statement by the Council and the Com-
mission that “within the meaning of this Directive any person excluded from participation in a 
procedure for the award of a public contract owing to an alleged infringement is a person having or 
having had an interest in obtaining a public contract and who has been harmed or risks being 
harmed. In particular, the fact of having suffered fi nancial loss shall not be considered a require-
ment for the admissibility of a review”, laid down in Council, doc. 7490/89, p. 10.
161 CoJ case C-249/01, Hackermüller, para. 18; CoJ case C-230/02, Grossmann, para. 26.
162 CoJ case C-570/08, Simvoulio, para. 35-36.
163 Cf. recital 122 New Public Sector Directive 2014/24; recital 128 New Utilities Procure-
ment Directive 2014/25; Dahlgaard Dingel (1999), p. 228; Trepte (2007), p. 552.
164 CoJ case C-249/01, Hackermüller, para. 26-29. See also CoJ case C-100/12, Fastweb, 
para. 26-30.
165 CoJ case C-410/01, Fritsch, para. 31-34. See also CoJ case C-230/02, Grossmann, para. 42.
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did not submit a bid because he found the specifications of the tender docu-
ments to be discriminatory will normally have legal standing, in as far as its 
actions relates to those specifications.166 Yet, as the Court rules in Grossmann, 
such a party can be denied access to a court or another review body for lack 
of interest if that party did not seek any review of the decision to include 
these specifications until after the contract had been concluded. In this rul-
ing it held that by acting in that manner that party compromised the direc-
tives’ objective of effective and rapid review.167 The Court has further 
repeatedly assessed national rules on legal standing in relation to members 
of a consortium, consisting of several legal persons, bringing actions under 
the directives. Here it distinguished between actions for the annulment of 
the award decision and actions for damages.168
3.3.2. Limitation periods and standstill periods
96. Provisions concerning limitation periods applicable to private parties 
wishing to initiate legal proceedings were inserted in the Procurement Rem-
edies Directives as part of the 2007 revision of these directives. These peri-
ods come in various forms. In particular, they vary in light of the remedy 
sought, as discussed in the previous section. In the first place, Member 
States may so set such limitation periods for applications for the review of 
decisions taking by contracting authorities.169 This provision applies not only 
to applications for review of contract award decisions, but more generally to 
any application for review of decisions taken in the context of or in relation 
to a contract award procedure falling within the scope of the Procurement 
Remedies Directives. These periods should have a length of at least ten or 15 
days, depending on the means of communication used. The fact that these 
periods are rather short is related to the predominance of the interest of the 
rapid resolution of public procurement disputes and consequently the com-
pletion of the contract award procedure.170 In the second place, for actions 
seeking to have a concluded contract considered ineffective longer minimum 
time limits apply.171 The latter must be either 30 days where a contract 
166 CoJ case C-230/02, Grossmann, para. 25-30; CoJ case C-26/03, Stadt Halle, para. 40.
167 CoJ case C-230/02, Grossmann, para. 34-40.
168 For these fi rst types of actions a requirement that the action be brought by all consortium 
members collectively (as opposed to one member individually) was held to be permissi-
ble, while for the second type it was not. See CoJ case C-57/01, Makedoniko Metro, 
para. 64-73; CoJ case C-129/04, Espace Trianon, para. 20; CoJ joined cases C-145/08 and 
C-149/08, Club Hotel Loutraiki, para. 65-80. Note that this latter case concerned a situation 
falling outside the scope of Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13, which 
was examined in particular under the principle of effective judicial protection. On the 
differences between these two types of actions, see also Opinion AG Sharpston joined 
cases C-145/08 and C-149/08, Club Hotel Loutraki, para. 99-125.
169 Art. 2c Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
170 See para. 78 above. As discussed in para. 79 above, the GPA provides in this respect for a 
minimum period of ten days.
171 Art. 2f Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
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award notice has been published or the parties concerned have been 
informed directly, or six months from the conclusion of the contract. Finally, 
in all other cases, notably where actions for damages are concerned, the limita-
tion periods are to be determined by national law.172
The above rules are largely a codification of abundant earlier case law of 
the Court of Justice on this topic. The general point of departure there is that 
reasonable limitation periods are in principle acceptable in contract award 
procedures, subject to the conditions that the effectiveness of the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives is not compromised and the principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness are respected.173 The Court has held that the full 
implementation of the objective of these directives to ensure effective and 
especially rapid review would be undermined if private parties were 
allowed to initiate legal proceedings at any time of the contract award pro-
cedure, thus possibly forcing the contracting authority to restart the entire 
procedure.174 However the abovementioned conditions were found to have 
been infringed in cases where the limitation period had not been set out 
expressly or where the contracting authority had created uncertainty in this 
regard.175 The Court has further clarified that the starting point for these 
periods ought to be the moment on which the infringement became known 
to the private parties concerned.176 In this connection the importance of ade-
quately informing these parties before any such time period can start to run 
has also been underlined.177 Indeed, the occurrence of new events subse-
quent to the expiry of the set limitation period, of which the private party 
concerned was not and could not reasonably have been aware, can imply 
that this period will start to run again, as from the date at which that party 
was adequately informed by the contracting authority or otherwise became 
aware of the events in question.178
97. Also introduced in 2007 were three new articles concerning standstill 
periods. These provisions should also be understood against the background 
of earlier case law of the Court of Justice. Of particular relevance is its 1999 
landmark ruling in Alcatel.179 This case concerned a contract award pro-
cedure initiated by an Austrian ministry for the supply of automatic data 
transmission systems. Having completed the procedure, on the same day 
172 Art. 2f(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
173 On these two principles, see section 2.2 above.
174 CoJ case C-470/99, Universale Bau, para. 77; CoJ case C-327/00, Santex, para. 50-52; CoJ 
case C-241/06, Lämmerzahl, para. 50-51; CoJ case C-456/08, Commission v. Ireland, 
para. 51-52; CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz, para. 37.
175 CoJ case C-327/00, Santex, para. 61; CoJ case C-241/06, Lämmerzahl, para. 57; CoJ case 
C-456/08, Commission v. Ireland, para. 57-58 and 74-75.
176 CoJ case C-470/99, Universale Bau, para. 78.
177 E.g. CoJ case C-406/08, Uniplex, para. 30-32; CoJ case C-251/09, Commission v. Cyprus, 
para. 57-58. See also CoJ case C-19/13, Fastweb, para. 48.
178 CoJ case C-161/13, Idrodinamica, para. 47.
179 CoJ case C-81/98, Alcatel, para. 29-43.
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the contract award decision was taken and the contract was concluded with 
the successful tenderer. The other tenderers were only informed afterwards. 
Upon application by one of these other tenderers, the national court seised 
observed that EU public procurement law had been infringed in the course 
of the contract award procedure. However, the contract having already 
been concluded, in the circumstances of the case at hand national law only 
allowed for an action for damages. The Court of Justice essentially found 
this to be incompatible with the Procurement Remedies Directives, even 
if at that time they did not provide expressly for a standstill period to be 
respected between the contract award decision and the conclusion of the 
contract. For this would in effect render meaningless the directives’ rem-
edies that are meant to be exercised at the pre-contractual stage, i.e. interim 
measures and the setting aside of unlawful decisions.180 The Court stressed 
that these directives seek to guarantee the availability of effective and rapid 
review at a stage where infringements can still be rectified. As a follow-up, 
the Commission launched a string of infringement cases against Member 
States that did not foresee such a standstill period in their national law. The 
resulting judgments confirmed and further elaborated on the Alcatel case. 
In particular, in Commission v. Austria, the Court of Justice highlighted the 
objective of complete legal protection.181 It held that this principle presup-
poses that, prior to the conclusion of the contract, all parties concerned must 
have sufficient time to examine the validity of the contract award decision. 
It also underlined that this implies that those parties must be informed of 
that decision.182 In other cases it ruled that, even where the possibility of 
judicial review can lead to a concluded contract being annulled ex post, this 
is in principle not sufficient to compensate for the impossibility of a private 
party to challenge the contract award decision before the conclusion of the 
contract.183
Subsequently the Commission found in the context of the 2007 revision 
of the Procurement Remedies Directives that there were significant differ-
ences in the manner in which the Member States had given effect to this 
earlier case law, leading to loopholes and uncertainties.184 It therefore pro-
posed codifying the relevant case law at EU level. The main objective of the 
rules in question is in essence to ensure that the pre-contractual stage is pro-
longed where necessary, so as to allow in particular for a realistic possibility 
for a private party to initiate proceedings for interim measures or the setting 
180 See subsection 3.2.1 above. The CoJ’s ruling in Alcatel concerned only the seting aside of 
unlawful decisions, but it would appear to apply also to the granting of interim relief. In 
a similar sense, see Trepte (2007), pp. 555 and 564.
181 CoJ case C-212/02, Commission v. Austria, para. 21-24.
182 See also CoJ case C-455/08, Commission v. Ireland, para. 30-34; CoJ case C-406/08, Uniplex, 
para. 30-31.
183 CoJ case C-444/06, Commission v. Spain, para. 45; CoJ case C-327/08, Commission v. France, 
para. 58.
184 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, p. 10.
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aside of unlawful decisions. Before this revision, lack of sufficient time was 
thought to have been an important reason why during the pre-contractual 
stage it could prove difficult to successfully bring a case. As was explained 
above, contracting authorities sometimes concluded the contract at issue as 
quickly as possible, in particular before any legal proceedings challenging a 
contract award decision could be brought or completed, given that such 
concluded contracts were normally left unaffected by the review (the so-
called ‘race to signature’).185
The resulting articles in the revised Procurement Remedies Directives 
essentially provide for a standstill period, which is to be respected by the 
contracting authority, of at least either ten or 15 days (depending on the 
means of communication used). Subject to certain exceptions, the contract 
may not be concluded during this period.186 Any such communication to the 
private parties concerned must moreover contain a summary of the reasons 
for the contracting authority’s decision in question. These rules are comple-
mented by similar provisions providing for the automatic suspension of on-
going contract award procedures pending the decision by the national court, 
at least where review in first instance is concerned.187 Obviously, during this 
latter period the contract may not be concluded either, so as not to make the 
pending review largely meaningless in practice. The abovementioned provi-
sion on the Member States being able to provide that, after the conclusion of 
the contract, the powers of the courts under the directives are limited to 
merely awarding damages was retained. It was however made expressly 
subject to the directives’ other provisions in this respect, notably those on 
ineffectiveness.188
3.3.3. Forum, procedure and general rules
98. The Procurement Remedies Directives contain rules on forum, i.e. on 
the court or other body designated to rule on the cases brought under these 
directives. On the whole the Member States are left considerable freedom to 
make their own choices in this respect. The term generally used in these 
directives is ‘review body’, which is a very broad term indeed. As such the 
directives leave it in principle to the Member States to decide whether the 
claims brought are to be decided by a body that is judicial in character, i.e. a 
civil or administrative court, or by another body, such as a non-judicial 
administrative body. In certain cases the directives moreover specifically 
require these review bodies to be “independent of the contracting authority”.189
185 See para. 75 above.
186 Art. 2a and Art. 2b Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
187 Art. 1(5) and 2(3) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13; Art. 2(4) Public 
Sector Remedies Directive 89/665; Art. 2(3a) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13.
188 Art. 2(7) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665; Art. 2(6) Utilities Remedies Directive 
92/13.
189 Art. 2d and 2e Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13 (relating to the con-
tractual remedy, discussed in subsection 3.2.3 above).
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Where a Member State chooses the first option, i.e. it designates a judicial 
body, no further requirements apply. But specific requirements are set out for 
the situation where the designated bodies are not judicial in nature.190 These 
requirements aim to ensure that these bodies nonetheless offer equivalent 
guarantees in terms of independence and impartiality.191 They entail, in a 
nutshell, the following. First, the body concerned must hear both sides and 
must provide reasons for its decisions in writing. Second, it should be 
ensured that an appeal can be lodged before a body that is not only indepen-
dent of the contracting authority, but that is also empowered under the EU 
Treaties to refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice.192 Third, the 
members of this independent appeal body must be appointed and leave 
office under the same conditions of the members of the judiciary as regards 
the authority responsible for their appointment, their period in office and 
their removal. And at least the president of this body must have the same 
legal and professional qualifications as members of the judiciary. Finally, the 
decisions of this appeal body must be legally binding. Thus, where a Mem-
ber States designates a non-judicial body, at least the possibility of a review 
on appeal by a body of a quasi-judicial nature and through a quasi-judicial 
procedure is to be ensured, so as to guarantee an independent, impartial and 
fair review of the contracting authorities’ decisions at least in second instance 
and also that preliminary questions can be referred where necessary. Yet 
those rules do not exclude review by administrative or specialised bodies.
The directives further provide that the power to award the remedies set 
out therein may be conferred on separate bodies responsible for different 
aspects of the review procedures.193 This latter provision is meant to accom-
modate the Member States that require that an unlawful decision is first set 
aside by an administrative court, after which damages claims can be brought 
before a civil court.194 In this respect the Member States represented in 
Council considered it “not […] advisable to amend this general system of admin-
istrative law for the public procurement sector alone”.195
In light of the flexibility resulting from the above provisions, it is unsur-
prising that in practice the Member States’ review systems differ consider-
ably between them. As regards the review in first instance, most have estab-
lished some form of specialised non-judicial or quasi-judicial public 
procurement review body, generally of an administrative nature. This can 
for example take the form of a special complaints board (Denmark), certain 
designated public procurement chambers (Germany), a competition office 
(Czech Republic) or a public procurement commission (Estonia). The deci-
190 Art. 2(9) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
191 Commission, Communication on the Council’s position on the proposal for Public Sector 
Remedies Directive 89/665, SEC(89) 1196, p. 9.
192 On the conditions for qualifying as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Art. 267 
TFEU on the preliminary reference procedure, see further para. 22 above.
193 Art. 2(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
194 See para. 78 above.
195 Council, doc. 7834/89 ADD 1, p. 7.
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sions taken by these bodies are normally subject to appeal before the – civil 
or administrative – courts of the Member States in question.196 Yet in several 
Member States public procurement disputes covered by the Procurement 
Remedies Directives are to be brought immediately before the ordinary 
courts. These are mostly either exclusively or partially administrative courts, 
as is the case for instance in Italy, France and Portugal. Where Member 
States opted for a ‘mixed’ system of review by administrative as well as 
civil courts of the sort referred to above, the latter tend to be competent to 
consider actions for damages whereas the administrative courts are to rule 
in the other cases. By contrast in Member States such as the United King-
dom, Sweden and the Netherlands civil courts are in principle competent to 
hear all public procurement disputes brought under these directives.197
99. Turning to the relevant rules of procedure, most noticeable are the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives’ rules on ‘pre-trial contacts’, according to 
which the Member States are entitled to require a party wishing to initiate 
proceedings to first notify the contracting authority of the alleged infringe-
ment and its intention to seek review.198 A considerable number of Member 
States has made use of this option, including Germany, Greece and 
Poland.199 Such pre-trial contacts may help to facilitate an amicable settle-
ment, which can be attractive from the point of view of costs and speed. But 
it can also lead to delays. The directives therefore specify that this possibility 
should not lead to the limitation periods or standstill periods, discussed in 
the previous subsection, being affected. In other words, the delay that such 
pre-trial contacts involve should not be such that the private party-com-
plainant is time-barred should it subsequently wish to bring legal proceed-
ings, not should the contested public contract be concluded with another 
party in the meantime.
Along similar lines, but going a step further, is the possibility of requir-
ing a private party to first seek review with the contracting authority.200 Only 
a limited number of Member States have made use of this possibility. One of 
them is Spain, where reportedly over 90% of the disputes are settled pursu-
ant to such a request for internal review by the authority concerned.201 Also 
in this case the directives seek to ensure that there are no serious adverse 
consequences for the private party seeking review, notably by providing 
that such an application to the contracting authority must result in the 
196 Commission, Report on the impact and effectiveness of EU public procurement legisla-
tion, SEC(2011) 853, pp. 69-70.
197 Commission, Annual public procurement implementation review 2012, SWD(2012) 342, 
p. 34.
198 Art. 1(4) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
199 Commission, Report on the impact and effectiveness of EU public procurement legisla-
tion, SEC(2011) 853, p. 69.
200 Art. 1(5) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
201 Commission, Annual public procurement implementation review 2012, SWD(2012) 342, 
p. 33.
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immediate suspension of the possibility to conclude a contract. Afterwards, 
the party concerned must again be left a minimum standstill period so as to 
ensure an opportunity to apply to the courts.202
The directives further require it to be ensured that the decisions taken by 
the national courts (or other review bodies) seised can be effectively 
enforced.203
100. Finally, certain what could be called ‘general rules’ have been laid 
down in the Procurement Remedies Directives. This term refers to the gen-
erally formulated provisions that are not related to a specific remedy or pro-
cedural issue, but that rather apply across the board. It is stated that Mem-
ber States must ensure that decisions taken by the contracting authorities 
“may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible” on the 
grounds that such decisions have infringed EU law in the field of public 
procurement or national law transposing that law.204 This provision sums 
up the essence of what these directives seek to achieve.205 These general 
rules have proven to be an important interpretative aid in several cases. An 
example is the aforementioned Grossmann ruling, where the Court held that 
under the Procurement Remedies Directives a private party can be denied 
access to court for lack of interest if that party failed to seek review of the 
decision to include certain specifications in the tender documents until after 
the contract had been concluded, as such behaviour compromises the direc-
tives’ objective of effective and rapid review.206 Another example is the Stadt 
Graz case, which has also already been discussed above. In this case it was 
found, for largely similar reasons as in Grossmann, that even a rebuttable 
presumption of fault set under national law in relation to actions for dam-
ages are incompatible with the Procurement Remedies Directives.207
3.4. Other enforcement issues
Apart from the measures facilitating the private enforcement of EU law dis-
cussed in the foregoing sections, other means of ensuring the compliance 
with and the enforcement of substantive EU public procurement law are not 
entirely absent. Below two alternative compliance mechanisms that are 
peculiar to the Utilities Remedies Directive and the scope for alternative dis-
pute resolution are first discussed. Attention then turns to the role of public 
enforcement in the present context.
202 On these standstill periods, see also para. 97 above.
203 Art. 2(8) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
204 Art. 1(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
205 Indeed, the CoJ has at times identifi ed this as their objective, even if it has not always 
been consistent in this respect. See para. 74 above.
206 CoJ case C-230/02, Grossmann, para. 37. See para. 95 above.
207 CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz, para. 43. See para. 88 above.
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3.4.1. Alternative compliance mechanisms and alternative dispute resolution
101. Up until 2007 the Utilities Remedies Directive contained two specific 
alternative mechanisms to ensure compliance with the relevant rules of substan-
tive EU public procurement law. It concerns, in the first place, the ‘attesta-
tion mechanism’.208 This entailed a voluntary system under which contract-
ing authorities had the possibility of having the conformity of their contract 
award procedures assessed through periodic audits. The second mechanism 
is the ‘conciliation procedure’.209 The latter allowed aggrieved private par-
ties to request the Commission to appoint an independent conciliator. If the 
Commission agreed, this conciliator was then to be drawn from a list estab-
lished by the former in consultation with the representatives of the Member 
States. This procedure could only be used with the agreement of the con-
tracting authority and would not result in any legally binding decisions. At 
the time of the adoption of the Utilities Remedies Directive, in 1992, consid-
erable attention was paid to these two innovative forms of dispute preven-
tion and resolution.210 This suggests that it they were thought to be able to 
play an important role in practice. In the context of the 2007 revision the 
Commission observed however that they had failed to generate any signifi-
cant interest on the side of the parties concerned. Having regard also to the 
administrative costs associated with keeping them in place, it was decided 
that these mechanisms were no longer to be retained.211 The provisions in 
question were therefore deleted from these directives.
102. Although the provision on the abovementioned centralised ‘concilia-
tion procedure’ was thus deleted in 2007, that is not to say that alternative 
dispute resolution cannot play a role in resolving disputes relating to the 
application of EU public procurement law. It has been seen in the foregoing 
that the Court of Justice has held it to be incompatible with the Procurement 
Remedies Directives’ rules on legal standing if national law makes recourse 
to a non-judicial reconciliation a mandatory requirement for having legal 
standing.212 Many Member States have nonetheless set up bodies that aim at 
finding extrajudicial solutions to public procurement disputes, such as an 
208 Art. 3-7 Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, as it stood before the 2007 amendment.
209 Art. 9-11 Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, as it stood before the 2007 amendment.
210 By means of a rough illustration, 12 of the 18 articles of the initial Commission proposal 
for this directive related to these two mechanisms. The importance attached to these 
mechanisms is moreover illustrated by the attention paid to them in the explanatory 
memoranda to the initial and amended Commission proposal. See Commission, Propos-
al for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297; Commission, Amended proposal 
for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(91) 158.
211 Recitals 29 and 30 Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66. See also Com-
mission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the field of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, pp. 13-14.
212 CoJ case C-410/01, Fritsch, para. 31-34. See para. 95 above.
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arbitration panel or an ombudsman.213 On the whole especially aggrieved 
private parties generally tend to prefer settling disputes amicably whenever 
possible, in light inter alia of the aforementioned fears of harming the busi-
ness relationship with the contracting authority and the length and costs of 
legal proceedings.214 Field research carried out in England and the Nether-
lands reveals for example a clear preference on the side of those parties for 
non-judicial forms of dispute resolution in one form or another.215
However, despite these advantages, resolving public procurement dis-
putes in this manner can also entail certain risks and drawbacks. In particu-
lar, public procurement rules generally aim at ensuring transparency and 
competition, rather than ‘one-on-one’ negotiations behind closed doors 
between contracting authorities and certain undertakings. Alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms are typically based precisely on the latter 
approach however.216 For example, the Procurement Remedies Directives 
would not reach their underlying aim of strengthening compliance with 
substantive EU public procurement law if an out-of-court settlement were to 
lead to an aggrieved private party agreeing to drop its claim in return for 
being awarded a future contract without competitive tendering. In other 
words, there is a risk that a dispute is resolved at the expense of the public 
interest or the interests of third parties. The resulting tension comes to light 
in relation to the EU level ‘conciliation procedure’, mentioned above. With a 
view to avoiding the abovementioned risk, this mechanism included the 
requirement that any agreement reached must be in accordance with EU law 
and that interested third parties (notably other undertakings interested in 
the public contract at issue) should be allowed to intervene in the concilia-
tion proceedings.217 At the same time these requirements are likely to be 
among the reasons why this mechanism generated so little interest in prac-
tice, leading to its abolishment.
3.4.2. Public enforcement
103. In the introduction to this chapter it was noted that over the years 
serious shortcomings have been identified as regards the compliance with 
EU public procurement law. Despite the adoption and subsequent revision 
of the Procurement Remedies Directives, these difficulties are not a thing of 
the past. Indeed, as the EU legislature noted in 2014, “there is still considerable 
213 Commission, Report on the impact and effectiveness of EU public procurement legisla-
tion, SEC(2011) 853, p. 69.
214 See para. 87 above. See also Commission, Report on the impact and effectiveness of EU 
public procurement legislation, SEC(2011) 853, pp. 71-73.
215 See Wood Report (2004), p. 54; study carried out on behalf of the Netherlands’ Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, published as Hebly, De Boer & Wilman (2007), p. 147.
216 Cf. Trepte (2007), pp. 373-374 and 376-577. See also Arrowsmith (2005), p. 1435; Caranta 
(2011), p. 84.
217 Art. 10(4) and Art. 11 Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, as it stood before the 2007 
amendment.
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room for improvement” in this regard.218 One conceivable response to these 
shortcomings would be to ensure, as a matter of EU law, that effective public 
enforcement structures are in place.219 At central, EU level this could entail 
granting the Commission particular powers to investigate and address 
(alleged) infringements. As regards public enforcement at national level one 
could further think in particular of the establishment of authorities charged 
with supervising and enforcing the correct application of the EU’s substan-
tive rules on public procurement. This is generally not the case at present 
however. As is set out below, with respect to the enforcement of the rules in 
question, public enforcement in effect plays only a modest role as a matter of 
EU law. This might well be related to the fact that the addressees – and 
therefore the potential infringers – of those rules are typically (semi-)public 
authorities themselves. It appears that the EU legislature is rather hesitant to 
make those authorities subject to significant public enforcement powers 
entrusted to other public authorities, regardless of whether the latter are EU 
or national authorities, thus leaving the burden of enforcement instead to 
the private parties concerned.
104. Concerning the possibilities at EU level, especially in its 1987 proposal 
for the Public Sector Remedies Directive the Commission initially placed 
considerable emphasis on certain innovative forms of public enforcement.220 
It had sought to obtain for itself rather far-going powers to intervene direct-
ly at national level. This took two forms. First, it was proposed to entitle 
the Commission to intervene in national review procedures, as a sort of 
amicus curiae, regarding matters of EU law. Second, this proposal included 
a suggestion for the Commission to be empowered to suspend on-going 
contract award procedures in certain cases. Arguably in the Commission’s 
view these two proposed forms of centralised public enforcement were at 
least as important as the proposed measures that sought to facilitate the 
private enforcement of EU public procurement law, discussed in the fore-
going.221 But the EU legislature (at that time only the Council) judged this 
proposed form of direct intervention to be “foreign to the system for the appli-
cation of [EU] law provided for in the [EU] Treaties [and] to the legal systems of 
the Member States” and it did not wish “to introduce so fundamental a change 
in the procedural law of the Member States and to apply it only to one sphere of 
218 Recital 121 New Public Sector Directive 2014/24; recital 127 New Utilities Procurement 
Directive 2014/25. See further para. 76 above.
219 See also section 2.4.2 above.
220 See Commission, Proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, COM(87) 134. 
See also Commission, Amended proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, 
COM(88) 733.
221 Again by means of a rough illustration, in the initial Commission proposal only one arti-
cle concerned the remedies available to private parties, whereas three articles related to 
the proposed Commission’s powers. The importance that the Commission attached to 
these powers is moreover evident from the attention paid thereto in the explanatory 
memoranda to the initial and amended Commission proposal.
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[EU] law”.222 This aspect of the proposal was therefore rejected. In the case 
of the proposed powers for the Commission to suspend on-going contract 
award procedures this rejection was even unanimous.223 A few years later, 
when discussing the proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive, the European 
Parliament argued in favour of granting the Commission similar powers to 
intervene directly in national proceedings. However this time the Commis-
sion itself decided against proposing such an arrangement. It argued that, 
given its limited resources, it could not verify the compliance of each and 
every entity with the applicable EU public procurement rules and that more 
costs-effective alternatives existed.224
The Commission was nevertheless not left entirely empty-handed 
however. Both Procurement Remedies Directives contain a ‘corrective 
mechanism’.225 This foresees that the Commission can notify a Member 
State when it considers that a “serious infringement” of EU procurement law 
has been committed and request its correction. Within 21 days, the Member 
State concerned must then confirm that the infringement has been corrected, 
explain why no such correction has been made or inform the Commission 
that the contract award procedure in question has been suspend. But the 
directives contain no provisions as to possible subsequent steps. The Court 
of Justice has clarified that in this regard the Member State concerned are not 
obliged to ‘automatically’ comply with the Commission’s request.226 Where 
a Member State refuses to do so, this effectively leaves the Commission only 
the option of initiating ‘regular’ infringement proceedings.227 Evidently, as 
the Court has confirmed, this corrective mechanism can neither derogate 
from nor replace the system established by the EU Treaties in this respect.228 
In 2007 the Commission observed that this corrective mechanism had not 
been used since the early 1990s. It cited difficulties in acting swiftly before 
the conclusion of the contract and in gathering convincing evidence of the 
alleged infringement.229 As part of the revision amendments were made so as 
to ‘refocus’ this mechanism on serious infringements of EU public procure-
ment law.230 However, as such, these amendments seem unlikely to substan-
tially alleviate the said difficulties. Neither do they alter the fact that, as was 
222 Council, doc. 7834/89 ADD 1, p. 5.
223 Commission, Communication on the Council’s position on the proposal for Public Sector 
Remedies Directive 89/665, SEC(89) 1196, p. 10. See Fernández Martín (1996), p. 221.
224 Commission, Amended proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(91) 158, 
pp. 4-6 and 14.
225 Art. 3 Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665; Art. 8 Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13.
226 Cf. CoJ Order case C-387/08 P, VDH, para. 23-25.
227 On these infringement proceedings, see subsection 2.4.1 above.
228 CoJ case C-359/93, Commission v. Netherlands, para. 13; CoJ case C-79/94, Commission v. 
Greece, para. 11. As is illustrated by these two cases, in practice the Commission tends to 
consider the notifi cation issued under the corrective mechanism as a letter of formal 
notice initiating the infringement proceedings.
229 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, p. 13.
230 Recital 28 Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66.
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explained above, the Commission’s powers under this mechanism are actu-
ally rather limited. It remains to be seen therefore whether this mechanism 
will be used more frequently and with more success in the time to come.
105. Turning to what could be called the more ‘classical’ forms of public 
enforcement in the EU legal order, i.e. through the involvement of national 
authorities charged with supervising and enforcing the application of EU 
public procurement law, the EU’s approach has been somewhat ambivalent. 
In its 1996 green paper on public procurement the Commission noted that 
the establishment of such authorities might have advantages, arguing that 
their very existence could already help prevent infringements. The Member 
States were therefore “invited” to consider this option.231 In its communica-
tion of two years later the Commission underlined that it did not have the 
resources to act itself as “a kind of ‘super enforcement authority’”.232 It therefore 
instead “encouraged” the setting-up of independent authorities by the Mem-
ber States as contact points for rapid, informal solution of public procure-
ment-related problems and for authorities from other Member States and 
the Commission.233 Neither the Procurement Remedies Directives nor the 
Substantive Procurement Directives at present set out an obligation to this 
effect however. The latter directives merely provide (since 2004) that the 
Member States may establish national public procurement authorities of this 
kind.234 This seems little more than stating the obvious. Most Member States 
have actually established a public supervision authority of some sort, 
although this is often only an ex post audit body or a non-independent pro-
curement office with limited powers.235
The more recent amendments to the EU’s public procurement rules did 
not fundamentally alter this situation.236 In the context of the 2007 revision 
of the Procurement Remedies Directives the possibility of including an EU 
law obligation to establish an independent national authority, empowered 
to notify alleged infringements to contracting authorities and if necessary 
bring cases before the national courts, was again raised. The Commission 
acknowledged that this could help solve disputes quickly and in an infor-
mal manner. An important further advantage is that enforcement measures 
would not necessarily depend on the decision of an undertaking whether or 
not to initiate legal proceedings. As was noted above, apart from possible 
legal constraints, in practice private parties are often deterred from doing so 
for fear of repercussions and financial constraints.237 But in 2007 a majority 
231 Commission, Green paper on public procurement in the EU, COM(96) 583, p. 17.
232 Commission, Communication on public procurement in the EU, COM(1998) 143, p. 13.
233 Ibid.
234 Art. 81 Public Sector Procurement Directive 2004/18; Art. 72 Utilities Procurement Direc-
tive 2004/17.
235 Commission, Report on the impact and effectiveness of EU public procurement legisla-
tion, SEC(2011) 853, pp. 63-65.
236 See subsection 3.1.3 above.
237 See in particular para. 87 above.
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of Member States took an unfavourable view of this option. Invoked were 
fears of being ‘overwhelmed’ by nuisance cases, as well as the costs of set-
ting up and operating the authorities.238 This obligatory public enforcement 
option was therefore discarded, despite having received strong support 
from the private sector.239 What remains as a matter of EU law at present is 
the Public Procurement Network. This is principally an informal forum for 
the exchange of information and best practices between the public authori-
ties concerned.240
This issue later re-emerged in the context of the aforementioned revision 
of the EU’s substantive public procurement rules in 2014.241 In that context 
the Commission proposed an obligation for the Member States to designate 
a single, independent ‘oversight body’, which would be charged inter alia 
with monitoring the application of the relevant rules, issuing own initiative 
opinions and helping to settle complaints.242 These already not very ambi-
tious proposals were watered down further during the legislative process. 
The new substantive public procurement directives only provide for an obli-
gation to designate “one or more authorities, bodies or structures” that are 
responsible for ‘monitoring’ the application of the relevant rules and for 
‘indicating’ possible problems to “national auditing authorities, courts or tribu-
nals or other appropriate authorities or structures, such as the ombudsman, nation-
al parliaments or committees thereof”.243 This seems a very modest step indeed.
It is therefore clear that in this field EU law does not provide for ‘proper’ 
public enforcement at national level, in the sense that neither under the rules 
that are currently in force, nor under the recently adopted new substantive 
public procurement directives the Member States are required to designate 
an authority with significant powers to investigate and effectively address 
(alleged) infringements of EU public procurement law.
238 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, pp. 25, 26 and 39-42; Commission, Proposal for Procurement Remedies 
Amending Directive 2007/66, COM(2006) 195, pp. 4-5.
239 In the consultation preceding the 2007 revision over 85% of the undertakings expressed a 
preference for obliging the Member States to set up such an independent authority. Of 
the consulted lawyers and professional and non-governmental organisations, around 
60% and almost 70% respectively held this view. See Commission, Responses to the con-
sultation on the operation of national review procedures in the fi eld of public procure-
ment, 2004. Similar strong support has been found during fi eld research carried out in the 
Netherlands. See Hebly, De Boer & Wilman (2007), p. 147.
240 See further http://www.publicprocurementnetwork.org.
241 See para. 76 above.
242 See Commission, Proposal for New Utilities Procurement Directive 2014/25, COM(2011) 
895, pp. 107-108 (Art. 93); Commission, Proposal for New Public Sector Procurement 
Directive 2014/24, COM(2011) 896, pp. 101-102 (Art. 84).
243 Art. 83 New Public Sector Directive 2014/24; Art. 99 New Utilities Procurement Directive 
2014/25. See also Art. 45 Concessions Awards Directive 2014/23. As regards the possibil-
ity for interested parties to bring possible infringements to the attention of the competent 
national authorities, see recital 122 New Public Sector Directive 2014/24 and recital 128 
New Utilities Procurement Directive 2014/25.
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3.5. Summary
106. Having been adopted in 1989 and 1992, the two – very similar – Pro-
curement Remedies Directives seek to strengthen compliance with substan-
tive EU public procurement law, such against the background of the objec-
tive of realising an EU-wide internal market for public contracts. Member 
States are obliged under these directives to ensure that four remedies are 
available to the private parties concerned in proceedings before the national 
courts. It concerns interim measures, the setting aside of unlawful decisions, 
actions for damages and, since their revision in 2007, a contractual remedy 
in the form of concluded contracts being considered ineffective. These rem-
edies are complemented by a set of common rules on a number of proce-
dural issues, which include rules on legal standing that specify which par-
ties are entitled to initiate legal proceedings under these directives and rules 
of forum regarding the bodies competent to decide on the actions in ques-
tion. The Procurement Remedies Directives also provide for rules on limita-
tion periods and standstill periods, so as to ensure respectively that the 
aforementioned actions are brought rapidly and that the private parties con-
cerned have a realistic possibility to do so. In this field EU law imposes only 
very limited specific public enforcement obligations on the Member States.
 
This chapter focuses on the IPR Enforcement Directive, which seeks to 
ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the EU. The outline 
of this chapter largely mirrors that of the foregoing chapter. Accordingly the 
first section below outlines the background and context of this directive. The 
next sections then analyse its main content. In the latter context the remedies 
for which this directive provides are discussed, whereby a distinction is 
made between measures of a preliminary, provisional and precautionary 
nature, actions for damages and other decisions on the merits under this 
directive. Attention then turns to the most relevant procedural provisions. 
The final section of this chapter is dedicated to other enforcement-related 
issues concerning infringements of intellectual property rights, in particular 
the public enforcement dimension.
4.1. Introduction
This section introduces the IPR Enforcement Directive. To this aim the first 
subsection below briefly sketches its background, notably the EU’s involve-
ment with substantive intellectual property law, the infringements thereof 
that this directive seeks to address as well as the process of its adoption, 
implementation and possible revision. Then, before analysing the content of 
this directive in further detail in the subsequent sections, some more general 
remarks are made with a view to clarifying the context in which it is applied.
4.1.1. Substantive law and infringements
107. Intellectual property rights are the rights given to persons over the 
creation of the mind, usually giving those persons an exclusive right over 
the use of their creations for a certain period of time. The term ‘intellectual 
property’ in its classical sense encompasses two main categories. To begin 
with, it covers copyrights and related rights, i.e. rights granted to authors of 
literary or artistic works and rights of performers, procedures of phono-
grams and broadcasting organisations. It further covers industrial property, 
thus including distinctive signs protected by trademarks and geographic 
indications, as well as inventions protected by patents and industrial 
designs. Although not a ‘classical’ form of intellectual property, this term 
can also include trade secrets. Trade secrets are typically used as a comple-
ment or alternative to protection under intellectual property law strictly 
4. Intellectual property law
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speaking, either because the latter is legally not possible or because this is 
simply seen as a preferable form of protecting know-how and business 
information in a given situation. They thus result from a policy decision of 
the undertaking concerned, rather that they are statutory rights. On a broad-
er understanding of this term, internet domain names can also be consid-
ered a form of intellectual property.
108. Over the years many acts of secondary EU law concerning substantive 
intellectual property law have been adopted, in particular with a view to 
levelling the playing field for undertakings operating on the EU’s internal 
market. At present virtually all types of intellectual property rights are, to a 
greater or lesser extent, affected by EU law.1 These substantive EU rules are 
all based on internal market-related provisions of the EU Treaties, namely 
Articles 53, 62, 114 and/or 352 TFEU. It is only since 2009 (Treaty of Lisbon) 
that a specific legal basis has been inserted in the EU Treaties for the creation 
of European intellectual property rights in the context of the internal mar-
ket, i.e. Article 118 TFEU.
In this connection a distinction can be made between two forms of such 
EU legislative activity. First, there is EU legislation harmonising the rules of 
substantive intellectual property law of the Member States. Such harmonisa-
tion has taken place for instance concerning national laws on trade marks,2 
designs,3 and copyrights and related rights, the latter leading inter alia to the 
adoption of Directive 2001/29 concerning copyrights and related rights in 
the information society (‘Infosoc Directive’).4 Second, the EU has adopted 
legislation that creates EU unitary rights. This latter legislation is not con-
cerned with the harmonisation of national laws, but instead creates new, 
self-standing intellectual property rights at EU level, which offer direct pro-
tection in all Member States. Examples include Regulation 207/2009 on the 
Community trade mark (‘Community Trade Mark Regulation’),5 Regulation 
6/2002 on Community designs (‘Community Designs Regulation’)6 and 
1 Cf. recital 3 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48: “the substantive law on intellectual property 
[…] is nowadays largely part of the acquis communautaire”.
2 Directive 2008/95/EC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade 
marks, OJ 2008, L 299/25. In 2013 the Commission proposed recasting this directive. See 
Commission, Proposal for a directive to approximate the laws of the Member States relat-
ing to trade marks, COM(2013) 162.
3 Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs, OJ 1998, L 289/28.
4 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society, OJ 2001, L 167/10. See also Directive 93/83/EEC on the 
coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright appli-
cable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, OJ 1993, L 248/15; Directive 
2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ 2006, 
L 372/12; Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programmes, 
OJ 2009, L 111/16.
5 Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark, OJ 2009, L 78/1.
6 Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 on Community designs, OJ 2002, L 3/1.
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Regulation 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights (‘Community Plant 
Variety Rights Regulation’).7
Furthermore in 2012 a patent package was adopted. It consists of two 
regulations,8 complemented by an Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 
(‘Patent Court Agreement’).9 This agreement has been signed (but for the 
time being not yet ratified) by almost all Member States.10 After several ear-
lier attempts over the past decades,11 this package creates an EU regime on 
unitary rights for patents. It differs from the abovementioned regimes pro-
viding for EU unitary intellectual property rights however, as it creates the 
possibility of giving unitary effect to European patents granted pursuant to 
the European Patent Convention rather than an EU unitary right proper. 
Procedurally this regime came into being as a form of ‘enhanced 
cooperation’.12 That implies that it does not (or at least not necessarily) 
involve all Member States. The Patent Court Agreement is an intergovern-
mental agreement, which is not part of EU law strictly speaking. This agree-
ment not only designates the competent courts, as it names already indi-
cates, but it also sets out the applicable rules on remedies and procedures for 
the private enforcement of the rights in question.13 In this respect it thus 
constitutes, as it were, a form of ‘harmonised transposition’ of the IPR 
Enforcement Directive by the Member States concerned regarding the 
enforcement of this specific intellectual property right.
109. Infringements of intellectual property rights can take many forms. 
One could think of the production and sale of clothing containing a pro-
tected brand name without the authorisation of the trade mark holder 
or the reproduction of a film in violation of copyright law. It is generally 
acknowledged that intellectual property rights infringements of this kind 
take place on a very significant, and probably also increasing, scale. In its 
1998 green paper on this subject-matter the Commission called this a “wide-
7 Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights, OJ 1994, L 227/1.
8 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection, OJ 2012, L 361/1; Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protec-
tion with regard to the applicable translation arrangements, OJ 2012, L 361/89. In 2013 
Spain fi led an action for the annulment of these regulations; see CoJ case C-146/13, Spain 
v. Parliament and Council, and CoJ case C-147/13, Spain v. Council (pending).
9 Council, Notice Agreement on a Unifi ed Patent Court, OJ 2013, C 175/1. See also CoJ 
Opinion 1/09, Patent Court Agreement.
10 For the most recent state of play as regards the signature and ratifi cation of the Patent 
Court Agreement, see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/ratifi ca-
tion/index_en.htm.
11 See e.g. Commission, Proposal for a regulation on the Community patent, COM(2000) 
412.
12 Art. 20 TEU; Art. 326-334 TFEU. See CoJ joined cases C-274/11 and C-295/11, Spain and 
Italy v. Council. See further e.g. Pistoa (2014), p. 247.
13 See Art. 56-82 Patent Court Agreement.
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spread phenomenon with a global impact”.14 Precise and undisputed figures 
about the scale of these infringements are scarce however. World-wide trade 
in counterfeit and pirated products15 has been estimated to represent a val-
ue of $ 250 billion in 2007, up from $ 100 billion in 2000.16 More specifically 
regarding the EU, the Commission held that these infringements are detri-
mental to the proper functioning of the internal market, as they give rise to 
a deflection of trade and distort competition, leading to a loss of confidence 
and less investment and outlay on innovation and creativity.17 They are also 
said to have negative consequences in terms of consumer protection, as 
‘fake’ products may not offer the same quality as ‘real’ ones. It has been esti-
mated that infringements of intellectual property rights could lead to losses 
reducing the EU’s cumulative gross domestic product by € 8 billion per 
year.18 In 2000 the Commission found that its concerns were largely shared 
by the respondents to the consultation that it had initiated through the 1998 
green paper.19 In this connection it noted that “[c]ounterfeiting and piracy, 
which were once craft activities, have become almost industrial-scale activities”.20 
It appears that these activities regularly involve organised crime.21 As the 
Commission observed in 2014, such commercial-scale infringements are 
“both insidious and a moving target”.22
4.1.2. Proposal, adoption, objective and possible revision
110. In light of, first, the EU’s involvement with substantive intellectual 
property law and, second, the scale and possible consequences of the 
infringements of this law, as discussed in the foregoing, the question arose 
whether legislative measures should be taken at EU level as regards the 
14 Commission, Green paper on combating counterfeiting and piracy in the single market, 
COM(98) 569, p. 4.
15 The term ‘counterfeiting and piracy’ is regularly used as an alternative for infringements 
of intellectual property rights, without there being a material difference (at least as used 
by the Commission). See Commission, Green paper on combating counterfeiting and 
piracy in the single market, COM(98) 569, pp. 6-7; Commission, Communication on 
enhancing the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the internal market, 
COM(2009) 467, p. 3 (n. 1).
16 Commission, Communication on a single market for intellectual property rights, 
COM(2011) 287, p. 17.
17 Commission, Green paper on combating counterfeiting and piracy in the single market, 
COM(98) 569, p. 5.
18 Commission, Communication on a single market for intellectual property rights, 
COM(2011) 287, p. 17.
19 Commission, Communication on the follow-up to the green paper on combating counter-
feiting and piracy in the single market, COM(2000) 789.
20 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 12,
21 Commission, Communication towards a renewed consensus on the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, COM(2014) 392, p. 2. Here a UK study is cited, according to which 
81% of intellectual property rights infringing products are estimated to be associated 
with organised crime.
22 Ibid.
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remedies and procedures applicable in proceedings before the national 
courts relating to the enforcement of the rights in question by the private 
parties concerned. In January 2003 the Commission essentially answered 
this question in the affirmative by adopting a proposal for a new directive on 
this subject-matter.23
In the explanatory memorandum to this proposal the Commission 
called EU involvement with the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
a “logical extension” of the EU’s involvement with substantive intellectual 
property law.24 There it also expanded on the scale and consequences of 
these infringements. This was called “a constantly growing phenomenon” that 
constitutes “a serious threat to national economies and governments”.25 Accord-
ing to the Commission disparities between national laws in the EU had a 
“major impact, in particular on the effectiveness and costs of procedures, time scales 
and the amounts of damages granted”.26 This was said to have direct repercus-
sions on trade between the Member States and a direct impact on the condi-
tions governing competition in the market. The Commission found this “dif-
ficult to reconcile with guaranteeing rights holders an equivalent level of protection 
in the internal market”.27 Other negative effects of intellectual property rights 
infringements were also noted, such as their impact on innovation and com-
petitiveness, the cultural sector, employment, tax revenues and market sta-
bility, consumer protection and public order.28 The Commission found com-
bating this phenomenon of “vital importance” and proposed a directive “to 
tackle this situation by harmonising national legislation on the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights”.29
111. After a relatively speedy legislative process, this proposal led to the 
adoption by the EU legislature of the IPR Enforcement Directive in April 
2004.30 Agreement between the EU’s co-legislators, i.e. the European Parlia-
ment and the Council, was reached little more than a year after the publica-
tion of the Commission proposal. The imminent ‘eastern’ enlargement of the 
EU with ten new Member States as per May 2004 is widely believed to have 
acted as an important incentive to reach an agreement beforehand.31
23 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46.
24 Ibid., p. 5. Cf. Reinbothe (2010), p. 6, where the provisions on the enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights are called “a corollary” of harmonisation of EU Member States’ intel-
lectual property rights.
25 Ibid., p. 3.
26 Ibid., p. 15.
27 Ibid., p. 5. On these differences between national enforcement systems, see further e.g. 
Vandermeulen (2005), p. 30.
28 Ibid., pp. 4-12.
29 Ibid., p. 3.
30 For an overview of the process leading to the directive’s adoption, see Kur (2004), p. 821.
31 Kur (2004), p. 821; Reinbothe (2010), p. 8; Lakits-Josse (2011), p. 520.
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Whereas the adoption process may have been rather smooth, the same 
cannot be said of the process of transposition. Member States were obliged to 
transpose the directive into national law by April 2006.32 Only five Member 
States did so on time.33 The overall transposition process was not fully com-
pleted until 2009, Germany, Sweden and Luxemburg being the last Member 
States to ensure transposition.34 This also means that, to date, the rules set 
out in this directive have been applicable at national level and available to 
aggrieved private parties for only a relatively modest period of time. As a 
consequence the experiences with its practical application and the case law 
generated in this regard are somewhat limited.
112. The directive’s legal basis is Article 114 TFEU, i.e. the EU Treaties’ pro-
vision that allows for the adoption of measures for the approximation of 
national laws having as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.35 This link between the legislative measures in question 
and the internal market is extensively explained in the directive’s recitals. 
There the protection of intellectual property is called an essential element of 
the success of the internal market.36 The negative consequences of an 
absence of “effective means of enforcing intellectual property rights” are also 
highlighted.37 It is said to be necessary therefore to ensure that the substan-
tive law on intellectual property is “applied effectively” in the EU. The recitals 
further note the “major disparities” between the Member States as regards the 
means of enforcing intellectual property rights, for instance as regards pro-
visional measures, the preservation of evidence, the calculation of damages 
and injunctive relief.38 This was seen as “prejudicial to the proper functioning of 
the internal market and [making] it impossible to ensure that intellectual property 
rights enjoy an equivalent level of protection throughout the [EU] [and leading] to 
a weakening of the substantive law on intellectual property rights and to a fragmen-
tation of the internal market in this field”.39
113. The IPR Enforcement Directive’ objective is, according to its recitals, “to 
approximate legislative systems so as to ensure a high, equivalent and homogeneous 
level of protection in the internal market”.40 This has also been identified as its 
32 Art. 20 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
33 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 27.
34 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 4; Com-
mission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 27.
35 On Art. 114 TFEU and legal basis issues generally, see further subsection 10.1.1 below.
36 Recital 1 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
37 Recital 3 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
38 Recital 7 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
39 Recitals 8-9 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
40 Recital 10 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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objective in the case law of the Court of Justice.41 In other cases the Court 
has however referred in this respect to ensuring simply the “effective protec-
tion of intellectual property”42 or “the enforcement of intellectual property rights by 
means of the introduction, for that purpose, of various measures, procedures and 
remedies within the Member States”.43 The provisions of this directive thus 
govern the aspects of intellectual property rights related to, first, the enforce-
ment of those rights and, second, infringements of them, by requiring that 
there must be effective legal remedies designed to prevent, terminate or rec-
tify any such infringement.44
114. In its 2010 report on the application of this directive, as well as in sev-
eral subsequent (consultation) documents, the Commission discussed a pos-
sible revision of this directive. For now it remains uncertain whether a legis-
lative amendment will actually be proposed in the near future. The available 
documents suggest that, if and when such an amendment were to be pro-
posed, it would in all likelihood address a limited number of specific issues, 
such as the directive’s application in an online environment, the clarification 
of its scope, the involvement of third party-intermediaries and the difficul-
ties that small and medium-sized enterprises are said to experience when 
trying to enforce their intellectual property rights.45 Where relevant, these 
issues are further discussed below.
4.1.3. Additional general remarks
115. The first additional remark to be made here concerns the directive’s 
impact on the domestic laws of the Member States. On the one hand, as any 
other such directive, the IPR Enforcement Directive evidently seeks to har-
monise the relevant rules of national law. Consequently it obliges the Mem-
ber States to amend those laws, be it to varying degrees and in various man-
ners, where they relate to the remedies and procedures for the enforcement 
of intellectual property rights.46 On the other hand efforts have been made 
to ensure that the pre-existing national legal regimes are respected as much 
as possible. The Commission has stressed that “account should be taken of the 
41 CoJ case C-406/09, Realchemie, para. 49.
42 CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, para. 131.
43 CoJ case C-180/11, Bericap, para. 73; CoJ case C-435/12, ACI Adam, para. 60.
44 CoJ case C-180/11, Bericap, para. 75; CoJ case C-435/12, ACI Adam, para. 61.
45 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, pp. 5-9. See 
also Commission, Responses to the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, July 
2011; Commission, Communication on a single market for intellectual property rights, 
COM(2011) 287, p. 19; Commission, Consultation on the civil enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, 2012; Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, July 2013; Commission, Communication 
towards a renewed consensus on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
COM(2014) 392, p. 7.
46 Cf. Speyart (2005), p. 271; Norrgård (2005), p. 507; Harbottle (2006), p. 721; Schaffner 
(2010), p. 178.
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legal traditions and situation of each Member State” and that “the question is to 
ensure that intellectual property rights are enforced in an equivalent fashion 
throughout the [EU], but within the existing national frameworks”.47 The direc-
tive explicitly allows Member States to retain or adopt further-going nation-
al legislation, in so far as such measures are more favourable for holders of 
intellectual property rights.48 Some of its provisions are moreover merely 
optional.49 The Commission has described the directive as “a minimum but 
standard toolbox” to combat infringements of intellectual property rights in 
legal proceedings before the national courts.50
116. It can further be noted that the (draft) directive was on the whole rath-
er critically received by academics and other interested parties. Some criti-
cized it for not going far enough in harmonising the laws of the Member 
States.51 Others questioned in contrast the justification for amending those 
laws.52 The latter doubted especially the underlying assessment by the 
Commission that infringers of intellectual property rights exploited dispari-
ties in the domestic laws of the Member States.53 It was argued that the mat-
ters at issue should be left to national law pursuant to the principle of sub-
sidiarity. The ‘fragmenting’ effects that the directive would have on national 
laws were also noted. The latter refers to the fact that the directive applies 
only to infringements of intellectual property rights, whereas the national 
laws that it affects are typically designed to apply across the board, i.e. also 
in relation to infringements of other rules of law. Other commentators found 
several of the directive’s provisions too vague and elastic.54
117. A third remark is that other rules of EU law may also be of relevance 
in relation to infringements of EU intellectual property law. To begin with, 
substantive EU intellectual property law can be of importance, not only for the 
relevant substantive rules it lays down, but also for the enforcement-related 
provisions it occasionally contains. For instance, the Infosoc Directive set 
outs some (rather rudimentary) rules on sanctions and remedies in respect 
of infringements, including actions for damages, injunctions and the sei-
zure of infringing material.55 The abovementioned legislation establishing 
EU unitary rights typically contains rather detailed rules on the designa-
47 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 15.
48 See in particular Art. 2(1) and recitals 13 and 14 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. Cf. 
Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 5.
49 E.g. Art. 12 and Art. 13(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
50 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 5.
51 Massa & Strowell (2004), p. 246.
52 Cornish et al. (2003), p. 448.
53 See also Massa & Strowell (2004), p. 244.
54 Kur (2004), p. 830; Gielen (2005), p. 10. In a similar sense, see Geiger, Raynard & Rodà 
(2011), p. 546; Norrgård (2005), p. 503.
55 Art. 8 Infosoc Directive 2001/29.
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tion of specialised national courts, applicable law, jurisdiction, sanctions and 
provisional and protective measures. Such rules can for example be found 
in the Community Design Regulation and the Community Trade Mark 
Regulation.56 The Community Plant Variety Rights Regulation also includes 
rules on civil law claims.57 Those rules specify that infringers may be sued 
to enjoin such infringements and/or to pay reasonable compensation and 
make good any further damages. Restitution of unlawfully made profits by 
the infringer may also take place under this regulation, in accordance with 
national law. Moreover, pursuant to the implementing rules, where in cer-
tain cases a party has repeatedly and intentionally not complied with its 
obligations, there is an obligation to compensate damages covering at least a 
lump sum calculated on the basis of the quadruple average amount charged 
for the licensed production of a corresponding quantity.58
The IPR Enforcement Directive should further be understood against 
the background of certain other provisions of EU law that can have an impact 
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. This directive comple-
ments Regulation 608/2013 (‘Customs Enforcement Regulation’), which 
provides the basis for cooperation between private parties holding intellec-
tual property rights and the customs authorities of the Member States.59 
This regulation (and its predecessor) is seen as an important means for fight-
ing intellectual property right infringements where customs matters are 
concerned.60 The E-Commerce Directive also contains rules that can be rel-
evant in the present context, especially in relation to liability of online inter-
mediaries in relation to infringements of intellectual property rights.61 The 
rules of the IPR Enforcement Directive are without prejudice to those rules 
set out in the E-Commerce Directive.62 There is further often a strong funda-
mental rights dimension to intellectual property rights-related disputes, 
which means that the Charter can be of particular importance too.63 The 
provisions of the Charter that can come into play, depending on the case at 
hand, include Article 47 on the right to effective judicial protection,64 Article 
17(2), which stipulates that intellectual property shall be protected,65 and 
56 See e.g. Art. 80, 88-90 and 93 Community Designs Regulation 6/2002; Art. 95, 101-103 and 
109 Community Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009.
57 Art. 94 and 97 Community Plant Variety Rights Regulation 2100/94. See e.g. also its Art. 
101, 103, 104 and 107 concerning jurisdiction, rules of procedure, legal standing and pen-
alties respectively.
58 Art. 18(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1768/95 implementing rules on the agricul-
tural exemption provided for in Article 14(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 on 
Community plant variety rights, OJ 1995, L 173/14.
59 Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, OJ 2013, L 181/15.
60 See e.g. Daele (2004), p. 214. See further Vrins & Schneider (2006).
61 Art. 12-15 E-Commerce Directive 2000/31.
62 Art. 2(3)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
63 Cf. recitals 2 and 32 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
64 On Article 47 Charter, see further para. 43 above.
65 On Article 17(2) Charter, see further Geiger (2009), p. 113, with further references.
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Articles 7 and 8 on the right to respect for private life and protection of per-
sonal data respectively.66
118. Finally, the IPR Enforcement Directive’s international law context 
should not be overlooked.67 Of particular importance is the Agreement on 
Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS Agreement’), 
concluded in the context of the WTO.68 This agreement, which came into 
effect on 1 January 1995, applies to all WTO members, including all EU 
Member States and the EU itself.69 It sets out general obligations, such as 
most-favoured nation treatment, national treatment of non-nationals and 
intergovernmental dispute resolution,70 as well as substantive rules on the 
protection of intellectual property rights.71 Most importantly for the present 
purposes, the TRIPS Agreement lays down rules on the enforcement of these 
rights by private parties.72 The IPR Enforcement Directive being one of the 
measures through which the EU has given effect to its obligations under the 
TRIPS Agreement,73 in many respects the former builds on the latter. In the 
explanatory memorandum to its proposal for this directive, the Commission 
repeatedly highlighted this kinship, while noting that on various points the 
obligations contained in this directive go beyond those set out in the agree-
ment.74 Consequently the relevant provisions of EU law are, as far as possi-
ble, to be interpreted in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement.75
66 Concerning the protection of personal data, Art. 2(3)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48 provides explicitly that it does not affect Data Protection Directive 95/46. In 
addition Art. 16 Charter on the freedom to conduct a business and Art. 11 Charter on the 
freedom of expression and information can e.g. be of relevance. See also para. 124 below.
67 On the external dimension of intellectual property rights enforcement from an EU per-
spective, see further Matthews (2010), p. 104.
68 See recitals 4 and 5 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
69 See Decision 94/800/EC concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Commu-
nity, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay 
Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994), OJ 1994, L 336/1.
70 Parts I and V TRIPS Agreement.
71 Part II TRIPS Agreement. In many instances these rules reproduce and extend provisions 
of pre-existing international conventions established under the aegis of a specialised 
agency of the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (‘WIPO’). 
The main WIPO conventions are the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial 
property (‘Paris Convention’) and the Berne Convention for the protection of literary and 
artistic works (‘Berne Convention’). Both conventions also contain certain (rather rudi-
mentary) provisions relating to enforcement. See Art. 2(1) and 9-10 Paris Convention; Art. 
15-16 Berne Convention.
72 Part III TRIPS Agreement.
73 CoJ case C-180/11, Bericap, para. 73.
74 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 12. See 
also Commission, Communication on the follow-up to the green paper on combating 
counterfeiting and piracy in the single market, COM(2000) 789, p. 6.
75 CoJ case C-53/96, Hermès International, para. 28.
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The parties to the TRIPS Agreement must “permit effective action” 
against any act of infringement, including expeditious and deterrent rem-
edies.76 The relevant procedures must be “fair and equitable […] and not be 
unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwar-
ranted delays”.77 In particular, civil judicial procedures must be available, 
fulfilling certain minimum requirements as regards the course of proceed-
ings.78 The TRIPS Agreement further stipulates that the competent judicial 
authorities must have the authority to order the defendant to produce evi-
dence lying within its control, where the applicant has presented reason-
able available evidence sufficient to support its claims.79 Similarly, but on 
an optional basis, these authorities may be authorised to order infringing 
parties to provide information on third parties involved in the production 
or distribution of the goods or services concerned.80 Specific remedies are 
also provided for, including injunctions (i.e. orders to a party to desist from 
an infringement) and damages, which must be adequate to compensate for 
the injury suffered because of the infringement.81 It must further be pos-
sible to order the disposal or destruction of the infringing goods, as well 
as prompt and effective provisional measures.82 Lastly, the parties to the 
TRIPS Agreement are under an obligation to provide for criminal sanctions, 
at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale.83
Apart from the foregoing, in 2010 agreement was reached at interna-
tional level on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (‘ACTA’). This 
international agreement was negotiated on an ad hoc multilateral basis, out-
side existing structures such as the WTO. In essence ACTA seeks to further 
strengthen the possibilities to enforce intellectual property rights world-
wide. It builds on the TRIPS Agreement, but it contains further-going pro-
visions on various points, including on enforcement via civil law proce-
dures and criminal law.84 ACTA has been signed by countries such as the 
US, Canada, Japan and South Korea, as well as by the EU and most of its 
Member States. The Commission took the view that ACTA’s provisions are 
fully in line with currently existing EU acquis.85 It proposed finalising the 
process of ratification that follows the signature.86 However within the EU 
76 Art. 41(1) TRIPS Agreement.
77 Art. 41(2) TRIPS Agreement.
78 Art. 42 TRIPS Agreement.
79 Art. 43(1) TRIPS Agreement.
80 Art. 47 TRIPS Agreement.
81 Art. 44 and 45 TRIPS Agreement respectively.
82 Art. 46 and 50 TRIPS Agreement respectively.
83 Art. 61 TRIPS Agreement.
84 Art. 7-12 and 23-26 ACTA. See also Art. 27 ACTA, which lays down specifi c provisions 
relating to enforcement in the digital environment.
85 E.g. Commission, Communication on a single market for intellectual property rights, 
COM(2011) 287, p. 20.
86 See Commission, Proposal for a decision on the conclusion of ACTA, COM(2011) 380.
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this international agreement proved to be very controversial. From various 
sides criticism was voiced, relating inter alia to the non-transparent manner 
in which ACTA had been negotiated, the correctness of the Commission’s 
above assessment, the impact it might have on the right to privacy and 
protection of personal data and more generally the absence of a sufficiently 
balanced approach.87 In the end the European Parliament refused to give its 
consent, which is required for an international agreement such as this one 
to be ratified at EU level.88 As a consequence the EU did not ratify ACTA 
and is therefore not bound by it.
4.2. Remedies
The core of the IPR Enforcement Directive consists of a set of specific private 
enforcement remedies, which for the present purposes can be divided into 
five categories. To begin with, there are measures related to obtaining and 
preserving evidence and information relevant to intellectual property dis-
putes. These measures, which take an important place under this directive, 
are largely of a preliminary nature, in that they normally precede any assess-
ment on the merits of the case. In the second place, the directive sets out a 
number of measures of a provisional and precautionary nature. It concerns 
in particular interlocutory injunctions, to be issued by means of interim 
measures. As regards possible decisions on the merits, in the third place, the 
directive foresees the possibility for the competent court to order certain cor-
rective measures and ‘permanent’ injunctions. The fourth remedy concerns 
another possible decision on the merits, namely as regards actions for dam-
ages. Fifthly and finally, there is the possibility for the national court to order 
two complementary measures under this directive, namely the payment of 
legal costs and publicity measures. These five categories are subsequently 
discussed in the following.
87 E.g. European Parliament, Resolution on the transparency and the state of play of ACTA 
negotiations, P7_TA(2010)0058; European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the 
current negotiations by the EU of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 
OJ 2010, C 147/1; European Parliament, Resolution on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), P7_TA(2010)0432. See also European academics (2011), p. 65. For the 
Commission’s reply to this latter submission, see Commission, Comments on the “opin-
ion of European academics on ACTA”, April 2011. For a further explanation from the side 
of the Commission offi cials involved in the ACTA negotiations, see Devigne, Velasco-
Martins & Iliopoulou (2010), pp. 33-42.
88 European Parliament, Legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclu-
sion of ACTA, P7_TA-PROV(2012)0287. The European Parliament’s consent was required 
under Art. 218(6) TFEU.
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4.2.1. Disclosure measures
119. The recitals of the IPR Enforcement Directive state that “evidence is 
an element of paramount importance for establishing the infringement of intellec-
tual property rights”.89 This view is widely shared by academics, practitio-
ners and other stakeholders alike.90 The EU legislature also considered it of 
importance, with a view to ensuring a high level of protection, to allow a 
rightholder to obtain precise information on the origin of infringing goods 
or services, relevant distribution channels or the identity of any third parties 
involved in the infringement.91 Against this background, the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive lays down three sorts of measures relating to evidence and 
information.
120. In the first place, the directive provides in a general manner that the 
competent national court may order the defendant to present evidence lying 
within the latter’s control, subject to the protection of confidential informa-
tion. However this can only be done upon the private party initiating the 
proceedings having first presented “reasonably available evidence sufficient 
to support its claims, and has, in substantiating those claims, specified evidence 
which lies in the control of the opposing party”.92 Thus, not only is a court order 
required and is confidential information protected, the applicant must also 
establish a prima facie case and specify which evidence is concerned. This 
provision is modelled on the TRIPS Agreement.93 The directive adds that on 
an optional basis Member States may provide that “a reasonable sample of a 
substantial number of copies of a work or any other protected object” is considered 
to constitute reasonable evidence.94
Apart from this general provision, under the same conditions the Mem-
ber States must also ensure, more specifically, that their courts can order, 
where appropriate, the communication of banking, financial or commercial 
documents under the control of the opposing party.95 Under the directive 
this latter measure is limited however to cases of infringements committed 
on a commercial scale. In the recitals it is clarified that this refers to acts car-
ried out for direct or indirect commercial advantage, and that this would 
normally exclude acts carried out by end consumers acting in good faith.96 In 
this manner the directive seeks to ensure a degree of proportionality between 
89 Recital 20 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
90 See e.g. Gielen (2005), p. 8; Bonadio (2008), p. 321; Hess (2008), pp. 289-290; Cornish, 
Llewelyn & Aplin (2010), pp. 88-89; Lakits-Josse (2011), pp. 529 and 531. See also Study 
European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-a), p. 2.
91 Recital 21 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
92 Art. 6(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
93 Art. 43 TRIPS Agreement. Cf. Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 20.
94 Art. 6(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
95 Art. 6(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
96 Recital 14 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/18.
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the (scale of) the infringements and the measures imposed as a consequence 
thereof.
121. In the second place, particularly when confronted with the possibility 
of having to present evidence lying within its control, discussed above, a 
party having infringed intellectual property rights might be inclined to 
destroy or otherwise dispose of relevant evidence.97 It must therefore be 
ensured under the IPR Enforcement Directive that, even before proceedings 
on the merits of the case are initiated, a court can order “prompt and effective” 
provisional measures to preserve evidence.98 The applicable conditions are 
essentially similar to the ones mentioned in the previous paragraph as 
regards the presentation of evidence. The directive specifies that these pres-
ervation measures may take the form of the detailed description (with or 
without taking samples) or the physical seizure of the infringing goods or in 
the production or distribution of those goods or of documents relating 
thereto. This thus entails the issuing of ex parte search orders, allowing a 
private party to enter the premises of another party for the preservation of 
evidence of alleged infringements of intellectual property rights.
The IPR Enforcement Directive indicates that in certain cases this reme-
dy may be granted without the other party having been heard. On the one 
hand such an approach is understandable, because hearing that party might 
mean that he has an opportunity to destroy the evidence before a court 
order is issued. On the other hand this obviously goes rather far, as it denies 
that party of its right to contest the claims made by the applicant. Therefore 
this measure can only be ordered where it is necessary, “in particular where 
any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the rightholder or where there is a 
demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed”.99 A set of additional procedural 
safeguards are also provided for, including an obligation to inform the party 
that is subject to this measure afterwards, the possibility of an ex post review 
and hearing, the lodging of adequate security by the applicant, revocation if 
no proceedings on the merits are initiated within a set time period and com-
pensation to be paid where it turns out that the measure was incorrectly 
applied for.100
This provisional measure to preserve evidence has been modelled upon 
arrangements that already existed in various Member States, in particular 
what used to be known as ‘Anton Pillar orders’ under English law and the 
French saisie-contrefaçon procedure.101 This English law equivalent has been 
said to have greatly contributed to the speed and effectiveness of the civil 
97 Cf. Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-a), p. 2.
98 Art. 7(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
99 Art. 7(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
100 Art. 7(1)-(4) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
101 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, pp. 13 and 
20; Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 8.
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process in dealing with infringers of intellectual property rights.102 Its inclu-
sion in the IPR Enforcement Directive means that this measure has been 
‘generalised’, in that it must be made available in all Member States and in 
relation to all intellectual property rights covered by the directive. In some 
cases this ‘generalisation’ has gone even further, for instance in the Nether-
lands, where the rules in question have been applied by analogy also to 
cases that do not concern (alleged) infringements of intellectual property 
rights.103
122. In the third place, the IPR Enforcement Directive also provides for 
what it calls a private party’s ‘right of information’.104 This provision is mod-
elled on the pre-existing laws of certain Member States, notably the Benelux 
countries and Germany.105 According to the Commission, its ‘elevation’ to 
the European level, upon a suggestion by the European Parliament, found 
unanimous support of interested circles.106 This right is concerned with 
information on the origin and the distribution networks of the infringing 
goods or services, such as names and addresses of producers or suppliers. It 
can also concern information on quantities produced and prices obtained. 
Whereas the former information can be of obvious importance to determine 
whether and how an infringement has been committed, the latter informa-
tion can inter alia be of relevance to determine its scale and the damage it 
may have caused. In response to a “justified and proportionate request”, under 
this directive the national court must be able to order the disclosure of the 
aforementioned information.
One possibility is that this order is addressed to the (alleged) infringer. 
However the directive also provides for the possibility that the order is 
addressed to certain third parties, namely where the latter were found to be 
in possession of the infringing goods, using the infringing services or pro-
viding services used in the infringing activities. Covered are also third par-
ties that have been indicated by any of the aforementioned persons as being 
involved in the production, manufacture or distribution of the goods and 
services in question. In each of these cases the third party in question can 
only be involved if its activities take place on a commercial scale. Consum-
ers acting in good faith are consequently in principle excluded.107 The pro-
viders of services used in the infringing activities are known as intermediar-
ies.108 One can think of undertakings transporting the goods concerned or, 
in an online environment, providers of internet access or of services for 
online market places. This extension of the right of information so as to cov-
102 Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin (2010), pp. 89-90.
103 HR case 12/05529, UGH.
104 Art. 8 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
105 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 20.
106 Ibid.
107 See recital 14 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
108 Cf. recital 23 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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er also certain third parties is an example of a situation where the directive 
goes beyond the regime of the TRIPS Agreement, as the latter provides for 
this measure only on an optional basis.109
123. As regard the functioning in practice of the abovementioned measures, 
the Commission’s 2010 assessment of the application of this directive sug-
gests that the overall picture is rather positive. For instance, the abovemen-
tioned possibility of using samples as evidence is said to have be on the 
whole considered favourably by stakeholders.110 Even if the provision in 
question is only optional, it has been introduced in many Member States. 
This was found to have led to a general improvement in the enforcement 
possibilities. The abovementioned provisional measures for the preservation 
of evidence were also highlighted as having helped rendering the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights more effective.111 By contrast the pos-
sibility of description orders, included on an optional basis in the directive, 
was reported to have been little used by the Member States. Many found 
this to be more common in a criminal law context than in a civil law con-
text.112 As regards the abovementioned right of information, the possibility 
of requiring information from third parties-intermediaries was reported to 
be novel to most Member States. It was said to have significantly increased 
the ability to trace and obtain knowledge of parties infringing intellectual 
property rights and to have facilitated the calculation of damages.113
That is not to say that no critical comments were made in this context. 
The collection of evidence in cross-border cases reportedly remains difficult 
for example.114 Broadly speaking, this refers to situations where the appli-
cant and the defendant are not established in the same Member State or 
where an element relevant to the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of 
another Member State. In addition gathering evidence in relation to infringe-
ments committed via the internet was singled out as a particular difficulty, 
both in light of the anonymity that this medium can offer and the formal 
requirements in terms of acceptable evidence that apply in some national 
jurisdictions.115 Lastly, some stakeholders considered several specific issues 
to be in need of clarification, including the prima facie evidence needed in 
109 Art. 47 TRIPS Agreement.
110 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 3; Com-
mission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, pp. 7-8.
111 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 3.
112 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 8.
113 Ibid., p. 11. As regards the calculation of damages, see also para. 133 below.
114 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 9; Com-
mission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 8. See also Commission, Responses to the report on IPR 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48, July 2011, p. 18. See further Hess (2008), p. 289.
115 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 8.
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order to obtain a court order, the degree to which applicants must specify 
the information to which their request for disclosure relates, the requirement 
that the evidence must be under the control of the other party and the scope 
of the protection offered to confidential information.116 As regards the afore-
mentioned ex parte search orders, rightholders asked for a further strength-
ening, while academics and consumer organisations warned against risks of 
abuse.117
124. Finally, and more generally, the involvement of third party-intermediar-
ies in the context of the aforementioned right of information has proven to 
be particularly controversial, especially in online situations. This possibility 
regularly leads to litigation where, besides the IPR Enforcement Directive, 
various other acts of secondary EU law as well as a number of fundamental 
rights are involved.118 A particular concern in this respect is often the protec-
tion of the right to privacy and protection of personal data. One such case is 
Promusicae, decided by the Court of Justice in 2008 on the basis of a Spanish 
preliminary reference.119 Promusicae, a non-profit organisation of holders of 
intellectual property rights, applied for a court order addressed to an inter-
net access provider to disclose the identities and addresses of some of the 
latter’s clients. The persons in question had allegedly infringed intellectual 
property rights held by Promusicae’s members by using a ‘peer-to-peer’ file 
exchange programme. Promusicae needed this information to be able to ini-
tiate legal proceedings against those persons. The Court of Justice held that, 
although this is not excluded, the IPR Enforcement Directive’s aforemen-
tioned right of information does not mean that the Member States are obliged 
to provide for the disclosure personal data, which are protected inter alia 
under the E-Privacy Directive,120 in the context of civil proceedings.121 As 
regards the relevant fundamental rights, at issue were on the one hand the 
right to protection of intellectual property and right to an effective remedy 
on the side of the rightholders and on the other hand the right to privacy 
and protection of personal data of the persons concerned.122 The Court ruled 
that a fair balance needs to be struck between these various fundamental 
rights, taking account also of the principle of proportionality.123 In subse-
116 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 9; Com-
mission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 9. See also Commission, Responses to the report on IPR 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48, July 2011, pp. 18-19.
117 Commission, Responses to the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, July 2011, 
p. 19.
118 See further Van Eecke (2011), p. 1455.
119 CoJ case C-275/06, Promusicae. See also CoJ Order case C-557/07, LSG.
120 See in particular Art. 5(1) E-Privacy Directive 2002/58.
121 CoJ case C-275/06, Promusicae, para. 57-58. See Art. 8(3)(e) IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48.
122 Art. 17(2), 47, 7 and 8 Charter respectively.
123 CoJ case C-275/06, Promusicae, para. 68.
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quent case law it added that national legislation that provides for such a 
possibility of disclosure of personal data is likely to ensure the required fair 
balance, where it enables the court seised to weigh the conflicting interests 
involved on the basis of the facts of each case and taking due account of the 
requirements of proportionality.124
In 2010 the Commission limited itself in this respect to the statement 
that “[f]urther evaluations could be needed” regarding the extent to which the 
Member States complied with the requirements resulting from the above 
case law.125 The fate of ACTA, discussed above, where similar concerns 
played an important role, underlines the sensitivity of this matter.126 This is 
further confirmed by the responses to the consultations on the function and 
future of the IPR Enforcement Directive, including from the side of several 
Member States.127 This possible involvement of third party-intermediaries 
in the context of civil proceedings between holders of intellectual property 
rights and alleged infringers has been justified essentially on the basis of the 
central role of these (online) intermediaries as ‘gatekeepers’ and the infor-
mation that they often possess in that capacity.128 The Court of Justice seems 
receptive to this view.129 Predictably, (organisations of) rightholders tend to 
be in favour of such an approach involving third party-intermediaries. But 
organisations concerned with the protection of online freedoms, consumer 
organisations and intermediaries themselves speak of a ‘privatisation’ of 
enforcement and stress the risk of ‘private censorship’. These opponents 
argue that intermediaries should not act as a sort of ‘internet police’, forcing 
them to take arbitrary decisions with respect to their customers based on 
allegations, and that in this connection personal data should only be dis-
closed to the competent public authorities and not to other private parties.
4.2.2. Interlocutory injunctions and seizures
125. The IPR Enforcement Directive specifies a number of provisional and 
precautionary measures that national courts must be able to take. In all cases 
the measures in question, further discussed below, are to be ordered at the 
applicant’s request. The applicable requirements to be fulfilled before such 
124 CoJ case C-461/10, Bonnier, para. 57-60.
125 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, pp. 7-8. 
Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, pp. 12-13.
126 See para. 118 above.
127 Commission, Responses to the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, July 2011, 
pp. 4-7 and 11-14. See also Commission, Responses to the public hearing on IPR Enforce-
ment Directive 2004/48, June 2011; Commission, Responses to the public consultation on 
the civil enforcement of intellectual property rights, July 2013, p. 14.
128 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 16. See also Frabboni (2010), p. 119.
129 See e.g. CoJ case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien, para. 27, where it is held in connection to 
the injunctions referred to in Art. 8(3) Infosoc Directive 2001/29 that “such intermediaries 
are, in many cases, best placed to bring such infringing activities to an end”.
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an order can be made are essentially similar to those discussed in the forego-
ing subsection as regards the preservation of evidence.130 Accordingly the 
applicant must submit reasonably available evidence and there must be a 
possibility for these orders to be made in appropriate cases without having 
heard the opposing party, subject to a set of specific safeguards.131
126. A first type of measure of this kind is an interlocutory injunction. In its 
2003 proposal for the IPR Enforcement Directive the Commission took the 
view that provisional measures are of paramount importance in the event of 
an infringement of intellectual property rights.132 Under this directive this 
remedy entails preventing any imminent infringement as well as provision-
ally forbidding the continuation of an alleged infringement.133 This being an 
interim measure, there is no need to await a decision on the merits of the 
case, as is clarified in the recitals.134 There it is further said that these mea-
sures are particularly justified where any delay would cause irreparable 
harm to the private party holding the intellectual property right. In other 
words, this remedy is meant for cases where rapid interference is required 
by means of the establishment of interim measures. The definitive legal situ-
ation can subsequently be determined in an action on the merits. However, 
as the relevant recital also recalls, this should not come at the expense of the 
defendant’s rights of defence and the requirements of proportionality.
In this connection the directive sets out several complementary rules. 
For instance, it is specified that this remedy may also entail making the con-
tinuation of the allegedly infringing activity subject to the lodging of a guar-
antee. That guarantee can then be used to ensure that the rightholder is com-
pensated, should it later emerge that he is entitled thereto. The directive also 
specifies that, under the same conditions, these interlocutory injunctions can 
also be issued against intermediaries, i.e. third parties whose services are 
being used to infringe intellectual property rights. In those cases the rele-
vant conditions and procedures are to be determined by national law, 
according to the relevant recital.135 As was the case with the extension of the 
right of information to intermediaries,136 also in this case the coverage of 
these third parties marked a step beyond the regime of the TRIPS Agree-
ment.137 This approach was novel to most Member States.138 Lastly, it is 
stipulated that the above injunctions can be made subject to a recurring pen-
alty payment, where provided for by national law. That is for instance the 
130 See para. 121 above.
131 Art. 9(3)-(7) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
132 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 21.
133 Art. 9(1)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
134 Recital 22 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
135 Recital 22 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
136 See para. 122 above.
137 Art. 50 TRIPS Agreement. On this agreement, see para. 118 above.
138 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 15.
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case in the Netherlands, where these payments are due to the applicant, as 
well as in Slovakia and Germany, where they are instead to be paid to the 
court that imposed this measure.139
127. It appears that the functioning in practice of the above remedy is mostly 
considered rather positively. Interlocutory injunctions are said to be granted 
relatively quickly.140 Reportedly these injunctions, being interim measures, 
often lead to a settlement between the parties, thus making legal proceed-
ings on the merits unnecessary. The Commission therefore called this the 
“main enforcement remedy” for most private parties concerned.141 Also the 
possibility of issuing such injunctions against third party-intermediaries 
was reported to be relatively frequently used, once again especially in rela-
tion to alleged online infringements.142 This can for instance lead to the 
blocking of a website or taking down specific information. This generally 
rather favourable assessment of this remedy is echoed in other studies and 
in the legal literature.143 This is consistent with the finding that stopping the 
infringing activity is, together with dissuading future infringements, typi-
cally the prime objective of private parties that are confronted with infringe-
ments of their intellectual property rights.144
Yet in the context of the said assessment certain complaints were also 
observed. These include the level of evidence required in some Member 
States, such as Finland, among other things as regards the level of certainty 
that an infringement has actually taken place before these provisional mea-
sures are granted.145 Other sources suggest however that evidence is gener-
ally not a major concern in this respect.146 The Commission further reported 
that the legal costs (lawyers, court fees, experts, etc.) involved in obtaining 
139 Ibid., p. 13.
140 Ibid., pp. 13-15.
141 Ibid., p. 14. See also Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, July 2013, p. 15.
142 As regards the issues related to the involvement of third party-intermediaries under IPR 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48, see in particular para. 124 above and 131 below.
143 See e.g. Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-b), p. 4. As 
regards the legal literature, see e.g. Bonadio (2008), p. 322; Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin 
(2010), p. 75. See also Reinbothe (2010), p. 7 (concerning Art. 8(3) Infosoc Directive 
2001/29). Note that interlocutory injunctions often already played an important role 
before the entry into force of this directive. See e.g. Kur (2004), p. 825; Meier-Beck (2004), 
pp. 113-114.
144 Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, July 2013, p. 7.
145 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 14.
146 Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-b), p. 5. According to 
this study, in most Member States rightholders encounter no diffi culties in providing the 
required evidence as regards the applicant being the rightholder and the imminent 
infringement of this party’s right.
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this remedy can be a concern.147 However again there are other reports sug-
gesting that the amounts involved are on the whole comparably modest.148 
In the legal literature this remedy is in fact mostly seen as relatively cheap to 
obtain.149 An arguably more substantial – or, it appears, at least more widely 
shared – concern with respect to especially interlocutory injunctions is their 
functioning in cross-border situations.150 That applies especially where the 
intellectual property right at issue is not an EU unitary right.151 In the latter 
case, pursuant to the relevant EU regulations, as explained by the Court of 
Justice, both the jurisdiction of the national court seised and the territorial 
scope of the right granted cover in principle the entire EU.152 Although also 
in these cases stakeholders have reported difficulties in practice in obtaining 
cross-border interlocutory injunctions,153 these difficulties are typically con-
siderably greater in relation to intellectual property rights based on national 
law (notably patents154). For here the general rule is that jurisdiction and 
territorial scope are limited to national borders.155
147 In Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 14 (n. 35), amounts ranging from € 3.500 to € 25.000, 
and up to € 40.000 in patent infringement cases are cited. These amounts appear to be 
based on Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-b), pp. 6-7. 
However the relevant section in this latter report relates specifi cally to measures to pre-
serve evidence, and not to interlocutory injunctions.
148 Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-b), pp. 6-7. Here it is 
reported that obtaining interlocutory injunctions (and other provisional and precaution-
ary remedies) can be rather costly in some Member States, but much less so in other 
Member States. The amounts cited entail at most a few thousands euros and often less.
149 Bonadio (2008), p. 322; Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin (2010), p. 75.
150 Note that these concerns generally apply in much the same way to the ‘permanent’ 
injunctions, discussed in para. 130 below. For practical reasons both issues are discussed 
jointly here. See Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights, July 2013, p. 8. See further Kur (2006), p. 844; Joseph 
(2006), p. 850; Döring & Van Velsen (2006), p. 858. As regards EU unitary rights, see Fields 
(2011), p. 597; Schnell (2011), p. 210.
151 See para. 108 above.
152 Art. 103(2) Community Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009; Art. 90(3) Community Design 
Regulation 2006/6. See e.g. CoJ case C-235/09, DHL Express, para. 50.
153 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 18.
154 In particular before the patent package, referred to in para. 108 above, having entered 
into force.
155 In the late 1990s certain national courts (especially in the Netherlands, but later also in 
other Member States, such as Germany) issued injunctions which had effects also beyond 
the borders of the jurisdiction in question. This can obviously be attractive for righthold-
ers, for example where various infringers belonging to the same group infringe a patent 
in several jurisdictions in an identical manner. However in 2006 the CoJ marked certain 
clear limits to these practices. It did so on the basis of (what is now) Brussels I Regulation 
44/2001 (see its Art. 22(4)). See in particular CoJ case C-539/03, Roche Nederland, para. 41. 
See also CoJ case C-4/03, GAT v. LUK, para. 31. Cf. Nuyts (2008); Commission, Staff 
working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, 
SEC(2010) 1589, p. 18.
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128. Apart from these interlocutory injunctions, the IPR Enforcement 
Directive provides for two other sorts of provisional and precautionary 
measures, both of which involve the seizure of certain goods. To begin with, 
there is the possibility for the court to order the seizure or delivery up of the 
goods suspected of infringing an intellectual property right.156 This serves to 
prevent their entry into or movement within the channels of commerce. In 
other words, the idea is create a possibility to intervene before the goods in 
question disappear out of sight or become difficult to trace for the private 
party wishing to initiate private enforcement proceedings. The national 
court must in addition be able to order the precautionary seizure of movable 
and immovable property of the alleged infringing party, including the 
blocking of bank accounts and other assets.157 This latter provision has been 
modelled on an arrangement found in English law, known as a ‘freezing’ (or 
‘Mareva’) injunction.158 Under the directive it can only be ordered in cases of 
infringements committed on a commercial scale. It is further limited to situ-
ations where the applicant has demonstrated that there are circumstances 
likely to endanger the recovery of damages. It is specified that, to this end, 
the competent authorities may order the communication of back, financial 
or commercial documents, or appropriate access to the relevant information. 
It follows that here the emphasis is not so much on the prevention of the 
infringement or limiting the damage that may emerge as a result thereof, but 
that this latter remedy rather aims to ensure that any such damage, if and 
when it emerges, can actually be compensated as much as possible.
4.2.3. Corrective measures and ‘permanent’ injunctions
129. Turning to the various remedies for which the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive provides as a result of a decision by the competent national court on 
the merits of the case, a first type concerns what the directive calls correc-
tive measures. This refers to the “appropriate measures” that must be avail-
able with regard to the infringing goods or the materials principally used 
in their creation.159 These measures can take (at least) three forms, namely 
recall from the channels of commerce, definitive removal from those chan-
nels or destruction of the goods and materials in question. These measures 
are to be taken in principle at the expense of the infringing party.160 Propor-
tionality as well as respect for the interests of third parties must be ensured 
when requests for these measures are considered.161 In a sense the measures 
156 Art. 9(1)(b) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
157 Art. 9(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
158 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, pp. 13 and 
21.
159 Art. 10(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
160 Art. 10(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
161 Art. 10(3) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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referred to here can be seen as the ‘permanent’ version of the possibilities of 
seizure on a provisional basis, discussed in the previous subsection.162
The possibility of recall and definitive removal of infringing goods from 
the channels of commerce, which has been developed originally in the 
national laws of the Netherlands and Belgium, was new to most other Mem-
ber States.163 These measures appear to be generally little used in practice, 
something that is said to be due largely to the fact that they are difficult to 
enforce where the goods are no longer in the infringer’s possession.164 The 
possibility of having infringing goods destructed, based on the TRIPS 
Agreement,165 has been reported to be the most common corrective mea-
sure.166 Nonetheless the costs of these measures are often seen as a particu-
lar problem. Even if the directive makes it clear that these costs are to be 
borne by the defendant, in practice they are often first incurred by the appli-
cant. Having these costs reimbursed may then prove difficult, for instance 
because the former is unknown or insolvent.167
130. On the whole of greater practical importance is the possibility under 
the IPR Enforcement Directive for a private party to apply for injunctions 
aimed at prohibiting the continuation of an infringement.168 Also this is, as 
it were, the ‘permanent’ version of the possibility of issuing interlocutory 
injunctions, discussed earlier.169 According to the directive, where provided 
for by national law, non-compliance with these ‘permanent’ injunctions 
shall, where appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty payment with a 
view to ensuring compliance. As was the case with those interlocutory 
injunctions, also these ‘permanent’ injunctions appear to be regularly used 
in practice.170 The remarks made in the foregoing as regards the functioning 
of this remedy in cross-border situations also apply here, mutatis mutandis.171
162 See para. 128 above.
163 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 22.
164 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 19.
165 Art. 46 TRIPS Agreement. Cf. Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 22.
166 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 20. See also Study European observatory on coun-
terfeiting and piracy (undated-c), p. 1.
167 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 8; Com-
mission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 20.
168 Art. 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also Art. 8(3) Infosoc Directive 2001/29.
169 See para. 126 above.
170 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 17.
171 See para. 127 above.
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The IPR Enforcement Directive expressly stipulates that these ‘perma-
nent’ injunctions may also be addressed to intermediaries, i.e. a third party 
whose services are used for the infringement.172 For most Member States 
this was a novelty.173 The Commission has singled out this remedy as one of 
the elements that have helped render the enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights in the EU more effective.174 However, once more, this possible 
involvement of these third parties in civil disputes has led to legal com-
plexities and controversies. This debate is to some extent similar to the one 
on their involvement in relation to the right of information. Reference is 
therefore made to the foregoing.175 In addition there has been some discus-
sion as to whether it must first be established that these intermediaries can 
be held liable or have infringed certain duties before interlocutory injunc-
tions can be granted, as is reported to be the case in Member States such as 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and Latvia.176 If so, that then raises 
the question of the relationship between this measure and the liability 
exemptions for online intermediaries laid down in the E-Commerce Direc-
tive.177 The Commission stressed that injunctions are not intended as penal-
ties and that the IPR Enforcement Directive contains no such liability 
requirement.178 It considered that the establishment of liability is therefore 
not required.179 In 2010 it stated its intention to explore how to involve inter-
mediaries more closely.180
131. In the meantime the Court of Justice has clarified a number of issues 
related to the issuing of injunctions against (online) intermediaries.181 Of 
particular importance is the 2011 judgment in L’Oréal v. eBay.182 In this case, 
an English preliminary reference, a number of persons had sold products 
protected by intellectual property rights held by an undertaking (L’Oréal) 
on an online market place (eBay). Before the competent national court, the 
rightholder applied inter alia for an injunction under the IPR Enforcement 
Directive against the online market place in its capacity as intermediary. The 
172 See the last sentence of Art. 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
173 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 17.
174 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 3.
175 See para. 124 above.
176 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 16; Study European observatory on counterfeiting 
and piracy (undated-b), p. 9.
177 Art. 12-15 E-Commerce Directive 2001/31. Cf. Study European observatory on counter-
feiting and piracy (undated-b), pp. 5 and 9.
178 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 16.
179 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 7.
180 Ibid.
181 On the concept of an (online) ‘intermediary’ (in connection to Art. 8(3) Infosoc Directive 
2001/29), see CoJ case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien, para. 30-39.
182 CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay.
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injunction applied for entailed an order to take the necessary measures to 
prevent future infringements occurring on its website. The following four 
aspects of the Court’s ruling in this case, as confirmed by and further elabo-
rated on in subsequent rulings, stand out for the present purposes.
First, it was held that the term ‘injunction’, when used in connection to 
intermediaries, is to be understood more broadly than when an infringing 
party is the addressee thereof. In the latter case, as is apparent from the 
wording of the directive, such injunctions are limited to prohibiting the con-
tinuation of an infringement.183 But in relation to intermediaries it simply 
speaks of ‘injunctions’. From this the Court deduced that in those cases the 
injunction can also be aimed at preventing future infringements.184 Second, it 
was clarified that the rules for the operation of these injunctions, such as the 
conditions to be met and the procedures to be followed, are in principle a 
matter for national law.185 Yet those rules of national law, as well as their 
interpretation by the national courts, must be such that the directive’s objec-
tive can be achieved and its limitations are respected.186 In particular, an 
online market place cannot be obliged to actively monitor all the data of 
each of its customers, as this would be against the express prohibition to this 
effect laid down in the E-Commerce Directive.187 It would also be contrary 
to the IPR Enforcement Directive’s ‘general rules’ which state that any mea-
sure to be taken must be fair and proportionate and not be excessively cost-
ly.188 Third, the need to strike a fair balance between the various (fundamen-
tal) rights and interests at stake when imposing any of the measures at issue 
here was highlighted.189 Finally, implicit in this ruling appears to be that, in 
line with the Commission’s abovementioned submissions, there is no need 
for the liability of the intermediary to be established before injunctions can 
be imposed.
132. As a final point it should be noted that the IPR Enforcement Directive 
offers the Member States to provide for what are called ‘alternative mea-
sures’.190 This is meant as an alternative to the corrective measures and the 
‘permanent’ injunctions discussed above. This possibility entails, in appro-
183 See the fi rst sentence of Art. 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
184 CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, para. 128-134. See also CoJ case C-70/10, Scarlet Exten-
ded, para. 31; CoJ case C-360/10, SABAM, para. 29.
185 Cf. recital 23 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
186 See also CoJ case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien, para. 43-44 (concerning the injunctions 
referred to in Art. 8(3) Infosoc Directive 2001/29).
187 CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, para. 135-139. See Art. 15(1) E-Commerce Directive 
2000/31. See also CoJ case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended, para. 32-36; CoJ case C-360/10, 
SABAM, para. 30-34.
188 Art. 3(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also para. 144 below.
189 CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, para. 143. Here a reference was made to CoJ case 
C-275/06, Promusicae, discussed in para. 124 above. See also CoJ case C-70/10, Scarlet 
Extended, para. 41-46; CoJ case C-360/10, SABAM, para. 39-51; CoJ case C-314/12, UPC 
Telekabel Wien, para. 46.
190 Art. 12 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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priate cases and at the request of the person liable to be subject to the mea-
sure in question, a court order for the defendant to pay pecuniary compen-
sation to the injured party. In other words, where the Member State in 
question has made use of this optional provision, it allows the defendant to 
‘buy off’ for instance an imminent order to recall infringing goods or a par-
ticular injunction. In essence the underlying idea is to prevent dispropor-
tionate outcomes from occurring.191 The directive makes this possibility sub-
ject to certain conditions however. The defendant must have acted 
unintentionally and without negligence, it must emerge that the execution 
of the measure in question would cause the defendant disproportionate 
harm, and the compensation to be paid to the injured party must appear 
reasonable satisfactory. In 2010 less than half of the Member States (includ-
ing Denmark, Poland, Romania, Sweden and Germany) had made use of 
this option.192
4.2.4. Actions for damages
133. The provision of the IPR Enforcement Directive on actions for damages 
proved to be one of a limited number of issues that were controversial in the 
course of the legislative process leading to this directive’s adoption. This 
aspect of the Commission’s proposal was hotly debated and underwent sig-
nificant changes.193 A key issue was the means of qualifying and quantifying 
the damages due. The point of departure was that private parties holding 
intellectual property rights were reported to generally encounter difficulties 
establishing and proving the precise level of damages suffered.194 As was 
noted above, the TRIPS Agreement provides that damages should be “ade-
quate” to compensate for the injury suffered in cases of wilful or negligent 
infringements.195 At the level of the Member States at least three different 
methods were in use before the adoption of the directive, whereby the 
details of each of them varied widely and some Member States also allowed 
for combining several of these methods. In a nutshell, these three methods 
entailed calculating the amount of damages due on the basis of: (i) the actu-
al loss suffered by the applicant; (ii) the infringer’s unlawful profits made in 
191 Cf. recital 25 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also Commission, Proposal for IPR 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 22.
192 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, pp. 20-21.
193 Cf. Reinbothe (2010), p. 19.
194 Cf. Commission, Green paper on combating counterfeiting and piracy in the single mar-
ket, COM(98) 569, pp. 20-21.
195 Art. 45(1) TRIPS Agreement. In its Art. 45(2) it is added that the parties to this agreement 
may authorise their judicial authorities to order recovery of profi ts and/or payment of 
pre-established damages even where the infringer did not knowingly, or without reason-
able grounds to know, engage in infringing activity.
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connection to the infringement; or (iii) the royalties or fees that would have 
been due had the infringer requested authorisation from the rightholder.196 
134. In its proposal the Commission sought to supplement the TRIPS 
Agreement and to tackle the abovementioned disparities.197 It proposed 
taking this agreement’s ‘adequate damages’ criterion as the starting point 
in cases of wilful or negligent infringements. On that basis it then specified 
this further through two – alternative – methods of calculating the dam-
ages due. The first of these methods was the establishment of fixed-rate 
damages, amounting to double the royalties or fees that would have been 
due. The second method entailed the award of damages corresponding 
to the actual prejudice suffered, including lost profits. On an optional basis 
it was proposed that this latter method would also encompass elements 
other than economic factors (i.e. non-material damage), such as the mor-
al prejudice caused. It would also include the recovery, for the benefit of 
the rightholder, of all the profits made by the infringer attributable to the 
infringement in question. In the Commission’s view, the latter was meant 
to act as a “deterrent”, particularly with respect to intentional infringements 
perpetrated on a commercial scale.198 Regarding these ‘unfair profits’ it also 
proposed including a rule of evidence, pursuant to which it would be for the 
rightholder to submit evidence only with regard to the amount of the gross 
income achieved by the infringer. It would then be for the latter to provide 
evidence of its deductible expenses and profits attributable to factors other 
than the protected object.199
Especially this first proposed method was critically received by the 
Member States represented in Council however.200 No clear single reason for 
this opposition emerges from the available preparatory documents; this is 
likely to have varied per Member State. The abovementioned diversity at 
national level probably played a role, in that most Member States may well 
have been keen to avoid having to amend their national laws as they stood. 
Another probable factor is that – even if the Commission had argued the 
contrary201 – many understood the proposed fixed-rate ‘double royalties’ 
arrangement as constituting, or at least coming (too) close to, a form of puni-
tive damages, i.e. damages that are not so much aimed at compensating the 
injury suffered, but rather at punishing and deterring infringers.202
196 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 14.
197 Ibid., pp. 14 and 23.
198 Ibid., p. 23.
199 Ibid., pp. 23 and 38-39 (Art. 17(2)).
200 Council, doc. 12055/03, p. 9-10.
201 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 23.
202 Cf. Kur (2004), p. 827; Meier-Beck (2004), p. 122; Benhamou (2009), p. 147; Cohen & 
Mottet Haugaard (2010), p. 376-377; Lakits-Josse (2011), p. 545.
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135. The final text of the IPR Enforcement Directive does not include the 
provision on the doubling of the royalties or fees, referred to above. Instead 
the directive’s damages regime builds on the second method proposed by 
the Commission. It takes as the central criterion, for wilful and negligent 
infringements, the award of damages “appropriate to the actual prejudice 
suffered”.203 Two more detailed methods of setting these damages are then 
provided for. These somewhat resemble, but nonetheless differ from the 
ones initially proposed by the Commission.
The first method is based on taking into account “all appropriate aspects”, 
including lost profits of the rightholder, unfair profits made by the infringer 
and, “in appropriate cases”, non-economic factors such as moral prejudice. In 
deviation from the Commission’s proposal, no rule of evidence has been 
included as regards the extent of these unfair profits. The second – alterna-
tive – method provided for in the IPR Enforcement Directive is the setting of 
damages as “a lump sum on the basis of elements such as at least the amount of 
royalties or fees which would have been due”. Thus, the Commission proposal to 
provide for compensation of twice the royalties has been reduced to (at 
least) once. In the recitals of this directive it is clarified that the aim is not to 
introduce an obligation to provide for punitive damages. Rather the idea is 
to allow for compensation based on objective criteria, while taking account 
of the expenses incurred by the rightholder.204
On an optional basis, in cases other than wilful or negligent infringe-
ments, Member States may furthermore provide that the competent national 
court is empowered to order “the recovery of profits or the payment of damages, 
which may be pre-established”.205
136. The EU legislature thus rejected the Commission’s relatively innova-
tive suggestions to provide for pre-fixed ‘double royalties’ damages as well 
as the proposed rule of evidence. The provision that was finally adopted is 
in fact rather modest. The damages regime seems to add little of substance 
as compared to the regime of the TRIPS Agreement. It follows from the 
fore going that several elements are either rather vaguely worded or only 
addressed on an optional basis. As a consequence considerable leeway con-
tinues to be left to the Member States when transposing the above provi-
sion into their respective national laws. Indeed, the Commission reported 
in 2010 that most Member States had found it unnecessary to amend their 
pre-existing national laws, as these were deemed to be already compatible 
with the damages regime of the IPR Enforcement Directive.206 As is dis-
cussed further in the following paragraph, the introduction of this provision 
on actions for damages further seems to have had limited effect in practice.
203 Art. 13(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
204 Recital 26 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
205 Art. 13(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
206 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 5.
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And yet two qualifications are in place here. First, the IPR Enforcement 
Directive’s provision on damages nonetheless appears to have had some 
impact at national level, even if this may not always be a direct consequence. 
For instance, the possibilities for claiming unfair profits made by the defen-
dant reportedly improved in France and Italy.207 In the Netherlands, the 
possibility of setting damages as a lump sum was made explicit,208 whereas 
Swedish law was amended so as to clarify that non-material damage can be 
compensated as well.209 In Spain provision has been made in certain cases 
for the recovery of a lump sum equal to 1% of the infringer’s relevant turn-
over.210 Second, it should probably not be assumed too readily that the 
directive’s provision on damages is not very ‘demanding’. On various 
points its wording is such that a more extensive reading is also conceiv-
able.211 For example, “all appropriate aspects”, account of which must be taken 
when setting the damages, is not an unequivocal term. An argument could 
be made that this includes not necessarily either the negative economic con-
sequences or the unfair profits made by the infringer, to which the directive 
refers, but both in accumulation.212 Different views can also be taken as to 
who is to decide, and on which basis, what “an appropriate case” is in which 
non-material damages are to be made available. The directive similarly 
makes it clear that, when quantifying the damages due, its ‘all appropriate 
aspects’ and the ‘lump sum’ methods are alternatives. It is less evident how-
ever whether these two alternatives should be available to the private party-
applicant and the competent court or that instead the national legislature 
can select and impose one of these two methods.213 There thus remains 
scope for debate and interpretation on several points. This also implies that 
it cannot be excluded that the Court of Justice will interpret the said provi-
sion more extensively than what is sometimes presumed.
137. Concerning the effects in practice, in 2010 damages awarded for intel-
lectual property right infringements were said to remain rather low, with 
only few Member States reporting an increase as a result of the directive.214 
207 Urbanchuk & Tumbridge (2008), pp. 578-579; Benhamou (2009), p. 125; Hassan (2010), 
pp. 756-757; Schaffner (2010), p. 184.
208 Brinkhof, Van Gardingen & Hermans (2010), p. 179.
209 Lundgren & Ulfsdotter (2010), p. 218.
210 Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-d), p. 2; Adamov, 
Fazekas & Tivadar (2009), p. 344; Pérez, Rabadán & Serano (2010), p. 201.
211 That may apply even more so when the provision is read in conjunction with the ‘general 
rules’ laid down in Art. 3 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, discussed in para. 144 
below.
212 Cf. Rognstad (2011), p. 50. On this issue in relation to English law, see Fitzgerald & Firth 
(2014), p. 737.
213 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 23.
214 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 8.
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The Commission observed that “damages awards in intellectual property cases 
are not requested by rightholders as a matter of course”.215 Various legal and 
practical difficulties were reported, including lengthy procedures, high costs 
and difficulties in assessing and demonstrating the amount of damages 
allegedly suffered, resulting in low amounts awarded.216 It appears that as a 
consequence actions for damages are generally not the preferred remedy in 
cases of infringements of intellectual property rights.217
The Commission has therefore floated several ideas for the directive’s 
possible amendment on this point. These include granting damages commen-
surate with the infringer’s unfair profits even where they exceed the actual 
damage suffered so as to prevent unjust enrichment and claiming damages 
from managing directors in case of insolvent legal person-infringers.218 
Especially this latter suggestion has however generally not been received 
favourably by respondents. More generally, rightholders tend to favour leg-
islative change, arguing inter alia for lump sums to be included.219 By con-
trast potential defendants tend to oppose it, invoking the risk of non-profes-
sionals and intermediaries being sued and the possible chilling effects on 
innovation and the sharing of cultural expressions. The latter parties insist 
on the determination of damages on the basis of concrete data regarding the 
material loss suffered. Most respondents, including all Member States that 
reacted to the 2010 report in which the Commission made these suggestions, 
argued against punitive damages. Provisions of this kind were held to be 
inconsistent with the European legal tradition, even if the 2010 Commission 
report and other reports indicate that such measures are available in certain 
cases under the domestic laws of the Member States.220 More generally, most 
Member States argued against any amendment to the currently existing IPR 
Enforcement Directive’s damages regime.221 This would appear to make 
substantial changes of the directive in this regard unlikely in the near future.
215 Ibid., p. 21.
216 Ibid., pp. 21-23. See also Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy 
(undated-d); Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforcement 
of intellectual property rights, July 2013, p. 20; Roland (2014), p. 297.
217 Ibid., p. 21.
218 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 8.
219 Cf. Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-d), p. 11.
220 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 24. This report indicates that under Slovenian law 
provision is made for punitive damages. Punitive damages are further reported to be 
available in certain cases in Bulgaria and Ireland, as well as in Austria and in the UK. See 
respectively Cohen & Mottet Haugaard (2010), p. 376; Study European Communities 
Trade Mark Association (undated); Beetz & Tremmel (2010), pp. 21-22; Cornish, Llewelyn 
& Aplin (2010), pp. 81-82; Till (2010), pp. 131 and 133. On the potential disadvantages of 
punitive damages in the present context, see also Geiger, Raynard & Rodà (2011), p. 547.
221 Commission, Responses to the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, July 2011, 
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4.2.5. Legal costs and publicity measures
138. As regards the last two remedies to be discussed here, the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive contains, in the first place, a provision on the allocation of 
legal costs. It stipulates that “reasonable and proportionate legal costs and other 
expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a general rule, be borne by the 
unsuccessful party, unless equity does not allow this”.222 As the Court of Justice 
has clarified, this provision aims to strengthen the level of protection of 
intellectual property rights by avoiding the situation in which an injured 
party is deterred from initiating legal proceedings in order to protect its 
rights. In the Court’s view, it follows that the infringer “must generally bear all 
the financial consequences of his conduct”.223 This broadly corresponds with the 
Commission’s original intention, which was to ensure that the legal costs, 
lawyer’s fees and any other expenses incurred by the successful party are, in 
principle, borne in full by the other party.224
This provision on legal costs has led to several concerns however. To 
begin with, at the time of the adoption of the IPR Enforcement Directive 
several Member States initially wished to delete it altogether, because in 
their perception it did not respect the principle of subsidiarity and the EU 
lacked competence to legislate on this subject-matter.225 The European Par-
liament objected to the explicit reference to lawyer’s fees that the Commis-
sion’s proposal originally contained.226 It pointed in this connection to the 
particularities of the laws of various Member States in this regard.227 This 
reference was therefore eventually deleted. The resulting article is largely 
similar to the corresponding provision laid down in the TRIPS Agree-
ment.228 Moreover this article has been formulated in such a broad manner 
that most Member States did not deem it necessary to amend their pre-exist-
ing national rules in order to comply with this provision of the directive.229 
Yet there are exceptions. Most notably in the Netherlands an amendment to 
the national rules of civil proceedings was introduced, which has in turn led 
to a judicial practice whereby the legal costs are typically deemed to be 
recoverable in their entirety in intellectual property cases, such in deviation 
222 Art. 14 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
223 CoJ case C-406/09, Realchemie, para. 48-49.
224 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 23.
225 Council, doc. 13027/03, p. 5. See also Council, doc. 16289/03, p. 16.
226 See Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 41 
(Art. 18). Here reference was made to “legal costs, lawyer’s fees and any other expenses”, 
while including a sentence stating that “[t]he responsible authorities shall determine the sum 
to be paid”.
227 European Parliament, Report on the proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, 
A5_0468/2003, p. 29.
228 Art. 45(2) TRIPS Agreement. Cf. Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 23.
229 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 24.
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of the ordinary rules in civil law proceedings. In the legal literature it has 
been questioned whether this is in all respects in accordance with the 
requirements of the directive, in particular where the rather rigid applica-
tion of this rule is concerned, which appears to leave little or no space for 
taking account of the particular circumstances of the case at hand.230
Also after the adoption of the IPR Enforcement Directive stakeholders 
furthermore continue to complain that the legal costs reimbursed in the cas-
es covered by it are in practice often far below the costs actually incurred by 
the successful private party-applicant.231 Estimates of the recoupable per-
centage of the legal costs incurred differ considerably between the Member 
States, ranging from for instance 30% in Italy to 80% in Ireland.232 Adequate 
rules on the compensation of legal costs are considered of considerable 
importance, as litigation costs in intellectual property cases are said to be 
often high.233 Such costs can for example be incurred for using technical 
experts or for making test purchases in order to gather evidence and sub-
stantiate a claim. That applies even more so in cross-border situations. Also 
in light of the seemingly diverging interpretation of the directive’s provision 
on legal costs across the EU, calls have therefore been made for its clarifica-
tion.234 The Commission has seemed to be inclined to act upon these con-
cerns, at least where the enforcement of intellectual property rights by small 
and medium-sized enterprises is concerned.235 However it remains for now 
uncertain whether any such action will involve proposing legislative chang-
es to the directive.
139. A final remedy to be mentioned here entails what the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive calls publicity measures. In this connection Member States 
must ensure that a national court may order “appropriate measures for the dis-
semination of the information concerning the decision, including displaying the 
decision and publishing it in full or in part” can be ordered.236 It is added that 
Member States may also allow for other additional publicity measures, 
including prominent advertising. In its proposal for this directive the Com-
230 For an overview, discussion and further references, see Vrendenbarg (2013), p. 160. The 
fact that all preliminary references relating to this provision of the directive to date were 
made by Dutch national courts should probably be seen in light of this legislative change 
and the resulting case law and discussions. See CoJ case C-406/09, Realchemie; CoJ case 
C-180/11, Bericap; CoJ case C-435/12, ACI Adam. See also CoJ case C-681/13, Diageo 
Brands (pending).
231 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 24. Cf. Study European observatory on counterfeit-
ing and piracy (undated-d), p. 9.
232 Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-d), p. 10.
233 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 24.
234 Geiger, Raynard & Rodà (2011), p. 548.
235 Commission, Communication towards a renewed consensus on the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, COM(2014) 392, p. 7.
236 Art. 15 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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mission had stated that the publication of judicial decisions is generally con-
sidered an effective measure for informing the public and a deterrent against 
infringements of intellectual property rights.237 The recitals clarify accord-
ingly that this measure is meant to act as “a supplementary deterrent to future 
infringers and to contribute to the awareness of the public at large”.238 In some 
jurisdictions, for instance in Ireland and the United Kingdom, the introduc-
tion of this remedy implied a notable innovation, which is occasionally used 
in practice.239 However on the whole this provision of the IPR Enforcement 
Directive tends to receive only limited attention.240
4.3. Procedural provisions and related issues
Having introduced the IPR Enforcement Directive and having discussed the 
remedies laid down therein in the foregoing, attention now turns to the 
directive’s most important procedural provisions and several related issues. 
The first subsection below discusses the rules on its scope and on the legal 
standing of private parties wishing to initiate legal proceedings under this 
directive. The subsequent subsection then concentrates on issues of forum, 
procedure and what is referred to here as the directive’s ‘general rules’.
4.3.1. Scope and legal standing
140. The Commission’s proposal for the IPR Enforcement Directive under-
went several changes during the law-making process where the provision 
on the directive’s scope is concerned. The EU legislature extended the scope 
of this directive in two manners. In the first place, the Commission had pro-
posed a general restriction to infringements of intellectual property rights 
committed for commercial purposes or causing significant harm to the right-
holder. This was considered too limited by the EU legislature.241 This gen-
eral limitation was therefore dropped at an early stage of the legislative 
deliberations, although a similar restriction has been retained in a number of 
specific provisions.242 A second extension of the scope of the directive was 
the inclusion of a provision specifying that this directive not only relates to 
237 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 23.
238 Recital 27 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
239 Gibbons (2014), p. 23.
240 Cf. e.g. Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforce-
ment Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 24, where this provision is not mentioned at 
all. Neither does it appear to have been raised by the respondents to the ensuing consul-
tation. See Commission, Responses to the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, 
July 2011.
241 Council, doc. 11107/03; Council, doc. 12450/03; European Parliament, Report on the pro-
posal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, A5_0468/2003, p. 6. See also Massa & 
Strowell (2004), pp. 247-253.
242 See Art. 6(2), 8(1) and 9(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also its recital 14.
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infringements of intellectual property rights established or harmonised by 
EU law, as the Commission had proposed,243 but also to ‘purely’ national 
laws (i.e. national laws other than those transposing obligations stemming 
from the relevant EU directives on substantive intellectual property law). 
One could think of acts involving unfair competition, including parasitic 
copying, or similar activities.244
The Commission had further proposed listing the relevant instru-
ments of substantive EU law on intellectual property in an annex to the IPR 
Enforcement Directive.245 The directive as finally adopted does not list the 
legal instruments or rights concerned however. It is stipulated instead in 
a general manner that the directive applies to “any infringement of intellec-
tual property rights as provided for by [EU] law and/or by the national law of the 
Member State concerned”.246 In the recitals it is added that the scope of the 
directive should be defined as widely as possible.247 In 2005 the Commission 
published a statement listing the intellectual property rights that it consid-
ers to be covered by the directive.248 This list is not legally binding however. 
Neither is it exhaustive. If and when the aforementioned possible revision of 
this directive takes place, a list might be annexed to it for clarification pur-
poses.249 For the time being the current arrangement means however that 
the scope of IPR Enforcement Directive is not always entirely clear. In any 
case not included in the said Commission list are trade secrets. As was noted 
earlier, whereas trade secrets are not intellectual property rights in a ‘classi-
cal’ sense, they can be considered as such when this term is understood in a 
broad manner.250 They are covered for instance by the TRIPS Agreement.251 
Rather than extending the scope of the IPR Enforcement Directive so as to 
clarify that trade secrets are covered as well and inserting relevant rules, 
in 2013 the Commission published a proposal for a separate directive on 
the protection of trade secrets.252 At the heart of this draft directive lie a set 
of remedial and procedural rules meant to ensure the availability of civil 
redress against unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of trade secrets.253 
243 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, pp. 18 and 
32 (Art. 2).
244 Cf. recital 13 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
245 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, pp. 44-45 
(annex).
246 Art. 2(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
247 Recital 13 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
248 Commission, Statement concerning Article 2 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, 
OJ 2005, L 94/37.
249 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 7.
250 See para. 107 above.
251 Art. 39 TRIPS Agreement. On this agreement, see para. 118 above.
252 Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, COM(2013) 813. On this proposal, see 
further Grassie (2014), p. 677.
253 Ibid., pp. 19-24 (Art. 5-15).
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These rules are evidently inspired on, and to a high extent similar to, the 
rules set out in the IPR Enforcement Directive, without however being 
exactly the same. In the recitals of this draft directive it is said that, should 
the scope of these two acts overlap, the draft Trade Secret Directive takes 
precedence as a lex specialis.254
141. The IPR Enforcement Directive further lays down common rules on 
legal standing, i.e. rules regarding the persons that are considered to have the 
legal capacity to initiate legal proceedings for an alleged infringement of the 
intellectual property rights covered by the directive before the competent 
national courts. The directive lists four categories of persons.255 Unsurpris-
ingly, the first category is made up by the holders of the intellectual property 
rights in question. The second category consists of all other persons autho-
rised to use these rights, such as licensees. And also intellectual property 
collective rights-management bodies that are regularly recognised as having a 
right to represent rightholders are mentioned. The fourth and last category 
consists of professional defence bodies that are regularly recognised as having a 
right to represent rightholders.
In all four cases the directive contains certain further specifications. As 
regards the rightholders, it has been added that these private parties have 
legal standing “in accordance with the provisions of the applicable law”. That 
same specification also applies to all three other categories mentioned 
above. In addition, for these latter categories of persons, the further specifi-
cation has been included that they have legal standing “in so far as permitted 
by and in accordance with the provisions of the applicable law”. The precise mean-
ing of these phrases remains to be clarified by the Court of Justice. A likely 
reading appears to be that these latter three categories of persons can have a 
sufficiently direct interest and (therefore) legal standing under the IPR 
Enforcement Directive, but only in so far as permitted by the applicable (pre-
sumably: national) law.256 In contrast the first category, the rightholders, 
must have legal standing as a matter of EU law. In all cases the further 
detailed rules in this respect remain in principle to be determined by the 
applicable national law. Presuming that this reading is correct, it implies a 
step back from the Commission’s proposal, which was more ambitious in 
this regard. The latter essentially foresaw all abovementioned categories of 
person having legal standing as a matter of EU law, including the specifica-
tion that the collective rights-management bodies and the professional 
defence bodies were to have legal standing regardless of the Member State 
in which they are established.257
254 Ibid., p. 16 (recital 28).
255 Art. 4 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
256 See also recital 18 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
257 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, pp. 19 and 
33 (Art. 5).
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4.3.2. Forum, procedure and general rules
142. No detailed rules on the forum competent to rule on the actions 
brought pursuant to it have been laid down in the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive. At various places throughout the directive reference is simply made to 
“the competent judicial authorities”.258 This appears to imply that the cases 
brought under this directive are to be decided on by a body that is judicial in 
character, i.e. a national court and not a non-judicial dispute resolution body. 
Although this is neither made explicit nor necessarily the case,259 the 
assumption is that these actions are normally to be brought before a national 
civil court. This is implicit in the statement in the recitals that the directive 
does not aim to establish harmonised rules for judicial cooperation, jurisdic-
tion, the recognition and enforcement of decision in civil and commercial 
matters or deal with applicable law, there being other instruments of EU law 
governing such matters which equally apply to intellectual property cas-
es.260 This assumption also finds expression in the Commission’s statement 
that “[t]he Directive’s provisions (only) relate to civil law measures to enforce intel-
lectual property rights”, incorporating the TRIPS Agreement’s civil law mea-
sures.261
143. Regarding the rules of procedure applicable to the disputes covered by 
the IPR Enforcement Directive before the national courts, the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive is even less detailed than in respect of the rules on those 
courts themselves. In fact, no such rules on procedural matters are provided 
for. That means that issues such as the possibility of pre-trial contacts 
between the parties to the dispute or on the limitation periods for initiating 
legal proceedings remain unregulated in as far as this directive is concerned.
144. Finally, the directive sets out what can be called its ‘general rules’. 
This refers to its broadly formulated provisions concerning the manner in 
which the directive is to be understood and applied in general. In particular, 
the directive stipulates that the measures, procedures and remedies set out 
therein must be “fair and equitable and […] not be unnecessarily complicated or 
costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays”.262 It adds that 
they must also be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” and that they must 
be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate 
trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.263 The first phrase 
cited above clearly echoes the wording of the TRIPS Agreement,264 whereas 
258 See e.g. Art. 6(1), 7(1) and 8(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
259 Cf. recital 28 IPR Enforcement Directive.
260 Recital 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
261 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, pp. 4-5.
262 Art. 3(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
263 Art. 3(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
264 Art. 41(2) TRIPS Agreement.
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the latter reference to effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness has 
evidently been inspired on the case law of the Court of Justice on Member 
States’ penalties, as discussed earlier.265
In some situations these general rules can be applied independently, i.e. 
without them being read in conjunction with some of the directive’s more 
detailed provisions, in particular so as to address situations not expressly 
regulated by it. This occurred for instance in L’Oréal v. eBay, a case that has 
already been discussed earlier.266 It will be recalled that this case concerned 
the compatibility with the IPR Enforcement Directive of an injunction issued 
against an online intermediary for alleged trade in counterfeit products. The 
injunction sought by the rightholder consisted of an obligation for the inter-
mediary to actively monitor all the data of each of its customers in order to 
prevent any future infringement of intellectual property rights. The Court of 
Justice held that this injunction would not be compatible with the above-
mentioned general rule that the measures, procedures and remedies enacted 
pursuant to it must be fair, proportionate and not excessively costly. There-
fore it could not be granted. Other situations in which these general rules 
may play an important role are not hard to imagine. One possible example 
relates to the aforementioned absence in the directive of specific rules of 
procedure.267 In light of the above general rules, a particular rule of national 
procedural law may nonetheless have to be disapplied or interpreted in a 
particular manner, for example so as to avoid unwarranted delays or abuses. 
Moreover these general rules can fulfil an important function as an aid for 
the interpretation and application of the directive’s more detailed provi-
sions. One could for example imagine that the requirement for the direc-
tive’s remedies to be effective and dissuasive could tilt the balance in favour 
of an interpretation of its – not always entirely clear – provision on actions 
for damages in favour of the applicant in respect of unfair profits or non-
material damage.268
4.4. Other enforcement issues
This final section briefly addresses a number of other issues relating to the 
enforcement of intellectual property law generally and the IPR Enforcement 
Directive in particular. More specifically, it concerns alternative dispute reso-
lution and public enforcement. It is shown that, at least as a matter of EU law, 
these two issues play at present at most a very limited role in the enforce-
ment of intellectual property law.
265 See subsection 2.4.2 above.
266 CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, para. 139. See para. 131 above.
267 See para. 143 above.
268 See para. 135-136 above.
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4.4.1. Alternative dispute resolution
145. In settling intellectual property-related conflicts alternative dispute 
resolution certainly can play some role in practice.269 This applies in partic-
ular where such disputes emerge in situations where the parties have a con-
tractual relationship of some sort, for instance relating to licences or 
research and development activities. Concerning disputes founded on non-
contractual liability of a private party resulting from (alleged) infringe-
ments of intellectual property rights, beyond direct negotiations between 
the parties before initiating legal proceedings, alternative dispute resolution 
is generally used to a rather limited extent however.270 In particular, gener-
ally speaking, in this field no EU-level mechanisms aimed at encouraging 
this manner of resolving the intellectual property-related disputes at issue 
here exist at present. A notable exception is however the alternative dispute 
resolution procedure for disputes relating to the registration of ‘.eu’ top-
level internet domain names, provided for by Commission Regulation 
874/2004.271 Disputes of this kind are to be brought before the Czech Arbi-
tration Court, which has settled many of them since its designation in 
2005.272
4.4.2. Public enforcement
146. The IPR Enforcement Directive does not contain any provisions on the 
public enforcement of the relevant substantive rules. The directive limits itself 
to requiring the designation of Member States’ correspondents for questions 
on the implementation of the measures set out in the directive.273 These 
national correspondents are meant to create between them a network for 
administrative cooperation and exchange of information.274 The directive 
further includes a very general reference to Member States being entitled 
(but not obliged) to apply “other proportionate sanctions”.275 This refers espe-
cially to sanctions of a criminal nature. For in the corresponding recital it is 
269 Cf. e.g. Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, July 2013, p. 6. See e.g. also Gardner (2014), p. 565.
270 Cf. Vitoria (2006), p. 398; Hanotiau (2010), p. 155; Jabaly (2010), p. 730; Theurich (2010), 
p. 175.
271 Art. 22 and 23 Commission Regulation (EC) No 874/2004 laying down public policy 
rules concerning the implementation and functions of the .eu Top level Domain and the 
principles governing registration, OJ 2004, L 162/40.
272 See further http://www.adr.eu/. On this type of dispute resolution more generally, see 
De Werra (2012), p. 39.
273 Art. 19 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
274 Recital 30 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also Commission, Communication 
towards a renewed consensus on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
COM(2014) 392, pp. 8-10, where the Commission discusses manners to improve the 
cooperation between the various national authorities concerned and announces the 
establishment of a Member State export group on this subject-matter.
275 Art. 16 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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clarified that, in addition to the civil and administrative procedures and 
remedies provided under the directive, “criminal sanctions also constitute, in 
appropriate cases, a means of ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights”.276 It follows that under the IPR Enforcement Directive Member 
States are not required to establish some sort of public enforcement mecha-
nism or authority that seeks to ensure the effective application and enforce-
ment of substantive intellectual property law.
147. More in particular, although this is not precluded, under the direc-
tive the Member States are not obliged to provide for criminal sanctions 
for infringements of that law. Quite to the contrary, it is stipulated that the 
directive does not affect any national provisions relating to criminal proce-
dures or penalties in respect of IPR infringements.277 On this point the IPR 
Enforcement Directive deviates from the Commission’s proposal. Already 
in its 1998 green paper the Commission had argued that sanctions of this 
kind have certain advantages over civil law actions, in particular “greater 
dissuasive effect [and] more effective gathering of evidence”.278 In this respect it 
should be recalled that, at the time of the Commission’s proposal for the 
IPR Enforcement Directive, all Member States already provided for crimi-
nal sanctions, as is also required under the TRIPS Agreement.279 However 
the Commission noted considerable differences in the level of punishment 
and the method of calculating fines.280 It therefore held in the explanatory 
memorandum to its 2003 proposal that “although this directive does not aim to 
harmonise criminal penalties as such, the effective application of genuinely deter-
rent sanctions in all Member States would help greatly in combating counterfeit-
ing and piracy”.281 In concrete terms the Commission proposed stipulating 
that all infringements committed intentionally and for commercial purposes 
should be treated as criminal offences. It also proposed including a rule that 
the available sanctions should consist of imprisonment, fines and the con-
fiscation of goods.282 In appropriate cases, certain further sanctions would 
also have to be provided for, such as the destruction of infringing goods, the 
closure of the establishment concerned, a ban on engaging in commercial 
activities and judicial winding up.283
276 Recital 28 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
277 Art. 2(3) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
278 Commission, Green paper on combating counterfeiting and piracy in the single market, 
COM(98) 569, p. 18. See also Commission, Communication on the follow-up to the green 
paper on combating counterfeiting and piracy in the single market, COM(2000) 789, p. 9.
279 Art. 61 TRIPS Agreement. See e.g. also Study Westkamp (2007), pp. 75-78.
280 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 15.
281 Ibid., p. 15.
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However, as has been observed elsewhere, the reaction of the Member 
States to this aspect of the proposal “could not have been more negative”.284 
They unanimously rejected it, mainly on grounds related to the proposal’s 
legal basis. The Member States considered – unlike the Commission – that 
Article 114 TFEU on measures related to the internal market, which was part 
of the then so-called ‘first pillar’,285 did not allow for the adoption of mea-
sures relating to criminal law.286 By implication, in the Member States’ view 
such measures could only be adopted under the then ‘third pillar’, which 
concerned matters related to justice and home affairs. The provision con-
cerned was consequently deleted from the draft. All that currently remains, 
by means of a compromise with the European Parliament,287 is the afore-
mentioned provision that Member States may apply other proportionate 
sanctions. Already at the time the Commission announced that it stuck to its 
views that criminal sanctions were required to effectively fight infringe-
ments of intellectual property law and that this could be done under Article 
114 TFEU however.288 Therefore it soon presented a new proposal, based on 
that article.289 This proposal is largely similar to the 2003 one, but it goes 
further by proposing to include minimum levels of maximum penalties 
(four years of imprisonment, fines up to € 300.000).290 The proposal also 
includes rules on powers of confiscation, rightholders being allowed to form 
‘joint investigation teams’ with the competent Member States’ authorities 
and the ex officio initiation of criminal proceedings.291 Yet also this new pro-
posal proved to be very controversial especially in the Council.292 Not only 
284 Reinbothe (2010), p. 21.
285 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU edifi ce rested on three so-
called ‘pillars’. The fi rst pillar consisted of the EC Treaty and encompassed inter alia inter-
nal market-related provisions. The ‘third pillar’ concerned justice and home affairs, as 
provided for under the (then) EU Treaty.
286 Council, doc. 6052/04, pp. 2-3.
287 Cf. European Parliament, Report on the proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, 
A5_0468/2003, p. 30
288 Council, doc. 8285/04, p. 2.
289 Initially, in 2005, the Commission had submitted two new proposals: a draft directive and 
a Council framework decision, based on the (then) fi rst and the third pillar respectively. 
In 2006 it replaced these two proposals by a single proposal however. In the Commis-
sion’s view, the ruling in CoJ case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, on criminal measures 
in the fi eld of environmental law, another former ‘fi rst pillar’ matter, implied that provi-
sions of criminal law required for the effective implementation of fi rst pillar instruments 
of EU law could be established under that pillar. See Commission, Proposal for a direc-
tive on criminal measures for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, COM(2006) 
168, p. 2. On the Commission’s reading of the said ruling more generally, see Commis-
sion, Communication on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005 
(Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council), COM(2005) 583.
290 Commission, Proposal for a directive on criminal measures for the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, COM(2006) 168, p. 10 (Art. 5).
291 Ibid., p. 11 (Art. 6, 7 and 8 respectively).
292 Seville (2009), p. 413. Cf. Hilty, Kur & Peukert (2006), p. 970; Geiger (2010), p. 629. See 
however also Schneider & Vrins (2006), p. 173.
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did certain doubts as to its legal basis remain, some Member States also 
doubted the necessity of an EU instrument on this matter in light of the 
nature and scale of the problem, noting that the effects of the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive could at that stage not yet be properly assessed.293 This pro-
posal therefore did not lead to the adoption of a directive.
4.5. Summary
148. The IPR Enforcement Directive seeks to facilitate the private enforce-
ment of rules of EU and national law on intellectual property. Having been 
adopted in 2004 after a relatively smooth legislative process, it can be seen 
as a complement to the EU’s extensive involvement with substantive intel-
lectual property law in the context of the internal market. The content of the 
directive has been heavily influenced by an instrument of international law, 
the WTO TRIPS Agreement, even if the former goes further on a number of 
points. At the core of this directive are a set of specific remedies. These 
include remedies to be applied for in proceedings on the merits, such as cor-
rective measures (recall, removal or destruction of the infringing goods), 
‘permanent’ injunctions aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the 
infringement, actions for damages and publicity measures given publicity to 
the judicial decision. Arguably at least equally important in practice are the 
remedies that are to be applied for on a preliminary or provisional basis, 
notably a range of measures related to the disclosure of evidence and inter-
locutory injunctions. The IPR Enforcement Directive further provides for a 
– rather broadly formulated – rule on the allocation of legal costs. Regarding 
procedural issues the directive is generally more modest. The rules on its 
scope are rather ambitious if imprecise, whereas its provision on legal stand-
ing leaves considerable leeway to the Member States. The directive’s ‘gen-
eral rules’ can play an important complementary or interpretative role, but 
rules on forum and procedure are (almost) entirely absent. The latter also 
applies for alternative dispute resolution and public enforcement, despite 
the Commission’s so far mostly unsuccessful efforts to lay down as a matter 
of EU law certain rules on criminal sanctions.
293 Council, doc. 10329/06.

The present chapter is concerned with selected legislative developments in 
the field of EU consumer protection law. Contrary to the fields assesses in 
the foregoing two chapters, in this case no one single, self-standing EU legal 
act exists that is exclusively concerned with private enforcement and that 
covers in principle all substantial rules at issue. That is not to say however 
that there is no legislation in force that is relevant for the present purposes. 
Quite to the contrary, consumer protection law may well be one the fields of 
EU law with the greatest regulatory focus on remedial and procedural 
issues, even if in this case the relevant provisions is mostly embedded in and 
interlinked with the substantive regulatory activity.1 With some notable 
exceptions, the measures related to enforcement (be it private or public) are 
typically not restricted to specific legislative acts, but instead many ‘sub-
stantive’ legal acts also contain certain enforcement-related provisions. 
These measures moreover tend to be rather diverse. Without being exhaus-
tive, a number of legal acts and other legislative developments, considered 
to be particularly relevant for the present purposes, are assessed below. It 
concerns in particular the Consumer Injunctions Directive, the Unfair Terms 
Directive and the Product Liability Directive. When discussing these and a 
number of related directives, the focus is each time especially on the three 
main (substantive) private enforcement remedies provided for therein, 
namely, injunctions, contractual remedies and actions for damages respec-
tively. First, EU consumer protection law generally is briefly introduced 
however. At the very end of this chapter, relevant developments related to 
three other enforcement-related issues are discussed, i.e. collective redress, 
alternative dispute resolution and public enforcement.
5.1. Introduction
By means of an introduction this section first briefly sketches the back-
ground of EU consumer protection law. Subsequently an overview is giv-
en of the most important substantive rules applicable in this field of law. 
The early developments as regards consumers’ rights of redress are also 
sketched.
1 Cf. Storskrubb (2008), p. 27.
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5.1.1. Background
149. Consumer protection is one of various fields of action that developed 
at EU level in the ‘slipstream’ of the drive to establish and complete the EU’s 
internal market. This drive implied the disapplication of national rules seek-
ing to protect consumers where those rules had the (incidental or deliberate) 
side-effect of “crystallising given consumer habits so as to consolidate an advan-
tage acquired by national industries” and where as such they constituted an 
obstacle to the free movement of especially goods and services within the 
EU.2 In the case law of the Court of Justice it has been clarified that con-
sumer protection can be a justified reason to restrict such free movement, 
but only under certain relatively strict conditions, notably non-discrimina-
tion and proportionality.3 Establishing the EU’s internal market thus led to 
a degree of deregulation at national level (‘negative harmonisation’). Par-
tially as a consequence thereof, the need was felt for a degree of re-regula-
tion at EU level (‘positive harmonisation’).4 For, as the European Parlia-
ment stated in 1987, “the protection of the interest of the consumer […] must be 
considered a corollary of the free movement of goods and services”.5 As such con-
sumer protection has also been seen as a means to increase the credibility of 
the project of European integration in the public eye and to bring that proj-
ect ‘closer to the citizens’.6
150. EU activity related to consumer protection can be traced back (at least) 
until the 1970s. In several ‘soft law’ instruments, i.e. non-legally binding acts 
such as resolutions and recommendations, the rights of the European con-
sumers were stressed. These rights include the right to protection of health 
and safety and the right to information and education.7 By the mid-1980s, 
the EU legislature adopted the first ‘hard law’ consumer protection mea-
sures, i.e. legally binding instruments such as directives or regulations.8 Yet 
it was not until 1993 (Treaty of Maastricht) that consumer protection was 
recognised as an EU competence in its own right. Under the current EU 
Treaties this competence is shared by the EU and the Member States.9 Article 
12 TFEU requires that account is taken of consumer protection requirements 
2 CoJ case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, para. 32.
3 E.g. CoJ case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, para. 8; CoJ case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 
para. 28; CoJ case C-76/90, Säger, para. 15; CoJ joined cases C-105/12 to C-107/12, Essent, 
para. 58.
4 See further Unberath & Johnston (2007), p. 1237; Weatherill (2011), pp. 838-846.
5 European Parliament, Resolution on consumer redress, OJ 1987, C 99/203, recital B.
6 See e.g. Commission, Green paper on access of consumers to justice and the settlement of 
consumer disputes in the single market, COM(93) 576, p. 7.
7 Cf. Council, Resolution on a preliminary programme of the EEC for a consumer protec-
tion and information policy, OJ 1975, C 92/1.
8 See e.g. Directive 84/450/EEC relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising, OJ 
1984, L 250/17.
9 Art. 4(2)(f) TFEU.
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when defining and implementing EU policies and activities, whereas pur-
suant to Article 38 Charter EU policies must ensure a high level of consum-
er protection.10 This means that consumer protection has a ‘cross-cutting’ 
dimension.
More specifically, Article 169(1) TFEU states that “in order to promote the 
interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the [EU] 
shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, 
as well as promoting their right to information, education and to organise them-
selves in order to safeguard their interests”. The following paragraphs of this 
article provide for two legal bases for the adoption of secondary EU law in 
this field. In the first place, reference is made to Article 114 TFEU for the 
adoption of measures in the context of the completion of the internal market 
so as to contribute to the attainment of the aforementioned consumer pro-
tection objectives.11 In addition a proper self-standing legal basis for the 
adoption of measures to support, supplement and monitor the consumer 
protection policy pursued by the Member States is provided for.12 The latter 
measures cannot prevent the Member States from maintaining or introduc-
ing more stringent protective measures.13 In other words, unlike under the 
former legal basis, the measures adopted on the basis of the latter are neces-
sarily limited to ‘minimum harmonisation’. That means that Member States 
remain at liberty to retain or adopt further-going rules of national law. The 
latter provision has hardly been used to date.14 Instead, as is discussed in 
further detail in the following, Article 114 TFEU tends to be the preferred 
option when adopting secondary EU law in this field.
5.1.2. Substantive EU consumer law and consumers’ rights of redress
151. Since the mid-1980s a relatively broad and diverse range of EU legal 
acts related to consumer protection have been adopted.15 In many cases 
this legislation has since been updated and replaced by more recent acts. 
Generally speaking, the EU legislation can be taken to confer rights on the 
private parties concerned, as the Court of Justice has had occasion to con-
firm expressly in several cases.16 The traditional core of the EU’s body of 
10 On the Charter more generally, see para. 43 above.
11 Art. 169(2)(a) TFEU. On Art. 114 TFEU and legal basis issues generally, see further sub-
section 10.1.1 below.
12 Art. 169(2)(b) and (3) TFEU.
13 Art. 169(4) TFEU.
14 Stuyck (2009), p. 68. The only example cited of a legal act adopted on this basis is Direc-
tive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered 
to consumers, OJ 1998, L 80/27.
15 For an overview and a general discussion, see Weatherill (2005); Micklitz, Reich & Rott 
(2009); Weatherill (2011), pp. 837-867.
16 See e.g. CoJ case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, para. 28 (regarding what is now Consumer Rights 
Directive 2011/83); CoJ joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94, Dil-
lenkofer, para. 33-46 (regarding Art. 7 Package Travel Directive 90/314); CoJ case 
C-144/99, Commission v. Netherlands, para. 18 (regarding Unfair Terms Directive 93/13).
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consumer protection law consists of rules that regulate pre-contractual sales 
practices. In this context particular emphasis is typically placed on the pro-
vision of information so as to allow consumers to take informed decisions. 
As to Court of Justice has held, “information, before concluding a contract, on 
the terms of the contract and the consequences of concluding it is of fundamental 
importance for a consumer”.17 Prominent examples of this approach can be 
found in Directive 2005/29 on unfair commercial practices (‘Unfair Com-
mercial Practices Directive’), Directive 2008/48 on consumer credit agree-
ments (‘Consumer Credit Directive’) and Directive 2011/83 on consumer 
rights (‘Consumer Rights Directive’).18
In addition a number of other consumer protection directives regulate, 
at least to some degree, the actual content of consumer contracts. Examples 
of the latter include the aforementioned Unfair Terms Directive and Direc-
tive 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated 
guarantees (‘Consumer Sales Directive’).19 Elements of both of these two 
regulatory approaches can be found in Directive 90/314 on package travel, 
package holidays and package tours (‘Package Travel Directive’).20 Under-
stood in a wider sense, EU consumer protection law also includes advertising 
law, notably Directive 2006/114 on misleading and comparative advertis-
ing21 (‘Misleading Advertising Directive’) and Directive 2003/33 on tobac-
co advertising (‘Tobacco Advertising Directive’).22 There is further a consid-
erable body of EU product safety law, such as Directive 2001/95 on general 
product safety23 (‘Product Safety Directive’) and Directive 2009/48 on toy 
safety (‘Toy Safety Directive’).24 The Product Liability Directive can also be 
included in this latter category, even if it is somewhat of an outlier, given 
that, different from these other directives, it seeks to protect consumers by 
laying down certain rules on civil liability in case of defects, rather than by 
setting out certain specific prohibitions or prescriptions.
17 CoJ case C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb, para. 44.
18 Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in 
the internal market, OJ 2005, L 149/22; Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer credit agree-
ments for consumers, OJ L 1333, 22.5.2008, p. 66; Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer 
rights, OJ 2011, L 304/64.
19 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13; Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of con-
sumer goods and associated guarantees, OJ 1999, L 171/12.
20 Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours, OJ 1990, 
L 158/59. In 2013 the Commission proposed replacing this directive. See Commission, 
Proposal for a new package travel directive, COM(2013) 512.
21 Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising, OJ 2006, 
L 376/12.
22 Directive 2003/33/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco 
products, OJ 2003, L 152/16.
23 Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety, OJ 2002, L 11/4. In 2013 the Commis-
sion proposed replacing this directive. See Commission, Proposal for a regulation on con-
sumer product safety, COM(2013) 78.
24 Directive 2009/48/EC on the safety of toys, OJ 2009, L 170/1.
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Although this may vary to some extent depending on the legal act at 
issue, in EU consumer protection law the term ‘consumer’ is normally 
understood to refer to a natural person acting for purposes falling outside 
his trade, business, craft or profession.25
152. From the outset considerable emphasis has been placed on the impor-
tance of the consumers’ right of redress. This was already the case in the 
aforementioned ‘soft law’ instruments dating from the 1970s, where this 
was identified as one of the basic consumer rights. The Council held in this 
respect that “consumers are […] entitled to proper redress for […] injury or dam-
age [resulting from purchase or use of defective goods or unsatisfactory services] by 
means of swift, effective and inexpensive procedures”.26 The Commission noted 
that “this right [of redress] will not be applied at [EU] level but remains within the 
jurisdiction of each Member State. Only where the situation requires it, will the 
Commission present proposals for improving existing systems and putting them to 
better use”.27
The difficulties involved in dealing with minor claims (in monetary 
terms) were acknowledged early on. As the Commission noted in its 1984 
memorandum on consumer redress, such difficulties can result from com-
paratively high legal costs, lengthy proceedings and psychological barri-
ers.28 Already in the late 1970s and early 1980s especially the European Par-
liament therefore called for the adoption of secondary EU law to improve 
and harmonise legal procedures available in consumer cases, inter alia so as 
to ensure that consumer associations have legal standing to initiate legal 
proceedings and to facilitate alternative dispute resolution.29 More general-
ly, this latter institution considered that “the substantive rights conferred by 
[EU] legislation on the consumer must be supplemented by appropriate proce-
dural mechanisms to ensure their enforcement”.30 Initially the Commission 
maintained that enacting EU legislation of this kind would be difficult and 
time-consuming.31 But by 1987 it announced its intention to examine the 
opportunity of drafting a directive introducing a general right for consumer 
25 See e.g. Art. 2(1) Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83; Art. 2(b) Unfair Terms Directive 
93/13; Art. 2(a) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29.
26 Council, Resolution on a preliminary programme of the EEC for a consumer protection 
and information policy, OJ 1975, C 92/1, p. 8.
27 Commission, Information memo on the adoption by the Council of a preliminary pro-
gramme for a consumer protection and information policy, P-19/75, p. 2.
28 Commission, Memorandum on consumer redress, COM(84) 629 fi nal, p. 7.
29 Cf. the 1977 report and resolution by the European Parliament and the 1979 opinion by 
the Economic and Social Committee, cited in Commission, Memorandum on consumer 
redress, COM(84) 629 fi nal, p. 7.
30 European Parliament, Resolution on consumer redress, OJ 1987, C 99/203, recital C.
31 Commission, Memorandum on consumer redress, COM(84) 629 fi nal, pp. 11-12. The 
annex to this document sets out several options that exist in the laws of certain Member 
States and third countries.
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associations to act in the courts of the Member States in the general interest 
of the consumers.32 In the Commission’s subsequent green paper on con-
sumers’ access to justice, dating from 1993, the idea of facilitating actions for 
injunctions brought by bodies representing consumer interests was further 
outlined.33 This document also identified several issues in respect of which 
further steps could possibly be taken at EU level, such as the granting of 
legal aid, the simplified settlement of cross-border disputes, the promotion 
of self-regulation by industry and cooperation between the competent 
authorities of the Member States.
5.2. Consumer Injunctions Directive: injunctions
This subsection concentrates on the Consumer Injunctions Directive. Excep-
tionally in EU consumer protection law, this is a self-standing legal act that 
is exclusively concerned with enforcement-related issues. It concentrates on 
facilitating injunctive relief, to be obtained in the collective interest of con-
sumers. In the first subsection below the directive is introduced. Its system 
of mutual recognition as regards legal standing to bring a case and the rem-
edies available under the directive are also outlined. In the following sub-
section attention turns to the directive’s other provisions, its functioning in 
practice and other EU legislation that is relevant in connection to actions for 
injunctions to address infringements of certain rules of substantive consum-
er protection law.
5.2.1. Introduction, mutual recognition and remedies
153. As was observed in the foregoing section, the idea of adopting sec-
ondary EU law facilitating the bringing of actions for injunctions by bodies 
representing the interests of consumers dates back to the very beginning of 
EU consumer protection law. Although provisions on this subject-matter can 
also be found elsewhere, the most prominent example of legislation of this 
kind is the Consumer Injunctions Directive. This directive was originally 
32 Commission, Supplementary communication on consumer redress, COM(87) 210, p. 3. 
This statement should be seen against the background of especially the European Parlia-
ment’s insistence on the adoption of legislative measures. Cf. European Parliament, Res-
olution on consumer redress, OJ 1987, C 99/203.
33 Commission, Green paper on access of consumers to justice and the settlement of con-
sumer disputes in the single market, COM(93) 576, pp. 77-86. See also Commission, Com-
munication on an action plan on consumer access to justice and the settlement of con-
sumer disputes in the internal market, COM(96) 13.
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adopted in 1998 after a comparatively smooth legislative process.34 It was 
codified in 2009, in light of the amendments made to its annex.35 Its legal 
basis is Article 114 TFEU.36
According to its recitals, the directive was adopted in light of “an urgent 
need for some degree of approximation of national provisions” on the matters cov-
ered by it.37 At the same time the Commission underlined in its proposal 
that “historical and legal traditions will be in no way compromised” by the adop-
tion of this directive.38 There it was added that “the proposed text in no way 
prejudices established remedies at national level: these rights may be far broader in 
certain Member States […] than in others, but their harmonisation does not seem 
warranted given the current state of [EU] law”.39
154. At the basis of the Consumer Injunctions Directive lies the idea that 
most Member States had already designated one or more entities qualified 
to take legal action in the collective interests of consumers.40 Its recitals 
explain that this latter term does not include the cumulation of interests of 
individual private parties that have been harmed by an infringement.41 At 
stake are thus rather the interests of the consumers as a whole, and not the 
interests of individual consumers regardless of whether the latter are pur-
sued individually or ‘bundled’ in a collective claim. The directive leaves it in 
principle to the Member States to determine which entities are qualified to 
bring these kinds of claims under their respective national laws. The central 
concept of a ‘qualified entity’ is defined broadly. It encompasses “any body or 
organisation which, being properly constituted under the law of a Member State, 
has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the provisions [of substantive consumer 
protection law at issue] are complied with”.42 These entities may in particular be 
either independent public bodies specifically responsible for protecting the 
34 See Commission, Proposal for Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(95) 712. 
See also Commission, Amended proposal for Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, 
COM(96) 725. The European Parliament was mostly supportive of the Commission pro-
posal. See European Parliament, Report on the proposal for Consumer Injunctions Direc-
tive 2009/22, A4-0354/96. Although on a number of issues the Member States represent-
ed in the Council introduced amendments (indicated below), an agreement between the 
co-legislators was reached relatively quickly. The fi nal text of this act resembles to a high 
extent that of the Commission’s original proposal.
35 In the EU’s legal terminology the term ‘codifi cation’ refers to the adoption of a new legal 
act that incorporates amendments made to the initial legal act, without however making 
any substantive changes.
36 On Art. 114 TFEU and legal basis issues generally, see further subsection 10.1.1 below. On 
the function of Art. 114 TFEU specifi cally in a consumer protection context, see also 
para. 150 above.
37 Recital 7 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. On the background of this directive, 
see further Rott (2001), p. 401.
38 Commission, Proposal for Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(95) 712, p. 8.
39 Ibid., p. 8.
40 Cf. ibid., p. 10.
41 Recital 3 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
42 Art. 3 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
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aforementioned interests or private organisations, such as consumer associa-
tions, whose purpose it is to protect those interests in accordance with the 
criteria laid down by the national law.43 The Member States can either chose 
between or combine these two options.44
This implies that the Member States have considerable leeway when 
determining which entities they wish to regard as being qualified, and thus 
to have legal standing, for the purposes of this directive. That reflects the 
diversity across the EU as regards the responsibility for enforcing consumer 
protection law. Historically Member States such as France and Belgium have 
tended to rely on actions brought by consumer associations, whereas for 
instance in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden specific 
public authorities were responsible and in Germany, the Netherlands and 
Italy this was left open to any entity meeting certain predetermined crite-
ria.45 In practice also after the adoption of the Consumer Injunctions Direc-
tive the Member States continue to retain widely diverging criteria in force 
for the recognition of such entities.46 That said, virtually all Member States 
now grant legal standing to consumer associations.47 Facilitating actions 
brought by these latter parties is one of the main purposes of this direc-
tive.48 Although less common, many Member States also empower certain 
specialised national consumer authorities, an ombudsman or another public 
authority to take legal action under this directive.49
155. The Consumer Injunctions Directive concentrates on cross-border situ-
ations, i.e. situations where infringements of substantive EU consumer pro-
tection law produce effects in other Member States. Before its adoption most 
Member States reserved the right to take legal action against such infringe-
ments to entities that they had expressly recognised.50 A situation could 
therefore occur whereby an undertaking established in Member State A sold 
a product to a consumer in Member State B, while for instance imposing a 
contract term that is considered unfair under the Unfair Terms Directive.51 
43 Art. 3 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. Note that organisations representing 
fi rms or federations of fi rms are not mentioned here. In this regard this provision devi-
ates from the Commission’s proposal and from certain other consumer protection direc-
tives, such as Art. 23(2)(c) Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83. Cf. Council, doc. 
11674/96.
44 Recital 11 Consumer Injunctions Directive. See also its recitals 9 and 10.
45 Commission, Proposal for Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(95) 712, pp. 6 
and 10.
46 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), p. 611.
47 Study University of Leuven (2007), p. 331.
48 Cf. Cafaggi & Micklitz (2009), pp. 408-409.
49 Study University of Leuven (2007), pp. 331-332.
50 Commission, Proposal for Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(95) 712, 
pp. 5-11.
51 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13 is one of the directives listed in Annex I to Consumer 
Injunctions Directive 2009/22 (see point 5 of this annex).
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An entity qualified to take legal action in Member State A might then well 
be unaware, unwilling or legally unable to act against such an infringement. 
After all the infringement had its effects in Member State B. As it stood, a 
qualified entity from Member State B would often not be qualified to take 
legal action in Member State A.52 As a consequence the effectiveness of the 
EU consumer protection rules was considered to be at risk. Against this 
background the Consumer Injunctions Directive essentially seeks to ensure 
that “the effectiveness of national measures transposing the [substantive EU con-
sumer protection directives concerned] […] is [not] thwarted where the [unlaw-
ful] practices produce effects in a Member State other than that in which they 
originate”.53 This is done with a view to avoiding disruptions to the smooth 
functioning of the internal market and distortions of competition, as well 
as ensuring that consumer confidence in the internal market is not dimin-
ished.54
The directive seeks to tackle these abovementioned so-called ‘intra-EU 
infringements’ essentially by providing for a system of mutual recognition.55 
It works as follows. The Member States must inform the Commission of the 
entities that, pursuant to their respective national laws, are qualified to initi-
ate legal proceedings under this directive. On that basis the Commission 
publishes a list of notified qualified entities.56 The Member States must 
then ensure that, in the case of an infringement originating in their territory, 
“any qualified entity from another Member State where the interests protected by 
that entity are affected by the infringement, may apply to the [competent] court or 
administrative authority”.57 The list must in these cases be accepted as proof 
of the entity’s legal capacity to bring a case. However the national court58 
seised retains the right “to examine whether the purpose of the qualified entity 
justifies its taking action in a specific case”.59 This latter provision thus restricts 
to some extent the application of the abovementioned principle of mutual 
recognition by allowing for further verifications in individual cases. It was 
not part of the Commission’s proposal, but it was inserted at the insistence 
of the Member States in the course of the legislative process leading to the 
adoption of this directive.60
52 The applicable rules of private international law can of course also be of relevance in this 
regard. Cf. Art. 2(2) and recital 7 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
53 Recital 4 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
54 Recitals 5 and 6 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
55 Art. 4 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See also its recital 12.
56 See e.g. OJ 2012, C 97/1. In 2006 276 qualifi ed entities had been notifi ed, whereby two 
Member States (Germany and Greece) together accounted for over half of these. See 
Study University of Bielefeld (2008), p. 632.
57 Art. 4(1) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
58 For the sake of brevity reference is made here only to national courts, even if this directive 
also allows for cases being brought before a national administrative authority. On the 
rules on the forum that apply in this connection, see para. 158 below.
59 Art. 4(1) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
60 Cf. Council, doc. 5382/1/97, 7 February 1997.
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156. As to the types of actions that can be brought, the Consumer Injunc-
tions Directive lists three remedies. The main one is an action for the “cessa-
tion or prohibition” of the infringement at issue.61 As is also evident from the 
title of this legal act, as well as that of its particular provision setting out the 
remedies, this directive is thus primarily concerned with actions for (pro-
hibitive) injunctions.62 It is added here that this measure is to be ordered 
“with all due expediency, where appropriate by way of summary procedure”. Two 
other remedies are also provided for. Where appropriate, an applicant may 
seek the imposition of publicity measures, i.e. the publication of the decision 
in question in full or in part or of a corrective statement with a view to elim-
inating the continuing effects of the infringement. In addition the directive 
refers to the availability of penalty payments, to be paid into the public purse 
or to any other designated beneficiary. These payments are to be made in the 
event of a failure to comply with the decision rendered within a set time 
limit, so as to ensure compliance. At the insistence of the Member States 
represented in Council, this latter measure however only applies “in so far as 
the legal system of the Member State concerned so permits”.63 A majority of Mem-
ber States nonetheless provides for this possibility.64
5.2.2. Other provisions, practical effects and other legislation
157. The aforementioned remedies must be made available in relation to 
infringements, which are defined as any act contrary to the directives listed in 
Annex I to the directive as transposed into the internal legal order of the 
Member States that harms the collective interests of consumers.65 After sev-
eral additions over the years, this annex currently lists 13 consumer protec-
tion directives. According to the Commission, this means that “a large pro-
portion” of the substantive EU rules in this domain are now within the scope 
of the Consumer Injunctions Directive.66
In the recitals it is suggested that this directive applies not only to 
infringements of the national measures transposing the directives listed in 
its Annex I, but also the protective measures that go beyond the level 
required by those directives.67 In other words, although this is not expressly 
stated, it appears that where those directives provide only for minimum 
harmonisation and a Member States chooses to also enact further-going 
61 Art. 2(1)(a) Consumer Injunction Directive 2009/22.
62 This limitation to injunctions does not imply however that other remedies, such as 
actions for damages, cannot be available under national law in relation to the infringe-
ments in question. Several Member States provide for this possibility. See Study Univer-
sity of Leuven (2007), p. 340.
63 Cf. Council, doc. 11674/96.
64 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 611 and 622-624.
65 Art. 1(2) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
66 Commission, First report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2008) 756, 
p. 4.
67 Recital 4 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
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measures, infringements of the latter can also be covered by the Consumer 
Injunctions Directive. In any case the directive does not prevent Member 
States from granting qualified entities or other persons concerned more 
extensive rights to bring actions at national level.68 Accordingly Poland and 
the Netherlands for instance apply the directive to any practice harming the 
collective interests of consumers, while Portugal and Latvia also permit 
action where the interest of an individual consumer is at stake.69
158. The above provisions are complemented by certain rules on the forum 
before which proceedings under this directive are to be brought. The rules in 
question are formulated in a very general manner. The Consumer Injunc-
tions Directive provides that Member States must designate “the courts or 
administrative authorities competent to rule on proceedings commenced by quali-
fied entities”.70 No further requirements are set out, other than the statement 
in the recitals that the courts or administrative authorities concerned should 
have the “right to examine the effects of previous decisions”.71 There it is also 
stated in general terms that the specific features of national legal systems 
must be taken into account to every extent possible by leaving Member 
States free to choose between different options having equivalent effect. Pre-
sumably, that means that Member States are in principle free to designate 
either a court or a (non-judicial) administrative authority to rule on the 
actions brought under this directive and arguably that, where an adminis-
trative authority is competent, safeguards must be provided for that ensure 
a degree of independence and impartiality equivalent to those of the nation-
al judicial authorities. In any case a clear majority of the Member States has 
opted for designating a national court and not an administrative authority.72
The directive further contains a separate article on ‘prior consultation’.73 
It allows the Member States to require a private party that intends to seek an 
injunction to first try to achieve the cessation of the infringement at issue 
with the alleged infringer and, if the Member State concerned so decides, 
also with the qualified entity of the Member State in which the injunction 
would be sought, before it can initiate legal proceedings. This is meant to 
give the defendant an opportunity to ‘spontaneously’ bring the infringe-
ment to an end.74 This possibility of requiring pre-trial contacts between the 
68 Article 7 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
69 Commission, First report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2008) 756, 
p. 5; Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 610 and 638-640.
70 Art. 2 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
71 Recital 9 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
72 Commission, First report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2008) 756, 
p. 3.
73 Art. 5 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See also Notice from the Member States, 
Rules governing prior consultation adopted pursuant to Article 5 of Consumer Injunc-
tions Directive 2009/22, OJ 2009, C 181/6.
74 Recital 14 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. Cf. Commission, Proposal for Con-
sumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(95) 712, p. 12.
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parties is subject to a time limit; if the consultation does not lead to the ces-
sation of the infringement within two weeks, an action may be brought 
without delay. A considerable number of Member States, including Italy, 
Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom, made use of the option offered 
by this provision.75
159. The Commission observed in 2008 that the directive’s effects in practice 
were “disappointing” in as far as tackling cross-border infringements of the 
relevant rules of substantive EU consumer protection law is concerned.76 
It could only point to two (successful) cases where the abovementioned 
system of mutual recognition had been used. Subsequent reports suggest 
that there may have been an increase since then; stakeholders reported 70 
cases with a cross-border dimension over the 2008-2011 period. However 
this is still only a fraction of the total number of actions for injunctions 
reportedly brought during that latter period (namely 5632 cases, i.e. slightly 
over 1%).77 Moreover this reported increase seems mainly due to a broader 
understanding of what constitutes a cross-border case. Included are also 
situations where a qualified entity initiates legal proceedings in its ‘home’ 
Member State against an (alleged) infringer that is established in another 
Member State but that operates in that ‘home’ Member State. By contrast 
the abovementioned mutual recognition mechanism that is meant to allow 
qualified entities to act outside their ‘home’ Member State continues to be 
“rarely used”.78
The view is widely shared that an important explanation for this limited 
use of this remedy with respect to cross-border infringements lies in the dif-
ficulties relating to costs and funding, especially where consumer associa-
tions are concerned.79 Also when assessing the use of actions for injunctions 
under this directive more generally are the costs of the legal proceedings 
mentioned as an obstacle. More specifically, this appears to concern not nec-
essarily the legal costs of the applicant itself, but rather the potential costs 
associated with the risk of having to pay the opponents costs under the ‘los-
er pays’ principle. Some Member States therefore provide for financial sup-
port for qualified entities.80 Likewise complexities of the legal proceedings, 
real or perceived, are seen as a general concern, which is however aggra-
75 Commission, First report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2008) 756, 
p. 4. See also Study University of Leuven (2007), p. 336; Study University of Bielefeld 
(2008), pp. 609 and 634-636.
76 Ibid., p. 5.
77 Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 4.
78 Ibid., p. 6.
79 See e.g. Study University of Leuven (2008), pp. 612-613, 641 and 644; Cafaggi & Micklitz 
(2009), p. 422; Poncibò (2009), pp. 297-298; Rott (2001), p. 410. See also Commission, First 
report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2008) 756, p. 6.
80 Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 11.
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vated in cross-border situations.81 Other concerns mentioned are the length 
of proceedings and the limited effects that judgments typically have, namely 
in principle only between the parties to the dispute and in the jurisdiction 
concerned (and not erga omnes).82 The effectiveness of the directive’s rules on 
penalty payments has also been questioned, whereas the possibility of 
ordering the publication of the court or authority’s decision or a corrective 
statement appears not be used frequently in practice.83 More generally, 
while acknowledging that it marks an important step, the directive has been 
widely criticised for addressing “but very few of the complex legal questions 
involved in cross-border litigation with a view to private enforcement of [EU] 
law”.84 One of the suggestions made in this connection is covering not only 
injunctive relief, but also actions for damages.85
Having said that, these continuing difficulties with respect to cross-
border infringements and the fact that certain obstacles remain should not 
distract from the fact that actions for injunctions are a widely used rem-
edy in consumer cases. Generally speaking, it is moreover a rather effective 
one, as the success rate tends to be high.86 Injunctions consequently have 
been held to be “a successful tool for policing markets”.87 Presumably in this 
light, in 2008 and again in 2012, the Commission decided against proposing 
amendments to this directive.88 It appears that, specifically in relation to the 
difficulties encountered in cross-border cases, other (comparatively) recent 
EU legislative measures are hoped to have a positive effect. It concerns in 
particular the 2001 Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments and the 2007 Rome II Regulation on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations,89 as well as the increased coopera-
81 Ibid., p. 12.
82 Ibid., pp. 12-13. See also Commission, First report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 
2009/22, COM(2008) 756, pp. 6-8; Study University of Leuven (2007), pp. 342-348.
83 Study University of Leuven (2007), pp. 341-342. In relation to these penalties and the 
enforcement of court decisions, see also Commission, Second report on Consumer 
Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 635, pp. 13-14.
84 Betlem (2007), p. 703. For comparable criticism, see Bogdan (1998), p. 374; Micklitz (2001), 
p. 867; Storskrubb (2008), pp. 29-30; Azar-Baud (2010), p. 199. See also Study University 
of Leuven (2007), pp. 347-348.
85 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 613 and 644. At the time of its adoption, the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee had argued in favour of also making provision for actions 
for damages. See Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on the proposal for a direc-
tive on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, OJ 1997, C 30/112. For a 
discussion of this option, see Poncibò (2009), p. 283.
86 Commission, First report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2008) 756, 
p. 4.
87 Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 7. See also Study University of Leuven (2007), pp. 346-347.
88 Commission, First report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2008) 756, 
p. 8; Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 16.
89 Brussels I Regulation 44/2001 and Rome II Regulation 864/2007. See further para. 14 
above.
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tion between consumer protection authorities under the EU’s rules relating 
to public enforcement.90
160. It is further noteworthy that many other consumer protection directives 
also contain provisions facilitating actions for injunctions. These provi-
sions are typically part of directives that principally set out certain substan-
tive rules. A common element tends to be the requirement for the Member 
States to ensure that “adequate and effective means” exist to enforce compli-
ance with the rules at issue.91 In some cases it is then merely added that 
these means shall include provisions whereby public bodies and consumer 
and professional organisations having a legitimate interest may take action 
under national law before the courts or before the competent administrative 
authorities.92
In other cases more detailed rules are provided for, such as in the Unfair 
Terms Directive. This directive specifies that persons or organisations, hav-
ing a legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers, must 
be allowed to initiate legal action before a national court or administrative 
authority. The purpose of these actions is to obtain “a decision as to whether 
contractual terms drawn up for general use are unfair, so that they apply appropri-
ate and effective means to prevent the continued use of such terms”.93 Also here 
the idea is to facilitate some form of ‘representative’ action, in particular 
(but not necessarily) by consumer associations.94 While these actions are 
typically aimed at obtaining injunctive relief, under national law they can 
also take other forms, such as a contractual remedy.95 Such actions can be 
brought even where the unfair term has not (yet) been used in a specific 
contract, in light of the deterrent nature and dissuasive purpose of these 
measures and their independence of any particular dispute.96 In terms of 
forum, although many Member States also provide for a system of admin-
istrative control in one form or another, the above actions are normally to 
be brought before their civil courts, whereby many provide for what the 
90 See further subsection 5.5.3 below.
91 E.g. Art. 23 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83. Further specifi cations are sometimes 
added, e.g. “in the interest of consumers, competitors and the general public”, “in the interests of 
traders and competitors” or “in the interests of consumers” in Art. 7 Unfair Terms Directive 
93/13, Art. 5 Misleading Advertising Directive 2006/114 and Art. 11 Unfair Practices 
Directive 2005/29 respectively.
92 E.g. Art. 23 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83.
93 Art. 7(2) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. On this directive, see also section 5.3 below.
94 Cf. Commission, First amended proposal for Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(92) 66, 
p. 3. See also CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and C-244/98, Océano Grupo, para. 27; CoJ case 
C-372/99, Commission v. Italy, para. 14; Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 430-431.
95 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-472/10, Invitel, para. 35-40. See also Opinion AG Trstenjak case 
C-472/10, Invitel, para. 39 (n. 12); Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 428-429.
96 CoJ case C-372/99, Commission v. Italy, para. 15-16; CoJ case C-472/10, Invitel, para. 37. 
Such independence of a specifi c dispute also implies however that these associations are 
not entitled to intervene in individual cases under this directive. See CoJ case C-470/12, 
Pohotovost, para. 43-57.
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Commission called in its 2000 report on this directive a “substantial ‘admin-
istrative’ admixture”.97 The latter refers to the possibility of certain pub-
lic authorities (such as a national consumer authority or an ombudsman) 
bringing a case before the competent national civil courts. More generally, 
the introduction of the abovementioned rules is said to have led to a sig-
nificant increase in the number of cases brought, even if its effects vary con-
siderably per Member State.98 The shortcomings in its application broadly 
resemble those identified in relation to the Consumer Injunctions Directive, 
discussed above.99
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive100 provides for rather detailed 
rules that are comparable to the ones set out in the Unfair Terms Directive, 
discussed above, but that go further in that they specify that the competent 
courts or administrative authorities must be empowered to order the ces-
sation of the infringement and to prohibit imminent infringements “even 
where there is no proof of actual loss or damage or of intention or negligence”.101 
An accelerated procedure, either with interim or with definitive effect, must 
further be made available to decide on these actions.102 Under the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive Member States may also provide for the 
possibility of the publication of the decisions or of corrective statements to 
be ordered.103 Where a Member State designates an administrative author-
ity as the competent forum, the latter must be composed so as not to cast 
doubts on its impartiality, have adequate powers to monitor and enforce 
the observance of their decisions, give reasons for its decisions and be sub-
ject to judicial review.104 Also in this case the Member States remain free to 
require prior recourse to other means of dealing with complaints.105 Finally, 
the competent courts or authorities must be able to require the defendant, 
where appropriate, to furnish evidence to underpin any factual claims made 
in relation to a commercial practice and to consider these claims inaccurate 
if the evidence is deemed to be insufficient.106
97 Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(2000) 248, p. 21. See also 
Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 423-432.
98 Ibid., p. 32. See also Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 433-434.
99 Ibid., pp. 22-23. Here the length of proceedings and the general lack of erga omnes effect of 
decisions taken are cited in particular. See also para. 159 above.
100 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29. See also Art. 5-7 Unfair Advertising 
Directive 2006/114; Art. 7 Tobacco Advertising Directive 2003/33.
101 Art. 11(2), fi rst subparagraph Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29.
102 Art. 11(2), second subparagraph Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29.
103 Art. 11(2), third subparagraph Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29.
104 Art. 11(3) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29.
105 Art. 11(1) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29.
106 Art. 12 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29.
p. 172 B. Selected EU legislation para. 162
5.2.3. Summary
161. The Consumer Injunctions Directive can be seen as both modest and 
ambitious at the same time. It is modest in that it is largely limited to actions 
for injunctions, brought by qualified entities in the collective interests of the 
consumers, with a particular emphasis on addressing infringements having 
cross-border effects. The effects in practice of this directive have so far on the 
whole also been modest. On the other hand the directive is ambitious. It is 
one of the few self-standing EU legal acts with ‘horizontal’ aspirations, i.e. 
covering a relatively wide range of substantive rules, that is concerned with 
a number of particular remedies (injunctions, publicity measures, penalty 
payments) as well as other aspects of national procedural law (forum, pre-
trial contacts) for the enforcement of EU law at national level. It is particu-
larly innovative where it seeks to apply the principle of mutual recognition 
to the legal standing of such qualified entities. Several other consumer pro-
tection directives, such as the Unfair Terms Directive and the Unfair Com-
mercial Practices Directive, also contain rules aiming to facilitate the bring-
ing of actions for injunctions. These latter two directives furthermore both 
set out complementary rules on a number of related issues, such as legal 
standing, forum, accelerated procedures and evidence.
5.3. Unfair Terms Directive: contractual remedies
In the present section attention turns from actions for injunctions to what is 
referred to in this study as contractual remedies, i.e. the measures affecting 
the validity or effectiveness of contracts concluded in breach of EU law. Of 
particular importance in this respect is the Unfair Terms Directive.107 This 
directive is therefore first briefly introduced, after which its provision laying 
down a contractual remedy is assessed. The second subsection then discuss-
es the obligation of the competent national courts to raise of its own motion 
the unfairness of a contract term and its possible consequences for the con-
tract, the effects of this contractual remedy in practice and the other EU leg-
islation that is relevant in this connection.
5.3.1. Introduction and contractual remedy
162. The Unfair Terms Directive, adopted in 1993 on the basis of Article 
114 TFEU,108 has been called “a first incursion of EU law into the heartland of 
national contract thinking”.109 The process of drafting and adopting it took 
107 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
108 On Art. 114 TFEU and legal basis issues generally, see further subsection 10.1.1 below. On 
the use of Article 114 TFEU specifically in a consumer protection context, see also 
para. 150 above.
109 Weatherill (2005), p. 115.
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almost two decades.110 In its proposal the Commission was careful to under-
line that “the time is not ripe for approximating or unifying the national laws 
relating to the whole field of contractual and quasi-contractual obligations or even 
to the limited sphere of the sale of goods and provision of services”.111 Nevertheless 
heated debates took place in the Council before the directive was eventually 
adopted, not in the last place concerning the provision discussed below.112 
The Commission has described the end result as “a delicate compromise”.113
163. In essence this directive seeks to harmonise the laws of the Mem-
ber States as regards the prevention of the use of unfair terms in ‘stan-
dard’ contracts concluded between consumers and undertakings (sellers 
or suppliers).114 Under the directive a term is qualified as ‘unfair’ if it has 
not been individually negotiated and causes, contrary to the requirements 
of good faith, a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.115 Its annex 
contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of such terms.116 Examples 
include contract terms obliging the consumer concerned to pay a dispropor-
tionately high compensation where he fails to fulfil his obligations, allowing 
the undertaking concerned to terminate a contract without reasonable notice 
or excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action.
Against the background of the aim of progressively establishing the 
EU’s internal market, the directive seeks to avoid or lessen the “many dispari-
ties” and “marked divergences” that were observed to exist in this respect.117 
In the recitals it is further noted that “more effective protection of the consumer 
can be achieved by adopting uniform rules”,118 while also noting that “as they 
now stand, national laws allow only partial harmonisation to be envisaged”.119
164. Of particular importance for the present purposes is the Unfair Terms 
Directive’s provision stating that Member States must provide that unfair 
terms “shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the 
110 Early drafts were discussed as far back as 1975. It was however not until 1990 that the 
Commission actually submitted a proposal. See Commission, Proposal for Unfair Terms 
Directive 93/13, COM(90) 322, pp. 9-12. See also Commission, Communication on unfair 
terms in contracts concluded with consumers, COM(84) 55.
111 Commission, Proposal for Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(90) 322, p. 13.
112 See further Weatherill (2005), pp. 115-116; Micklitz, Reich & Rott (2009), pp. 123-126.
113 Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(2000) 248, p. 5.
114 Art. 1(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See also its recital 4. On matters falling outside the 
scope of this directive pursuant to its Art. 1(2), see e.g. CoJ case C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb, 
para. 25-31; CoJ case C-280/13, Barclays, para. 38-45. Regarding the capacity of the per-
sons concerned, see CoJ case C-488/11, Asbeek Brusse, para. 24-30.
115 Art. 3 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
116 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-472/10, Invitel, para. 25.
117 Recitals 1-3 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
118 Recital 10 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
119 Recital 12 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
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consumer”.120 It continues by stipulating that the contract shall continue to 
bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence 
without the unfair terms. The Court of Justice has clarified that this concerns 
a mandatory provision, which aims to replace the formal balance that the 
consumer contract in question establishes between the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties concerned with an effective balance that re-establishes 
equality between them.121
Originally the Commission had proposed laying down an obligation for 
the Member States to prohibit the use of unfair terms in combination with a 
provision stipulating that such contracts would be “void” if used nonethe-
less.122 However the Council deleted this prohibition as it was seen as par-
tially redundant and excessive, while also replacing the term ‘void’ by ‘not 
binding’ as this latter term was considered legally more appropriate.123 The 
latter term is a more neutral legal concept, thus allowing the Member States 
a wider margin of manoeuvre, in light of diverging legal systems and tradi-
tions in respect of civil law.124 This is underlined by the explicit reference 
to national law that the Council also inserted. The addition of the words 
‘on the consumer’ makes it explicit that this remedy can be invoked only to 
the benefit of the consumer and not (also) of the undertaking concerned.125 
The Commission explained that the intention of the resulting provision is 
“to ensure that no unfair term may be enforced to the detriment of a consumer”, 
while leaving the precise legal classification to the domestic legal system 
of each Member State.126 It suggested that this could be done through legal 
concepts of national law such as relative or absolute nullity, non-existence 
or ‘voidance’.127
165. Seen against this background, it is not surprising that the relevant 
provision of the Unfair Terms Directive has been transposed into national 
law in many different ways. Effect has been given to the term ‘not binding 
on the consumer’ through national law concepts such as non-existence, nul-
120 Art. 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
121 E.g. CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 40; CoJ case C-169/14, Sánchez Mor-
cillo, para. 23.
122 Commission, Proposal for Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(90) 322, p. 69 (Art. 3); 
Commission, First amended proposal for Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(92) 66, 
p. 11 (Art. 7).
123 See Council, doc. 8406/1/92; Council, doc. 8406/1/92, p. 5. See also Commission, Com-
munication on the Council’s position on the proposal for Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, 
SEC(92) 1944, p. 6; Commission, Second amended proposal for Unfair Terms Directive 
93/13, COM(93) 11, p. 2.
124 Opinion AG Trstenjak case C-472/10, Invitel, para. 48.
125 Cf. Micklitz, Reich & Rott (2009), p. 144 (see also p. 207).
126 Commission, Second amended proposal for Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(93) 11, 
p. 2.
127 Ibid., p. 2. See also Council, doc. 4884/93, p. 2, where the Council expressed the view that 
this term can imply inter alia that the relevant part of the contract is void.
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lity, revocability, voidability and unenforceability.128 Under Bulgarian, Ger-
man and Spanish law for instance an unfair term within the meaning of the 
directive is automatically null and void.129 A largely similar concept of non-
existence is applied in France.130 The laws of the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands provide for relative nullity, whereby the unfair term can be 
declared void upon application.131 In Italy provision is made for a some-
what comparable concept of ‘protective’ nullity, allowing the consumer to 
rely on the term so long as it suits him, as only this party can invoke the nul-
lity.132 Under the laws of certain Member States, such Hungary and Poland, 
a court ruling establishing the unfairness of a term can in certain cases have 
effects erga omnes. This means that the ruling applies in respect of all con-
sumers that concluded a contract containing this term with that particular 
undertaking or even with other undertakings.133
166. This raises the issue what, from an EU law perspective, the limits are 
to the leeway that this provision leaves to the Member States. In 2000 the 
Commission took the view that it should at least be ensured that the con-
sumer in question is free to refuse to honour the contractual obligation 
imposed by the unfair term before the competent court has adjudicated on 
the matter.134 In addition it argued that any court judgment finding a term to 
be unfair should take effect from the time of conclusion of the contract, i.e. 
with retroactive effect (ex tunc).135 This would thus significantly limit the 
possibilities available under national law.
It appears however that the Court of Justice is inclined to take more of 
a ‘hands-off’ approach. It mostly respects the Member States’ leeway under 
this provision, while at the same time seeking to ensure that the aim of this 
provision is achieved. More specifically, the Court has confirmed that the 
Member States have “a certain degree of autonomy so far as concerns the definition 
of the legal arrangements applicable to unfair terms”.136 In line with the wording 
of the Unfair Terms Directive, the central issue is that Member States must 
ensure that these terms are not binding on the consumer.137 The Court has 
left it to the national court seised to draw all the necessary consequences 
128 Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(2000) 248, pp. 19-20.
129 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 357, 361, 373 and 407.
130 Ibid., pp. 360 and 407.
131 Ibid., pp. 358, 368 and 407. Under Netherlands’ law an unfair term can also not be applied 
on the basis of the principles of reasonableness and equity (‘redelijkheid en billijkheid’; Art. 
6:248 BW).
132 Ibid., p. 365.
133 Ibid., pp. 431-432. See also Keirsbilck (2013), pp. 1468-1469. As such these rules address 
some of the concerns noted in Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, 
COM(2000) 248, pp. 22-23.
134 Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(2000) 248, p. 19.
135 For a similar view, see Opinion AG Trstenjak case C-472/10, Invitel, para. 47.
136 CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 62.
137 Ibid., para. 62.
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under national law so as to achieve this result, and to assess whether the 
contract in question can continue to exist without that term.138 To this aim 
that court must “do whatever lies within its jurisdiction, taking the whole body of 
domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised 
by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that [Article 6(1)] is fully effective and 
achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it”.139 This also 
applies with regard to the future.140 For the Court of Justice, the key is there-
fore that a national court does not apply a term that it considers to be unfair, 
without such non-application being qualified further as a matter of EU 
law.141
The Court has further ruled that, at least in cases where a contract term 
is found to be unfair pursuant to a ‘representative’ action brought under this 
directive,142 that term should generally not be binding on consumers who 
have concluded a contract containing this term with that particular under-
taking, regardless of whether these consumers were party to the proceed-
ings in question.143 Yet whilst this result can be achieved through a ruling 
having effects erga omnes,144 it also noted that this does not exclude the pos-
sibility of other types of national measures.145 Concerning the remainder of 
the contract, i.e. the other terms than the unfair ones, it has been held that, 
although national law may provide otherwise, the directive itself does not 
imply that a national court could or should annul the entire contract con-
taining an unfair term where this would be advantageous for the consumer 
concerned.146 Neither does it allow the national court to amend the contract 
other than by deleting the unfair term, to the extent that such continuity is 
legally possible under national law.147
5.3.2. Own motion judicial review, practical effects and other legislation
167. The Court of Justice has shown considerably less restraint on another 
issue relating to the aforementioned contractual remedy set out in the Unfair 
Terms Directive. This concerns the question whether a national court should 
verify of its own motion (ex officio) whether a given term is unfair and there-
138 CoJ case C-40/08, Asturcom, para. 57-58; CoJ Order case C-76/10, Pohotovost, para. 61-62; 
CoJ case C-453/10, Pereničová, para. 30.
139 CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 72.
140 CoJ case C-472/10, Invitel, para. 43.
141 CoJ case C-243/08, Pannon, para. 35; CoJ case C-488/11, Asbeek Brusse, para. 49.
142 Pursuant to Art. 7(2) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See further para. 160 above.
143 CoJ case C-472/10, Invitel, para. 38. See also Opinion AG Trstenjak case C-472/10, Invitel, 
para. 59-60, where it was argued that serious doubts from the viewpoint of proportional-
ity and protection of fundamental rights would arise however if the effects of such a rul-
ing were to extent also to other undertakings that use the same term in their contracts but 
that are not party to the proceedings in question.
144 See para. 159 above.
145 CoJ case C-472/10, Invitel, para. 39-40.
146 CoJ case C-453/10, Pereničová, para. 31-35.
147 CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 64-71.
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fore not binding on the consumer. On this issue the Commission had princi-
pally argued that the competent national court should be empowered to do 
so.148 The Court has held in a remarkable and much commented upon string 
of cases, starting with its 2000 judgment in Océano Grupo, that this is not only 
a possibility, but in principle also an obligation for that court.149
Océano Grupo concerned a preliminary reference by a Spanish court. Sev-
eral consumers had bought certain products (encyclopaedias), but they 
failed to pay the sums due. The undertakings that had sold them the prod-
ucts then initiated legal proceedings. In application of the relevant term of 
the contract, these cases were brought before the court located at the under-
takings’ principal place of business, rather than at the place where the con-
sumers were domiciled, as is the general rule. The national court seised 
doubted whether it had jurisdiction, considering the possible unfairness of 
the term in question. In addition it was unsure whether it could raise this 
issue of the possible unfairness of its own motion. In its judgment the Court 
of Justice confirmed that a term such as the one at issue had the object or 
effect to exclude or hinder the consumers’ right to take legal action and is 
therefore unfair. As regards the second question, it held that the Unfair 
Terms Directive is founded on the idea that the consumer is in a weak posi-
tion vis-à-vis the undertaking concerned as regards both his bargaining pow-
er and his level of knowledge. It found that the aim of the contractual rem-
edy for which it provides would not be achieved if the consumer were 
himself obliged to raise the unfair nature of the term. Especially where the 
amounts involved are limited, the consumer may be deterred by the law-
yer’s fees. In the Court’s view there is thus a real risk that the consumer does 
not challenge the unfair term himself, particularly because of ignorance of 
the law.
It was therefore found that the effective protection of the consumer can 
be attained only if the national court acknowledges that it has power to eval-
uate terms of this kind of its own motion. The Court also noted that the sys-
tem of protection laid down in this directive is based on the notion that the 
imbalance between the consumer and the undertaking concerned may only 
be corrected by positive action unconnected with the actual parties to the 
contract. Here it referred to the aforementioned possibility of ‘representa-
tive’ actions being brought under this directive by certain third parties, such 
as consumer associations.150 In conclusion it was held that “the [national] 
court’s power to determine of its own motion whether a term is unfair must be 
regarded as constituting a proper means both of achieving the result sought by Arti-
cle 6, namely, preventing an individual consumer from being bound by an unfair 
148 Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(2000) 248, pp. 19-20.
149 CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and C-244/98, Océano Grupo, para. 22-29. On this case and sub-
sequent case law, see e.g. Stuyck (2001), p. 719; Ebers (2010), p. 823; Stuyck (2010), p. 879; 
Schebesta (2010), p. 847; Trstenjak & Beysen (2011), pp. 119-121; Keirsbilck (2013), p. 1467.
150 Art. 7(2) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See para. 160 above.
p. 178 B. Selected EU legislation para. 168
term, and of contributing to achieving the aim of Article 7, since if the court under-
takes such an examination, that may act as a deterrent and contribute to preventing 
unfair terms in contracts concluded between consumers and sellers or suppliers”.151
168. In subsequent cases the Court of Justice has held that the competent 
national court should not only be empowered to act of its own motion, but 
that it is in principle obliged to do so.152 In light of the nature and importance 
of the public interest underlying this directive, it was found – in the context 
of the possible annulment of an arbitration award – that the provision in 
question must be regarded as having standing equal to national rules of 
public policy (d’ordre public).153 As a general rule, the national court is there-
fore under an obligation to assess whether a term is unfair within the mean-
ing of the Unfair Terms Directive and therefore not binding on the consum-
er, to the extent that the necessary legal and factual elements are available to 
it, as a means to compensate for the imbalance between the private parties 
concerned.154
Although broad and far-going, this obligation is however not unqualified. 
For instance, the Court has clarified that where this own motion assessment 
leads to the finding that the term is unfair, the national court should nor-
mally inform the parties to the dispute and invite them to comment.155 
When the consumer then still does not wish to assert the unfairness of the 
term, the national court is not obliged to consider it unfair.156 Neither does 
such an obligation necessarily exist in the context of the enforcement of a 
previous arbitration award which has since become final (res judicata).157 In 
addition this obligation does not apply in cases brought by consumer pro-
tection associations, given that here the same imbalance between the parties 
is not presumed to exist.158
151 CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and C-244/98, Océano Grupo, para. 28.
152 In addition to the cases mentioned above and below, see also CoJ case C-473/00, Cofi dis; 
CoJ case C-137/08, Pénzügyi Lízing. Note that the CoJ has since applied essentially the 
same reasoning also to other consumer protection directives, namely (what are now) 
Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48 and Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83. See CoJ 
case C-429/05, Rampion; CoJ case C-227/08, Martín Martín.
153 CoJ case C-168/05, Mostaza Claro, para. 35-38; CoJ case C-40/08, Asturcom, para. 52-53. 
For an alternative approach, rejecting an extensive interpretation of the concept of ’public 
policy’ and concentrating instead on an infringement of the right to a fair hearing, see 
Opinion AG Tizzano case C-168/05, Mostaza Claro, para. 55-61. On the term ‘public poli-
cy’ within the meaning of Brussels I Regulation 44/2001, see e.g. CoJ case C-7/98, Krom-
bach, para. 37; CoJ case C-394/07, Gambazzi, para. 27.
154 E.g. CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 42-43; CoJ case C-415/11, Aziz, 
para. 46-47; CoJ case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo, para. 24.
155 CoJ case C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank, para. 31. See also CoJ case C-488/11, Asbeek Brusse, 
para. 52.
156 CoJ case C-243/08, Pannon, para. 33.
157 CoJ case C-40/08, Asturcom, para. 34-38.
158 CoJ case C-413/12, ACICL, para. 49-50.
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In this line of case law the EU law principles of equivalence and effective-
ness have been repeatedly applied.159 Article 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 
having been held to be of equal standing as a national rule of public policy, 
the former principle implies that the effects of earlier, final judgments may 
still need to be reassessed, where national law provides for this possibility in 
cases of breaches of national rules of public policy. Here the Court under-
lined that, where national law gives the competent national court the discre-
tion to do so, this must be taken to imply an obligation.160 It has further held 
that specific national proceedings for the simplified and rapid recovery of 
uncontested claims can be incompatible with the principle of effectiveness, 
where such procedures completely prevent the court from considering of its 
own motion whether a term is unfair. Here the risk that a consumer would 
not lodge his objections, because of the short time period, associated costs or 
his unawareness, was stressed once more.161 On similar grounds, in certain 
cases, interim relief must be available against enforcement proceedings.162 
Yet the Court has also ruled that in this context the principle of effectiveness 
cannot be “stretched” so far as to mean that the national court must compen-
sate not only for a procedural omission on the part of the consumer, but also 
his “total inertia”.163
169. Apart from the rules on actions for injunctions, discussed earlier,164 the 
Unfair Terms Directive contains no further provisions in respect of the rem-
edies and procedures applicable in proceedings before the national courts 
regarding unfair terms. No provision is made for example for actions for dam-
ages. In respect of the contractual remedy at issue here the directive also leaves 
it open which body is to rule on the actions in question. Neither does it touch 
upon the issue of limitation periods for actions bought under that directive.
170. As regards its functioning in practice, doubts have been expressed as 
to whether the current system of protection that the Unfair Terms Directive 
offers to private parties is adequate.165 In its report on this directive, dating 
from 2000, the Commission was critical, observing that unfair terms contin-
ue to be used on a wide scale and calling the said system “very ineffective”.166 
It noted that the situation where a term has been held to be non-binding 
159 On these two principles, see further section 2.2 above.
160 E.g. CoJ case C-40/08, Asturcom, para. 51-54; CoJ case C-488/11, Asbeek Brusse, para. 46.
161 CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 53-55.
162 CoJ case C-415/11, Aziz, para. 57-63. CoJ case C-34/13, Kušinová, para. 66.
163 CoJ case C-40/08, Asturcom, para. 47. See also CoJ case C-34/13, Kušinová, para. 56.
164 See para. 160 above.
165 Cf. CoJ case C-144/99, Commission v. Netherlands, para. 18; CoJ case C-478/99, Commission 
v. Sweden, para. 16 and 18; CoJ case C-243/08, Pannon, para. 21. Here it is clarifi ed that 
Art. 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13 is intended to accord a right to the citizen in his 
role of consumer.
166 Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(2000) 248, p. 35 (see also 
p. 20).
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differs little from the situation where the term had not been used in the first 
place, which implies that the undertakings using those terms in effect run 
little risks. The Commission further argued that its effectiveness depends 
also on the ease of the consumers’ access to justice and, perhaps primar-
ily, on sufficient information being available to them. This report therefore 
raised the options of reinforcing this ‘civil penalty’ or complementing it by 
providing for criminal sanctions or actions for damages.
The abovementioned Océano Grupo case law, which dates from after the 
publication of the Commission’s report, appears to have helped to address 
its latter concern about consumers being insufficiently informed. However 
to a large extent the former concern about undertakings in effect hardly run-
ning any risks seems still equally valid today. A more recent study also 
warned against the possible lack of effectiveness as a consequence of the 
rather rudimentary regulation of the legal consequences of a finding that a 
contract term is unfair as well as consumers’ lack of knowledge in this 
respect.167 Nonetheless, when in 2008 the Commission proposed replacing 
the Unfair Terms Directive, its intended successor (i.e. the Consumer Rights 
Directive168) contained a provision that is essentially the same as the one 
discussed above.169 The EU legislature eventually decided against repealing 
this directive however.170 The aforementioned provision consequently 
remains in force today.
171. Finally, several other directives in the domain of consumer protection 
also contain provisions on contractual remedies. For example, the Consumer 
Sales Directive provides that a consumer may have the contract “rescinded” 
where the consumer goods to which the contract relates are not in conformi-
ty.171 In the recitals of this directive it is specified that the detailed arrange-
ments whereby the recession of the contract is effected may be laid down in 
national law.172 The consequences of exercising this right of rescission are 
sometimes seen as unclear.173 In addition under this directive any contrac-
tual term or agreement concluded before the lack of conformity is brought 
to the seller’s attention which waives or restricts the rights resulting from 
the directive “shall, as provided for by national law, not be binding on the 
consumer”.174 The similarity in wording between this latter provision and 
167 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 347 and 434.
168 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83.
169 Commission, Proposal for Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83, COM(2008) 614, p. 34 
(Art. 37).
170 See e.g. Council, doc. 8992/11, pp. 5-6.
171 Art. 3(2), (5) and (6) Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44.
172 Recital 15 Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44.
173 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), p. 706. Some clarity is provided by CoJ case 
C-404/06, Quelle, para. 39; CoJ joined cases C-65/09 and C-87/09, Weber, para. 72. 
Regarding the implementation of this directive, see also Commission, Report on Con-
sumer Sales Directive 1999/44, COM(2007) 210.
174 Art. 7 Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44.
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Article 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive is evident. In the absence of any relevant 
indications in the preparatory documents, the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice or otherwise, it remains for now an open question whether it should be 
understood in the same manner.175
Another example of contractual remedies in the field of EU consumer 
protection law can be found in the Package Travel Directive, which allows con-
sumers to “withdraw from the contract” without penalty, in case the undertak-
ing concerned does not honour its primary commitments under the contract 
in question.176 It has been held that this is to be understood as a right for the 
consumer to cancel the contract, similar to the right of rescission as provided 
in the Consumer Sales Directive.177 The Commission’s 2013 proposal to 
replace this directive speaks in this regard of the right to “terminate” the con-
tract.178 This suggests that this right is to be distinguished from the ‘right of 
withdrawal’ which can be found in several other consumer protection direc-
tives.179 In these latter cases, this concept relates primarily to a ’cooling-off 
period’, meaning that a consumer can withdraw from a concluded contract 
under certain conditions and within a limited time period.180
5.3.3. Summary
172. The Unfair Terms Directive provides for a contractual remedy, pursu-
ant to which a consumer is ‘not bound’ by an unfair term in a consumer 
contract. The broad and rather imprecise wording of this provision, in com-
bination with the explicit reference to national law laid down therein, means 
that it can be – and indeed has been – transposed into national law in differ-
ent manners. To date, while stressing that the effectiveness of this provision 
must be safeguarded, the Court of Justice has on the whole been rather toler-
ant of the Member States’ leeway in this respect and the resulting diversity 
at national level. It has however opted for a rather extensive interpretation 
on another point related to this provision, namely the obligation, as a gen-
175 Cf. Commission, Proposal for Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44, COM(95) 520, p. 16. As 
regards the transposition into national law, see Study University of Bielefeld (2008), 
p. 692.
176 Art. 4(5) Package Travel Directive 90/314. See also its Art. 4(6).
177 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 213 and 298-299.
178 Commission, Proposal for a new package travel directive, COM(2013) 512, p. 24 (Art. 9(2)
(b) and 10).
179 E.g. Art. 6 Distance Marketing Directive 2002/65; Art. 14 Consumer Credit Directive 
2008/48; Art. 9 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83.
180 On the effects of such a withdrawal, cf. CoJ case C-481/99, Heininger, para. 35; CoJ case 
C-350/03, Schulte, para. 66-69 and 92; CoJ case C-229/04, Crailsheimer, para. 46-49. Note 
that these cases relate to Directive 85/577/EEC to protect the consumer in respect of con-
tracts negotiated away from business premises, OJ 1985, L 372/31 (‘Doorstep Selling 
Directive’), which has since been replaced by Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83. Differ-
ent from its predecessor, the latter directive contains a relatively detailed harmonised 
arrangement concerning this right of withdrawal and its effects and uses somewhat dif-
ferent terminology (see its Art. 9-16).
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eral rule, for the competent national court to raise of its own motion (ex offi-
cio) the unfair nature of a term. Other than this provision and its provision 
on injunctions discussed earlier, the Unfair Terms Directive does not contain 
for any other remedial or procedural provisions that are relevant for the 
present purposes. Although less broadly construed and mostly differently 
worded, somewhat similar contractual remedies can be found in certain 
other consumer protection directives, most notably the Consumer Sales 
Directive and the Package Travel Directive.
5.4. Product Liability Directive: damages
A third, quite different approach from the ones discussed in the foregoing 
two subsections has been laid down in the Product Liability Directive.181 This 
directive seeks to facilitate the private enforcement of the relevant substan-
tive rules of EU law by focusing on another remedy, namely civil liability for 
damages. After a brief general introduction of this directive, its central prin-
ciple of no-fault liability is outlined below. There it is also explained what is 
understood in this context by the term ‘damage’. Subsequently the manner in 
which this liability is limited and the other relevant legislation are discussed.
5.4.1. Introduction, no-fault liability and damage
173. The Product Liability Directive dates from 1985. This directive is consid-
ered not only a corner stone of the EU’s consumer protection acquis, but also 
as an important step on the path towards the gradual harmonisation of the 
law on non-contractual liability and private law generally.182 Based on Arti-
cle 115 TFEU, it aims to address divergences between national laws on prod-
uct liability, so as to ensure undistorted competition between economic 
operators, facilitate the free movement of goods and avoid differences in 
levels of consumer protection.183 The Court of Justice has described this 
directive as reflecting “a complex balancing of different interests, [including] 
guaranteeing that competition will not be distorted, facilitating trade within the 
common market, consumer protection and ensuring the sound administration of 
justice”.184 The Court has also held that the directive confers rights on the 
injured private parties concerned.185
181 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
182 E.g. Izquierdo Peris (1999), p. 331; Weatherill (2005), p. 137; Fairgrieve & Howells (2007), 
pp. 692-693.
183 Cf. recital 1 Product Liability Directive 85/374. On Art. 115 TFEU and legal basis issues 
generally, see subsection 10.1.1 below.
184 CoJ case C-52/00, Commission v. France, para. 29.
185 Cf. CoJ case C-177/04, Commission v. France, para. 49 (regarding Art. 3(3) of the directive).
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174. The Commission initially published its proposal for this directive in 
1976, followed by an amended version in 1979.186 These proposals proved to 
be controversial.187 Certain Member States, in particular Germany, feared that 
extended liability for damages would harm industry.188 There was also a 
fear of excessive litigation, especially regarding small claims.189 No less than 
nine years of discussions by the EU legislature (at that time only the Coun-
cil, the European Parliament merely having a consultative role190), numer-
ous statements at the time of its adoption as well as various exceptions, 
limitations and merely optional provisions, discussed below, were required 
before agreement could finally be reached. As imposed by its legal basis, i.e. 
Article 115 TFEU, this agreement was in the end unanimous.
In a sense controversies continued after its adoption. France for instance 
did not transpose the directive into national more than a decade later, after 
having been condemned by the Court of Justice for not having done so ear-
lier.191 Whereas some Member States, such as Germany, feared that the lia-
bility regime would be too harsh, France’s reluctance related rather to the 
higher level of consumer protection for which its national law provided.192 
Particularly problematic from this perspective is the Court’s ruling that the 
directive provides for ‘complete’ (or ‘maximum’) harmonisation (as 
opposed to ‘minimum’ harmonisation) of the matters regulated by it.193 This 
means that Member States remain at liberty to retain or establish their 
domestic regimes on product liability only for matters not regulated by this 
directive, such as liability based on other grounds or concerning other prod-
ucts.194 But other national rules, such as those on the liability of suppliers, 
which existed inter alia in France, cannot be maintained, because this matter 
is exhaustively covered by the directive.195
175. The Product Liability Directive starts by providing that “the producer 
shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product”.196 It defines what 
constitutes a ‘product’ and which undertakings qualify as ‘producers’ for 
186 Commission, Proposal for Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(76) 372; Commis-
sion, Amended proposal for Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(79) 415.
187 Commission, Third report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2006) 496, p. 6. 
See also Study Lovells (2003), p. 135; S. Weatherill (2005), p. 135; Micklitz, Reich & Rott 
(2009), pp. 220-221.
188 Reich (1986), p. 137. See e.g. Council, doc. 5555/80, pp. 4 and 13.
189 Van Doorn (1989), p. 11. See e.g. Council, doc. 7020/81, p. 19; Council, doc. 7413/84, p. 9.
190 For the latter’s opinion, see European Parliament, Opinion on the proposal for Product 
Liability Directive 85/374, OJ 1979, C 127/61.
191 CoJ case C-52/00, Commission v. France.
192 Van Dam (2006), pp. 371 and 374-375.
193 E.g. CoJ case C-52/00, Commission v. France, para. 14-24; CoJ case C-154/00, Commission v. 
Greece, para. 10-20; CoJ case C-495/10, Dutrueux, para. 20-22.
194 E.g. CoJ case C-183/00, González Sánchez, para. 30-31; CoJ case C-285/08, Moteurs Leroy 
Somer, para. 25.
195 Art. 3(3) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
196 Art. 1 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
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the purposes of this directive.197 It also explains when a product is defective, 
i.e. when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, 
taking all circumstances into account.198 The directive then continues by 
specifying its central principle of liability without fault. It stipulates in this 
regard that “the injured person shall be required to prove the damage, the defect 
and the causal relationship between defect and damage”.199 By implication, a pri-
vate party-applicant does not need to prove – and, presumably, does not 
even need to submit – that the producer was at fault for the latter’s liability 
in damages to be incurred.200
The Product Liability Directive thus establishes no-fault (‘strict’) liability 
of the producer for any defects in the products covered. This approach relies 
on the view that it is extremely difficult or even impossible for a consumer 
to provide proof of fault on the side of the producer, meaning that imposing 
such a requirement would leave consumers unprotected.201 According to its 
recitals, the no-fault liability provided for is the “sole means” of adequately 
solving the perceived problem related to product liability, i.e. the fair appor-
tionment of risks inherent in modern technological production.202 Even so, 
this approach was new to most Member States.203
176. The directive adds that where two producers are liable for the same 
damage, they are jointly and severally liable.204 The rights of contribution or 
recourse in such a case are expressly left to be regulated by national law. It is 
further made explicit that the producer cannot limit or exclude its liability 
under this directive.205 The rules in question are thus mandatory in nature.
177. Another important provision is the directive’s description of what is 
understood in this connection by the concept of ‘damage’.206 This was anoth-
er particularly controversial issue during the legislative process.207 Two 
heads of damage are specified, namely, first, damage caused by death or by 
personal injuries and, second, damage to, or the destruction of, any item of 
property, other than the product itself, with a lower threshold of € 500, pro-
vided that the item of property is of a type ordinarily intended for private 
use and that it was used by the injured person mainly for his own private 
197 Art. 2 and 3(1) Product Liability Directive 85/374 respectively. Pursuant to its Art. 3(3) 
the liability established under this directive extends in certain cases to the supplier of the 
product in question.
198 Art. 6(1) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
199 Art. 4 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
200 Cf. CoJ case C-402/03, Skov, para. 19.
201 Commission, Proposal for Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(76) 372, p. 1.
202 Recital 2 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
203 Cf. Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000), p. 674 (concerning the legal systems of Eng-
land, France and Germany). See also e.g. Council, doc. 10512/81, p. 2.
204 Art. 5 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
205 Art. 12 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
206 Art. 9 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
207 Taschner (2002), p. 390.
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use or consumption. Accordingly claims for compensation in respect of 
damage to or the destruction of the defective product itself are not covered. 
This implies that these latter claims are to be settled under national law.208 
Under the directive issues relating to non-material damage, such as compensa-
tion for pain and suffering, are expressly left to be dealt with by the laws of 
the Member States.209 This is in line with the Commission’s initial propos-
al.210 However, further to a suggestion to this effect by the European Parlia-
ment, the amended proposal did include this head of damage.211 The Coun-
cil nonetheless decided to exclude it from the final text of the directive, in 
light of the differing understandings of this concept in the Member States 
and because it was felt inappropriate to harmonise this aspect only for this 
particular domain.212
178. The Court of Justice has since clarified what is to be understood by 
this concept of ‘damage’ within the meaning of the Product Liability Direc-
tive, particularly in its ruling in Veedfald.213 This case, dating from 2001, was 
referred by a Danish court. It concerned a defective perfusion fluid used for 
kidney transplantations. In the context of the resulting litigation, the ques-
tion arose how the abovementioned provision is to be interpreted. In its 
reply the Court began by pointing out that, while two heads of damages are 
specified, the term ‘damage’ itself is not defined in the directive. It also held 
that the directive exhaustively sets out the heads of damages that may be 
possible. Thus, a national court may not decline to award any damages at all 
under the directive on the ground that, where the other conditions of liabil-
ity are fulfilled, the damage incurred is not such as to fall under any of the 
abovementioned heads mentioned in the directive. The Court ruled that, 
although it is left to the national legislatures to determine the precise content 
of these two heads of damages, it must be ensured that “full and proper com-
pensation” is available for damage resulting from death or personal injury or 
from damage to or destruction of an item of property. A Member State can 
therefore not restrict these types of material damage which are to be made 
good. By contrast the reparation of non-material damage is governed solely 
by national law, meaning that this latter type of damage may or may not be 
recoverable.
208 Cf. Commission, Proposal for Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(76) 372, p. 13.
209 Art. 9, last subparagraph Product Liability Directive 85/374. See also its recital 9.
210 Commission, Proposal for Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(76) 372, p. 12.
211 Commission, Amended proposal for Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(79) 415, 
p. 6.
212 Council, doc. 7669/85, pp. 4-5.
213 CoJ case C-203/99, Veedfald, para. 23-33.
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179. As regards the abovementioned threshold of € 500, the recitals of the 
Product Liability Directive clarify that this is meant to “avoid litigation in 
an excessive number of cases”.214 This threshold was introduced as part as an 
overall compromise on the contentious issue of which damages are to be 
covered by the directive.215 In the view of the Court of Justice it should not 
be regarded as unduly affecting injured parties’ rights of access to court.216 
For, despite this exclusion of minor material damage from the scope of this 
directive’s special liability regime, these parties can still bring an action 
under the ordinary law of contractual or non-contractual liability.
5.4.2. Limits, practical effects and other legislation
180. The Product Liability Directive limits and moderates the effects of the 
aforementioned no-fault liability in various manners. In fact, it does so to 
the extent that it has been held that the provisions in question “fail to live up 
to the ideal” of no-fault liability.217 An important element in this connection is 
that a producer cannot be held liable under the directive if he proves the 
existence of certain exonerating circumstances. These are set out in an exhaus-
tive list.218 They include the defence that the state of science and technologi-
cal knowledge when the product was put into circulation was not such as to 
enable the existence of the defect to be discovered, known as the ‘develop-
ment risk defence’.219 The provision making this defence available is option-
al, in that the directive entitles Member States not to include it in their 
national laws.220 Only very few Member States (Finland, Luxembourg) 
decided however to completely exclude this defence.221
181. In addition the Product Liability Directive provides for certain time 
bars. These come in two forms. First, there is a limitation period of three years 
as from the day the injured party becomes aware or should reasonably have 
become aware of the damage, the defect and the identity of the producer.222 
Setting such a uniform period was seen as being in the interest of both the 
214 Recital 9 Product Liability Directive 85/374. Note that some uncertainty exists as to 
whether this is a proper threshold or rather that this is a deductible amount (which may 
in part be due to the differences between the various language versions of this directive). 
See Fairgrieve & Howells (2007), pp. 674-975.
215 Taschner (2002), p. 390.
216 CoJ case C-52/00, Commission v. France, para. 29-32; CoJ case C-154/00, Commission v. 
Greece, para. 29-32.
217 Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000), p. 678.
218 Art. 7 Product Liability Directive 85/374. This possibility was largely absent in the Com-
mission’s proposals. Cf. CoJ case C-203/99, Veedfald, para. 15; CoJ case C-127/04, O’Byrne, 
para. 25.
219 Art. 7(e) Product Liability Directive 85/374. On the development risk defence, see CoJ 
case C-300/95, Commission v. UK, para. 25-29. See also Study Fondazione Rosselli (2004).
220 Art. 15(1)(b) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
221 Howells (2008), p. 126.
222 Art. 10(1) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
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injured private party and the producer.223 The suspension and interruption 
of this period is left to be settled by national law.224 Second, the directive 
specifies a time period of ten years as from the moment the product was put 
into circulation, at the expiry of which the consumer’s rights under this 
directive are extinguished, unless legal proceedings have been instituted in 
the meantime.225 This latter provision rests on the thought that it would be 
unreasonable to make the producer liable for an unlimited period.226
182. Pursuant to the directive liability may further be reduced or disal-
lowed when, having regard to all the circumstances, the damage is caused 
by a defect in the product and by the fault of the injured person or any per-
son for whom the injured person is responsible.227 This thus covers the situ-
ation of contributory negligence by the private party concerned.228 By contrast 
under the directive the act or omission of a third party may not be reason to 
reduce the liability of the producer. In the latter case any right of contribu-
tion or recourse for the producer vis-à-vis that third party is to be deter-
mined in accordance with the applicable national law.229
183. A final measure that limits the effects of the no-fault liability for which 
the directive provides is that it leaves the Member States the option to cap the 
producer’s liability for damage resulting from death or personal injury and 
caused by identical items with the same defect at an amount not lower than 
€ 70 million.230 The fact that this latter provision is accompanied by an 
express requirement for the Commission to report, after ten years, on the 
effects of this provision and the statement that on that basis the Council 
shall decide whether or not to repeal this cap illustrates that also this issue 
was contentious.231 The recitals explain that in most Member States it was 
seen as inappropriate to set such a financial ceiling, but that legal traditions 
in this regard differed and that therefore the possibility of a derogation from 
the principle of unlimited liability should be foreseen.232
184. As to the practical effects of the Product Liability Directive, the picture 
that emerges on the basis of various reports and studies is that the relevant 
national regimes on product liability continue to differ significantly.233 That 
223 Recital 10 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
224 Art. 10(2) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
225 Art. 11 Product Liability Directive 85/374. On the application of this ten year period, see 
CoJ case C-127/04, O’Byrne; CoJ case C-358/08, Aventis Pasteur.
226 Recital 11 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
227 Art. 8(2) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
228 Cf. recital 8 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
229 Art. 8(1) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
230 Art. 16(1) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
231 Art. 16(2) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
232 Recital 17 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
233 See in particular Study Lovells (2003), pp. 9-23.
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is the case for instance as regards the assessment of damages, group actions, 
rules on evidence, pre-trial discovery of evidence and recovery of legal 
costs. Many stakeholders reportedly consider these procedural differences 
of more importance than differences in the applicable substantive law. It 
further appears that on the whole under this directive only limited numbers 
of cases are brought before the competent national courts, in part because a 
considerable number of cases are thought to be settled.234 Accordingly it has 
been held that the Product Liability Directive has been more debated than 
utilised in litigation.235 A modest increase in litigation has been observed in 
more recent years. But the Product Liability Directive is reported to have 
played only a limited role in this increase; more important factors are 
thought to have been greater consumer awareness and access to informa-
tion, as well as increased media attention.236
The Commission appears to find neither the abovementioned legal dif-
ferences nor the low level of litigation problematic, at least not to such a 
degree that it intends proposing legislative change. The only amendment 
made to the Product Liability Directive dates from 1999 when, in the after-
math of the ‘mad cow’ crisis, primary agricultural products were brought 
within its scope.237 Various possible more profound amendments were dis-
cussed in a Commission green paper dating from the same year, further to 
suggestions by the European Parliament.238 These include measures related 
to the following issues: (i) the relaxation of the burden of proof on consum-
ers, for instance by inferring a causal relationship, establishing a lower stan-
dard of proof or imposing obligations on producers to disclose certain docu-
mentation or to bear the costs of an expert opinion; (ii) the possibility of 
abolishing the abovementioned development risk defence; (iii) reducing or 
abolishing the financial threshold of € 500; (iv) extending the concept of 
‘damage’ so as to cover also non-material damage; and (v) improving access 
to justice for private parties by making provision for injunctions and/or col-
lective redress mechanisms such as of the type know in the United States 
234 Commission, First report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(95) 617, p. 2; Com-
mission, Second report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2000) 893, p. 10; 
Commission, Fourth report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2011) 547, p. 4. 
See also Study McKenna (1994), p. 14; Weatherill (2005), p. 146; Howells (2008), p. 130; 
Micklitz, Reich & Rott (2009), p. 247.
235 Howells (2008), p. 121.
236 Study Lovells (2003), pp. 31-38.
237 Directive 1999/34/EC amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning lia-
bility for defective products, OJ 1999, L 141/20 (‘Product Liability Amending Directive’).
238 Commission, Green paper on liability for defective products, COM(1999) 396. See also 
Commission, Communication on the Council’s position on the proposal for Product Lia-
bility Directive 85/374, SEC(1998) 2232. See further Izquierdo Peris (1999), pp. 339-344; 
Whittaker (2005), pp. 440-450.
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class actions. But in 2001,239 and again in 2006240 and 2011,241 the Commis-
sion decided against proposing any amendments. It did so despite the per-
sistent pressure to do so from consumer associations and certain national 
authorities, generally (if cautiously) supported by the European Parlia-
ment.242 The Commission argued that there was insufficient proof of major 
problems and that the differences in the application of the directive did not 
affect the functioning of the internal market.243 It also recalled the controver-
sies that existed at the time of the adoption of this directive. It held that the 
resulting compromise constitutes a delicate balance between the various 
interests concerned, which it did not wish to upset.
185. Looking beyond the Product Liability Directive to other relevant EU 
legislation, it can be noted that in 1990 the Commission proposed a directive 
on the liability of suppliers of services.244 The Commission explained in its 
proposal that here it had originally intended to propose a no-fault liability 
system, similar to that of the Product Liability Directive. But this approach 
had encountered strong resistance from interests groups and was consid-
ered to deviate too much from the national laws in force. Therefore the Com-
mission instead proposed a fault-based liability regime, subject to a reversal 
of the burden of proof to the advantage of the injured private party.245 This 
proposal was rather negatively received by the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and interests groups however. The Com-
mission concluded that the proposal stood no chance of being adopted and 
withdrew it in 1994.246 It follows that, despite certain subsequent efforts by 
the Commission in this regard, services providers’ civil liability in damages 
continues at present essentially to be left to be regulated by the laws of the 
Member States.247
239 Commission, Second report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2000) 893, p. 28.
240 Commission, Third report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2006) 496, 
pp. 11-12.
241 Commission, Fourth report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2011) 547, p. 4.
242 European Parliament, Resolution on the Commission green paper on liability for defec-
tive products, A5-0061/2000.
243 Cf. Study Lovells (2003), pp. 15-28.
244 Commission, Proposal for a services liability directive, COM(90) 482. See further Pfen-
ningstorf (1991), p. 493. On the liability of undertakings under Product Liability Directive 
85/374 and the liability of service providers, see CoJ case C-495/10, Dutrueux.
245 Commission, Proposal for a services liability directive, COM(90) 482, p. 8.
246 Commission, Communication on new directions on the liability of suppliers of services, 
COM(94) 260.
247 See e.g. Study View (2004). See also Commission, Proposal for Services Directive 
2006/123, COM(2004) 2. Here it was proposed stipulating that contractual liability of ser-
vice providers would be covered by the country of origin principle, whereas non-contrac-
tual liability would not (see its Art. 16-17). This aspect of the proposal was not retained by 
the EU legislature however. Recital 51 Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal 
market, OJ 2006, L 376/36 (‘Services Directive’) now states that “[i]ssues such as liability for 
providing incorrect or misleading information should be determined by Member States”.
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The Package Travel Directive contains provisions that are to some extent 
comparable to those of the Product Liability Directive.248 It provides in 
essence that Member States must ensure that undertakings organising or 
offering such holidays are liable for damages resulting from the failure to 
properly perform the contract at issue. This liability is subject to an excep-
tion in case of lack of fault of that undertaking, because of failures in the 
performance attributable to the consumer or a third party or to force majeure. 
As such the Package Travel Directive can be said to be based on an approach 
that is somewhere in between no-fault and fault-based liability.249 In the 
context of its currently on-going revision, moving towards clear no-fault 
liability was an option that received considerable support from Member 
States.250 The Commission’s 2013 proposal for a directive replacing the Pack-
age Travel Directive does not address this matter expressly however.251 Of 
particular relevance is also the 2002 Leitner ruling of the Court of Justice.252 
This case concerned an Austrian preliminary reference that arose as a result 
of salmonella poisoning during an all-inclusive package holiday. Austrian 
law did not foresee compensation for non-material damages (in this case: 
loss of holiday enjoyment). The Package Travel Directive does not expressly 
address this issue, but it does stipulate that Member States may limit com-
pensation for damage other than personal injury. The Court ruled that the 
type of damage at issue is covered by this directive. It pointed first to its 
objective, which is to eliminate disparities. It held that divergences as to 
whether non-material damage is covered would cause significant distor-
tions of competition, given that non-material damage is a frequent occur-
rence in the field of package holiday. It further recalled that the directive and 
particularly its provision on liability are designed to protect consumers and 
that compensation for non-material damage arising from the loss of enjoy-
ment of the holiday is of particular importance to consumers. While noting 
that the directive refers in a general manner to ‘damage’, the Court took the 
abovementioned possibility of limiting compensation for damage other than 
personal injury as an implicit recognition of the right to compensation also 
of non-material damage.
248 Art. 5 Package Travel Directive 90/314.
249 Cf. European Parliament, Study on safety and liability issues relating to package travel, 
January 2008, p. 4. See also Study University of Bielefeld (2008), p. 321. According to the 
latter study, whether or not a fault requirement applies is left to the Member States.
250 Commission, Responses to the consultation on Package Travel Directive 90/314, March 
2010, p. 5.
251 Commission, Proposal for a new package travel directive, COM(2013) 512, p. 26 (Art. 12). 
Here no longer mention is made to the absence of fault as a reason for not incurring liabil-
ity, but there are other exonerating circumstances. According to the Commission’s pro-
posal (p. 9), the underlying principles remain unaltered, while certain clarifi cations are 
provided for and certain gaps are closed.
252 CoJ case C-168/00, Leitner, para. 20-24.
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5.4.3. Summary
186. The Product Liability Directive, which came about after a long and 
complex legislative process, lays down the principle of no-fault (‘strict’) lia-
bility of a producer of defective products. This means that, for a private 
party to obtain compensation, it only needs to prove (and presumably first 
submit) that there is the damage, a defect and a causal relationship between 
the two – but not that the producer was at fault. The directive requires the 
compensation of damage caused by death or by personal injuries and dam-
age to property other than the product itself, with a lower threshold of € 500. 
Whereas under these two heads of damages the compensation must be full 
and proper, the compensation of non-material damage is expressly left to be 
settled by national law. The ‘strictness’ of the resulting liability under this 
directive is however significantly limited and moderated, notably by the 
possibility of a development risk defence, the establishment of limitation 
and expiry periods as well as an (optional) financial ceiling. Despite the 
adoption of the Product Liability Directive, at national level the relevant 
rules continue to differ significantly. Moreover, although much debated, 
relatively few cases are brought under this directive. To date, the Commis-
sion has nonetheless rejected suggestions to propose amending it. While a 
proposed parallel directive on the liability of suppliers of services has never 
been adopted, especially the Travel Package Directive contains liability rules 
that are to some extent comparable.
5.5. Other enforcement issues
Notwithstanding the range of legislative measures discussed in the preced-
ing sections, the Commission held in 2007 that enforcement and redress 
remained priority areas for further action in the field of EU consumer pro-
tection law.253 Generally speaking, what appears to be emerging is a partial 
move away from the dominant ‘corporatist’ approach that underlies the reli-
ance on actions for injunctions brought by representative organisations, as 
provided for in the Consumer Injunctions Directive and numerous other 
directives.254  In 2006 the Commission suggested providing for a set of gen-
eral contractual remedies, including a right to terminate the contract, and a 
general right to damages.255 These suggestions proved controversial how-
ever. The European Parliament argued against any such further-going EU 
measures, submitting that these issues are generally best left to be settled 
253 Commission, Communication on the EU consumer policy strategy 2007-2013, COM(2007) 
99, pp. 8 and 10-11.
254 Poncibò (2009), pp. 293 and 306 respectively. See section 5.2 above.
255 Commission, Green paper on the review of the consumer acquis, COM(2006) 744, 
pp. 22-23 and 30.
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under national law, whereas Member States proved to be divided.256 The 
rather modest provisions on these points that the Commission eventually 
included in its subsequent proposal for the Consumer Rights Directive were 
deleted by the EU legislature.257 More recent developments tend to concen-
trate mainly on the specific issues of facilitating collective redress actions by 
private parties, promoting alternative dispute resolution and ensuring 
stronger public enforcement.258 These three topics are discussed below.
5.5.1. Collective redress
187. As was noted earlier, already in the 1980s collective redress in con-
sumer cases was identified as an area where EU legislative action might 
need to be taken.259 However only in more recent years did this topic re-
appear on the EU’s law-making agenda, in particular through the Commis-
sion’s 2008 green paper on collective redress.260 At the heart of this discus-
sion lies the concern that certain infringements of EU law – notably, but not 
exclusively, consumer protection law – may lead to harm that, on the indi-
vidual level, is comparatively modest in monetary terms, but that, taken 
together, may have significant negative consequences, including the distor-
tion of the market. Without specific measures, in such a case a typical indi-
vidual consumer is likely to decide against initiating legal proceedings, con-
sidering the efforts, litigation costs, complexities and uncertainties involved 
doing so, which are likely to outweigh the possible gains even if those pro-
ceedings result in a favourable outcome. This is known as the ‘rational apa-
thy’ of the private parties concerned. As a consequence the infringement in 
question can remain unaddressed, the damage uncompensated and the 
infringed provision ineffective, thus leading to ‘under-enforcement’.261 
Where the aggrieved individual private parties nevertheless do decide to 
initiate legal proceedings, reasons of procedural efficiency and consistency 
may also argue in favour of treating these claims collectively, rather than 
adjudicating each of them separately.
The perceived problem of rational apathy can be tackled in various man-
ners. Public enforcement could be strengthened for example.262 One could 
also seek to reduce the costs, risks and complexities of the private parties 
concerned when they act individually. Certain measures to this effect have 
256 Commission, Report on the outcome of the public consultation on the review of the con-
sumer acquis, 2007, pp. 10-11; Study Civic Consulting (2007), pp. 14-15 and 85-90.
257 Commission, Proposal for Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83, COM(2008) 614, in par-
ticular pp. 30-32 (Art. 25 and 27).
258 Cf. Commission, Communication on the enforcement of the consumer acquis, 
COM(2009) 330, p. 3.
259 See para. 152 above.
260 Commission, Green paper on consumer collective redress, COM(2008) 794.
261 Cf. Loos (2011), p. 487.
262 As regards the public enforcement of EU consumer protection law, see subsection 5.5.3 
below.
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already been taken at EU level, notably through ensuring the availability of 
legal aid and simplified small claims procedures.263 Another possible man-
ner is facilitating collective redress. In this context this latter term encom-
passes any mechanism that may accomplish the cessation or prevention of 
unlawful business practices that affect a multitude of applicants or the com-
pensation for the harm caused by such practices.264 Accordingly the focus is 
typically on two remedies, i.e. (prohibitive) injunctions and actions for dam-
ages. In the EU’s terminology the term ‘collective redress’ generally covers 
cases where several individual claims are bundled in one single claim (‘col-
lective action’) as well actions brought by certain third parties (e.g. consum-
er associations, other non-governmental organisations, an Ombudsman) on 
behalf of the parties that actually suffered harm without the latter being 
party to the proceedings themselves (‘representative action’).265
188. The problem analysis set out in the abovementioned 2008 green paper 
relied mainly on two studies.266 Both highlighted that at national level the 
relevant legal environment tends to be very dynamic and very diverse. In 
2008 13 Member States had some form of collective redress mechanism in 
place. A total of 326 ‘consumer-relevant’ collective redress cases had been 
documented.267 It was found that the existing collective redress mecha-
nisms had not led to unreasonable costs or other disproportionate negative 
consequences for business, whereas they did have an added-value for con-
sumers’ access to justice. Their costs were identified as the main potential 
obstacle preventing consumers from obtaining satisfactory redress in mass 
cases, followed by formal requirements, length of judicial proceedings, lack 
of awareness and information, as well as the lack of any collective redress 
mechanisms in certain Member States. These obstacles were said to lead to 
significant adverse immediate economic consequences for consumers and 
structural effects on consumer markets, even more so in cross-border situ-
ations. Yet the lack of collective redress mechanisms in 14 Member States 
led only to a very modest loss in consumer welfare (in total € 2,1 million 
per year). Consumers were further found to be generally not motivated to 
participate in ‘opt-in’ group actions, whereby they expressly need to sig-
263 Legal Aid Directive 2003/8 and Small Claims Regulation 861/2007.
264 Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective redress, 
SEC(2011) 173, p. 3.
265 See e.g. Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 18-22. Actions by qualifi ed 
entities under Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, discussed in subsection 5.2.1 
above, are thus representative actions.
266 Study Civic Consulting (2008a); Study Civic Consulting (2008b). See also European Par-
liament, Study on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012.
267 The period under consideration covered roughly the decade up to 2008. A clear majority 
of these cases came from just one Member State (namely France; 196 cases). The three 
most ‘productive’ Member States (France, Germany and Spain) together accounted for 
almost 85% of all documented cases.
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nal their willingness to participate in the collective redress proceedings, in 
case of large-scale low-value damage. No significant deterrent effect was 
observed as a result of collective redress mechanisms, unless where col-
lective actions receive particular media attention. The amount of awarded 
damages appeared a less important factor in this regard. Finally, the impact 
on trade and competition between Member States of the differing national 
approaches was said to remain very modest, although this might change 
depending on future developments.
189. The Commission found this existing situation unsatisfactory.268 It 
therefore embarked on a consultation process with a view to establishing 
whether and if so, which measures ought to be taken at EU level in relation 
to collective redress. According to the 2008 green paper, the areas of particu-
lar attention included the financing of procedures, the issue which parties 
are to have legal standing to initiate proceedings, the question of whether 
collective redress procedure should have an ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ character 
(in the latter case, the consumer’s participation is presumed, unless he 
expressly indicates otherwise) and how to distribute the compensation 
obtained.269 Here it was further stated that “elements which are said to encour-
age a litigation culture such as is said to exist in some non-European countries, 
such as punitive damages, contingency fees and other elements” should be avoid-
ed.270 In 2011 a second round of consultation aimed at identifying common 
legal principles on collective redress and examining how these principles 
could fit into the EU legal system and the domestic legal orders of the Mem-
ber States, so as to “guide any possible initiative for collective redress in 
legislation”.271 Notably this second consultation sought to ensure a ‘coherent’ 
(or ‘horizontal’) approach. This refers to a possible initiative that is not lim-
ited to infringements of EU consumer protection law, but that would instead 
apply across the board, i.e. in principle in any field of EU law. Infringements 
of EU competition law, which had initially been excluded, would therefore 
268 Commission, Green paper on consumer collective redress, COM(2008) 794, pp. 3-7.
269 On the issues that can arise in relation to opt-in and opt-out models of collective redress 
(as well as collective redress generally), see also para. 445 below.
270 Commission, Green paper on consumer collective redress, COM(2008) 794, pp. 12-14. The 
term ‘contingency fees’ refers to lawyers’ fees that are granted as a percentage of the 
damages awarded. Cf. Civil Consulting (2008b), p. 54.
271 Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective redress, 
SEC(2011) 173, p. 5. The following principles were mentioned: (i) effective and effi cient 
redress; (ii) the importance of information and the role of representative entities; (iii) 
need to take account of collective consensual resolution as a means of alternative dispute 
resolution; (iv) strong safeguards to avoid abusive litigation; (v) appropriate fi nancing 
mechanisms, notably for citizens and small and medium-sized enterprises; and (vi) effec-
tive enforcement across the EU. See also Commission, Responses to the collective redress 
benchmark consultation, 2008.
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also be covered.272 This is in line with the situation in most Member States 
that provide for collective redress mechanisms.273
The responses to these consultations indicated that views on the pos-
sibility of EU legislative action relating to collective redress tend to differ 
considerably.274 Broadly speaking, consumer associations expressed their sup-
port for such an initiative. They pointed to the difficulties that consumers 
were said to encounter in obtaining effective redress and the expected posi-
tive effects in terms of compliance and equal treatment. Representatives of 
business in contrast generally took a negative view. These parties submitted 
that the existence of an enforcement problem with a European dimension 
had not been demonstrated and warned against creating an ‘US-style’ liti-
gation culture. Many legal practitioners and academics expressed doubts 
as to whether a sufficient legal basis could be found in the EU Treaties, in 
particular if such action were to extend to situations without a clear cross-
border dimension. The positions taken by the public authorities that respond-
ed largely echoed these diverging views. A majority supported introducing 
new EU level mechanisms for collective redress, as these were expected to 
have beneficial effects on the enforcement of substantive law, the protection 
of consumers’ rights, the right to equal access to justice and legal certainty. 
Some also thought that such measures could serve as a deterrent. Other 
respondents, including for instance the German government, expressed 
doubts however as regard the need and added-value of EU action. Concerns 
related to legal basis and subsidiarity issues were also voiced, in particular 
in case of a ‘horizontal’ approach. At the same time many noted that a sec-
tor-specific approach would be detrimental to the internal cohesion of the 
national legal systems of civil procedure. A great majority of public authori-
ties also cautioned against creating a ‘claims culture’. Making provision for 
punitive damages or contingency fees was almost unanimously opposed. 
The ‘loser pays’ principle for the allocation of legal costs and discretion 
for the judge on points such as admissibility were mentioned as important 
safeguards in this respect. The European Parliament found that possibilities 
for injunctive relief should be improved. It also argued that any possible 
legislative initiative should be of horizontal application and be based on 
an ‘opt-in’ approach, that there should not be an obligation for defendants 
to disclose relevant evidence and information (‘discovery’), that punitive 
272 Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective redress, 
SEC(2011) 173, p. 12. On the initial exclusion of competition law infringements, see Com-
mission, Green paper on consumer collective redress, COM(2008) 794, p. 3.
273 See European Parliament, Study on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 19; Buc-
cirossi & Carpagnano, p. 4.
274 See Commission, Responses to the consultation on consumer collective redress, 2009; 
Commission, Responses to the hearing on collective redress, October 2011; Commission, 
Responses to the consultation and hearing on collective redress, October 2011.
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damages should be prohibited and that the allocation of legal costs should 
be left to be settled in accordance with the applicable national law.275
190. In 2013 the foregoing cumulated in the adoption of Commission Recom-
mendation 2013/396 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collec-
tive redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union law (‘Collective Redress Recommendation’).276 Its 
aim is to facilitate access to justice, stop illegal practices and enable injured 
private parties to obtain compensation in mass harm situations caused by 
violations of rights granted under EU law, while ensuring appropriate pro-
cedural safeguards to avoid abusive litigation.277 The scope of this recom-
mendation is consequently truly ‘horizontal’, in that the recommendation 
covers in principle all fields of EU law. Expressly mentioned are, besides 
consumer protection law, EU law on competition, environment protection, 
protection of personal data, financial services and investor protection.278 It 
moreover sets the threshold for something being considered a ‘mass harm 
situation’ rather low, as this is understood to cover any situation where two 
or more persons claim to have suffered harm causing damage resulting from 
the same illegal activity.279
The Collective Redress Recommendation states that all Member States 
should have collective redress mechanisms at national level for both injunc-
tive and compensatory relief in accordance with the basic principles laid down 
therein.280 Such mechanisms can cover group actions as well as representative 
actions.281 In the latter case actions can be brought by (non-profit) representa-
tive entities, either designated in advance or certified on an ad hoc basis and/
or by certain public authorities.282 In cross-border situations the bringing of 
a single action in a single forum should not be prevented and representatives 
entities designated in advance should also have legal standing in other Mem-
ber States.283 Other recommendations relate to the allocation of legal costs 
(‘loser pays’ principle; contingency fees in principle prohibited) and fund-
ing (transparency, conditions for third party financing, as a general rule no 
275 European Parliament, Resolution on towards a coherent European approach to collective 
redress, P7_TA(2012)0021.
276 Commission, Recommendation 2013/396/EU on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union law, OJ 2013, L 201/60. See also Commission, Communica-
tion towards a European horizontal framework for collective redress, COM(2013) 401. 
For a (critical) discussion, see Hodges (2013), p. 67. On this recommendation, see also 
Stadler (2013a), p. 483; Benöhr (2014), p. 243; Tzakas (2014), p. 225.
277 Point 1 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
278 Recital 7 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
279 Point 3(b) Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
280 Point 2 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
281 Recital 17 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
282 Points 4, 6 and 7 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
283 Points 17 and 18 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
para. 191 Chapter 5. Consumer protection law p. 197
remuneration related to damages award).284 Particularly as regards injunctive 
collective redress it is said that such actions should be treated with all due 
expediency, where appropriate by way of summary proceedings.285 Sanc-
tions are recommended against the losing defendant with a view to ensuring 
compliance with the court’s order, including the payment of a fixed amount 
per day’s delay.286 As to the recommendations that particularly relate to com-
pensatory collective redress, here the general rule is the ‘opt-in’ approach, as 
explained above.287 Alternative dispute resolution and out-of-court settle-
ments are to be encouraged in this connection, but not imposed.288 Limitation 
periods should be suspended during any such attempt to resolve the dispute 
consensually, whereas it is also said that the binding outcome thereof should 
be verified by the courts.289 According to the recommendation, punitive dam-
ages should be prohibited and collective redress actions should normally 
only start after the conclusion of any public enforcement proceedings.290
191. The recommendation specifies that the Member States should imple-
ment the principles set out therein within two years from its adoption, i.e. 
by June 2015.291 Whereas this instrument can certainly have an influence in 
practice, it is important to note however that in the EU legal order a recom-
mendation has no binding force.292 The Court of Justice has clarified that 
recommendations are not capable of creating rights on which private parties 
can rely before national courts.293 But it also insists that recommendations 
“are not without any legal effect” and that “national courts are bound to take them 
into consideration in order to decide disputes brought before them, in particular 
where such recommendations cast light on the interpretation of national measures 
adopted in order to implement them or where they are designed to supplement bind-
ing provisions of EU law”.294 Recommendations are thus a ‘soft law’ instru-
ment of a particular sort. That being so, it remains to be seen to which extent 
the Collective Redress Recommendation will help to achieve the aforemen-
tioned objectives. The Commission committed to evaluating its impact after 
four years and assessing whether any further measures – including legally 
binding legislative measures – should be proposed.295
284 Points 13-16, 29-30 and 32 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. The latter 
points only relate to compensatory collective redress.
285 Point 19 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
286 Point 20 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
287 Point 21-24 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See para. 189 above.
288 Points 25-26 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
289 Points 27-28 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
290 Points 31 and 33-34 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
291 Point 38 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
292 Art. 288 TFEU. Art. 292 TFEU empowers the Commission to adopt recommendations.
293 See e.g. CoJ joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini, para. 40.
294 Ibid.
295 Point 41 and recital 26 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
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5.5.2. Alternative dispute resolution
192. The second more recent enforcement-related development concerns 
efforts to facilitate alternative dispute resolution in consumer protection cases. 
This refers to the out-of-court resolution of disputes arising between con-
sumers and undertakings through the intervention of an external entity of 
some sort. It encompasses mediation procedures as well as non-judicial pro-
cedures of an adjudicatory nature, such as procedures before complaint 
boards, arbitration and conciliation. In this context direct negotiations 
between the parties and internal complaint handling are not covered by the 
term alternative dispute resolution.296 This development overlaps in part 
with the one discussed in the previous subsection, given that, as was noted 
above, alternative dispute resolution is seen as one of the means to facilitate 
collective redress, although here the emphasis is on individual consumer 
cases.
193. Studies carried out in the second half of the 2000s found that alterna-
tive dispute resolution can offer a low cost and speedy means for settling con-
sumer disputes.297 In practice this often does not cost more than € 50, while 
taking on average 90 days to conclude. It was also observed in these studies 
that the vast majority of existing arrangements at the national level are vol-
untary in nature. Alternative dispute resolution tends to be often and 
increasingly used across the EU, but only to a limited extent for collective or 
cross-border cases. The diversity of existing mechanisms was found to be 
high however, inter alia as regards the composition of the external entity 
involved and the effects of the positions it takes. The shortcomings identi-
fied include the generally very limited awareness of the availability of such 
mechanisms and gaps in their coverage. Funding was also found to be a 
sensitive issue. Consultations of stakeholders revealed that, certainly as 
compared to the issue of collective redress discussed in the previous subsec-
tion, the facilitation of alternative dispute resolution in consumer cases is 
not particularly controversial.298 According to the Commission, the need to 
further develop it was generally acknowledged, a majority of the respon-
dents also supporting the idea of the EU taking action on this point.299
296 Commission, Proposal for Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11, COM(2011) 793, pp. 2 
and 4.
297 Study University of Leuven (2007); Study Civic Consulting (2009). See also European 
Parliament, Study on cross-border alternative dispute resolution in the EU, June 2011.
298 Commission, Consultation paper on the use of alternative dispute resolution, 2011.
299 Commission, Proposal for Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11, COM(2011) 793, p. 3. On 
the legal effects of recommendations, see para. 191 above.
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Over the years certain measures to encourage and facilitate alternative 
dispute resolution have already been enacted at EU level, including several 
Commission recommendations.300 Certain legislative measures have also 
been taken, such as Directive 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in 
civil and commercial matters (‘Mediation Directive’) and the inclusion of 
specific provisions in several consumer protection directives, although the 
latter tend to be limited in scope and detail.301 On the back of the aforemen-
tioned studies and consultations, the Commission considered it necessary to 
address this issue in a more general manner. This should be understood 
against the background of an effort to improve the functioning of the inter-
nal market at retail level.302 As the Commission explained, considering that 
consumers tend to be concerned about difficulties relating to the resolution 
of disputes when buying cross-border and that a majority of consumer com-
plaints currently remain unresolved, alternative dispute resolution proce-
dures can be a means to empower consumers and put them at the heart of 
the EU’s internal market.303
194. The EU legislature has since adopted, in 2013, Directive 2013/11 
on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes (‘Consumer ADR 
Directive’).304 This directive seeks to ensure, in a nutshell, that EU wide in 
all economic sectors alternative dispute resolution procedures are available 
300 Commission, Recommendation 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the bodies 
responsible for out-of-court settlement of disputes, OJ 1998, L 115/31; Commission, Rec-
ommendation 2001/310/EC on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the 
consensual resolution of consumer disputes, OJ 2011, L 109/56. See also Commission, 
Recommendation 2010/304/EC on the use of a harmonised methodology for classifying 
and reporting consumer complaints and enquiries, OJ 2010, L 136/1. Reference can fur-
ther be made to the existence of ECC-Net, an EU-wide network of European consumer 
centres that seek to inform consumers about their right and assist them in the resolution 
of disputes in cross-border cases. See further http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/
about_ecc_en.htm. FIN-Net does something similar in relation to fi nancial services. See 
further  http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/about_ecc_en.htm.
301 Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial mat-
ters, OJ 2008, L 136/3. Concerning the said individual directives, see e.g. Art. 24 Con-
sumer Credit Directive 2008/48.
302 Cf. Commission, Communication on a digital agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245, p. 13; 
Commission, Communication on a Single Market Act, COM(2011) 206, p. 9.
303 Commission, Communication on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes in 
the single market, COM(2011) 791, pp. 2-3.
304 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, OJ 2013, 
L 165/63. For a (critical) assessment of this directive, see Wagner (2014), p. 165. Together 
with this directive a complementary act was adopted, which is specifi cally concerned 
with the resolution of consumer disputes in the online sphere, i.e. Regulation (EU) No 
524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes, OJ 2013, L 165/1 (‘Con-
sumer ODR Regulation’). In this connection, see also the draft procedural rules on online 
dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce transactions, established in the 
context of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (Uncitral), available via www.
uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/working_groups/3online_dispute_resolution.
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for consumer disputes. These procedures are to be used in principle on a 
voluntary basis.305 At the heart of these procedures are alternative dispute 
resolution entities which seek to propose or impose a solution or to bring 
together the parties concerned with the aim of facilitating a solution to both 
domestic and cross-border consumer disputes.306 The directive provides 
that these procedures should be easily accessible and that certain common 
quality requirements are to be respected, in terms of expertise, indepen-
dence, impartiality, transparency and effectiveness.307 During an attempt to 
settle out-of-court a dispute, any applicable limitation and prescription 
period for initiating legal proceedings is to be suspended.308 Rules are fur-
ther set out as regards informing and where necessary assisting consumers 
and as regards the cooperation between the abovementioned entities 
amongst themselves and with the competent public enforcement authori-
ties that the Member States must designate under this directive.309 The lat-
ter have as their main task the supervision of those entities, including the 
verification of compliance with the said quality requirements and the cre-
ation of a list of compliant entities.310 The directive is to be transposed into 
national law by July 2015.311
5.5.3. Public enforcement
195. Although there are significant differences between Member States, 
EU-wide public enforcement has traditionally not occupied a central position 
in relation to consumer protection law. By 2003 several Member States had 
still not established any form of public authority with specific consumer 
protection enforcement responsibilities.312 They were not obliged to do so 
under EU law. Most acts of substantive EU consumer protection law only set 
out the general and rather rudimentary obligation for the Member States to 
ensure the availability of effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties to 
address infringements.313 It has been seen earlier that under the Consumer 
Injunctions Directive public bodies can act as a ‘qualified entity’ and initiate 
legal proceedings in that capacity.314 Yet this does not concern what is nor-
mally understood by public enforcement.315 Moreover, even if this possibil-
ity has reportedly contributed to public bodies playing an increasingly 
305 Art. 1 Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11.
306 Art. 2(1) Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11.
307 Art. 5-11 Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11.
308 Art. 12 Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11.
309 Art. 13-18 Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11.
310 Art. 19-20 Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11.
311 Art. 25(1) Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11.
312 Commission, Proposal for CPC Regulation 2006/2004, COM(2003) 443.
313 E.g. Art. 11 Distance Marketing Directive 2002/65; Art. 13 Unfair Practices Directive 
2005/29; Art. 24 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83. See also subsection 2.4.2 above.
314 See para. 154 above.
315 See para. 22 above.
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important role in the enforcement of consumer protection law, neither is 
there an obligation under EU law to provide for the involvement of public 
authorities in this respect.316
196. Especially as from the early 2000s onwards the above picture began to 
change however. Since then stronger emphasis has been placed on the public 
enforcement of the EU consumer protection rules. The Commission’s overall 
policy is now said to be to push Member States to establish public enforce-
ment authorities charged with enforcing EU consumer protection law.317 
This is illustrated by the fact that the Commission’s 2009 communication on 
the enforcement of the EU consumer protection rules is concerned almost 
exclusively with public enforcement. There it is stated that action by public 
authorities “occupies a central role, because it underpins all other strategies and is 
a prerequisite for their success”.318 This increased attention at EU level for the 
public enforcement of EU consumer protection law is illustrated by the fol-
lowing two specific developments.
In the first place, measures related to public enforcement can be found 
in certain specific EU legal acts, especially those relating to product safety. 
Most notably the 2001 Product Safety Directive specifies not only that Mem-
ber States must ensure that producers and distributors comply with the sub-
stantive rules at issue. It also stipulates that public authorities must be estab-
lished at national level to monitor compliance.319 These public authorities 
are charged with taking certain specified measures where necessary, such as 
checks, warnings or product recalls. The Commission must be informed 
when these measures are taken. Under this directive a network has also 
been established to facilitate cooperation between all public authorities 
involved. In addition it empowers the Commission to intervene directly by 
requiring the national authorities concerned to take one of the said specified 
measures. This possibility is subject to strict conditions and a degree of over-
view by the Member States, which is testimony to the controversial nature of 
316 Cf. Study University of Leuven (2007), p. 331.
317 Micklitz & Reich (2009), p. 514. See also Micklitz (2011a), p. 581.
318 Commission, Communication on the enforcement of the consumer acquis, COM(2009) 
330, p. 2. See e.g. also Commission, Green paper on European consumer protection, 
COM(2001) 531. The chapter of this latter document dealing with enforcement (pp. 16-18) 
is dedicated almost exclusively with public enforcement. See also Commission, Commu-
nication on the follow-up to the green paper on EU consumer protection, COM(2002) 289. 
Cf. Cafaggi & Micklitz (2009), p. 405.
319 Chapters IV and V Product Safety Directive 2001/95. See also chapter IV Toy Safety 
Directive 2009/48.
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this mechanism, at least at the time of its adoption.320 This system is comple-
mented by the framework established under Regulation 765/2008 setting 
out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to 
the marketing of products.321 As part of this framework Member States must 
establish public authorities charged with certain market surveillance and 
intervention tasks. These measures are considered to have had a mostly pos-
itive effect, although certain shortcomings have also been observed.322 
Against this background the Commission published in 2013 its ‘product 
safety and market surveillance package’.323 An important element of this 
package is a proposal for a new regulation that would in effect merge the 
abovementioned regimes, so as to simplify the applicable market surveil-
lance rules.324
In the second place, of broader importance is Regulation 2006/2004 on 
consumer protection cooperation (‘CPC Regulation’).325 This regulation seeks 
to tackle similar issues as the Consumer Injunctions Directive, discussed 
earlier, namely infringements of EU consumer protection legislation with 
a cross-border dimension.326 But unlike this directive, the CPC Regulation 
relies primarily on ‘classic’ public enforcement means, even if, in the course 
320 As regards these conditions, there must be a ‘serious risk’ to the health or safety of con-
sumers in various Member States. Three specifi c (cumulative) conditions must further 
have been met, in effect providing that Commission intervention is a last resort in cases 
with an EU dimension. In addition the Member States, and where relevant also an EU 
scientifi c committee, must be consulted before any decision can be taken. See further 
Weatherill (2005), pp. 209 and 212-213. The controversial nature of this direct intervention 
mechanism is underlined by the (unsuccessful) legal challenge. See CoJ case C-359/92, 
Germany v. Council, para. 37.
321 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market 
surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 
339/93, OJ 2008, L 218/30 (see its chapter III).
322 Cf. Commission, Report on Product Safety Directive 2001/95, COM(2008) 905; Commis-
sion, Responses to the consultation on Product Safety Directive 2001/95, November 2010. 
These shortcomings include a lack of resources on the side of the competent national 
authorities, diffi culties related to the cooperation between these authorities and regula-
tory fragmentation.
323 See Commission, Communication on more product safety and better market surveillance 
in the single market for products, COM(2013) 74. This package includes Commission, 
Proposal for a regulation on consumer product safety, COM(2013) 78.
324 Commission, Proposal for a regulation on market surveillance of products, COM(2013) 
75.
325 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible 
for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, OJ 2004, L 364/1. On the functioning of 
this regulation, see Study Civic Consulting, Van Dijk & ICF GHK (2012).
326 Accordingly the provisions of CPC Regulation 2006/2004 on mutual assistance (chapters 
II and III) cover ‘intra-EU infringements’, i.e. acts or omissions contrary to the legislation 
covered that harms or is likely to harm the collective interests of consumers residing in a 
Member State other than the one where the act or omission took place or originated, 
where the infringing undertaking is established or where relevant evidence or assets can 
be found. Cf. Art. 2(1) and 3(b) CPC Regulation 2006/2004. On Consumer Injunctions 
Directive 2009/22, see section 5.2 above. Recital 14 and Art. 2(5) CPC Regulation 
2006/2004 clarify that this directive and this regulation are meant to apply in parallel.
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of the legislative process, various clauses allowing Member States a con-
siderable degree of flexibility were introduced.327 In a nutshell, it obliges 
Member States to designate public authorities with specific responsibili-
ties to enforce the consumer protection rules set out in its annex.328 It also 
specifies the powers that these authorities must possess. They must inter 
alia be empowered to request information from any person, carry out on-
site inspections and require the cessation or prohibition of infringing activi-
ties.329 The CPC Regulation further aims to facilitate cooperation between 
these authorities, for instance as regards the exchange of information and 
the provision of assistance in enforcement actions. The Commission has cer-
tain tasks at the central level, including maintaining a database with infor-
mation concerning the various actions taken under this regulation.330 Provi-
sion is also made for more general coordination and cooperation activities 
between all public authorities concerned.331 These authorities cooperate in 
the CPC Network.332
197. As a final point in relation to public enforcement, it can be noted that 
some Member States (e.g. France) provide for criminal sanctions for certain 
infringements of consumer protection legislation.333 In addition to the ‘stan-
dard’ clause on effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, the Toy 
Safety Directive stipulates that these penalties “may include criminal sanctions 
for serious infringements”.334 Provisions of this kind have also been included 
in the aforementioned Commission proposals relating to product safety.335 
However, beyond these rather basic references, which moreover still leave it 
to the Member States to decide whether or not they wish to provide for pen-
alties of this kind, no provision is made regarding criminal sanctions under 
EU law.
327 In particular, pursuant to Art. 4(2) and (4) CPC Regulation 2006/2004 other public or 
non-public bodies may also be designated in certain cases and the competent national 
authorities may exercise their powers either directly under their own authority or under 
the supervision of the judicial authorities, or by application to the competent courts. Cf. 
Commission, Proposal for CPC Regulation 2006/2004, COM(2003) 443; Council, doc. 
7073/04; European Parliament, Resolution on the proposal for CPC Regulation 
2006/2004, P5_TA(2004)0296.
328 Art. 3(a) and (c) and Art. 4(1) CPC Regulation 2006/2004.
329 Art. 4(3) and (6) CPC Regulation 2006/2004.
330 Art. 10 CPC Regulation 2006/2004.
331 Art. 16-17 CPC Regulation 2006/2004.
332 Implementing rules concerning this cooperation have been laid down in Commission 
Decision 2007/76/EC implementing Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws as 
regards mutual assistance, OJ 2007, L 32/192.
333 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), p. 610; Cafaggi & Micklitz (2009), p. 408; Azar-Baud 
(2010), p. 204.
334 Art. 51 Toy Safety Directive 2009/48.
335 E.g. Commission, Proposal for a regulation on consumer product safety, COM(2013) 78, 
p. 21 (Art. 18(2)).
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5.5.4. Summary
198. This final section of chapter 5 has made it clear that, especially in 
recent years, the private enforcement-related measures set out in the legisla-
tion discussed earlier in this chapter have been complemented by a number 
of other measures. These include, in the first place, the adoption in 2013 of 
the Commission’s Collective Redress Recommendation. EU involvement 
with this form of redress having proved to be controversial, this document 
only gives non-legally binding guidance. It seeks to facilitate collective 
actions for injunctions or damages for infringements of EU consumer pro-
tection law as well as other EU law. In the second place, the 2013 Consumer 
ADR Directive sets out common rules on alternative dispute resolution in 
consumer protection cases. Lastly, although public enforcement has tradi-
tionally played only a limited role in this field, that has changed more 
recently. Particularly under the 2004 CPC Regulation the Member States 
must establish certain public enforcement mechanisms to address infringe-
ments of EU consumer protection law.
This final chapter of part B is concerned with the private enforcement-relat-
ed developments regarding EU competition law.1 In this field both the old-
est as well as the most recent EU legislative measures of the type under 
consideration in this study can be found. Since the very beginning of EU law 
the EU Treaties contain an important contractual remedy, laid down in Arti-
cle 101(2) TFEU. And in 2014 the EU legislature reached agreement on the 
Competition Damages Directive. A discussion of these two measures, and in 
particular this directive, lies at the heart of this chapter. In the following this 
field of law is first introduced. Discussed are the relevant rules of substan-
tive EU competition law and their application, the infringements of those 
rules and the damage caused as a consequence thereof, as well as the said 
contractual remedy. Attention then turns to the Competition Damages 
Directive. First the road towards the adoption of this directive is outlined in 
some detail, considering its long history and the insights this offers as 
regards the coming into being of this recent private enforcement-related act 
of secondary EU law. Next the content of this directive is analysed. In the 
final section several other issues relevant to the enforcement of EU competi-
tion law are discussed, most notably the applicable public enforcement 
mechanisms.
6.1. Introduction
This section begins with a brief outline of the main rules of substantive EU 
competition law and the rules of secondary EU law that regulate their appli-
cation. It then discusses some of the typical sorts of competition law 
infringements that are of relevance here and the damage that these infringe-
ments cause to individual parties and to society as a whole. In the last sub-
section the contractual remedy laid down in Article 101(2) TFEU is dis-
cussed.
1 Here the term ‘competition law’ is used in a narrow sense, covering the substantive rules 
laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the corresponding rules of national law. As 
such this term is used interchangeably with the term ‘antitrust law’. It excludes most 
notably the rules of EU law on state aid and merger control, set out in Art. 107-109 TFEU 
and Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertak-
ings, OJ 2004, L 24/1, respectively. On the private enforcement of these latter rules, see 
e.g. Bailey (2007), p. 101; Grzeszick (2011), p. 907; Honoré & Eram Jensen (2011), p. 265; 
Hohler (2012), p. 369.
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6.1.1. Substantive EU competition law and its application
199. The main provisions of EU competition law, set out in Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, have always played an important role in the EU’s legal order. The 
Court of Justice has held that Article 101 TFEU constitutes a fundamental 
provision that is “essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the 
[EU] and, in particular, the functioning of the internal market”.2 Already at an 
early stage the Court clarified, notably in its ruling in BRT, that Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU produce direct effects in relations between private parties and 
create rights in respect of the parties concerned that national courts must 
safeguard.3 The primary function of EU competition law is generally under-
stood to be protecting the competitive process and, in so doing, consumer 
welfare, against the background of the EU’s internal market imperative.4 
Subject to these substantive EU competition rules are ‘undertakings’, which 
term is understood to mean any entity, regardless of its legal status or the 
way it is financed, engaged in economic activity, i.e. that is offering goods or 
services on a given market.5
200. The first pillar of substantive EU competition law is Article 101 TFEU, 
which prohibits in its first paragraph agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and other concerted practices that 
may affect trade between Member States and that have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market. This article thus prohibits in particular cartels. In more con-
crete terms, it is for instance illegal under this provision for competing 
undertakings to agree between them to set prices at a certain level or to 
divide the market by restricting their respective activities to certain territo-
ries or segments.
Article 101 TFEU also reflects the thought that agreements, decisions or 
concerned practices that would normally be prohibited under its first para-
graph can in some cases have overall positive effects. One could think of cer-
tain forms of cooperation between undertakings in the field of research and 
development, the training of personnel or the distribution of their products 
or services. Article 101(3) TFEU therefore stipulates that the prohibition set 
2 CoJ case 126/97, Eco Swiss, para. 36. This statement was made with reference to Art. 3(1)
(g) EC, as it stood before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Cf. Art. 3(1)(b) 
TFEU, where it is stipulated that the EU has exclusive competence as regards the estab-
lishment of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.
3 CoJ case 127/73, BRT, para. 16; GC case T-458/04, Au Lys de France, para. 70.
4 Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) EC, OJ 2004, C 101/97, 
para. 13. See e.g. also Monti (2003), p. 3; C. Ehlermann (2008), p. x; Komninos (2008), 
p. 190; Whish & Bailey (2012), pp. 19-24. This does not mean however that opinions can-
not differ as to how ‘consumer welfare’ is to be understood in this connection. See e.g. 
Ottervanger (2010).
5 E.g. CoJ case C-41/90, Höfner, para. 21; CoJ joined cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavlov, 
para. 75.
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out in the first paragraph may be “declared inapplicable”. This possibility is 
subject to the conditions that the cooperation leads to efficiency gains, that 
consumers get a fair share of the resulting benefits, that the restriction of 
competition is indispensable to achieve these benefits and that competition 
is not entirely eliminated.6
201. The second cornerstone of substantive EU competition law is Article 
102 TFEU. Whereas Article 101 typically covers coordinated behaviour 
between several undertakings, Article 102 covers unilateral anti-competitive 
behaviour by one undertaking alone.7 More specifically, it prohibits under-
takings from abusing a dominant position within the internal market or a 
substantial part thereof, in so far as this may affect trade between Member 
States. This article is thus concerned with undertakings having a particular 
strong position on the relevant market, possibly (but not necessarily) a 
monopoly. Having such a dominant position is, in and by itself, not prohib-
ited under Article 102 TFEU; what is not allowed is the abuse of such a posi-
tion.
Article 102 TFEU does not include a provision that is equivalent to Arti-
cle 101(3) TFEU, mentioned above. In this case the prohibition can therefore 
not be declared inapplicable where the behaviour in question is deemed to 
have overall beneficial effects. However, despite the absence of such an 
‘Article 102(3)’, the Court of Justice has made it clear that there is scope for 
an undertaking that infringed the prohibition set out in Article 102 to argue 
that its conduct is objectively necessary or that it produces substantial effi-
ciencies that outweigh any anticompetitive effects on consumers.8
202. While the abovementioned rules of primary EU law on competition 
have in substance been left unaltered since the very beginning of EU law, the 
same cannot be said of the rules of secondary EU law that regulate the appli-
cation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Regulation 1/2003 on the implementa-
tion of the EU competition rules (‘Competition Regulation’) is of particular 
importance in this regard.9 This regulation, adopted in 2003 and applicable 
as from May 2004, is the result of a fundamental reform of the previously 
existing supervision and enforcement structure.10 This “legal and cultural 
6 Cf. Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) EC, OJ 2004, C 101/97.
7 Exceptionally Art. 102 TFEU can also cover cases of ‘collective dominance’ by more than 
one undertaking. See e.g. CoJ joined cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie Mari-
time Belge.
8 See e.g. CoJ case 311/84, Centre belge d’etudes de marché, para. 26; CoJ case C-95/04 P, 
British Airways, para. 69 and 86. See also Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 EC to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, OJ 2009, C 45/7, para. 28-30.
9 Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down 
in Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ 2003, L 1/1.
10 Commission, White paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 
EC, OJ 1999, C 132/1.
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revolution”11 sought to modernise and decentralise the application of EU 
competition law. At the heart of this reform lay the manner in which Article 
101(3) TFEU is applied. Under the old system only the Commission was 
empowered to grant exemptions under this provision.12 It did so upon prior 
notification by the undertakings concerned. Undertakings could also ask the 
Commission to certify that an agreement, decision or concerted practice did 
not violate the EU competition rules. All this led to an extensive system of 
notifications of intended actions to the Commission, with a view to obtain-
ing such exemptions and clearances. In practice a parallel system of infor-
mal guidance by the Commission also developed.
The Competition Regulation takes a radically different approach. Under 
the reformed regime the Commission no longer has the exclusive power to 
grant the exemptions referred to in Article 101(3) TFEU.13 Instead each 
undertaking must in principle make its own assessment as to the compli-
ance of its behaviour with the EU competition rules, including the condi-
tions set out in this third paragraph. National competition authorities as 
well as the competent national courts are empowered to assess whether 
these rules and conditions have been complied with.14 In this respect it is 
provided that, whereas the burden of proving an infringement of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU rests on the party or authority alleging the infringement 
in question, undertakings that claim the benefit of Article 101(3) must prove 
that the conditions set out therein have been met.15 Similarly under the 
aforementioned case law relating to possible defences under Article 102 
TFEU it is for the undertaking concerned to raise this defence and to demon-
strate the existence of the facts and circumstances on which it seeks to rely in 
this connection.16
203. Especially in light of the decentralisation that it brought about, the 
Competition Regulation also contains several rules on the application and 
enforcement of EU competition law at national level. Three such rules are of 
particular relevance here. First, where the competition authorities or the 
courts of the Member States apply national competition law to agreements, 
decisions or concerted practices covered by Article 101(1) TFEU that may 
affect trade between Member States or to any abuse prohibited by Article 
102 TFEU, they must also this EU law provision in parallel.17 Second, the 
Commission and national competition authorities each have the possibility 
11 Ehlermann (2000), p. 537.
12 See Council Regulation No 17 First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty, OJ 1962, 13/204.
13 Art. 1(2) Competition Regulation 1/2003.
14 Cf. Art. 5 and 6 Competition Regulation 1/2003.
15 Art. 2 Competition Regulation 1/2003.
16 E.g. GC case T-201/04, Microsoft, para. 688. See also Commission, Guidance on the Com-
mission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 EC to abusive exclusionary con-
duct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009, C 45/7, para. 30.
17 Art. 3(1) Competition Regulation 1/2003.
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to submit, upon request or on their own initiative, amicus curiae observations 
in proceedings before the national courts relating to EU competition law.18 
The Commission is entitled to do so where the coherent application of Arti-
cles 101 and 102 TFEU so requires, regardless of whether the proceedings in 
question are of an administrative, civil or criminal nature.19 Third and final-
ly, the Competition Regulation stipulates that national courts cannot take 
decisions in respect of agreements, decisions and concerted practices that 
run counter to earlier decisions adopted by the Commission and that these 
courts must avoid giving decisions which would conflict with a decision 
contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated.20
204. Subject to the applicable rules of EU law such as the ones referred to 
above, the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at national level is in 
principle governed by the procedural rules of the Member States.21 Accord-
ingly, as confirmed in the Court of Justice’s 1995 landmark ruling in Van 
Schijndel, as a general rule, EU law does not require national courts to aban-
don the passive role assigned to them in civil proceedings in order to raise a 
point of EU competition law of their own motion (ex officio).22 But this rule is 
not without exceptions. For one thing, as was held in Van Schijndel itself, 
pursuant to the principle of equivalence an obligation of own motion judi-
cial review can exist where the court seised has an obligation or discretion to 
raise comparable points of law under national law.23 For another thing, in 
Eco Swiss, a subsequent case that concerned proceedings for the annulment 
of an arbitration award whereby national law required the court seised to 
raise certain issues of public policy (d’ordre public) of its own motion, such an 
obligation was also found to exist.24 There the Court pointed to the above-
mentioned fundamental importance attached to EU competition law, mean-
ing that it should be seen as a matter of public policy. It also noted that own 
motion judicial review ensured that preliminary questions could be referred 
to the Court of Justice, given that arbitration panels are in principle not 
allowed to do so in so far as they are not courts or tribunals within the 
meaning of Article 267 TFEU.25
18 Art. 15 Competition Regulation 1/2003. See also Commission, Cooperation notice, 
OJ 2004, C 101/54.
19 Recital 21 Competition Regulation 1/2003; Commission, Cooperation notice, OJ 2004, 
C 101/54, para. 4. Cf. CoJ case C-429/07, Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst v. X.
20 Art. 16(1) Competition Regulation 1/2003. Cf. CoJ case C-344/98, Masterfoods, para. 60. 
On the interpretation of the resulting rule, see also Opinion AG Cruz-Villalon case 
C-199/11, Otis, para. 46-47.
21 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-60/92, Otto v. Postbank, para. 14.
22 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 13-14 and 22. See also 
para. 39 above.
23 On the principle of equivalence, see subsection 2.2.1 above.
24 CoJ case 126/97, Eco Swiss, para. 40-41; CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, 
para 31.
25 See also para. 22 above.
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More recently the Court has at times stated, also in proceedings that 
did not concern the possible annulment of arbitration awards, that Arti-
cles 101 and 102 TFEU are “a matter of public policy which must be automati-
cally applied by national courts”.26 For now it remains to be clarified what is 
precisely meant by this statement. In particular, in light of the earlier Van 
Schijndel judgment and the fact that, as the Court later confirmed on another 
occasion,27 the application of the principle of equivalence was central to the 
outcome reached in Eco Swiss, it is uncertain whether this more recent case 
law should be understood as implying an obligation on national courts to 
raise of their own motion rules of EU competition law wherever relevant, 
including in situations where domestic law does not foresee such a possibil-
ity even for matters of public policy.28
6.1.2. Infringements and damage
205. Infringements of EU competition law can take many forms. Some 
infringements are the result of bona fide unawareness or misunderstanding 
of the applicable rules. Yet in many other instances the illegal anticompeti-
tive behaviour is deliberate and considerable efforts are made to conceal it.29 
Article 102 TFEU itself expressly lists various forms of forbidden abuses of a 
dominant position. This includes the undertaking concerned charging 
excessive prices, differentiating its prices between trading partners without 
objective justification or refusing to supply its products or services to certain 
customers. Article 101 TFEU in contrast does not itself cite any examples of 
forbidden behaviour. Various sorts of anticompetitive acts can be covered by 
the prohibition set out in its first paragraph. Such behaviour can take place 
in a ‘vertical’ context, i.e. between undertakings that do not operate – and 
compete – at the same level of the supply chain. By means of an example 
one could think of a so-called ‘beer tie’ agreement. Many pubs are owned by 
beer brewers and subsequently leased to a tenant. Yet it can be contrary to 
Article 101 TFEU for the lease agreement to stipulate that the tenant is 
obliged to purchase all the beer served in the pub from that brewer, thus 
excluding other brewers.
26 CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 31. See also CoJ case C-8/08, 
T-Mobile Netherlands, para. 49.
27 CoJ joined cases C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 40.
28 See also recital 1 Competition Damages Directive, where it is stated that “Articles 101 and 
102 [TFEU] are a matter of public policy”. While this statement appears to echo the above-
mentioned CoJ rulings in Manfredi and T-Mobile Netherlands, no further explanation is 
provided for in this directive. Notably, contrary those rulings, in this recital it is not stated 
that these provisions “must be automatically applied”; instead it is said that these articles 
“should be applied effectively throughout the Union”.
29 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 27, where such behaviour is observed to be “fre-
quently covert”.
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A typical example of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU for the present 
purposes is however a ‘horizontal’ cartel, whereby several undertakings 
supplying a particular product or service coordinate their market behaviour. 
Take for instance the so-called ‘elevator cartel’, which was discovered in 
2007.30 Instead of competing, the four major European manufacturers of 
elevators and escalators were found to have allocated tenders and other con-
tracts between them in several Member States, thus sharing markets and 
fixing prices in violation of the prohibition set out in Article 101(1) TFEU. 
These undertakings had also exchanged information on sales volumes and 
prices, operated a mutual compensation scheme, participated in regular 
meetings and established other contacts in order to decide on these competi-
tion restrictions and the implementation thereof. With a view to concealing 
their illegal anti-competitive behaviour, the meetings in question mostly 
took place in hotels and restaurants instead of at the premises of the under-
takings concerned. For the same reason the employees concerned regularly 
used their private and prepaid mobile phones instead of their company 
phones.
206. Infringements of the kind referred to above can cause considerable 
harm. Although the amounts at issue may vary considerably, there is 
research suggesting that nine out of ten cartels lead to an ‘overcharge’, i.e. an 
amount that is higher than what the customers of the conspiring undertak-
ings would have had to pay under normal competitive conditions.31 At mac-
ro-level, the damage caused by price-fixing and other particularly serious 
‘hard-core’32 cartels alone has been estimated to amount to somewhere 
between € 25-69 billion per year EU-wide, which corresponds to a negative 
impact on consumer welfare of around 0,2-0,55% of EU GDP.33 At the same 
time, as it stands, the chances of detecting such illegal cartels are generally 
rather low, probably no more than 10-20%.34 Acknowledging on the one 
hand that not all infringements are detected and on the other hand that also 
other infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU than the aforementioned 
‘hard-core’ cartels incur damage, foregone amounts of compensation for 
these competition law infringements have been estimated to amount to a 
total of between € 5,7 and 23,3 billion each year across the EU.35
30 See Commission, Decision C(2007) 512, Elevators and escalators cartel; GC joined cases 
T141/07, T142/07, T145/07 and T146/07, Otis; CoJ Order case C-493/11 P, United Techno-
logies; CoJ case C-199/11, Otis.
31 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 18. 
See further Study Oxera Consulting (2009), p. 91.
32 On ‘hard-core’ restrictions in the context of Art. 101(1) TFEU, see Commission, De mini-
mis notice, OJ 2001, C 368/13, para. 11.
33 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 22 (relating to EU GDP in 2011).
34 Ibid., p. 23.
35 Ibid.
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6.1.3. Article 101(2) TFEU: contractual remedy
207. Already from the very beginning of EU law an important private 
enforcement remedy has been laid down in the EU Treaties. It concerns the 
contractual remedy provided for in Article 101(2) TFEU,36 which stipulates 
that any agreement or decision prohibited under that article shall be “auto-
matically void”. This is in fact the only instance where primary EU law pro-
vides for such a measure. Article 102 TFEU does not contain a similar provi-
sion regulating the contractual consequences of an infringement of the 
prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position set out in that article.37 Nei-
ther do the EU Treaties expressly foresee a comparable remedy for infringe-
ments of other rules of substantive EU law.
The Court of Justice has clarified that this term ‘automatically void’ is an 
autonomous concept of EU law, which is intended to ensure compliance 
with the relevant substantive rules prohibiting anticompetitive cartels.38 It is 
absolute, the agreement or decision concerned having no effect either 
between the parties concerned or vis-à-vis third parties, with retro-active 
effect (ex tunc).39 Under the Court’s case law the further consequences of a 
finding of an agreement or decision being void within the meaning of Arti-
cle 101(2) TFEU are in principle to be determined in accordance with nation-
al law however. This includes the question to which extent other provisions 
of the agreement, or of related agreements, that do not in themselves imply 
a breach of the prohibition set out in this article can be severed and can con-
tinue to apply.40
208. The practical importance of the above contractual remedy especially lies 
in the fact that the agreements in question cannot be enforced in court. This 
can lead to uncertainty for the infringing undertakings concerned, which 
in turn can act as a strong disincentive for undertakings to conclude agree-
ments that may not be in conformity with the prohibition set out in this arti-
cle.41 Accordingly it “intensifies the conflicts of interests and the internal centrifu-
gal force among the participants of a cartel”.42 For instance, there is little point 
in including a ‘beer tie’ in a lease agreement for a pub, as was explained 
above, when the brewer knows that he cannot enforce that provision if the 
36 Milutinovic (2014), p. 350, considers that this is not a remedy, but rather a sanction.
37 That does not necessarily mean however that there cannot be such consequences as a 
matter of EU law. See further para. 303 below.
38 CoJ case 56/65, Société Technique Minière, p. 250.
39 CoJ case 319/82, Société de Vente de Ciments, para. 11; CoJ case 48/72, Brasserie de Haecht, 
para. 26-27; CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 22; CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, 
Manfredi, para. 57.
40 CoJ case 56/65, Société Technique Minière, p. 250; CoJ case 319/82, Société de Vente de 
Ciments, para. 11; CoJ case 10/86, VAG France, para. 14-15. See further Cauffman (2012), 
p. 95.
41 Wils (2003a), p. 474.
42 Möschel (2013), p. 2.
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pub tenant refuses to respect that contractual obligation. Likewise, under-
takings operating a cartel comparable to the aforementioned elevator cartel 
may sometimes be able to secretly divide the market, fix prices and operate 
a compensation scheme between them. But the moment one of the cartel 
members no longer respects the agreement, none of the other members can 
(threaten to) bring legal proceedings to enforce what had been agreed in 
violation of EU competition law.
Yet this remedy also has its limitations. As the above examples already 
illustrate, Article 101(2) TFEU tends to be used mainly as a ‘defensive’ 
instrument in litigation between private parties.43 That means that it is typi-
cally invoked by one of the parties to the agreement with a view to avoid 
being bound by a particular obligation resulting from the agreement in 
question (e.g. to purchase beer exclusively from one brewer or to respect 
agreed market shares). Third parties may generally have little incentive to 
bring private enforcement proceedings relying on this remedy, as they are 
not a party to the agreement and are therefore at most only indirectly affect-
ed. The foregoing also illustrates that the relevance of this contractual rem-
edy for especially the most serious (‘hard-core’) infringements of Article 
101(1) TFEU can be limited. Given the evident illegality of the scheme oper-
ated by the elevator cartel members, normally none of the undertakings con-
cerned will anyway consider enforcing the agreement in court.44 
This contractual remedy is thus of considerable practical importance, 
but it is generally not very well suited as an ‘offensive’ tool for private par-
ties wishing to address these most serious infringements.
6.2. Towards the Competition Damages Directive
The thought that the aforementioned contractual remedy laid down in Article 
101(2) TFEU might need to be complemented by other private enforcement-
related measures, provided for as a matter of secondary EU law, is far from 
new. In many respects the road towards the Competition Damages Direc-
tive had been particularly long and winding indeed. This section sketches 
the main developments that eventually led to the adoption of this directive 
in 2014. Four stages are distinguished for these purposes. First, an over-
view is given of the early developments in this regard (1960-2000). Second, 
two subsequent developments – one legislative and one jurisprudential –
are discussed, which go a long way in explaining why this subject-matter 
then re-appeared on the EU’s law-making agenda (2000-2005). Third, the 
Commission’s green paper and white paper outlining possible EU legislative 
measures in this respect are analysed, together with its following aborted 
43 Wils (2003a), pp. 474-475; Eilmansberger (2007), p. 433; Komninos (2008), p. 149; Miluti-
novic (2010), p. 144; Peyer (2012), p. 350.
44 Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 320.
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initiative to propose a directive (2005-2010). Lastly, attention is paid to subse-
quent jurisprudential developments and the Commission’s proposal for this 
directive (2010-2013).
6.2.1. Early developments (1960-2000)
209. Already in the 1960s a study was carried out that looked into the pos-
sibilities for what it now known as the private enforcement of EU competi-
tion law.45 It concluded that in all of the then six Member States private 
parties affected by a violation of the EU competition rules could take legal 
action before the national courts to obtain civil law remedies, such as dam-
ages, injunctions, periodic penalty payments and the publication of court 
judgments.46 A few years later the Commission added that actions for dam-
ages brought by private parties could provide “useful support” for the public 
enforcement of these rules, while noting that the civil law consequences, 
other than those resulting from the application of Article 101(2) TFEU, “are 
generally considered as being governed by the national laws of the Member 
States”.47
210. In the following decades this issue re-surfaced repeatedly. In par-
ticular, in the 1980s the Commission floated the idea of adopting second-
ary EU law on the private enforcement of the EU competition rules. The 
Commission’s 1983 report on competition policy noted that, while “[s]
cant use has yet been made of the possibility of actions for damages for breaches 
of the [EU] competition rules”, “[t]he Commission believes it desirable that the 
judicial enforcement of Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] should also include the 
award of damages to injured parties, because this would render [EU] law more 
effective”.48 This report indicated that the Commission was therefore look-
ing at what steps could be taken to facilitate damages actions of this kind.49
In the same period a similar point was made in various academic pub-
lications (many of them written by a Commission official).50 These publica-
tions not only set out the legal framework and highlighted some successful 
45 European Parliament, ‘Rapport fait au nom de la commission du marché intérieur ayant pour 
objet la consultation demandée à l’Assemblée parlementaire européenne par le Conseil de la Com-
munauté économique européenne sur un premier règlement d’application des articles 85 et 86 du 
traité de la C.E.E.’, doc. 104/1960-1961, cited in Milutinovic (2010), pp. 27-28.
46 Study ‘La réparation des conséquences dommageables d’une violation des articles 85 et 86 du 
traite instituant la CEE’, p. 5, cited in Temple Lang (1981), p. 338.
47 Reply to European Parliament question 519/72 from Mr Vredeling, OJ 1973, C 67/54, cit-
ed in Temple Lang (1981), p. 339.
48 Commission, Thirteenth report on competition policy, 1984, p. 136. Cf. Komninos (2008), 
p. 163.
49 Ibid.
50 Temple Lang (1981), p. 335; Jacobs (1983), p. 353; Temple Lang (1983), p. 219; Temple Lang 
(1985), p. 29; Steiner (1987), p. 102. Mr Temple Lang worked at the time for the Commis-
sion’s legal service (only one of these publications states that the opinions expressed 
there are personal).
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examples of such actions that had been brought before national courts. It 
was also suggested here that the EU should adopt a directive, with the pur-
pose of “[making] it clear that actions for compensation, declarations and injunc-
tions could be brought in national courts, harmonising national law remedies for 
breaches of [EU] antitrust law, [which] would substantially improve the general 
level of compliance with [EU] antitrust law”.51 In these publications the deter-
rent effect of these measures and the scarce manpower of the Commission 
and national authorities charged with the public enforcement of this law 
were also emphasised, noting that such a ‘decentralisation’ of EU competi-
tion law enforcement to the national courts would allow the Commission 
to focus on the more complex and particularly serious and cross-border 
cases.52
Moreover in the second half of the 1980s the Commission reportedly 
considered the possibility of proposing an EU regulation on the application 
of EU competition law by national courts. But it eventually decided against 
doing so, in light of negative reactions by legal experts of the Member 
States.53
211. Next, in the early 1990s again some relevant statements were made in 
this regard, this time in particular in relation to cases brought before the EU 
courts. For instance, the General Court touched upon this issue in passing in 
1992. It held that “among the consequences which an infringement of [Article 
101(1) TFEU] may have in civil law, only one is expressly provided for in Article 
[101(2)], namely the nullity of that agreement. The other consequences attaching to 
an infringement of Article [101 TFEU], such as the obligation to make good the 
damage caused to a third party or a possible obligation to enter into a contract […], 
are to be determined under national law“.54 This shows that here the emphasis 
was still firmly on the private enforcement possibilities under national law, 
as was the case in the aforementioned Commission statements made in the 
1960s.
In 1993 Advocate General Van Gerven suggested however an altogether 
different approach in his opinion in the Banks case.55 Building on the Court’s 
1991 Francovich ruling relating to the liability of Member States for infringe-
ments of EU law, discussed earlier,56 he argued that – even in the absence of 
any specific rules of secondary EU law – such actions for damages are pri-
marily a matter of EU law. In an extensive opinion it was said that “the gen-
eral basis established by the Court in the Francovich judgment for [Member] State 
51 Temple Lang (1983), pp. 302. See also Temple Lang (1981), pp. 341-342
52 On the public enforcement of EU competition law, see subsection 6.4.2 below.
53 Komninos (2008), p. 163 (n. 131).
54 GC case T-24/90, Automec, para. 50.
55 Opinion AG Van Gerven case C-128/92, Banks, para. 36-54. The fact that this case con-
cerned the ECSC Treaty appears to be of little relevance here (cf. para. 36 of the opinion). 
In its judgment the CoJ did not rule on the issue raised by the AG. See CoJ case C-128/92, 
Banks.
56 CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich. See further para. 59 above.
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liability also applies where an individual infringes a provision of [EU] law to which 
he is subject, thereby causing loss and damage to another individual”. It was add-
ed that “in a field such as competition law” there are two “powerful addition 
arguments” that mitigate in favour of private parties having the possibility 
under EU law of obtaining reparation for loss and damages caused by these 
infringements, as this would be the logical conclusion of the horizontal 
direct effect of the EU competition rules and it would help making these 
rules more operational.57
In the slipstream of the Francovich ruling and the Banks opinion, calls 
were made in the legal literature for EU legislative intervention on this mat-
ter.58 However, apart from the publication of an additional report assessing 
the situation at national level,59 at this stage still no concrete steps were tak-
en in the direction of the adoption of secondary EU law facilitating the pri-
vate enforcement of EU competition law.
6.2.2. Legislative reform and Courage case law (2000-2005)
212. The first of the two subsequent developments that go a long way in 
explaining why possible EU legislative intervention in this domain re-
emerged more recently has already been touched upon earlier.60 It concerns 
the fundamental reform of the rules on the application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU that led to the adoption of the Competition Regulation in 2003. This 
reform, which in effect amounted to a significant decentralisation from the 
EU to the national level, was mainly meant to allow the Commission to 
focus on actively uncovering particularly serious and covert infringements 
of EU competition law rather than handling the routine notifications and 
clearances that were typical of the pre-existing system.61 It is to be noted that 
the Competition Regulation contains no provisions that directly relate to the 
private enforcement of EU competition law. As the discussion of the early 
developments in the previous subsection illustrates, this reform was not a 
conditio sine qua non for private enforcement to take place.62 Indeed, it has 
been argued that, if anything, the reform mainly helped to facilitate ‘defen-
sive’ actions by private parties,63 as opposed to the ‘offensive’ type whereby 
57 Opinion AG Van Gerven case C-128/92, Banks, para. 43-44.
58 E.g. Smith (1992), p. 129; Benedict (1995), p. 247.
59 Commission, The application of Articles 85 and 86 EC by national courts in the Member 
States, July 1997.
60 See para. 202 above.
61 Cf. recital 3 Competition Regulation 1/2003. See also Commission, White paper on mod-
ernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 EC, OJ 1999, C 132/17. Note that 
although the solutions enacted differ, this reasoning is comparable to the one invoked in 
relation to the pleas for encouraging private enforcement in the early 1980s, referred to in 
para. 210 above.
62 For an extensive discussion of the ‘pre-modernisation’ and the ‘modernised’ system in 
relation to private enforcement, see Komninos (2008), pp. 24-139.
63 See para. 208 above.
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for instance a claim for damages is brought by a third party.64 However the 
resulting devolution of powers to the national level is still thought to have 
helped create the conditions under which private enforcement could take 
off, notably by forcing undertakings to think and act more independently on 
competition law issues and by empowering the national courts.65 The ener-
gy and resources required to conceive, draft, adopt and implement this 
reform further probably explain in large part why EU legislative action on 
private enforcement was not properly discussed until after its completion. 
As the then Commissioner for competition policy, Mr Monti, noted in 2001 
in relation to the Commission’s proposal for what was to become the Com-
petition Regulation, “[o]ur reform proposal already introduces substantial chang-
es [and] [w]e should not try to achieve too much all at once if we want to obtain real 
progress in reasonable time”.66
213. The second development is the Court of Justice’s Courage case law.67 
The 2001 Courage ruling has already been introduced earlier,68 but its impor-
tance in the present context justifies assessing it in further detail here. Cour-
age Ltd, a brewery, and Mr Crehan, a pub tenant, had agreed on a ‘beer tie’ 
as part of a lease agreement for the pub in question. As was explained above, 
this means that the latter was contractually obliged to purchase the beer 
sold in that pub exclusively from this particular brewer.69 When Courage 
sued Mr Crehan for unpaid deliveries of beer, the latter argued that the beer-
tie contract was contrary to Article 101(1) and thus automatically void under 
Article 101(2) TFEU.70 In addition Mr Crehan made a counter-claim for 
damages. He argued that he had been forced to buy its beers at prices higher 
than those that Courage charged to independent pub tenants. However 
under English law this latter claim was barred even if an infringement of 
competition law was to be found, because it does not allow a party to rely on 
its own illegal actions to obtain damages. The question referred to the Court 
of Justice by the English court seised was essentially whether such an abso-
lute bar is compatible with EU law.
In its reply the Court first recalled three general points, namely that EU 
law constitutes an own legal order intended to give rights to private parties, 
that Article 101 TFEU is a fundamental provision, as is underlined by prin-
64 Wils (2003a), p. 475; Eilmansberger (2007), p. 434.
65 Cf. e.g. recital 7 Competition Regulation 1/2003; Opinion AG Geelhoed joined cases 
C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 30; Commission, Staff working paper accompany-
ing the green paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, 
p. 11.
66 Monti (2003), p. 8.
67 Earlier the CoJ had already touched upon private enforcement-related aspects, yet with-
out being particularly clear in this respect. See CoJ case C-282/95 P, Guérin, para. 39; CoJ 
case C-242/95, GT-Link, para. 58-61.
68 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage. See para. 60 above.
69 See para. 205 above.
70 See subsection 6.1.3 above.
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ciple of automatic nullity laid down in Article 101(2) that can be relied on by 
anyone and that has absolute consequences, and that Article 101(1) produc-
es direct effects in relations between private parties and creates rights for the 
parties concerned which national courts must safeguard.71 It follows, 
according to the Court, that “any individual can rely on a breach of Article 
[101(1) TFEU] before a national court even where he is a party to a contract that is 
liable to restrict or distort competition within the meaning of that provision”.72 
Specifically in relation to the action for damages it added that “[t]he full effec-
tiveness of Article [101 TFEU] and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibi-
tion laid down [therein] would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to 
claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or 
distort competition. Indeed, the existence of such a right strengthens the working of 
the [EU] competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, which are fre-
quently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. From that point of 
view, actions for damages before the national courts can make a significant contribu-
tion to the maintenance of effective competition in the [EU]”.73 It was therefore 
found that there should not be an absolute bar to the actions at issue here.
The Court continued by recalling that, subject to the principles of equiv-
alence and effectiveness, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member 
State to designate the competent courts and to lay down the detailed proce-
dural rules governing such actions. It held that EU law does not prevent 
national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of rights guar-
anteed by that law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy 
them. Similarly EU law does in principle not preclude national law from 
denying a party who is found to bear significant responsibility for the dis-
tortion of competition the right to obtain damages from the other contract 
party, as a litigant should not profit from its own illegal conduct. In that 
regard account is to be taken, according to the Court, of the economic and 
legal context in which the parties find themselves and of their respective 
bargaining power and conduct and in particular whether the party claiming 
damages was in a markedly weaker position such as to seriously compro-
mise or even eliminate its freedom to negotiate the terms of the contract and 
its capacity to avoid the loss or reduce its extent.74
214. In 2006 the Court of Justice returned to this topic in Manfredi.75 This 
case, an Italian preliminary reference, concerned a ‘follow-on’ action, mean-
ing that the competent national competition authority had already found 
that the defendants (several undertakings offering civil liability auto insur-
ance) had entered into an unlawful price-fixing agreement. Subsequently 
71 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 19-23.
72 Ibid., para. 24.
73 Ibid, para. 26-27.
74 Ibid., para. 29-35.
75 CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi.
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Mr Manfredi and a number of other clients of these undertakings demanded 
to be compensated for the increase in the premiums that they had paid as a 
consequence of this coordinated anti-competitive behaviour. The questions 
referred to the Court of Justice in this case concerned not so much the exis-
tence of the right to compensation as such, but rather the more detailed rules 
that apply in this respect. The Court started by confirming what it had 
already held in Courage. In particular, it recalled that the full effectiveness 
and practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU 
would be at risk if such damages claims could not be brought, pointing to 
the discouraging effect thereof on possible infringements and the significant 
contribution that these claims can make to the maintenance of effective com-
petition.76 On this basis the Court clarified that any party can claim compen-
sation where there is a causal relationship between the harm suffered and the 
infringement at issue. In the absence of rules of EU law on this subject-mat-
ter, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, it is for the 
Member States to lay down the detailed rules on the application of the con-
cept of ‘causal relationship’.77 Under the same conditions it also for them to 
designate the courts before which the case is to be brought, to provide for 
the limitation periods that may apply to the bringing of these actions for 
damages and to set the criteria for determining the extent of the damages.78
On these latter two points the Court also offered further clarification 
however. In respect of the applicable limitation periods it held that, where 
pursuant to the national law such a period begins to run from the day of the 
establishment of the agreement or concerted practice, this would make it 
practically impossible to exercise the right to seek compensation, particu-
larly if this is combined with a short limitation period that is not capable of 
being suspended. For in such a situation, where there are continuous or 
repeated infringements, it is possible that this period expires even before the 
infringement is brought to an end. This would mean that it is impossible for 
a private party that suffered harm after the expiry of that period to initiate 
legal proceedings.79 Concerning the extent of the damages due, the Court first 
held that, pursuant to the principle of equivalence, it must be possible to 
award punitive damages for infringements of EU competition law if the 
award of such damages is available for infringements of similar actions 
founded on national law. It added that EU law does not prevent national 
courts from taking steps to prevent unjust enrichment. The Court further 
ruled that in case of infringements of EU competition law injured private 
parties must be able to seek compensation not only for actual loss (damnum 
emergens), but that it must also be possible for them to be compensated for 
76 Ibid., para. 60 and 90-91.
77 Ibid., para. 61-64.
78 Ibid., para. 71, 77 and 92.
79 Ibid., para. 78-79.
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loss of profit (lucrum cessans). A total exclusion of this latter head of damage 
cannot be accepted, according to the Court. Interest must also be paid, this 
being called an essential component of the compensation due.80
215. The above line of case law has since been confirmed on many occa-
sions.81 It has been instrumental for the present purposes particularly in two 
respects. To begin with, in line with what Advocate General Van Gerven had 
already argued in his opinion in Banks,82 this case law confirmed that pri-
vate parties injured by infringements of Article 101 TFEU have, as a matter of 
EU law, the right to claim damages. Unlike what sometimes had been 
assumed earlier,83 this is therefore not something that is left primarily to 
national law. Rather, in the absence of any specific EU rules, only the more 
detailed rules are to be determined by national law, pursuant to the princi-
ple of national procedure autonomy and subject to the principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness.84 Yet the above cases still leave many questions 
unanswered, such as whether the same reasoning applies to Article 102 
TFEU, which conditions apply precisely in relation to these private enforce-
ment actions and whether they may also encompass other remedies than 
actions for damages. Without in itself necessitating any further measures to 
be taken by the EU legislature, the Courage case law placed the issue of pri-
vate enforcement firmly in the spotlight.85
In addition the above case law underlines the significant contribution 
that private enforcement proceedings can make to the maintenance of effec-
tive competition in the EU. In other words, these actions are not only about a 
private party’s right to obtain compensation for the harm suffered. They 
also fulfil an important role in contributing to the achievement of one of the 
EU’s key policy objectives, i.e. the maintenance of effective competition, 
thus complementing the public enforcement efforts in this field. Thus, “[w]
hile pursuing his private interest, a plaintiff in such proceedings contributes at the 
same time to the protection of the public interest”.86 This highlights on the one 
hand the general interest associated with private enforcement actions, while 
on the other hand it leaves the question unaddressed how both forms of 
enforcement precisely relate to each other.
80 Ibid, para. 93-96.
81 E.g. CoJ case C-421/05, City Motors, para. 33; CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer, para. 28; CoJ 
case C-199/11, Otis, para. 40-43; CoJ case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, para. 21-27; CoJ case 
C-557/12, Kone, para. 20-24.
82 Opinion AG Van Gerven case C-128/92, Banks. See para. 211 above.
83 See in particular para. 209-211 above.
84 On these principles, see sections 2.1 (national procedural autonomy) and 2.2 (equivalence 
and effectiveness) above.
85 See e.g. Komninos (2002), p. 447; Ehlermann & Atanasiu (2003); Wils (2003a), p. 473; 
Andreangeli (2004), p. 758; Jones (2004), p. 13.
86  EFTA Court case E-14/11, Schenker, para. 132.
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6.2.3. Green paper, white paper and draft proposal (2005-2010)
216. On the back of this legislative reform and the Courage case law, the 
Commission judged the time ripe to renew its thinking on a possible legisla-
tive initiative. Therefore in 2005 it published a green paper on damages actions 
for infringements of the EU’s competition rules.87 This document aimed to 
identify obstacles to a more efficient system for bringing such actions and to 
outline various options for solving these problems. It reflected the view that 
there is a state of “total underdevelopment” where actions for damages for 
infringements of EU competition law under the laws of the Member States 
are concerned.88 This assessment rested largely on the findings of an exter-
nal study that was published in 2004, which spoke in this connection of 
“astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment”.89 It observed that, by 2004, 
there were EU-wide only around 60 judged cases for damages actions for 
infringement of EU or national competition law, around half of which had 
led to an award of damages.90 It identified a number of obstacles to bringing 
successful claims and suggested possible manners to tackle them.
217. Building on this assessment and the comments received, in 2008 the 
Commission published a white paper on the same subject-matter.91 It 
acknowledged that, since the publication of the green paper three years ear-
lier, specific legislation had been adopted in some Member States, such as 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, and that generally awareness and 
the number of cases brought (and probably also the number of out-of-court 
settlements reached) had increased.92 Indeed, a subsequent study identified 
96 damages actions in the 2004-2007 period.93 But that study also found that 
these cases were restricted to only ten Member States and that it mainly con-
cerned ‘clustered’ ‘follow-on’ actions initiated following findings of 
infringements by the competition authorities. Proper ‘stand-alone’ actions, 
i.e. cases brought independently of a preceding finding of an infringement 
87 Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672. See also Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the green 
paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732.
88 Ibid., p. 4.
89 Study Ashurst (2004), p. 1.
90 Ibid.
91 Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165. See also Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white 
paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404; Commis-
sion, Impact assessment relating to the white paper on damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 405.
92 For an overview of these developments at national level, see e.g. Komninos (2008), 
pp. 183-186; Nazzini (2009), pp. 402-403.
93 Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), p. 39. Unlike the aforemen-
tioned 2004 study by Ashurst, this later study concerns only claims for damages as a 
consequence of breaches of EU competition law, thus excluding cases concerning 
infringements of national competition law.
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by a competition authority, were found to make up only a relatively small 
part of the total. Here it was therefore submitted that the aforementioned 
state of ‘total underdevelopment’ had only marginally changed.94 On that 
basis the Commission considered that the problems identified earlier essen-
tially remained unchanged and that victims of infringements of EU competi-
tion law were still only rarely compensated for the harm suffered.95 It point-
ed to the amount of foregone compensation and it argued that a great deal 
of legal uncertainty existed.
While the main line thus remained unchanged, there are however cer-
tain notable differences in emphasis between the green paper and the white 
paper.96 Initially public and private enforcement of competition law had 
been said to be part of a common enforcement system and to serve the same 
aims, namely to deter forbidden anti-competitive practices and to protect 
undertakings and consumers.97 Actions for damages were thus seen as serv-
ing the twin purpose of compensating and deterring. By contrast in the 
white paper allowing for the full compensation of the harm caused by com-
petition law infringements was held to be the “first and foremost guiding 
principle”.98 This was said to “inherently” also produce beneficial effects in 
terms of deterrence of future infringements and greater compliance with the 
substantive rules at issue.99 In this later document the importance of follow-
ing a “genuinely European approach” was also reinforced, involving “balanced 
measures that are rooted in European legal culture and traditions”.100 The impor-
tance of preserving strong public enforcement was also underlined.101 
Another difference in emphasis can be found in the Commission highlight-
ing that the intended legislative exercise would on various points concern 
(merely) a codification of the relevant case law of the Court of Justice.102
94 Ibid., pp. 28 and 39-40.
95 Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 9.
96 This occurred presumably in response to the comments made on the preceding green 
paper. Cf. Cauffman (2011a), pp. 182-183; Wils (2013), p. 6.
97 Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, p. 3.




102 While this point is also made in the white paper (see p. 7), this emphasis on codifi cation is 
particularly evident in the accompanying staff working paper, in which many sections 
discussing the various measures suggested contain an overview of the body of EU law as 
it stands. See in particular Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white 
paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 90-91. 
On this proposed codifi cation exercise, see further Milutinovic (2010), p. 301.
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218. The 2008 white paper outlined several specific measures that could be 
taken to address the obstacles that private parties wishing to bring actions 
for damages for alleged infringements of EU competition law were said to 
encounter.103 As these measures are mostly discussed in further detail 
below,104 suffice to note here that – without expanding on the concrete form 
or legal basis of any legislative measures that it might propose105 – the fol-
lowing nine measures were identified: (i) ensuring that all injured private 
parties have legal standing to bring an action for damages, including parties 
lower down the supply chain (so-called ‘indirect purchasers’) and collective 
redress; (ii) facilitating access to evidence by providing for a disclosure mecha-
nism; (iii) providing for the binding effect of decisions finding an infringe-
ment by national competition authorities (and the national courts reviewing 
those decisions); (iv) providing for a rebuttable presumption that the defen-
dant was at fault when committing the infringement, where national law 
contains a fault requirement; (v) taking measures on the qualification and 
quantification of the damages due; (vi) allowing defendants to invoke the so-
called ‘passing-on defence’, i.e. the argument that the applicant did not suffer 
any harm because the overcharge resulting from the anticompetitive behav-
iour was passed on to indirect purchasers, coupled with a rebuttable pre-
sumption to the benefit of these indirect purchaser that this overcharge was 
passed on to them in its entirety; (vii) harmonising rules on the applicable 
limitation periods; (viii) addressing the issue of legal costs; (ix) regulating the 
interaction between public and private enforcement, in particular the non-disclo-
sure of documents in which undertakings confess to the competent public 
authorities their infringements of the competition rules in the hope of 
obtaining a reduction of, or even full immunity from, any fines that these 
authorities could impose, as part of the latter’s so-called ‘leniency pro-
grammes’, as well as the possible limitation of the successful leniency appli-
cants’ civil liability in damages.106
103 Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
pp. 4-10. See also Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672, pp. 5-11, for earlier refl ections and options in this regard.
104 I.e. in the context of the discussion of the Competition Damages Directive in section 6.3 
below.
105 Cf. Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
p. 2, where reference is made to “a combination of measures at both [EU] and national level, in 
order to achieve effective minimum protection of the victim’s right to damages under Articles [101 
and 102 TFEU] in every Member State and a more level playing fi eld and greater legal certainty 
across the EU”. See also Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper 
on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 97-98. In this 
latter document a preference is expressed for a binding EU legal act, without specifying 
this any further however. It was also suggested there that certain issues would be 
addressed through ‘soft law’ instruments, such as non-binding Commission guidelines.
106 On these leniency programmes, see further para. 269 below.
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219. The two abovementioned official documents generated a lively debate. 
In academic circles they set many pens in motion.107 Many stakeholders, 
academics, practitioners and public authorities also used the possibility 
offered to comment on to these documents.108 The reactions from the side 
of the business community were largely negative.109 These parties voiced 
inter alia principled and practical objections against using actions by private 
parties to further the general interest associated with the effective applica-
tion of EU competition law and concerns that the contemplated EU private 
enforcement rules might create a ‘US-style’ litigation culture. Most consumer 
associations spoke out in favour of taking action at EU level.110 The lawyers 
and academics that responded were on the whole rather nuanced.111 These 
latter respondents mostly recognised that there was room for improvement. 
But they also cautioned against a litigation culture, stressed the primacy of 
public enforcement and expressed doubts as to whether the obstacles identi-
fied indeed explained the relatively low number of damages claims brought, 
considering for instance that many cases are settled out-of-court. The logic 
of treating competition cases differently from other civil litigation was also 
questioned. Some further recalled that in certain Member States private 
competition litigation was already rather developed and that more recently 
there had been a significant increase in the number of cases brought.
Reactions from the side of public authorities were rather mixed. Many 
stressed the compensatory – and not punitive – nature of damages awards.112 
Several public authorities also highlighted the risks posed to the coherence 
107 See e.g. Hodges (2006), p. 1381; Komninos (2006), p. 5; Wilsher (2006), p. 27; Eilmansberg-
er (2007), p. 431; Komninos (2008); Nebbia (2008b), p. 23; Andreangeli (2009), p. 229; Wils 
(2009), p. 3; Komninos (2009, p. 363; Zippro (2009b); Milutinovic (2010); Nazzini (2011), 
p. 131; Basedow, Terhechte & Tichý (2011); Peyer (2011), p. 627; Frese (2011), p. 397.
108 For the responses submitted to the green paper and the white paper, see http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html.
109 See e.g. the comments on the green paper submitted by Association of French undertak-
ings (MEDEF); Internal Chamber of Commerce (ICC); American Chamber of Commerce 
to the EU (Amcham EU); European Chemical Industry Council (Cefi c); Confederation of 
Finish Industries (EK); association of the European insurance industry (CEA); the associ-
ation of German industry (BDI); UK business lobby CBI; Union of Industrial and Employ-
ers Federation of Europe (UNICE; now called BusinessEurope).
110 See e.g. the comments on the green paper submitted by European Consumer’s Organisa-
tion (Bureau européen des Unions de consommateurs, BEUC); UK-based consumer organisa-
tion Which?.
111 See e.g. comments on the green paper submitted by law fi rms Clifford Chance, Fresh-
fi elds Bruckhaus Deringer, Linklaters and CMS; UK bars and law societies; Europa Insti-
tuut Leiden University; Max Planck Institute; Dutch Bar Association; International Bar 
Association.
112 See e.g. the comments on the green paper submitted by the French government and Cour 
de cassation; Danish Ministry for Economic and Business Affairs; Netherlands govern-
ment and national competition authority; competent German federal ministry; UK gov-
ernment and national competition authority; Irish Competition Authority. Cf. Study 
Ashurst (2004), p. 84, where it is observed that punitive damages are only available, in 
certain cases, for infringements of the competition rules in three Member States, namely 
the UK, Ireland and Cyprus.
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of their respective domestic legal systems if specific action with regard to 
competition cases were to be taken. Arguments against a litigation culture 
were again voiced. The German and French governments were among those 
that took a rather negative stance.113 They essentially contested the need for 
EU legislation, raised questions as to its legal basis and submitted that, in 
accordance with the principles of national procedural autonomy and sub-
sidiarity, the aforementioned issues should be left to be regulated by the 
Member States. It was argued that, if any legislative action were to be taken, 
those issues would fall under the rules of the EU Treaties on judicial coop-
eration in civil matters.114 That said, while expressing some concerns, many 
other public authorities generally did not respond outright negatively; some 
actually spoke out in favour of an EU legislative initiative in this field.115 
The European Parliament, from its side, also expressed certain hesitations.116 
It requested clarification on the legal basis of any future legislative action 
and insisted on the use of the ordinary legislative procedure, meaning that 
it decides on a par with the Council on the proposed EU legislation.117 Just 
as several other public authorities, it argued in favour of a consistent and 
horizontal approach on collective redress,118 whereas it looked unfavour-
ably upon the suggestion of giving binding effect to decisions by national 
competition authorities. The European Parliament further considered that 
rules on limitation periods (for ‘stand-alone’ actions), quantification of dam-
ages and legal costs should be left to be regulated by national law. Notably, 
while it had initially urged the Commission to publish a white paper, in 
response to this latter document it did not expressly invite or encourage the 
113 Apart from the submissions by the competent German ministries and Bundesrat and the 
French government, see e.g. also the comments on the white paper submitted on behalf 
of Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark.
114 Cf. Art. 81 TFEU on judicial cooperation in civil matters, further discussed in para. 432 
below. At the time, these latter matters were part of the so-called ‘third pillar’, which 
implied that different requirements for the adoption of any secondary EU law applied as 
compared to the ‘fi rst pillar’ provisions of the EU Treaties on competition (Art. 103 TFEU) 
or the internal market (Art. 114 TFEU). Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2009 this pillar structure has been abolished however, although certain differences in the 
applicable requirements remain.
115 See e.g. the comments on the white paper submitted by the Netherlands government as 
well as the Belgian, UK, Czech and Romanian competition authorities.
116 European Parliament, Resolution on the green paper on damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2007)0152; European Parliament, Resolution on the white 
paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2009)0187. See also 
Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on the green paper damages actions for breach 
of EC antitrust rules, OJ 2006, C 324/1; Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on the 
white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, OJ 2009, C 228/40.
117 Art. 289 TFEU.
118 Besides the question whether collective redress should be regulated ‘horizontally’ or 
rather in a competition specifi c manner, a key issue in this respect is whether or not an 
express ‘opt-in’ by the private parties having suffered harm would be required. On col-
lective redress, see also subsection 5.5.1 above.
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Commission to submit a legislative proposal. Only in 2011 it made a sugges-
tion to this effect.119
220. In 2009 the Commission services set out to draft a directive on dam-
ages claims for infringements of EU competition law.120 However the result-
ing draft proposal for a directive never past the internal hurdles. That is to say, 
while this draft circulated informally also outside the Commission, it was 
never adopted by its College of Commissioners. Consequently neither was 
it formally published, let alone discussed or adopted by the EU legislature. 
It is therefore important to note that this draft proposal is non-existent in 
formal terms (a ‘non-proposal’, if you will121), although it nonetheless offers 
an interesting insight into the thinking of the Commission services at that 
point in time.
In terms of content the approach set out in this draft proposal was large-
ly in line with the 2008 white paper. Its main objective would be to ensure 
that private parties could obtain full compensation for harm suffered as a 
consequence of infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Punishing and 
deterring infringers would not be a primary objective, although deterrence 
would remain a welcome side-effect. The draft further contained specific 
measures on the following issues: the concept of full compensation (covering 
actual loss, loss of profit and interests); collective redress (either as a ‘group 
action’ or as a ‘representative action’ by a qualified entity, without that enti-
ty being required to individually identify the parties it represents but with a 
right of opt-out); disclosure of evidence (by the parties to the proceedings 
and third parties, to be ordered by the court upon the presentation of rea-
sonably available facts and evidence, subject to certain conditions and 
exceptions, including for leniency statements); passing-on defence (permit-
ted); binding effect across the EU of final decisions by competition authorities 
(and review courts) finding an infringement; fault (rebuttable presumption 
of fault upon the establishment of an infringement); and limitation periods 
(which would not begin to run before the end of the infringement and not 
end, in ‘follow-on’ cases, until two years after the final decision by a nation-
al competition authority).
The draft proposal was abandoned in the autumn of 2009, reportedly 
shortly before it was due to be adopted by the Commission. The reasons for 
this last-minute change of course remain unclear. The abovementioned hes-
itations and opposition expressed by business organisations and certain 
Member States, in particular Germany, are widely believed to have played a 
119 European Parliament, Resolution on the report on competition policy 2009, P7_
TA(2011)0023, para. 15.
120 Commission, Draft Proposal for a Council directive on the rules governing damages 
actions for infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. The text of this draft proposal 
has been published in Lowe & Marquis (2014) (see its Annex III). On this draft proposal, 
see also Alfaro & Reher (2010), p. 43; Cupa (2012), p. 524.
121 Cf. Marquis (2014), p. lxv.
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role in this decision.122 The same can probably be said of the potential for 
inter-institutional conflicts relating to the choice of legal basis, i.e. Article 103 
TFEU, which implied that the European Parliament would only have had a 
consultative role in the legislative process,123 as well as the need felt by 
many of the parties involved not to endanger the central role of public 
enforcement mechanisms.124 Personnel changes within the College of Com-
missioners in 2009 may also have been a relevant factor.125 In any case after 
this aborted attempt to establish a proposal, plans for such a directive were 
shelved for several years.
6.2.4. Pfleiderer case law and proposal (2010-2013)
221. Yet another important jurisprudential development – this time relat-
ing not so much to the right to claim damages as such, but rather to the 
interaction between public and private enforcement in this field – was argu-
ably required to reanimate the project. For in 2011 the Court of Justice issued 
its ruling in Pfleiderer.126 In this case, a German preliminary reference, the 
competent national competition authority had imposed fines on several 
undertakings for infringements of Article 101 TFEU. In the context of those 
public enforcement proceedings, some of these undertakings had submitted 
a leniency application to this authority. Pfleiderer AG was a customer of one 
of the infringing undertakings. With a view to preparing a claim for dam-
ages, it applied to the competition authority requesting full access to the 
case file, including the said leniency applications. After access had been 
refused, this private party appealed to the national court. The latter essen-
tially asked the Court of Justice whether EU law precluded the granting of 
such access.
In its judgment the Court started by observing that there are no binding 
EU rules in respect of national leniency programmes or the right to access to 
documents related thereto. It is therefore in principle for the Member States 
to establish and apply such rules.127 But these rules may not render the 
implementation of EU law impossible or excessively difficult and, more spe-
122 Cf. Chellel (2009); Milutinovic (2010), pp. 324-327; Vrcek (2010), pp. 277-278; Siragusa 
(2014), pp. 237-238.
123 Cf. e.g. Boylan (2009). On the legal basis issues arising in this connection, see further 
para. 228 below.
124 See e.g. Reich (2010), p. 119.
125 Commission president Mr Barroso was re-elected for a second term in offi ce in Septem-
ber 2009. It has been suggested that this re-election was linked to developments (or rather 
the lack thereof) in respect of the present subject-matter. See e.g. Micklitz (2011b), p. 102; 
Beumer & Karpetas (2012), p. 143 (n. 143); Hodges (2013), p. 72. Subsequently portfolios 
were redistributed within the Commission, including the replacement of Ms Kroes by Mr 
Almunia as Commissioner for competition policy. The new Commission took formally 
up its tasks on 1 February 2010.
126 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer. Cf. Commission, Impact assessment report on damages 
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 13-14.
127 Ibid., para. 19-23.
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cifically, it must be ensured that the effective application of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU is not jeopardised. The Court noted in this connection that leni-
ency programmes are useful tools to uncover and end competition law 
infringements that serve the objective of effective application of the said 
articles. It acknowledged that the effectiveness of these programmes could 
be compromised if documents related thereto were to be disclosed, because 
the possibility of such disclosure could deter undertakings from participat-
ing.128 However, with reference to its Courage case law,129 it was also recalled 
that any private party has the right to claim damages for loss caused to him 
by an infringement of EU competition law and that the resulting actions for 
damages can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective 
competition.130
In this light the Court held that, apart from the application of the prin-
ciples of equivalence and effectiveness,131 it is necessary “to weigh the respec-
tive interests in favour of disclosure of the information and in favour of the protec-
tion of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant of leniency” and that 
“[t]hat weighing exercise can be conducted by the national courts and tribunals 
only on a case-by-case basis, according to national law, and taking into account all 
the relevant factors in the case”.132 In so doing, it chose a different route than 
the one outlined by Advocate General Mazák, who had essentially argued 
that self-incriminating statements made by leniency applicants should be 
protected from disclosure.133 The Court instead found that EU law does not 
preclude giving access to the documents in question, but that it is for the 
national courts, on the basis of their national law, to determine the relevant 
conditions by weighing the interests protected under EU law.134
222. Two years later the Court of Justice built on this judgment in Donau 
Chemie.135 This latter case also concerned a request, submitted by (an asso-
ciation of) undertakings allegedly having suffered harm as a consequence of 
an infringement of Article 101 TFEU for which fines had been imposed, to 
be granted access to the file of a national competition authority with a view 
to gathering the evidence needed for bringing a damages claim. In this case 
the applicable national (Austrian) legislation did not allow the national 
court seised to weigh the interests at stake. The national legislature had in 
effect itself decided to give priority to the interest associated with keeping 
documents relating to public enforcement proceedings confidential, making 
the disclosure subject to the consent of all parties to the proceedings for the 
access to documents. The referring court’s question to the Court of Justice 
128 Ibid., para. 24-27.
129 See para. 213-215 above.
130 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer, para. 28-29.
131 On these two principles, see further section 2.2 above.
132 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer, para. 30-31.
133 Opinion AG Mazák case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer, para. 44.
134 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer, para. 32.
135 CoJ case C-536/11, Donau Chemie.
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was whether this legislation is to be considered compatible with EU law, in 
particular the principle of effectiveness.
The Court of Justice answered this question in the negative. It insisted 
that pursuant to the principle of effectiveness a national court must have the 
possibility to weigh up the respective interests in favour and against disclo-
sure. This weighing-up was held to be necessary because “any rule that is 
rigid, either by providing for absolute refusal to grant access to the documents in 
question or for granting access to those documents as a matter of course, is liable to 
undermine the effective application of, inter alia, Article 101 TFEU and the rights 
that provision confers on individuals”.136 On the one hand, where the parties 
adversely affected by the infringement have no other way of obtaining the 
evidence needed to establish their claim, in the Court’s view a refusal to 
grant them access renders nugatory the right to compensation under EU 
law. On the other hand it held that generalised access is not necessary and 
could harm the legitimate interests of the undertakings concerned (e.g. relat-
ing to their right to protection of business secrets) and the general interest 
(by deterring undertakings from cooperation with public enforcement 
authorities).137 Specifically as regards documents relating to leniency pro-
grammes, the Court acknowledged both the importance of these pro-
grammes and the possibility that undertakings will be deterred by the pos-
sibility of disclosure. But this was not seen as sufficient to systematically 
refuse all access to such documents. Given the importance of actions for 
damages, a mere abstract risk of undermining the effectiveness of leniency 
programmes was found not to suffice. Instead for non-disclosure to be justi-
fied there must be overriding reasons relating to each specific document, i.e. 
a risk that disclosure of that particular document would actually undermine 
the public interest relating to the effectiveness of leniency programmes.138
223. Just a few days after the Court issued its ruling in Donau Chemie the 
Commission published its proposal for the Competition Damages Direc-
tive.139 Whilst the content of this proposal is discussed where relevant in the 
following section together with the text of the directive, the following points 
merit being noted at the outset. To begin with, the proposal is in many 
respects a continuation of the line that was set out in the aforementioned 
official documents.140 The proposal accordingly aims to ensure that parties 
having suffered harm as a consequence of infringements of the EU com-
petition rules can obtain full compensation.141 In this connection the Com-
mission acknowledged that there had been “some recent signs of improvement 
136 Ibid., para. 31.
137 Ibid., para. 32-33.
138 Ibid., para. 40-48.
139 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404. See also 
Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203.
140 See subsection 6.2.3 above.
141 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 3.
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in a few Member States”.142 Several Member States adopted specific rules or 
were contemplating (further) amendments to their national laws relating 
to actions for damages for competition law infringements. Hungarian law 
for example now provides for a rebuttable presumption that (‘hard-core’) 
cartels lead to an illegal overcharge of 10%.143 A rise in the number of dam-
ages actions brought was also observed, while noting however that the vast 
majority of large actions of this kind are brought in just three Member States, 
namely the UK, Germany and the Netherlands.144 The Commission there-
fore found that the situation had not significantly changed in this respect 
since 2005.145 In its view there is still “a clear deficit in terms of compensatory 
justice”.146 This was attributed to the obstacles resulting from the applicable 
national laws that were mentioned in its earlier documents.147
Yet there are some noticeable differences in the general approach fol-
lowed by the Commission. In particular, apart from the aforementioned 
obstacles that private party-applicants are said to encounter, the proposal 
also emphasised the diversity in the rules of national law that regulate 
actions for damages for infringements of the EU competition rules. This 
diversity was said to lead to legal uncertainty and ‘uneven enforcement’ of 
the EU right to compensation and therefore to competitive advantages for 
some undertakings and distortions of the internal market.148 The proposal 
thus aims not only to shift the costs away from the victims and to act as an 
incentive for better compliance, but it also seeks to contribute to a more lev-
el playing field.149 In addition optimising the interaction between public and 
private enforcement is no longer one issue to be addressed among several oth-
ers in the context of the overall objective of ensuring full compensation for 
injured parties, as was the case earlier. The proposal instead identified this 
as a second objective in its own right, on a par with full compensation.150 
This was said to be due to “a new issue” that showed that “the EU right to 
compensation can sometimes be at odds with the effectiveness of public enforcement 
142 Ibid., p. 4.
143 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 17 (and its Annex 3). On this Hungarian law, see further Nagy 
(2011), p. 63.
144 Ibid., p. 19.
145 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 4; 
Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 18. On these earlier documents and the said obstacles, see sub-
section 6.2.3 above.
146 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 15.
147 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 4.
148 Ibid.; Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU 
antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 18-20.
149 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 4. See 
also Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU 
antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 15-20.
150 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, pp. 3-4.
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of the EU”.151 This refers to the aforementioned Pfleiderer ruling.152 Whilst 
admitting that there is no evidence that this ruling has had or will have a 
negative impact on the functioning of leniency programmes operated by the 
competent public enforcement authorities, it was thought to have led to 
uncertainty. In light of the required case-by-case assessment on questions of 
disclosure, an undertaking does not know in advance whether or not its 
leniency application will be disclosed by the public enforcement authority 
concerned. In the Commission’s view, this could negatively affect the will-
ingness of undertakings to cooperate and thus the public enforcement of EU 
competition law.153
224. Lastly, as to the reception of this proposal in the legal literature, it 
should first be noted that there is a widespread perception that the degree 
of damages litigation for infringements of competition law (predominantly 
‘follow-on’ actions) has been increasing over the past years, not only in the 
few Member States to which the Commission referred, but also in the EU 
more generally.154 Many further considered that, ‘post-Pfleiderer’, the ten-
sion between actions for damages for competition law infringements and 
leniency programmes needed to be addressed at EU level so as to preserve 
the effectiveness of these programmes.155 This is also the view of the Euro-
pean competition authorities.156 The Commission proposal itself was on 
the whole received in – cautiously – favourable terms. Criticism concerned 
mainly the generally rather modest degree of detail and the related fears 
that some uncertainty and divergences might persist also after its adop-
tion.157
151 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 5.
152 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer. See para. 221 above.
153 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 12-15 and 28.
154 See e.g. Barone & Amore (2010), p. 346; Jalabert-Doury (2010), p. 316; Milutinovic (2010), 
p. 346; Danov & Becker (2013), p. 77; Danov & Dnes (2013), p. 51; Kammin & Becker 
(2013), p. 61; Hodges (2013), p. 71; Wils (2013), p. 6; Guttuso (2014), p. 12; Ratliff (2014), 
p. 272.
155 See e.g. Nascimbene (2013), p. 269; Campbell & Feunteun (2014), pp. 34 and 38; Burrich-
ter & Ahlenstiel (2014), p. 103; Hummer & Cywinski (2014), pp. 117-118; Kumar Singh 
(2014), p. 117; Milutinovic (2014), p. 363; Pietrini (2014), p. 262; Ratliff (2014), p. 287; Silva 
Morais (2014), p. 128. See however also Danov & Dnes (2013),  pp. 56 and 59, where it is 
suggested that the possible friction between increasing numbers of actions for damages 
and leniency programmes may be overstated to some degree.
156 Heads of the European competition authorities, Resolution on the protection of leniency 
materials in the context of civil damages actions, 23 May 2012.
157 See e.g. Batchelor, Pike & Ghiorghies (2013), p. 165; Gamble (2013), pp. 619-620; Babirad 
(2013), p. 160; Guttuso (2014), pp. 20-22; Howard (2014), p. 53; 55; Louis (2014), p. 90; 
Milutinovic (2014), p. 376; Nordlander & Abenhaïm (2014), pp. 7-8; Silva Morais (2014), 
pp. 137-138; Stauber (2014), p. 38; Wisking, Dietzel & Herron (2014), p. 185. For a critical 
assessment, see in particular Kumar Singh (2014), pp. 120-122; Weidt (2014), p. 438.
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6.3. Competition Damages Directive
In this section the Competition Damages Directive is discussed. To this aim 
the first subsection below addresses a number of general (and interrelated) 
issues concerning its adoption, objectives, scope and legal basis. The follow-
ing subsection concentrates on the directive’s principal (substantive) reme-
dy, i.e. actions for damages, and the rules directly relating thereto regarding 
the qualification and quantification of the harm caused by the infringements 
at issue. Attention then turns to the measures related to the disclosure of 
evidence, followed by a discussion of the rules on joint and several liability, 
the ‘passing-on defence’ and the position of indirect purchasers. The last 
subsection examines the directive’s relevant procedural provisions and cer-
tain related issues.
6.3.1. Adoption, objectives, scope and legal basis
225. Even when excluding the discussions on a possible legislative initia-
tive on the private enforcement of EU competition law that took place in the 
1980s and 1990s,158 the Competition Damages Directive has been a long time 
in the making. Yet, after an incubation time of almost a decade (taking the 
2005 green paper as the starting point), the actual law-making process was 
relatively speedy. That is to say, less than a year elapsed between the publi-
cation of the Commission proposal in June 2013 and the political agreement 
that was reached in March 2014. At the time of writing this directive had not 
yet been adopted and published, but that is expected to take place before the 
end of 2014.159 Upon its entry into force 20 days after the date of publication, 
the Member States are required to transpose the directive into national law 
within two years, i.e. by the end of 2016. Although several important chang-
es were made in the course of the legislative process, which are discussed in 
further detail below, the main features of the Commission’s proposal 
remained unaltered. The end result has been described as “a finely-tuned 
compromise that goes to the limits of the flexibility of the co-legislators”.160
Although a range of factors is likely to have played a role, three ele-
ments stand out when seeking to explain the fact that, after having proved 
controversial at an earlier stage, the Competition Damages Directive was in 
the end adopted rather speedily.161 First, there is the 2011 Pfleiderer judgment, 
which, as was discussed above, led to the protection of the effectiveness of 
public enforcement (especially leniency programmes) being elevated as an 
objective in its own right, on a par with the actual facilitation of private 
enforcement.162 This meant that those that consider the public enforcement 
158 See subsection 6.2.1 above.
159 See para. 13 above.
160 Council, doc. 8088/14.
161 On this issue, cf. Hodges (2013), pp. 74-75.
162 See para. 221 above.
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of EU competition law to be of particular importance now also had a stake 
in seeing this directive adopted. The second factor relates to the position of 
the European Parliament. As is explained below, a solution was found for the 
question relating to the involvement of this institution in the legislative pro-
cess, ensuring that it could co-decide together with the Council.163 The 
upcoming elections for the European Parliament in May 2014 probably gave 
the negotiations on the draft directive an (extra) sense of urgency. Lastly, the 
Commission, and with it the EU legislature, moderated its ambitions. Several 
issues that had earlier been identified as obstacles but that had also proved 
controversial were excluded from this legislative initiative. It concerns espe-
cially possible EU rules on collective redress,164 but also on fault require-
ments165 and, at an earlier stage, legal costs.166 The issue of the causal rela-
tionship between the infringement and the harm is also left unaddressed in 
the directive.167
163 See further para. 228 below.
164 In line with the Commission’s proposal, recital 12 Competition Damages Directive states 
that “[t]his Directive should not require Member States to introduce collective redress mechanis-
ms for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 [TFEU]”. See further Commission, Impact 
assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 
203, p. 55, where the Commission noted that competition law is not the only fi eld in 
which scattered harm frequently occurs and in which it may be diffi cult to obtain com-
pensation for the harm suffered. It was also acknowledged that following such a ‘hori-
zontal’ approach could avoid unnecessary fragmentation of national civil laws. The 
Commission therefore stated its preference for addressing this issue in a more ‘horizon-
tal’ manner, i.e. through an initiative that relates not only to infringements of EU compe-
tition law but also to other infringement of EU law. See further the discussion of Collec-
tive Redress Recommendation 2013/396 referred to in subsection 5.5.1 above. This 
exclusion of collective redress from the directive has been perceived as the Commission 
“bend[ing] to the will of industry”. See Marquis (2014), p. xx.
165 The Commission’s 2008 white paper and its 2009 draft proposal, discussed in subsection 
6.2.3 above,  provided for a rebuttable presumption of fault. By contrast the Commis-
sion’s proposal did not address this issue at all, because the suggested provisions “were 
particularly criticised by some business respondents”. See Commission, Impact assessment 
report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 35. 
Recital 11 Competition Damages Directive states in this regard that Member States 
should, in principle, be able to maintain “other conditions for compensation under national 
law, such as imputability, adequacy or culpability”. Note that in CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to 
C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 61-63, discussed in para. 214 above, no explicit reference was 
made to a fault requirement. On that basis it was suggested in Commission, Staff work-
ing paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC anti-
trust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 51, that no such requirement can apply in respect of actions 
for damages for infringements of EU law. This view has been contested however. See 
Eilmansberger (2007), p. 458.
166 Already in its 2008 white paper the Commission had limited itself to ‘inviting’ Member 
States to ‘refl ect’ on their rules on legal costs and the allocation thereof between the par-
ties to the proceedings. See Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules, pp. 9-10. See also para. 328 below.
167 Recital 11 Competition Damages Directive.
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226. The objectives of the Competition Damages Directive remained essen-
tially unchanged as compared to the Commission’s proposal, discussed 
above.168 There are therefore two objectives.169 Largely in line with the 2005 
green paper and the 2008 white paper, its first objective is to ensure that 
anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of the relevant 
rules of competition law can effectively exercise the right to claim full com-
pensation for that harm and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market by ensuring equivalent protection throughout the Union for anyone 
who has suffered such harm.170 In addition, particularly in the aftermath of 
the aforementioned Pfleiderer case law, the directive seeks to coordinate the 
public and private enforcement of the competition rules in as far as actions for 
damages before the national courts are concerned.171 In fact, speaking of 
‘coordination’ (or ‘interaction’172) between public and private enforcement 
seems a bit of a euphemism. As is seen below, the measures taken in connec-
tion with this second objective essentially determine the degree to which the 
private enforcement possibilities provided for are to be limited so as to safe-
guard the effectiveness of the existing public enforcement mechanisms (and 
especially leniency programmes).173 It thus seems more accurate to speak of 
the ‘protecting’ or ‘preserving the central role’ of effective public enforce-
ment in the EU, as the Commission did earlier.174 In any case it follows from 
this second objective that the directive does not wholeheartedly seek to facil-
itate private enforcement, but it also restricts the possibilities to do so in 
some respects.
227. The main point to note as regards the scope of the directive is that 
it covers not only infringements of substantive EU competition law, i.e. 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It also covers certain rules of substantive nation-
al competition law. Not all rules of national competition law are covered 
however. The measures set out in the directive relate only those provisions 
of national competition law that “predominantly pursue the same objective as 
168 See para. 223 above.
169 See also recital 50 Competition Damages Directive.
170 Art. 1(1) Competition Damages Directive.
171 Art. 1(2) Competition Damages Directive. On the said case law, see para. 221-222 above.
172 Cf. recital 6 Competition Damages Directive. See also Commission, Proposal for the 
Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 3.
173 See in particular Art. 6 and 11 Competition Damages Directive, discussed in para. 235 
and 238 below concerning the non-disclosure of certain documents and the limits to the 
joint and several liability of infringers respectively. See also its Art. 9, discussed in 
para. 243 below, on the effects of infringement decisions by national competition authori-
ties in proceedings before national courts (but not vice versa).
174 See Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU anti-
trust rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 25; Commission, Work programme 2012 (Annex), 
COM(2011) 777, p. 3.
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Articles 101 and 102 [TFEU] and that are applied to the same case and in parallel to 
[EU] competition law pursuant to Article 3(1) of [the Competition Regulation]”.175
This inclusion of certain rules of national competition law, which is in 
line with the Commission’s proposal, can be seen as somewhat of a sur-
prise.176 For the 2005 green paper, the 2008 white paper and the 2009 draft 
proposal were all concerned only with the private enforcement of EU com-
petition law.177 Not even the possibility of such an extension so to also cover 
national law had been suggested there, nor was this issue raised in the sub-
sequent comments by stakeholders on these earlier documents.178 Neither 
does this extended scope seem immediately evident in light of the fact that 
the Court’s Courage case law, on which the directive builds in many respects, 
linked a private party’s right to compensation under EU law only to the 
effectiveness of the EU competition rules.179 The directive’s recitals explain 
this approach by pointing out that, otherwise, the position of applicants 
would be adversely affected by the application, in the same case, of diverg-
ing rules on civil liability for infringements of EU and national competition 
law, which is seen as constituting an obstacle to the proper functioning of 
the internal market.180 According to the Commission, this would have made 
it unworkable for judges to handle a case and it would have led to legal 
uncertainty and possible conflicting results, depending on whether the case 
is considered as relating to an infringement of the EU or of national competi-
tion law.181 Actions for damages for infringements of national competition 
law that do not affect trade between the Member States within the meaning 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU remain unaffected however.182
228. The Competition Damages Directive rests on a dual legal basis, i.e. Arti-
cles 103 and 114 TFEU.183 The choice for Article 103(1) TFEU seems unsur-
prising. This provision allows for the adoption of “appropriate regulations or 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 [TFEU]”. 
Although private enforcement is not among the possible measures specifi-
cally mentioned in its second paragraph, both the broad formulation of the 
first paragraph and the non-exhaustive character of its second paragraph 
175 Art. 4(2) Competition Damages Directive. There it is added that this does not include 
national laws which impose criminal penalties on national persons except to the extent 
that such penalties are the means whereby competition rules applying to undertakings 
are enforced. As regards this parallel application pursuant to Art. 3(1) Competition Regu-
lation 1/2003, see also para. 203 above.
176 Cf. Milutinovic (2014), pp. 368 and 374.
177 As is e.g. evident from the titles of these three documents, which all refer only to the EU 
(EC) competition rules. On these documents, see further subsection 6.2.3 above.
178 On these consultations, see para. 219 above.
179 On the Courage case law and its relevance in this connection, see para. 213-215 above.
180 Recital 10 Competition Damages Directive.
181 Commission, Proposal for Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, pp. 12-13.
182 Recital 10 Competition Damages Directive.
183 On Art. 103 and 114 TFEU and legal basis issues generally, see further subsection 10.1.1 
below.
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appear to make this provision in principle a sufficient legal basis. Indeed, 
before the adoption of this directive it was widely agreed that this provision 
seemed the most appropriate legal basis for a legislative initiative on the 
private enforcement of EU competition law.184 It was also the legal basis 
cited in the (non-official) draft proposal for a directive that the Commission 
services prepared in 2009.185 By contrast adding Article 114 TFEU, which 
empowers the EU to legislate when necessary for the purposes of its internal 
market, seems less obvious.186 For one thing, it is settled case law that a dual 
legal basis is only to be used exceptionally, and even then only on the condi-
tion that the legislative procedures for the adoption of the act in question 
foreseen by the articles concerned are not incompatible.187 For another thing, 
the ‘internal market dimension’ of the private enforcement of competition 
law was a theme that received only comparatively little attention in the 
Commission’s earlier official documents and the associated consultations.188 
It was only in the Commission’s 2013 proposal that this issue was given real 
emphasis.189 In line with the reasoning underpinning this proposal, the 
recitals of the Competition Damages Directive explain that the divergences 
between the pre-existing rules of the Member States in this regard lead to 
uncertainty, an uneven playing field and uneven enforcement of the right to 
compensation.190 The explanatory memorandum accompanying the pro-
posal for this directive goes at considerable length in further explaining this 
choice for this dual legal basis. It is said there that the directive pursues “two 
equally important goals which are inextricably linked”, namely, first, giving full 
effect to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and, second, ensuring a more level play-
ing field for undertakings operating in the internal market and making it 
easier for citizens and businesses to make use of the rights that they derive 
from the internal market.191 Article 103 TFEU alone was considered not to be 
sufficient, in particular because, while that provision only foresees measures 
to give effect to EU competition law, as was noted above, the directive also 
covers certain rules of national competition law. Given that, according to the 
Commission, the latter abovementioned objective is not merely ancillary to 
the former and there is an indissociable link between them and the measures 
they entail, it is concluded there that the directive is to be based on Article 
114 as well as on Article 103 TFEU.192
184 Van Gerven (2003a), p. 410; Eilmansberger (2007), pp. 440-441; Komninos (2008), pp. 180-
181; Milutinovic (2010), pp. 315-319. Specifi cally in relation to collective redress for com-
petition law infringements, see also Leskinen (2011), p. 113; European Parliament, Study 
on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 60; Buccirossi & Carpagnano (2013), p. 9.
185 See para. 220 above.
186 On Art. 114 TFEU and legal basis issues generally, see subsection 10.1.1 below.
187 E.g. CoJ case C-155/07, Parliament v. Council, para. 35-37 and 76-85; CoJ case C-130/10, 
Parliament v. Council, para. 43-47.
188 See subsection 6.2.3 above.
189 See para. 217 above.
190 See recitals 7-9 Competition Damages Directive.
191 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 8.
192 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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This explanation for the choice of legal basis of the Competition Dam-
ages Directive seems reasonable enough in itself.193 Yet there may also be 
another element that helps explaining this choice. For the legal basis chosen 
for an act of secondary EU law also determines which legislative procedure 
is to be followed when adopting that act and thus in particular the degree of 
involvement of the European Parliament in that procedure. In the present 
context this institution had long insisted on it being allowed to decide on a 
par with its co-legislator, the Council, under the ordinary legislative proce-
dure.194 Article 103 TFEU prescribes that the Council acts alone and gives 
the European Parliament merely a consultative role, whereas Article 114 
TFEU in contrast provides for the use of the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Adding this article as a second legal basis thus provided a justification for 
using this latter procedure when adopting the Competition Damages Direc-
tive. The aforementioned somewhat surprising extension of the initiative’s 
scope so as to cover also certain rules of national competition law, which in 
turn necessitated the use of Article 114 and the ordinary legislative proce-
dure it prescribes, should therefore perhaps (also) be seen in this light.195 In 
other words, one could be forgiven for thinking that this extension served as 
much to remedy obstacles of an EU inter-institutional nature as it was meant 
to address any problems of substance. While none of this necessarily leads 
to the conclusion that this choice of legal basis is incompatible with the EU 
Treaties,196 it does mean that the directive’s legality in this respect relies on 
the correctness of the assumptions that underpin the view that this is a case 
where: (i) exceptionally, a dual legal basis can be used (because the two cited 
objectives and the measures corresponding thereto are indeed inseparably 
linked, without one being ancillary to the other); and (ii) the two distinct 
legislative procedures foreseen under the two abovementioned articles are 
moreover not incompatible. The fact that legal basis issues were a matter of 
debate in the course of the legislative process, in particular for the Council, 
suggests that there is scope for debate on these points, even if the Council 
eventually concluded that the dual legal basis proposed by the Commission 
could be retained.197
193 Cf. e.g. Cauffmann (2013), p. 634.
194 See para. 219 above.
195 In a similar sense, see Milutinovic (2014), p. 375.
196 The EU legislature has after all generally considerable scope in determining the aim and 
content of an act of secondary EU law, in light of which whereas the choice of legal basis 
of that act is to be assessed. See further para. 381 below.
197 See Council, doc. 16176/13, which concerns an opinion of the Council’s legal service on 
the choice of legal basis of the draft directive (which was, at the time of writing, only par-
tially accessible to the public). On this opinion, see also Crofts (2013), p. 1.  See e.g. also 
Council, doc. 15979/13, p. 2; Council, doc. 15983/13, p. 2. See also European Parliament, 
Study on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 60, where doubts are expressed with 
regard to the compatibility of the two legislative procedures at hand.
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6.3.2. Actions for damages, qualification and quantification
229. Much of the discussion over the past decade on what was to become 
the Competition Damages Directive took place under the broad banner of 
the ‘private enforcement’ of EU competition law generally. However this 
directive concentrates on only one main (substantive) private enforce-
ment remedy, namely actions for damages.198 Its recitals confirm that this 
remedy is an “example” and “only one element of an effective system of private 
enforcement”.199 This focus on actions for damages was not always apparent 
when the possible facilitation of private enforcement of EU competition law 
was discussed at an earlier stage.200 Only more recently actions for damage 
have become the “legal and political fashion” where the private enforcement 
of EU competition law is concerned.201 Indeed, all of the official documents 
discussed in the foregoing – ranging from the Commission’s 2005 green 
paper up until its 2013 proposal – acknowledged that other remedies could 
play a role too in this respect, but nonetheless concentrated solely on this 
particular remedy.202
230. The Competition Damages Directive expressly lays down and further 
details the right to full compensation. Accordingly it is stated that the Member 
States must ensure that “any natural or legal person who has suffered harm 
caused by an infringement of competition law is able to claim and obtain full com-
pensation for that harm”.203 Here it is also explained what ‘full compensation’ 
entails, namely placing the person concerned in the position that that person 
would have been in had the infringement not been committed. According to 
the directive, covered are “therefore” three heads of damages, i.e. compensa-
tion for actual loss, loss of profit and interest.204 The recitals explain that this 
is meant as a reaffirmation of the relevant case law of the Court of Justice,205 
198 Cf. Art. 1 Competition Damages Directive.
199 Recitals 3 and 5 Competition Damages Directive respectively.
200 See subsection 6.2.1 above.
201 Milutinovic (2010), p. 143.
202 See Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, p. 3; Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the green paper 
on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, p. 9 Commission, 
Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 7 (n. 5); Commission, Impact assessment report on 
damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 12. In Commis-
sion, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 2, it is simply 
said that damages claims are “an important area of private enforcement of EU competition 
law”. On the possibilities of injunctive relief in a competition law context, see further 
para. 291 below.
203 Art. 2(1) Competition Damages Directive.
204 Art. 2(2) Competition Damages Directive.
205 Recital 12 Competition Damages Directive.
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presumably in particular the Court’s ruling in Manfredi.206 The Commission 
had held earlier that such a codification increases legal certainty and aware-
ness.207 Specifically as regards the obligation to compensate interest, the 
recitals add that this is without prejudice to the qualification of such interest 
as compensatory or default interest and to whether the effluxion of time is 
taken into account as a separate category or rather as part of the actual loss 
or loss of profit.208 The clarification proposed by the Commission’s that it 
concerns “interest from the time the harm occurred until the compensation in 
respect of that harm has actually been paid”209 was not retained by the EU legis-
lature however. Although the directive does not mention this expressly, the 
Commission further appears to consider that non-material damage is also 
compensable.210
The directive further stipulates that full compensation under this direc-
tive shall not lead to overcompensation, whether by means of punitive, mul-
tiple or other types of damages.211 This too is a deviation from the proposal, 
where no such provision was foreseen. The Commission had agreed that 
certain safeguards ought to be provided for, but it had also held that no risk 
of ‘overcompensation’ had occurred in the Member States.212 This provision 
is in line with the position expressed by many respondents to the earlier 
consultations and by the European Parliament.213 It appears that accord-
ingly this provision was inserted particularly at the insistence of this latter 
institution.214 The directive also codifies the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness in relation to the damages actions covered by the directive.215
231. The Competition Damages Directive states that quantifying the harm 
resulting from the infringements that it covers is “a very fact-intensive process 
and may require the application of complex economic models”, which is said to be 
“often very costly” and the cause of “difficulties for claimants in terms of obtain-
206 CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 95-97, discussed in para. 214 
above. Cf. Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 
404, pp. 4 and 13; Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on 
damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 56-59.
207 Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165, p. 7.
208 Recital 12 Competition Damages Directive.
209 Ibid., p. 31 (Art. 2(2)).
210 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 13.
211 Art. 2(2) Competition Damages Directive.
212 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 18. See also its p. 26, where it is noted that a trade-off exists 
between a higher chance of full compensation and a risk of overcompensation.
213 See para. 219 above.
214 European Parliament, Report on the proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, 
A7-0089/2014, p. 17 (Art. 2(2a)).
215 Art. 3 Competition Damages Directive. On these two principles generally, see further sec-
tion 2.2 above.
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ing the necessary data to substantiate their claims”.216 This is therefore consid-
ered to constitute a “substantial barrier preventing effective claims for 
compensation”.217 This view is widely shared.218 Against this background, the 
Competition Damages Directive sets out the following four specific mea-
sures in an attempt to address this situation.
In the first place, the Member States must ensure that the burden and the 
standard of proof required for the quantification of harm is not such as to ren-
der the exercise of the right to damages practically impossible or excessively 
difficult.219 This is in effect a restatement of the EU law principle of effec-
tiveness that would otherwise have applied anyway in the absence of more 
specific EU rules.220 The second measure is that the national court must be 
empowered to estimate the amount of harm.221 This is meant to take account 
of the fact that the quantification of the damage is, by definition, a hypo-
thetical exercise which cannot be made with complete accuracy.222 Most 
(although not all) national jurisdictions already provided for the possibility 
of ex aequo et bono determination or similar manners of leaving the national 
court seised some leeway in determining the amount of damages.223 Differ-
ent from the Commission’s proposal,224 this obligation under the directive 
is qualified in two ways however, as it is to take place “in accordance with 
national procedures” and it must be practically impossible or excessively dif-
ficult to precisely quantify the harm suffered.
In the third place, the directive provides for a rebuttable presumption that 
cartel infringements cause harm.225 This rests on findings that in practice the 
great majority of these infringements do indeed lead to harm being 
caused.226 From the side of the European Parliament this provision had ini-
tially been criticised for being “a generalisation of reality which is not entirely 
216 Recital 41 Competition Damages Directive.
217 Recital 41 Competition Damages Directive. On issues of quantifi cation, see also Commis-
sion, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 
165, p. 7; Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 60-61.
218 See e.g. Komninos (2008), p. 210; Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 311; Calisti & Haasbeek (2013), 
p. 5; Danov & Becker (2013), p. 79; Butz (2014), p. 331. See however also Wisking, Dietzel 
& Herron (2014), p. 190, who note that experience in the UK shows that damages can be 
assessed without signifi cant issues.
219 Art. 17(1) Competition Damages Directive.
220 On this principle, see subsection 2.2.2 above. See also recital 42 Competition Damages 
Directive.
221 Art. 17(1) Competition Damages Directive.
222 Recital 42 Competition Damages Directive.
223 Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the green paper on damages actions for 
breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, p. 40. See also Study Ashurst (2004), 
pp. 70-71; Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), pp. 451-452.
224 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 39 
(Art. 16(2)).
225 Art. 17(2) Competition Damages Directive.
226 See para. 206 above.
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accurate”,227 but it was retained nonetheless. Its reference to cartels implies 
that this rule does not apply to other sorts of infringements to which the 
Competition Damages Directive applies.228 This is in fact not a rule on quan-
tification properly speaking, as it merely provides that harm was caused, 
rather than that it relates to the question how much harm was caused.229 Cru-
cially, neither does it indicate to whom the harm was caused. That seems to 
imply that each individual applicant must still demonstrate that it suffered 
harm.230 The fourth and last measure on quantification provided for in the 
directive is new as compared to the Commission’s proposal, although it had 
been suggested earlier in the legal literature.231 It concerns the possibility for 
national competition authorities to assist national courts regarding the determi-
nation of the quantum of damages.232 While the directive obliges the Mem-
ber States to create this possibility, it also specifies that this is to occur upon 
request by the court and only where the authority deems this appropriate. 
To some extent similar arrangements already exist in some Member States, 
such as Spain and Finland.233
232. The four abovementioned measures on quantifying the harm should 
moreover be understood in their broader context. In as far as the directive 
itself is concerned, especially the directive’s measures on the disclosure of 
evidence, discussed below, can be of importance in relation to the quanti-
fication of the harm caused by a competition law infringement.234 For this 
can allow an applicant to obtain the information necessary for it to be able 
to adequately substantiate its claim where issues of quantification are con-
cerned. Furthermore in 2013, together with its proposal for the Competition 
Damages Directive, the Commission issued non-legally binding guidance.235 
This includes a practical guide that aims to assist national courts and par-
ties involved in actions for damages for competition law infringements by 
outlining economic and practical insights that may be of use when quan-
227 European Parliament, Draft report on the proposal for the Competition Damages Direc-
tive, 2013/0185(COD), p. 47. See also Batchelor, Pike & Ghiorghies (2013), p. 164.
228 The term ‘cartel’ is defi ned in Art. 4(14) Competition Damages Directive. Its recital 43 
explains that this limitation to cartels is considered justifi ed in light of the secretive nature 
of cartels, which makes it more diffi cult for applicants to obtain the necessary evidence.
229 Cf. recital 43 Competition Damages Directive. Cf. Calisti & Haasbeek (2013), p. 5.
230 Cf. Council, doc. 8088/14, p. 12.
231 See e.g. Rüggeberg & Schinkel (2006), pp. 407-418. See also Study CEPS, Erasmus Univer-
sity Rotterdam & LUISS, pp. 200-201.
232 Art. 17(3) Competition Damages Directive.
233 Komninos (2014), p. 155 (describing this as a “well-intended but fl awed idea”).
234 See subsection 6.3.3 below.
235 Cf. recital 42 Competition Damages Directive, where it is said that the Commission 
should provide general guidance at EU level in order to ensure coherence and predict-
ability.
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tifying the harm caused by an infringement.236 The guide sets out various 
methods and techniques that can be used to establish as precisely as pos-
sible the ‘non-infringement’ or the ‘counterfactual’ scenario, i.e. what would 
probably have happened had the infringement not occurred, for instance in 
terms of the development of prices. On the basis of such a counterfactual 
scenario a comparison can be made with what actually happened, whereby 
the difference can thus (possibly) be taken as a yardstick to determine the 
extent of the harm.
6.3.3. Disclosure measures
233. One of the key elements of the Competition Damages Directive is a set 
of measures relating to the disclosure, preservation and use of evidence in the 
context of the actions for damages covered. Before the adoption of the direc-
tive, the great majority of the Member States already provided for the pos-
sibility of some form of disclosure of evidence in private enforcement pro-
ceedings.237 But these rules can be interpreted in a restrictive manner, thus 
making disclosure difficult in practice, as is the case for instance in Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain.238 Moreover in many Member States, such as Ger-
many, France and the Czech Republic, only specifically designated pieces of 
evidence (as opposed to entire categories of evidence) are disclosable.239 
Rules on the involvement of third parties and the disclosure of evidence 
included in the file of competition authorities also differ across the EU. 
According to the Commission, this thus constituted “the primary example of 
divergence”, while holding that many of these national rules are inadequate 
to guarantee effective access to evidence.240 The directive’s disclosure 
regime could only be agreed after “intense negotiations” between the two EU 
co-legislators.241 While the main features of the Commission’s proposal 
remain intact, it was considerably altered during the legislative process.242
236 Commission, Practical guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 and 102 TFEU, SWD(2013) 205. See also Commission, Communi-
cation on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, OJ 2013, C 167/19.
237 Ibid., p. 17. See also Study Ashurst (2004), pp. 61-65; Study CEPS, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), pp. 345-357.
238 Barone & Amore (2010), p. 355; Callol (2010), p. 388; Lunsingh Scheurleer et al. (2010), 
p. 372; Siragusa (2014), p. 254.
239 See e.g. Jalabert-Doury (2010), pp. 318 and 338; Uřičař (2011), p. 144; Stauber (2014), p. 32.
240 Commission, Practical guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 and 102 TFEU, SWD(2013) 205, p. 19.
241 Council, doc. 8088/14, p. 5.
242 Commission, Proposal for Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, pp. 33-35 
(Art. 5-8).
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In essence this regime reflects an effort to reconcile two conflicting con-
siderations, leading to what has been called a “Faustian dilemma”.243 On the 
one hand the litigation at issue here is said to typically require a complex 
factual and economic analysis, notably as regards establishing the infringe-
ment, quantifying the damage caused and establishing causality, and to be 
characterised by an ‘information asymmetry’.244 This refers to much of the 
relevant evidence often being in the possession of the defendant and third 
parties, without it being sufficiently known or accessible to the private par-
ty-applicant. The crucial importance of adequate access to evidence is wide-
ly agreed.245 All this thus points to a need to provide for rules on the disclo-
sure of evidence that are, seen from the point of view of the (potential) 
applicant, generally ‘permissive’. On the other hand the disclosure of some 
of the evidence that is included in the file of a competition authority (i.e. the 
Commission or a national authority246) is considered to be potentially harm-
ful for the public enforcement of the rules at issue.247 That applies in particu-
lar for leniency statements and settlement submissions, in which undertak-
ings confess or agree not to contest their infringements with a view to 
obtaining immunity from fines or ending the public enforcement proceed-
ings respectively.248 This thus corresponds to the directive’s second objec-
tive, i.e. coordinating public and private enforcement. As the Court of Jus-
tice made clear in its aforementioned Pfleiderer case law, in the absence of 
specific rules of EU law it cannot simply be presumed that this type of evi-
dence is barred from being disclosed.249 This thus corresponds to what 
could be called the ‘restrictive’ element of the directive’s disclosure regime.
234. The main rule for which the Competition Damages Directive provides 
against this background is that, upon request of the applicant, the compe-
tent national court must be able to order the defendant or a third party to 
disclose relevant evidence that lies in their control.250 To this aim the private 
party requesting the disclosure must present “a reasoned justification contain-
ing reasonably available facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of 
243 Völcker, (2012), p. 695. On this tension, see further e.g. Canenbley & Steinvorth (2011), 
p. 315; Cauffman (2011a), p. 181; Rizzuto (2012), p. 1; Beumer & Karpetas (2012), p. 123.
244 See in particular recitals 13-14 Competition Damages Directive. See e.g. also Commission, 
Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 28-29; Commission, Proposal for the Competition 
Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, pp. 13-14.
245 See e.g. Bruns (2011), p. 130; Batchelor, Pike & Ghiorghies (2013), p. 161; Danov & Dnes 
(2013), p. 43; Kammin & Becker (2013), p. 67; Howard (2014), p. 53.
246 Cf. Art. 2(7) Competition Damages Directive.
247 See in particular recitals 18 and 21 Competition Damages Directive.
248 On these leniency and settlement programmes, see further subsection 6.4.2 below.
249 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfleiderer. See further subsection 6.2.4 above. See also CoJ case 
C-557/12, Kone, para. 36.
250 Art. 5(1) Competition Damages Directive.
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its claim for damages”.251 For reasons of equality of arms,252 the defendant can 
also make such a request, presumably subject to the same conditions.
The directive aims to give a central function to the national courts that 
are to decide on these requests for disclosure.253 They are expected to exer-
cise strict control.254 That is consistent with the legal tradition in the great 
majority of Member States.255 The national courts must be able to order the 
disclosure of specified pieces of evidence or of relevant categories of evi-
dence circumscribed as precisely and as narrowly as possible, while ensur-
ing however that any disclosure is limited to what is proportionate in light 
of the legitimate interests of all parties concerned.256 In that connection the 
courts must consider in particular three explicitly mentioned factors, name-
ly: (i) the extent to which the claim or defence is supported by available facts 
and evidence justifying the request; (ii) the scope and cost of the disclosure, 
especially for any third parties concerned, also to avoid non-specific search-
es of information which is unlikely to be of relevance (i.e. so-called ‘fishing 
expeditions’257); and (iii) whether the evidence in question contains confi-
dential information, especially concerning any third parties, and the 
arrangements for the protection of such information.
As is already implicit in this last factor, confidential information can in 
principle be disclosed under the directive, where the court considers this 
relevant. However Member States must ensure that effective measures are 
available to protect this information.258 Full effect must further be given to 
applicable legal professional privileges under EU or national law.259
251 Art. 5(1) Competition Damages Directive.
252 Cf. recital 14 Competition Damages Directive.
253 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 14.
254 Recital 15 Competition Damages Directive.
255 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 14. 
See also Bruns (2011), p. 129.
256 Art. 5(2) and (3) Competition Damages Directive. See also its recital 15. Art. 5(4) of this 
directive stipulates that the interest of an undertaking to avoid actions for damages does 
not constitute an interest that warrants protection.
257 Cf. Council, doc. 8088/14, p. 5; European Parliament, Report on the proposal for the 
Competition Damages Directive, A7-0089/2014, p. 21 (Art. 5(3)(b)). See also recital 21 
Competition Damages Directive.
258 Art. 5(5) Competition Damages Directive. See also its recital 17.
259 Art. 5(6) Competition Damages Directive.
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235. Turning to the more ‘restrictive’ part of the rules at issue, additional 
requirements apply where the possible disclosure concerns evidence in the file 
of a competition authority.260 Three points stand out in this regard. First, sev-
eral additional factors are spelled out that the national courts must take into 
account in the context of the abovementioned proportionality assessment. In 
these cases the courts must also consider: (i) the specificity of the request for 
disclosure as regards the nature, object or content of the document submit-
ted to the competition authority; (ii) whether the party requesting disclosure 
is doing so in relation to an actions for damages; and (iii) the need to safe-
guard the effectiveness of the public enforcement of the rules of competition 
law concerned.261
Second, and most importantly, the directive distinguishes several cate-
gories of evidence. For certain categories there is a temporal ban on disclo-
sure, namely until the moment the competition authority concerned has 
closed its proceedings. This ‘grey list’ covers information that the undertak-
ing in question specifically prepared for those public enforcement proceed-
ings, information drawn up and sent by these authorities as well as any 
withdrawn settlement submissions.262 This is meant to avoid undue inter-
ference with ongoing investigations by public enforcement authorities.263 
Leniency statements and settlement submissions are on a ‘black list’, mean-
ing that these pieces of evidence cannot be disclosed at any time. This abso-
lute protection reflects the thought that leniency and settlement procedures 
are important public enforcement tools and that undertakings could be 
deterred from participating if these self-incriminating documents were dis-
closed, thus exposing them to civil liability.264 The disclosure of evidence in 
a competition authority’s file that is not covered by either of these two lists 
can in principle be ordered at any time.265
Third and finally, there are limits as regards the use of evidence that 
is obtained solely through access to the file of a competition authority. Such 
access is given to undertakings so as to allow them to exercise their rights 
of defence in public enforcement proceedings.266 But this information could 
260 Pursuant to Art. 6(1) Competition Damages Directive the above rules are without preju-
dice to the rules and practices on public access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, OJ 2001, L 145/43 (‘Transparency Regulation’). On the possible disclosure of 
documents in the Commission’s file under that regulation, see CoJ case C-365/12 P, 
EnBW Energie. On this latter line of case law, see further Kellerbauer (2014), p. 56. Accord-
ing to Bentley & Henry (2014), p. 277, the directive leaves this case law intact and reaf-
fi rms that the route to disclosure via that regulation if effectively barred.
261 Art. 6(4) Competition Damages Directive.
262 Art. 6(5) and (6) Competition Damages Directive respectively. Pursuant to its Art. 6(8) 
partial disclosure of evidence falling within the ‘grey list’ is to be ordered where possible.
263 Recital 23 Competition Damages Directive.
264 Recital 24 Competition Damages Directive.
265 Art. 6(9) Competition Damages Directive.
266 Cf. Art. 27(2) Competition Regulation 1/2003.
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also be used in private enforcement proceedings. ‘Black listed’ evidence 
obtained in this manner is therefore to be deemed inadmissible in legal pro-
ceedings covered by the directive.267 The same applies for ‘grey listed’ evi-
dence, as long as the public enforcement proceedings in question have not 
been closed.268 For all other evidence obtained through this access to file 
there is also a restriction as to its use, namely that it can only be used in an 
action for damages by the party that the party in question or its legal succes-
sor, including a party that acquired this party’s claim.269 This latter rule is 
meant to prevent the information in question from becoming the object of 
trade.270
236. For the time being it remains an open question how – if and when 
asked – the Court of Justice would assess the above regime in light of its 
earlier rulings in Pfleiderer and especially Donau Chemie.271 It will be recalled 
that in those ruling the Court essentially refused, on the basis of the law as it 
stood prior to the directive, to prioritise the interest associated with public 
enforcement – and in particular the protection of leniency programmes – 
over the interests of private parties having suffered harm. It instead stressed 
the importance of both interests and insisted on a case-by-case weighting by 
the judiciary. On the one hand a legislative rule providing for absolute non-
disclosure precludes by definition such a weighting exercise. This could be 
understood to mean that therefore (also) the EU legislature cannot provide 
for such a rule. Concerns of this kind arose during the legislative process 
leading to the adoption of the Competition Damages Directive, especially on 
267 Art. 7(1) Competition Damages Directive. Instead of being deemed inadmissible, the evi-
dence in question may also be otherwise protected under the applicable national rules so 
as to ensure the full effect of the rule on the non-disclosure of this type of evidence.
268 Art. 7(2) Competition Damages Directive.
269 Art. 7(3) Competition Damages Directive.
270 Recital 23 Competetion Damages Directive.
271 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer; CoJ case C-536/11, Donau Chemie. See further para. 221-222 
above. For the sake of brevity it is presumed here that, despite the legal and factual differ-
ences, the logic underpinning this case law is also applicable to the situations covered by 
the Competition Damages Directive, including where evidence in the Commission’s fi le 
is concerned. Cf. Cauffman (2011b), pp. 608 and 611. It can further be noted that the EU 
legislature is not bound by the principle of effectiveness, discussed in subsection 2.2.2 
above, which was at issue in the abovementioned rulings. Any possible assessment by 
the CoJ would therefore probably rather concern compliance with the principle of pro-
portionality and the principle of effective judicial protection guaranteed under Art. 47 
Charter. On the relationship between the principle of effectiveness and the principle of 
effective judicial protection, see also para. 44 above. On the CoJ’s review of compliance 
by the EU legislature with the principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights set 
out in the Charter, see further subsection 10.1.2 below. Lastly, as this case law did not 
relate to settlement programmes, it remains an open question how the CoJ would rule on 
the absolute and temproral protection of the documents relating thereto.
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the side of the European Parliament,272 and in the legal literature.273 Consid-
ering the approach eventually chosen some scope for discussion on this 
point therefore remains also after the adoption of this directive.274
Yet it must be acknowledged on the other hand that the abovemen-
tioned ‘black list’ is limited to the documents that touch upon the very 
essence of this public enforcement tool, namely the leniency applications 
themselves. The temporal non-disclosure of the documents on the more 
extensive ‘grey list’ is moreover ‘compensated’ for by the extension of the 
applicable limitation periods.275 Arguably the above regime does not leave a 
private party-applicant worse off as compared to a situation where no such 
public enforcement mechanisms exist at all, as is the case elsewhere in EU 
law and in civil litigation generally. That party is thus ‘merely’ denied a 
weapon that it would not have had anyway in an ‘ordinary’ tort case, 
whereas there seems no reason to believe that a private enforcement action 
in a competition case can generally only succeed where the applicant has 
access to the documents concerned.276 That applies even more so in light of 
the other measures provided for in this directive, which in many cases are 
favourable to the applicants.277
237. The Competition Damages Directive further provides for several com-
plementary rules relating to the above measures on the disclosure and non-
disclosure of evidence. One of these is that the party from whom disclosure 
is sought must be provided with an opportunity to be heard before the order 
is granted.278 Another one is that an applicant must be able to request the 
national court to verify whether that a document is indeed a leniency state-
272 See European Parliament, Draft report on the proposal for the Competition Damages 
Directive, 2013/0185(COD), p. 26; Council, doc. 6493/14, p. 3. See also the suggestion to 
provide for the non-disclosure of these documents “as a general rule” (i.e. allowing excep-
tions in certain cases), set out in European Parliament, Report on the proposal for the 
Competition Damages Directive, A7-0089/2014, p. 22 (Art. 6(2a)).
273 E.g. Cauffmann (2013), p. 632; Gamble (2013), pp. 619-620; Guttuso (2014), p. 20; Kersting 
(2014), p. 2; Murphy (2014), p. 224; Nordlander & Abenhaïm (2014), p. 5; Stauber (2014), 
p. 26; Weidt (2014), pp. 440 and 444; Wisking, Dietzel & Herron (2014), p. 188. On this 
question, see also Opinion AG Jääskinen case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, para. 52-69.
274 As noted by Kumar Singh (2014), p. 118, the approach chosen by the EU lgislature is in 
effect closer to the one suggested by Advocate General Mazák in Pfl eiderer than to the 
Court’s ruling in that case. See Opinion AG Mazák case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer, referred to in 
para. 221 above.
275 Art. 10(5) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 244 below.
276 Cf. CoJ case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, para. 33; CoJ case C-365/12 P, EnBW Energie, 
para. 132.
277 See e.g. the relatively ‘generous’ disclosure regime set out in Art. 5 Competition Damages 
Directive, discussed in para. 234 above, but e.g. also other rules of evidence set out in its 
Art. 9, 14(2) and 17(1) and (2), discussed in para. 243 and 240 below and para. 231 above 
respectively. As is discussed in para. 351 below, there is evidently a relationship between 
the rules on the access to evidence (or the lack thereof) and the rules on the burden and the 
standard of proof.
278 Art. 5(7) Competition Damages Directive.
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ment or a settlement submission, as defined by the directive.279 In this con-
nection the court can ask (only) the competent competition authority for 
assistance, while the author of the document in question may also be heard. 
Furthermore a competition authority may, on its own initiative, state its 
views on the proportionality of a disclosure request concerning evidence 
included in its file.280 Under the directive that authority is to be addressed 
itself by a disclosure order only as a last resort, i.e. only where the parties to 
the proceedings or a third party cannot reasonably do so.281 While there 
seems something to say for instead turning to the competition authorities 
first, given the availability of these documents in their files and the associ-
ated reduced costs, efforts and intrusion on the side of the private parties 
concerned,282 this was however considered as too much of a burden on these 
authorities.283
Penalties are to be provided for in case of non-compliance with a disclo-
sure order, the destruction of evidence, non-compliance with an obligation 
to protect confidential information and breaches of the abovementioned 
limits on the use of evidence.284 The directive specifies that these penalties 
must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and, more specifically, that 
they must include the possibility for the court to draw adverse inferences 
(e.g. presuming something to be proven, or dismissal of the claim or 
defence), which is seen as a particularly effective penalty in this regard, as 
well as the possibility to order the payment of costs.285 Lastly, the directive 
stipulates that the Member States may provide for rules that lead to wider 
disclosure, without prejudice however to the aforementioned rules on the 
disclosure of confidential information, the right to be heard and the disclo-
sure of evidence included in the file of a competition authority.286
6.3.4. Joint and several liability and passing-on
238. Under the Competition Damages Directive the undertakings that 
committed an infringement through joint behaviour, such as a cartel, are 
jointly and severally liable for the harm caused. This means that each of 
those undertakings is bound to compensate the harm in full and that a pri-
vate party having suffered harm can require full compensation from any of 
279 Art. 6(7) Competition Damages Directive. For these two defi nitions, see its Art. 4(16) and 
(18).
280 Art. 6(11) Competition Damages Directive. See also its recital 27.
281 Art. 6(10) Competition Damages Directive. See also its recital 26.
282 Cf. Rosch (2014), p. 192; Siragusa (2014), p. 254.
283 Council, doc. 6493/14, p. 4. Cf. European Parliament, Report on the proposal for the 
Competition Damages Directive, A7-0089/2014, p. 20 (Art. 5(1a)).
284 Art. 8 Competition Damages Directive.
285 Cf. recital 30 Competition Damages Directive. It would seem however that penalties of 
this kind are of little relevance where third parties fail to comply with disclosure orders 
addressed to them. See also Bruns (2011), pp. 136-137.
286 Art. 5(8) Competition Damages Directive.
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them until it is fully compensated.287 Where relevant it is then for the under-
taking concerned to recover a contribution from its co-infringers. The 
amount of that contribution is to be determined in light of the undertakings’ 
relative responsibility for the harm in question, in accordance with the 
applicable rules of national law.288 In certain cases specific rules apply where 
the infringing undertaking is a small or medium-sized enterprise.289
Whereas these rules clearly seek to further the objective of ensuring full 
compensation, the objective of coordinating public and private enforcement 
also plays a role here. Undertakings that have been granted immunity from 
fines under a leniency programme are protected from “undue exposure to 
damages claims”.290 This was deemed necessary because the competition 
authority’s decision finding an infringement is likely to become final at an 
earlier stage with respect to these undertakings than with respect to the co-
infringing undertakings that were not granted leniency (and which may 
therefore contest that decision). This could mean that the immunity recipi-
ent becomes the most likely target in a (‘follow-on’) action for damages, 
where he would risk being required to compensate the applicant in full.291 
For that reason the directive relieves immunity recipients in principle from 
joint and several liability for the full damage caused. That undertaking 
remains jointly and severally liable only vis-à-vis its direct or indirect pur-
chasers or providers, whereas other injured parties can only claim damages 
from this undertaking where they cannot obtain full compensation from the 
other infringing undertakings.292 These co-infringers can similarly only 
recover a contribution from that undertaking that does not exceed the 
amount of harm caused to the latter’s direct or indirect purchasers or pro-
viders.293
239. A separate issue is the so-called ‘passing-on defence’, in respect of which 
considerable divergences were observed to exist at national level before the 
directive’s adoption.294 The Competition Damages Directive harmonises 
these national rules by expressly permitting this defence. This means that a 
287 Art. 11(1) Competition Damages Directive.
288 Art. 11(4) Competition Damages Directive. See also its recital 33.
289 Art. 11(3) Competition Damages Directive. See also its recital 33.
290 Recital 28 Competition Damages Directive.
291 Cf. Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, 
pp. 16-17.
292 Art. 11(3) Competition Damages Directive. See also its recital 33.
293 Art. 11(4) Competition Damages Directive. See also its Art. 11(5). The Council initially 
considered that this contribution regime, as proposed by the Commission, went further 
than necessary to neutralise the negative effects of actions for damages on leniency pro-
grammes, described above. But at the insistence of the European Parliament it later 
accepted the Commission proposal on this point, as this was considered to increase the 
effi ciency of enforcement. See Council doc. 15983/13, p. 3; Council, doc. 6493/14, p. 5.
294 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 16-17. On issues related to passing-on, see further Bulst (2011), 
p. 67.
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defendant can argue that the private party claiming damages passed-on, in 
whole or in part, the alleged harm resulting from the infringement to its 
own customers in the form of higher prices (‘overcharge’).295 After all, if it 
emerges that such passing-on did indeed occur, it was this ‘indirect pur-
chaser’ that actually suffered the harm and not the initial applicant.296 Com-
pensating the latter in such a case would thus result in overcompensation, 
which is expressly precluded under the directive.297 It is for the defendant 
that wishes to rely on the passing-on defence to prove not only the existence, 
but also the extent of the pass-on.298 The national courts concerned must be 
empowered to estimate which share of the overcharge was passed on, in 
accordance with the applicable rules of national law.299 The directive 
requires the Commission to issue guidelines on how to make such esti-
mates.300
240. The availability of the passing-on defence logically leads to the ques-
tion whether the said indirect purchaser can claim damages for the harm suf-
fered lower down the supply chain as a consequence of this passing-on. The 
directive expressly answers this question in the affirmative.301 In this case 
the burden of proving the existence and the extent of the pass-on rests in 
principle with this applicant however.302 Apart from the abovementioned 
possibility for the national court to estimate the share of the overcharge that 
was passed-on, which also applies here, the directive seeks to alleviate this 
burden on the indirect purchaser also in another manner. For it is provided 
that this private party is deemed to have proven that the passing-on to it 
occurred, where it can make a prima facie case to this effect.303 This means 
that the indirect purchaser must show that the defendant committed an 
infringement resulting in an overcharge and that it purchased the goods or 
services that were the subject of this infringement. It is then for the defen-
dant to rebut this presumption.304
When assessing whether the burden of proof relating to actions by indi-
rect purchasers is satisfied, national courts must, by means available under 
Union and national law, take due account of actions for damages and judg-
295 Art. 13 Competition Damages Directive. See also its recital 35.
296 Note that the higher prices resulting from the passing-on of an overcharge can result in 
reduced sales and thus a loss of profi t for the applicant. The rights to claim compensation 
for such loss of profi t remains unaffected by the availability of the passing-on defence. 
See Article 12(3) and recital 36 Competition Damages Directive.
297 Art. 12(1) and (2) Competition Damages Directive.
298 Art. 13 Competition Damages Directive.
299 Art. 12(5) Competition Damages Directive. This presumes that the overcharge is passed-
on in full. If the passing-on is only partial, the applicant remains capable of claiming the 
remaining part as damage from the infringing undertaking.
300 Art. 16 Competition Damages Directive.
301 Art. 12(1) Competition Damages Directive.
302 Art. 14(1) Competition Damages Directive.
303 Cf. recital 37 Competition Damages Directive.
304 Art. 14(2) Competition Damages Directive.
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ments relating to the same infringement brought by applicants from other 
levels in the supply chain, as well as relevant information in the public 
domain resulting from public enforcement cases.305 The same applies as 
regards the burden of proof relating to the aforementioned passing-on 
defence. The underlying aim here is to ensure consistency and to avoid both 
undue multiple liability and an undue absence of liability for damage 
caused by the infringements at issue, without disregarding the rights of 
defence and right to effective judicial protection of the parties concerned.306
6.3.5. Procedural provisions and related issues
241. The first of the five remaining issues to be discussed here is that of 
legal standing. The Competition Damages Directive contains no specific pro-
vision that outlines which private parties are entitled to bring legal proceed-
ings under this directive. But that does not mean that this subject-matter is 
not regulated with a degree of detail. In fact, several provisions contain rel-
evant indications. Most important is the provision that the directive seeks to 
ensure that “[a]nyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of compe-
tition law” can exercise the right to compensation.307 This is a reaffirmation 
of earlier case law.308 This wording makes it clear that a wide category of 
private parties is to have legal standing under the directive. That is con-
firmed elsewhere in the directive, where reference is made in this connection 
to “any natural or legal person”309 and where it is moreover clarified that this 
applies “irrespective of whether they are direct or indirect purchasers”.310 The 
recitals further explain that this term ‘anyone’ includes consumers, under-
takings and public authorities alike, irrespective of the existence of a direct 
contractual relationship with the infringing undertaking and regardless of 
whether or not a competition authority has previously found an infringe-
ment to exist.311
242. The second issue is the forum before which the actions for damages at 
issue are to be brought. In this regard the directive simply refers to “national 
courts”.312 This term has been defined as “any court or tribunal of a Member 
305 Art. 15(1) Competition Damages Directive.
306 See recital 40 Competition Damages Directive. See also Commission, Proposal for the 
Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, pp. 17-18.
307 Art. 1(1) Competition Damages Directive.
308 See recital 12 Competition Damages Directive. See in particular CoJ case C-453/99, Cou-
rage, para. 24, discussed in para. 231 above.
309 Art. 2(1) Competition Damages Directive.
310 Art. 12(1) Competition Damages Directive.
311 Recital 12 Competition Damages Directive. See also its recital 3. For an example of a pri-
vate enforcement action brought by a public authority (i.e. the Commission), see CoJ case 
C-199/11, Otis.
312 See e.g. Art. 1(2) Competition Damages Directive.
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State within the meaning of Article 267 [TFEU]”.313 This latter article sets out 
the preliminary reference procedure. In this manner it is ensured that the 
national court seised by an action for damages under the directive can refer 
preliminary questions to the Court of Justice. This reference to Article 267 
TFEU moreover means that these national courts must meet the conditions 
set in the Court’s case law on this Treaty article.314 Thus, while the compe-
tent body need not necessarily be judicial in character, account is taken, 
among other things, of whether it has a basis in law, it is independent and 
the proceedings are inter partes. Although this is not required under the 
directive, the presumption is that it is normally for the national civil courts 
to rule on the damages claims in question.315 As the Commission noted in its 
proposal, “[a]warding compensation is […] within the domain of national courts 
and of civil law and procedure”.316 While this statement is undoubtedly correct, 
it appears that in several Member States a degree of specialisation is ensured 
with respect to competition-related private enforcement actions. That is the 
case for instance in England and Wales (Competition Appeal Tribunal) and 
France (specialised chambers in a limited number of courts).317
243. Furthermore there is the issue of the effect of decisions by national compe-
tition authorities (and by the national courts reviewing those decisions) find-
ing a competition law infringement in legal proceedings brought under the 
directive. Pursuant to the Competition Regulation national courts cannot 
take decisions in those proceedings that run counter to the decisions taken 
by the Commission.318 Whether these national authorities can and should be 
treated on a par with the Commission in this respect remained contested 
however. The relevant national rules pre-dating the directive vary consider-
ably. While binding effect for decision by the ‘home’ competition authority 
is not uncommon, only very few Member States (notably Germany) extend 
this rule to decisions by ‘foreign’ authorities.319 Providing for such a rule at 
EU level would clearly be helpful to applicants in private enforcement cases. 
It could also help avoid diverging rulings across the EU. But it would also 
mean that a national court would no longer be free to make its own judg-
313 Art. 4(9) Competition Damages Directive.
314 See also para. 22 above.
315 See e.g. recital 6 Competition Damages Directive, where reference is made to “private 
enforcement actions under civil law”. See e.g. also the reference to Evidence Regulation 
1206/2001, laid down in Art. 5(1) Competition Damages Directive. That regulation only 
applies to the taking of evidence on civil and commercial matters (see its Art. 1(1)).
316 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 2.
317 Jalabert-Doury (2010), p. 320; Smith, Maton & Cambell (2010), pp. 301-302. See also Study 
Ashurst (2004), pp. 31-36.
318 Art. 16(1) Competition Regulation 1/2003. See para. 203 above.
319 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 16 and 57. See also Buccirossi & Carpagnano (2013), p. 5; Este-
va Mosso (2013), p. 51. Here it is reported that, apart from Germany, Sweden also pro-
vides for such a rule under its national law, whereas Austria is in the process of imple-
menting one.
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ment on the important point of whether or not an infringement occurred. 
Instead that court would be bound by a finding to this effect by a public 
authority of another Member State, notwithstanding the fact that the stan-
dards and procedural safeguards applicable in national public enforcement 
proceedings vary between the Member States. Given these complexities, this 
was “one of the more controversial issues” at the stage of the consultations pre-
ceding the directive.320 And also in the legal literature this issue proved to 
be controversial.321
This controversy continued during the legislative process. The Commis-
sion had proposed that a national court seised in an action for damages 
under the directive would be categorically barred from taking a decision 
running counter to a finding of an infringement by a national competition 
authority (or review court), regardless of whether it concerned a finding by 
the ‘home’ or a ‘foreign’ competition authority.322 In view of the diverging 
view both between the Member States and between the two co-legislators, 
in the end a different compromise was struck however.323 Such a finding is 
now deemed to be “irrefutably established” in the actions for damages cov-
ered by the directive only in so far as it does not concern a decision given in 
another Member State.324 In the latter case, the decision may, in accordance 
with the relevant rules of national law, “be presented before [the] national courts 
as at least prima facie evidence that an infringement of competition law has occurred 
and, as appropriate, may be assessed along with any other material brought by the 
parties”.325
244. The fourth issue concerns rules on limitation periods for initiating legal 
proceedings. According to the Commission, the fact that a vast majority of 
the Member States did not provide for limitation periods specifically for 
‘follow-on’ actions constituted an important obstacle for successfully bring-
ing actions for damages.326 The Competition Damages Directive therefore 
requires Member States to lay down rules in this regard, without these rules 
being restricted to ‘follow-on’ actions only however. Under the directive the 
Member States are to specify when the limitation period begins to run, its 
duration and the circumstances under which it can be suspended or inter-
320 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 57.
321 See e.g. Komninos (2007), p. 1387; Milutinovic (2010), pp. 281-301; Bruns (2011), p. 140; 
Komninos (2014), pp. 147-149; Milutinovic (2014), pp. 357-360.
322 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 36 
(Art. 9).
323 Council doc. 15983/13, p. 3; Council, doc. 6493/14, p. 3. See also European Parliament, 
Report on the proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, A7-0089/2014, p. 25 (Art. 
9), from which it follows that this institution essentially supported the Commission’s 
proposal on this point.
324 Art. 9(1) Competition Damages Directive.
325 Art. 9(2) Competition Damages Directive.
326 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 16 and 57. Cf. recital 32 Competition Damages Directive.
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rupted.327 On each of these three points further precision is provided for, 
which partly builds on earlier case law by the Court of Justice.328 These rules 
boil down to the following.
First, as regards the starting point, it is specified that the limitation period 
for bringing actions for damages under the directive shall not begin to run 
before the injured party knows, or can reasonably be expected to know, 
three elements, namely: (i) the behaviour and that it constitutes an infringe-
ment; (ii) that that infringement caused harm to the applicant; and (iii) the 
identity of the infringer.329 Second, the directive specifies that the duration of 
the limitation period must be at least five years.330 Although hardly spec-
tacular in itself, this provision is notable for being one of the few instances 
where the Commission’s proposal, and subsequently the directive itself, 
went further than the 2008 white paper. For in that document the focus was 
squarely on ‘follow-on’ actions only, where this aspect is concerned.331 
Third, Member States are to ensure that the period is suspended (or inter-
rupted) if a competition authority initiates an investigation or proceedings 
in respect of the infringement at issue. That suspension shall end not earlier 
than one year after the termination of these public enforcement proceed-
ings.332 This latter provision can be expected to be of significant importance 
in practice. It implies that ‘follow-on’ actions can sometimes be brought 
many years after the moment at which the infringement had been commit-
ted, considering that it can take a long time for public enforcement proceed-
ings to be concluded with a final decision.
245. By means of a last comment, the Competition Damages Directive con-
tains rules that have been designed to encourage consensual dispute resolu-
tion, which term includes out-of-court settlements, arbitration, mediation as 
well as conciliation.333 A first measure to this effect is the requirement that 
limitation periods must be suspended for the duration of the consensual 
dispute resolution process in as far as the participants to that process are 
concerned. This is meant to give these parties sufficient time to reach an out-
of-court settlement.334 Likewise, where legal proceedings have already been 
initiated, there may be reason for the court seised to suspend those proceed-
327 Art. 10(1) Competition Damages Directive.
328 See in particular CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 77-82, discussed 
in para. 214 above.
329 Art. 10(2) Competition Damages Directive. In addition the Commission had proposed 
stipulating that the limitation period cannot begin to run before the day on which a con-
tinuous or repeated infringement ends, but this provision was not retained by the EU 
legislature. See Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, 
COM(2013) 404, p. 36 (Art. 10(3)).
330 Art. 10(3) Competition Damages Directive.
331 See Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165, pp. 8-9.
332 Art. 10(3) Competition Damages Directive.
333 Cf. recital 44 Competition Damages Directive.
334 See recital 45 Competition Damages Directive.
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ings. The directive requires the court to be empowered to do the latter, with-
out this being an obligation for the court however and subject to a maxi-
mum of two years.335
Consensual dispute resolution is further facilitated under the directive 
by the rule that pursuant to a settlement having been agreed between an 
injured party and an infringing undertaking, in case of several infringers 
that would normally be jointly and severally liable, the remaining claim can 
only be exercised against the non-settling co-infringing undertakings, 
whereas the latter cannot recover contribution from the undertaking that 
settled.336 This rule prevents settling undertakings from being worse off as a 
consequence of the rules on joint and several liability, discussed earlier.337 
Also more generally national courts are to take due account of any damages 
paid pursuant to a prior consensual settlement when determining the 
amount of contribution that co-infringers can recover from each other.338
As a last measure prescribed by the directive in this connection, compe-
tition authorities may consider that compensation paid as a result of a con-
sensual settlement prior to its decision to impose a fine is a mitigating factor 
in the setting of that fine.339 This measure had not been included in the Com-
mission’s proposal; it was inserted at the request of the European Parlia-
ment.340 This latter institution had initially sought the inclusion of a ‘volun-
tary compensation mechanism’ as part of the relevant public enforcement 
proceedings, in the form of a provision on the suspension of those proceed-
ings so as to allow for the conclusion of an out-of-court settlement and an 
obligation for the competition authority concerned to consider this a miti-
gating factor when establishing the level of the fine.341 Suggestions along 
these lines were also raised in the legal literature, where it is also noted that 
this approach has in fact at times already been put in practice both at EU 
and national level.342 The provision finally agreed upon is considerably less 
stringent however, considering especially that the directive merely provides 
for a possibility for these authorities to do so, rather than an obligation.
335 Art. 18(2) and (3) Competition Damages Directive. This requirement is without prejudice 
to provisions of national law in matters of arbitration. See also recital 46, where reference 
is made in this connection to the interest of an expedious procedure.
336 Art. 19(1) Competition Damages Directive. This provisions foresees an exception to this 
rule in cases where the non-settling co-infringers cannot pay the damages corresponding 
to the remaining claim, subject however to the possibility to expressly exclude this pos-
sibility in the settlement agreement.
337 Cf. recital 47 Competition Damages Directive. See para. 238 above.
338 Art. 19(2) Competition Damages Directive.
339 Art. 18(4) Competition Damages Directive.
340 Cf. Council, doc. 6493/14, p. 4; European Parliament, Report on the proposal for the 
Competition Damages Directive, A7-0089/2014, p. 29 (Art. 17(2b)).
341 European Parliament, Draft report on the proposal for the Competition Damages Direc-
tive, 2013/0185(COD), p. 43.
342 See Neruda (2011), pp. 245-247; Rivas & Eclair-Heath (2012), p. 1; Ratliff (2014), pp. 291-
293; Silva Morais (2014), pp. 131-132.
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6.4. Other enforcement issues
This final section concentrates on the role of alternative dispute resolution 
and out-of-court settlements, as well as on the applicable public enforcement 
regime that has traditionally been of particular importance in this domain.
6.4.1. Alternative dispute resolution and settlements
246. As in many other fields of law, alternative dispute resolution, for 
instance through arbitration or mediation, can certainly be of relevance for 
resolving disputes concerning EU competition law.343 Indeed, it has been 
held that the growing importance of arbitration in settling competition law 
disputes is too often ignored and underestimated, and that there may well 
be grounds for regulating certain aspects thereof at EU level.344 However for 
the time being it appears that especially out-of-court settlements directly 
negotiated between the parties to the dispute play an important role in prac-
tice, at least where competition disputes of the type under discussion here 
are concerned. Even if it is hard to obtain concrete data, as has already been 
briefly mentioned earlier, many private enforcement disputes are thought to 
be settled out-of-court, i.e. before a final judgment is rendered or even before 
a case is brought.345 Indeed, it may well be that at least in certain jurisdiction 
a majority of these disputes are settled, as is for example reportedly the case 
in the United Kingdom.346
247. The EU law measures in this regard are on the whole rather modest 
however. As was set out above, the Competition Damages Directive con-
tains several rules that are expressly meant to encourage consensual dispute 
resolution.347 This illustrates that this manner of resolving disputes between 
private parties relating to infringements of EU competition law is generally 
looked upon favourably by the Commission and the EU legislature. The 
Commission has pointed to its potential to provide for a speedy solution, 
reduce costs for the parties concerned and avoid overburdening the 
courts.348 Of the two co-legislators especially the European Parliament tends 
343 Cf. e.g. CoJ case 126/97, Eco Swiss.
344 Silva Morais (2014), pp. 115-117 and 134.
345 See para. 219 above.
346 Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), p. 44; Danov & Dnes (2013), 
p. 49. See also Komninos (2008), p. 187, where a study is cited that suggests that in the US 
more than 80% of private enforcement cases in this domain are settled before the courts 
awarded any damages.
347 See para. 245 above.
348 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 27-28. See e.g. also Commission, White paper on damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165, p. 3; Commission, Staff work-
ing paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC anti-
trust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 75-76.
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to take a favourable view of this form of dispute resolution, as do many 
stakeholders.349 But the rules set out in this directive essentially do no more 
than encouraging and facilitating consensual dispute resolution, for instance 
by suspending limitation periods and by removing disincentives resulting 
from rules on joint and several liability. The directive contains no rules on 
the circumstances or the manner in which these alternative dispute resolu-
tion procedures themselves are to take place. The Commission expressly 
rejected the option of introducing an obligation to engage in an effort at 
consensual dispute resolution before a private party would be able to bring 
an action for damages under the directive.350
248. Finally, it can be noted that out-of-court settlements of competition 
disputes are not necessarily to be assessed solely in positive terms, as they 
may also well have certain downsides.351 In particular, unlike court judg-
ments, these kinds of settlements are, almost by definition, not transparent. 
This mean that they therefore cannot act as precedents and do not contribute 
to the development of the law. Moreover they can lead to outcomes that are, 
if not outright anti-competitive, then at least not desirable from a competi-
tion policy point of view. For the parties concerned settling their dispute is 
after all the dominant objective, rather than ensuring compliance with the 
law and contributing to the establishment of effective and optimal competi-
tion as such.
6.4.2. Public enforcement
249. The private enforcement-related developments discussed earlier in 
this chapter notwithstanding, public enforcement has traditionally been, 
and in all likelihood will also continue to be, the dominant manner in which 
the competition rules are enforced in the EU. At EU level as well as in most 
Member States this public enforcement is generally primarily ensured by 
public authorities governed by administrative law.352
250. As far as public enforcement at EU level is concerned, the Competition 
Regulation grants the Commission far-reaching powers to investigate and 
punish (alleged) infringements of EU competition law. It can among other 
things make unannounced visits (known as ‘dawn raids’) in order to inves-
349 See e.g. European Parliament, Resolution on the white paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2009)0187, para. 7. As regards the view of stake-
holders, see Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the 
EU antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 18.
350 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 35.
351 See Wils (2003a), p. 483; Wilsher (2006), p. 35; Milutinovic (2010), pp. 242 and 356.
352 Cf. e.g. Opinion AG Geelhoed joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 29; 
Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 295.
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tigate business and private premises.353 When an infringement is established 
it can impose a range of penalties, including injunctions, structural remedies 
and fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s annual turnover.354 These pow-
ers of the Commission are subject to review by the EU courts.355
Private parties that have a sufficient interest can play a role in this con-
text by bringing alleged infringements of the EU competition rules to the 
Commission’s attention.356 They can use what could be called a ‘reinforced’ 
complaint procedure, as compared (and in addition) to the ‘general’ possi-
bility for private parties to file complaints with the Commission regarding 
alleged infringements of EU law in the context of the latter’s power to bring 
infringement proceedings against Member States.357 This complaint proce-
dure plays an important role in practice. As such it can sometimes function 
as an alternative for private parties that otherwise might have brought a 
private enforcement action against the alleged infringing undertaking 
before the national courts.358 Yet the fact remains that this complaints proce-
dure essentially only grants private party-complainants certain procedural 
rights, such as being kept informed.359 The public enforcement proceedings 
themselves that may (or may not) be initiated upon the reception of a com-
plaint remain firmly public in nature. In particular, filing such a complaint 
can never lead to the award of damages by the Commission or the EU courts 
to the private party that filed the complaint. The amounts raised by any 
fines that the Commission might eventually impose flow to the EU budget.
251. As has already been touched upon in the foregoing, leniency pro-
grammes play an important role in connection to the public enforcement in 
this field of law. The Competition Damages Directive defines a leniency pro-
gramme as “a programme concerning the application of Article 101 TFEU or a 
corresponding provision under national law on the basis of which a participant in a 
secret cartel, independently of the other undertakings involved in the cartel, cooper-
ates with an investigation of the competition authority, by voluntarily providing 
presentations of his knowledge of the cartel and his role therein, in return for which 
the participant receives, by decision or a discontinuation of proceedings, immunity 
353 Art. 20 and 21 Competition Regulation 1/2003.
354 Art. 104 TFEU; Art. 7, 17-21 and 23-24 Competition Regulation 1/2003. As to these fi nes, 
see also Commission, Guidelines on fi nes, OJ 2006, C 210/2.
355 Cf. Art. 31 Competition Regulation 1/2003, where it is specifi ed that the EU courts have 
unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby the Commission has fi xed a fi ne or 
periodic penalty payments.
356 Cf. Art. 7 Competition Regulation 1/2003; Art. 6-7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 
773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 
81 and 82 EC, OJ 2004, L 123/18 (‘Competition Proceedings Regulation’); Commission, 
Complaints notice, OJ 2004, C 101/5.
357 See subsection 2.4.1 above.
358 Cf. Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 197.
359 Cf. GC case T-24/90, Automec, para. 71-98; GC case T-306/05, Scippecercola, para. 66 and 
91-97; GC case T-432/05, EMC Development, para. 55-60 (upheld on appeal in CoJ Order 
case C-367/10 P, EMC Development).
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from any fine to be imposed for the cartel or a reduction of such fine”.360 The Com-
mission’s leniency programme was introduced in 1996.361 The EU courts 
have held that, for the undertakings concerned to qualify for a reduction of 
the fine under this programme, they must demonstrate “a genuine spirit of 
cooperation”.362 Undertakings wishing to blow the whistle can do so by sub-
mitting ‘leniency statements’ to the Commission, in which they describe 
their knowledge of the cartel and their role therein.363
Especially considering that the fines imposed by the Commission can be 
very high, this programme thus creates an important incentive for undertak-
ings to turn in their fellow cartel participants, while they themselves might 
escape punishment entirely. This incentive is increased by the rule that only 
the first leniency applicant can qualify for full immunity, provided that the 
Commission did not already have sufficient incriminating evidence and that 
the leniency applicant concerned is also actually the first to provide such 
evidence. One of the key aspects of leniency programmes is therefore that 
they create distrust between the cartel members.364 For the undertakings 
concerned cannot be certain that one of them will not turn to the competent 
competition authorities so as to obtain immunity, whereas the others could 
then be confronted with hefty fines. In this manner leniency programmes 
allow the unravelling of cartels, which are otherwise generally difficult to 
detect. In the words of the Court of Justice, “leniency programmes are useful 
tools if efforts to uncover and bring to an end infringements of competition rules are 
to be effective and serve, therefore, the objective of effective application of Articles 
101 TFEU and 102 TFEU”.365 Indeed, the practical importance of the Com-
mission’s leniency programme for its public enforcement activities in this 
field can hardly be overstated. The vast majority of the cartels it discovers 
come to light after one or more undertakings concerned having applied for 
leniency. In the 2008-2011 period, no less than 21 of the Commission’s 24 
decisions in cartel cases (i.e. 88%) resulted from applications made under its 
leniency programme.366
360 Art. 4(15) Competition Damages Directive.
361 Cf. Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU anti-
trust rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 70-71; Commission, Leniency notice, OJ 2006, C 298/17.
362 CoJ case C-301/04 P, SGL Carbon, para. 68.
363 Cf. Art. 4(16) Competition Damages Directive.
364 Cf. Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), pp. 493-499.
365 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer, para. 25.
366 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 21.
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252. Since 2008 the Commission’s competition policy also includes the 
possibility of reaching settlements in the context of public enforcement pro-
ceedings.367 Under this settlement procedure undertakings that infringed 
EU competition law, having seen the evidence against them in the Commis-
sion’s file, may choose to cooperate rather than to contest the finding of an 
infringement and the imposition of a fine by the Commission. In that case 
they must file a settlement submission, in which they acknowledge their 
participation in and responsibility for the infringement.368 In return, the 
undertaking concerned can receive a reduction (by 10%) of the fines to be 
imposed.
The main aim of this settlement procedure is to simplify the public 
enforcement proceedings, reduce public enforcement litigation before the 
EU courts and, in so doing, free Commission resources. This procedure thus 
serves a different purpose than the abovementioned leniency programme. 
Whereas the former is primarily focused on improving detection, the latter 
mainly serves the aim of efficient prosecution. According to the Commission 
the practical importance of its settlement programme has been increasing, 
with five cartel cases having been settled in the 2008-2011 period.369 The 
Commission considers that this, too, is an important tool for the public 
enforcement of EU competition law.370
253. National competition authorities also have an important role to play 
in the public enforcement of EU competition law. In fact, in quantitative 
terms (i.e. in light of the number of decisions taken) they have been said to 
have become “the primary public enforcers of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU”.371 
The Competition Regulation obliges the Member States to designate such 
authorities, empowering them to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and to 
take decisions inter alia requiring an infringement to be brought to an end, 
ordering interim measures or imposing fines and periodic penalty pay-
ments.372 These national competition authorities are also empowered to 
carry out inspections.373 Although there are notable differences between 
the various national public enforcement systems in the EU, the competition 
authorities designated by the Member States thus generally possess pow-
367 Cf. Art. 10a Competition Proceedings Regulation 773/2004; Commission, Settlement 
notice, OJ 2008, C 167/1. On the EU’s settlement regime, see further Hinds (2014), p. 292. 
These ‘public enforcement settlements’ are not to be confused with the ‘private enforce-
ment settlements’ between private parties amongst themselves, referred to in subsection 
6.4.1 above.
368 Cf. Art. 4(18) Competition Damages Directive.
369 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 21.
370 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 25 
(recital 19).
371 Wils (2013), p. 4.
372 Art. 5 and 35 Competition Regulation 1/2003.
373 Art. 22 Competition Regulation 1/2003.
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ers that are similar to those of the Commission.374 The national competi-
tion authorities cooperate among themselves and with the Commission in 
the context of the European Competition Network (ECN).375 In virtually all 
Member States leniency programmes are in place, which are largely similar 
to the Commission’s programme, described above.376 As is the case with the 
latter, these national leniency programmes also tend to take an important 
place where public enforcement at national level is concerned.377
254. It has already been seen in the foregoing that coordinating public and 
private enforcement of competition law is an important objective of the Com-
petition Damages Directive.378 According to the rules pre-dating the direc-
tive, any leniency granted by the Commission does not affect the undertak-
ing’s situation before national courts in private enforcements actions.379 The 
same applies where public enforcement settlements of the type discussed 
above are concerned. It is important to note that this remains the general 
rule also after the entry into force of the Competition Damages Directive 
and the rules of national law transposing it. This directive limits the effects 
of the private enforcement-facilitating measures laid down therein on two 
points however, with a view to safeguarding the effectiveness of the above-
mentioned public enforcement instruments. It provides, first, for the tem-
poral and (for leniency statements and settlement submissions) absolute 
non-disclosure of documents in the file of a competition authority in legal pro-
ceedings under the directive and, second, it limits the joint and several liability 
of undertakings that have been granted immunity from fines under a leni-
ency programme.380
It is further worth recalling that the Competition Damages Directive 
establishes a degree of integration in procedural terms, over and above the 
aforementioned already existing possibility under the Competition Regula-
tion for competition authorities to make amicus curiae interventions in pro-
ceedings before national courts.381 As was discussed in the foregoing, it does 
so in several manners. Under the directive these authorities may intervene 
in pending private enforcement proceedings, by submitting observations on 
the proportionality of a disclosure request and by providing assistance on 
374 Cf. recital 35 of Competition Regulation 1/2003. See e.g. also Study European Competi-
tion Network (2012a); Study European Competition Network (2012b).
375 Art. 11-15 and 22 Competition Regulation 1/2003. See also Council and Commission, 
Joint statement on the functioning of the network of competition authorities, 2002; Com-
mission, Network notice, OJ 2004, C 101/43.
376 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 71. See e.g. also Wils (2008), p. 121.
377 Cf. ibid., p. 21.
378 See in particular para. 226 above.
379 Cf. Commission, Leniency notice, OJ 2006, C 298/17, para. 39.
380 Art. 6 and 11 Competition Damages Directive. See para. 235 and 238 above respectively.
381 Art. 15 Competition Regulation 1/2003. See para. 203 above.
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the determination of the quantum of damages.382 In addition findings of 
infringements by national public enforcement authorities (and the courts 
reviewing these decisions) constitute either binding evidence or at least pri-
ma facie evidence in actions for damages under the directive.383 The effect of 
this latter rule can be reinforced by the suspension of limitation periods 
until after the termination of the public enforcement proceedings.384 Under 
the directive competition authorities may also consider any compensation 
payments made as part of consensual settlements as a mitigating factor 
when they set fines for the infringements in question.385
255. Finally, there is also another form of public enforcement of competi-
tion law, namely through criminal law. In competition cases criminal sanc-
tions can, for example, take the form of imprisonment of directors of under-
takings having been found guilty of prohibited anti-competitive behaviour. 
Over the past years the feasibility and desirability of such measures has 
regularly been discussed and it has increasingly been put into practice at 
national level.386 Several Member States, including Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, provide under their national laws for criminals sanctions for com-
petition law infringements. The sanctions imposed by the Commission itself 
are not of a criminal nature.387 Yet the EU could conceivably still play a role 
in this respect, especially by establishing an EU law obligation on the Mem-
ber States to make provision for this type of sanctions at national level and 
by setting certain common rules in this regard.388 To date no such EU legisla-
tive measures have however been adopted or proposed.
6.5. Summary
256. In the field of EU competition law there has been, and continues to be, 
no lack of attention for private enforcement-related measures of EU law. 
Article 101(2) TFEU has long provided for a contractual remedy, pursuant to 
which anticompetitive agreements are automatically void. This remedy is 
regularly used in practice, mainly in a ‘defensive’ manner. Furthermore, 
after almost a decade of studies, consultations, debates and reflections, in 
2014 agreement was reached on the Competition Damages Directive. This 
directive concentrates on one particular substantive private enforcement 
remedy, namely actions for damages. The directive aims to ensure, in the 
382 Art. 6(11) and 17(3) Competition Damages Directive. See para. 237 and 231 above respec-
tively.
383 Art. 9 Competition Damages Directive. See para. 243 above.
384 Art. 10(5) Competition Damages Directive. See para. 244 above.
385 Art. 18(4) Competition Damages Directive. See para. 245 above.
386 See e.g. Wils (2003b), pp. 409-450; Zuleeg (2003), p. 451-461; Cseres, Schienkel & Vogelaar 
(2006); Wils (2008), pp. 155-201; Zippro (2009b), pp. 147-159; Baker (2014), pp. 41-62.
387 Cf. Art. 23(5) Competition Regulation 1/2003.
388 Cf. Wils (2003b), pp. 448-449; Zuleeg (2003), pp. 455-457. See also Wils (2005), pp. 156-159.
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first place, that any private party having suffered harm as a consequence of 
an infringement can obtain full compensation. To this aim it provides inter 
alia for rules on the disclosure of evidence, the qualification, quantification 
and passing-on of harm, joint and several liability of infringers, the effects of 
decisions by public enforcement authorities, limitation periods and consen-
sual dispute resolution. However a second key objective of the Competition 
Damages Directive is the coordination of public and private enforcement 
proceedings, considering that public enforcement is the dominant manner 
in which competition law is being enforced in the EU. In practice this means 
limiting some of the private enforcement possibilities laid down in this 
directive where that is deemed necessary to safeguard the effectiveness of 
public enforcement (in particular the leniency and settlement programmes 
that the public enforcement authorities operate). The temporal and absolute 
non-disclosure of certain documents in legal proceedings covered by the 
Competition Damages Directive and the directive’s limits to the joint and 
several liability of infringing undertakings should be seen in that light.





In part A of this study the most important legal principles and case law were 
assessed, together with the relevant public enforcement mechanisms. Part B 
subsequently outlined and analysed, on an individual basis, selected EU 
legislation relating to private enforcement in four fields of EU law. It con-
cerned in particular the Procurement Remedies Directives, the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive, the Consumer Injunctions Directive, the Unfair Terms Direc-
tive and the Product Liability Directive, as well as Article 101(2) TFEU and 
the Competition Damages Directive. Building on the foregoing, part C 
essentially seeks to analyse this legislation in a comparative and contextual 
manner, with a particular emphasis on the remedies and procedural rules 
provided for therein. Where appropriate, the findings that thus emerge are 
placed in their broader context, especially as regards legislation and case 
law concerning fields of EU law other than those assessed in part B. To this 
aim the present chapter 7 concentrates on two of the three ‘main’ (substan-
tive) remedies that can be identified in this context, namely actions for dam-
ages and actions for injunctions. The following chapter 8 continues this 
assessment by analysing the third ‘main’ class of action for private enforce-
ment purposes, i.e. contractual remedies, as well as the ‘other’ relevant rem-
edies. Chapter 9 then discusses the most relevant procedural provisions and 
related other issues.
7.1. Actions for damages
In the foregoing chapters it has been seen that the Procurement Remedies 
Directives, the IPR Enforcement Directive, the Product Liability Directive 
and the Competition Damages Directive all aim to facilitate the bringing of 
actions for damages. Actions for damages are therefore evidently an impor-
tant remedy when discussing EU legislation facilitating the private enforce-
ment of EU law. The respective particularities of each of the aforementioned 
fields of law notwithstanding, in the first subsection below four general 
observations are made on this remedy as it has been provided for in the EU 
legislation under consideration, followed by an interim conclusion. Next 
five more specific issues are addressed in each of the following subsections, 
namely: fault; causality; quantification of the harm; qualification of damag-
es, including joint and several liability; and damages awards going beyond 
mere compensation of the injury suffered, in particular punitive damages.
7. Actions for damages and actions 
for injunctions
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7.1.1. General: contradictions and paradoxes
257. The first general observation regarding the EU legislative measures on 
actions for damages discussed in part B is that the relevant provisions laid 
down in the EU legislation concerned are often only modestly prescriptive.
That is, to begin with, evidently the case under the Procurement Reme-
dies Directives. Here the relevant provision says in fact little more than that 
Member States should ensure that damages can be awarded to persons 
harmed by an infringement of the substantive rules at issue.1 It is thus not 
specified whether or not the infringer must be at fault for liability in dam-
ages to be incurred, there is at best only an implicit causality requirement 
and it is not specified what the damages to be awarded should entail. Only 
one of these two directives, the Utilities Remedies Directive, contains some 
further details on one particular issue. This latter directive specifies that, 
where bidding costs are claimed, the applicant “only” needs to prove the 
existence of an infringement, that he had a “real chance” of winning the con-
tract and that as a consequence of the infringement that chance was adverse-
ly affected.2 By implication where this provision applies the burden on the 
applicant is alleviated in that he does not need to demonstrate that he would 
have won the contract but for the infringement.
The IPR Enforcement Directive provides that infringers that acted know-
ingly or with reasonable grounds to know are to be ordered to pay “damages 
appropriate to the actual harm suffered by him/her as a result of the infringement”.3 
It clarifies that these damages can be set in two manners. One option is set-
ting them on the basis of “all appropriate aspects”. Mentioned in this connec-
tion are the negative economic consequences, including lost profits on the 
side of the injured party, unfair profits made by the infringer and, in appro-
priate cases, elements other than economic factors, such as the moral preju-
dice caused. The alternative is setting these damages as a lump sum, to be 
determined on the basis of elements such as (at least) the amount of royal-
ties or fees that would have been due had authorisation been requested 
from the holder of the intellectual property right in question. It follows that 
on the one hand the rules on actions for damages applicable in intellectual 
property cases are on the whole somewhat more detailed than those appli-
cable in public enforcement cases. On the other hand the fact remains how-
ever that these rules are still formulated in rather general and non-commit-
tal terms. Several relevant elements are touched upon (causality, extent of 
damages), but often rather by means of an illustration or as an option than 
in specific and prescriptive manner.
1 Art. 2(c) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665; Art. 2(d) Utilities Remedies Directive 
92/13. See subsection 3.2.2 above.
2 Art. 2(7) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13.
3 Art. 13(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsection 4.2.4 above. An 
(almost) identical regime has been set out in Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets 
directive, COM(2013) 813, p. 24 (Art. 13).
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The picture concerning the Product Liability Directive’s provisions on 
actions for damages is to some extent similar.4 Also here a degree of detail is 
provided. But at the same time several relevant issues are left either unad-
dressed or to be decided on an optional basis by the Member States. Central 
to this directive is the principle of no-fault liability of the producer of a 
defective product. It specifies that an injured party must prove the damage, 
the defect and the causal relationship between the defect and the damage.5 
Hence, there is no requirement to prove that the producer was at fault. It is 
further stipulated what the term ‘damage’ entails in this connection, namely 
damage caused by death or personal injuries and/or damage to property, 
while non-material damage is expressly left to be regulated by national law.6 
The Product Liability Directive further contains provisions on contributory 
negligence by the injured party and on the producer not being able to limit 
or exclude its liability.7 But issues such as causality or the quantification of 
the harm are not addressed. Furthermore under the Product Liability Direc-
tive a party that risks being held liable has a number of defences at its dis-
posal, but one of the most important of these, the so-called ‘development 
risks defence’, is only provided for on an optional basis.8 Similarly Member 
States may or may not decide to cap the producer’s liability under this direc-
tive.9 Thus, as the Commission acknowledged, the directive is “only an initial 
step towards establishing a genuine producer liability policy at [EU] level”.10
Finally, in many respects the Competition Damages Directive goes fur-
thest in setting out common EU rules on damages claims.11 This directive 
stipulates that anyone who has suffered harm has a right to full compen-
sation of the harm caused, while specifying how the harm caused is to be 
qualified and quantified as well as how to deal with situations where the 
harm may have been ‘passed-on’.12 It also contains rules on related mat-
ters such as the disclosure of evidence, the effects of infringement decisions 
taken by national competition authorities, limitation periods and the joint 
and several liability of certain infringers.13 However on several points the 
directive does in fact little more than codifying the case law of the Court of 
Justice. This is, to a greater or less extent, the case with respect to its rules on 
the qualification of the harm, legal standing and limitation periods.14 Also 
4 See section 5.4 above.
5 Art. 4 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
6 Art. 9 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
7 Art. 8(2) and 12 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
8 Art. 7 and 15(1)(b) Product Liability Directive 85/374.
9 Art. 16 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
10 Commission, Green paper on liability for defective products, COM(1999) 396, p. 11.
11 See section 6.3 above.
12 Art. 1, 2, 12-15 and 17 Competition Damages Directive respectively.
13 Art. 5-6, 9, 10 and 11 Competition Damages Directive respectively..
14 Art. 1(1), 2 and 10 Competition Damages Directive respectively. See also its Art. 3, which 
provides for a codifi cation of the EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness, dis-
cussed in section 2.2 above.
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the directive’s provision on the quantification of harm seems in fact some-
what less substantial than what might appear at first glance.15 Moreover 
several issues that had been initially identified as obstacles to the effective 
bringing of actions for damages remain unaddressed in this directive, such 
as collective redress, fault requirements, legal costs and causality.16
258. A second point is that for the EU legislature it has often been particu-
larly difficult to agree on the above EU legislative measures relating to actions 
for damages. Almost without exception the provisions in question were 
only adopted after lengthy and intense discussions and several amend-
ments. While that applies to some extent for the Procurement Remedies 
Directives and the IPR Enforcement Directive,17 it may be no coincidence 
that the two legal acts that are exclusively concerned with this substantive 
remedy, i.e. the Product Liability Directive and the Competition Damages 
Directive, proved to be particularly controversial. As regards the former, 
after the Commission had taken years to prepare its proposal, this directive 
was eventually only adopted after a difficult legislative process that lasted 
no less than another nine years.18 As regards the latter, it is true that the law-
making process itself was relatively speedy. But this should not distract 
from the fact that the Competition Damages Directive only came into being 
after an incubation time of almost a decade, during which this initiative 
proved to be highly controversial and the Commission aborted an earlier 
attempt to submit a proposal at the last moment.19 There is furthermore a 
case to be made that the fact that this directive was eventually proposed and 
adopted can be ascribed as much to a desire to protect the existing public 
enforcement mechanisms from possible negative consequences from 
increased private enforcement as to the ambition to facilitate private enforce-
ment.20
259. The third general observation concerns the practical importance of this 
remedy. In qualitative terms the Commission has over the years regularly 
observed that applicants wishing to bring actions for damages under the 
Procurement Remedies Directives, the IPR Enforcement Directive and the 
15 See para. 271 below.
16 See para. 225 above. On fault and causality under this directive, see also subsections 7.1.2 
and 7.1.3 below respectively. On collective redress and legal costs, see also subsections 
5.3.1 above and 8.2.5 below respectively.
17 See in particular para. 72, 75 and 85 above (concerning Procurement Remedies Directives 
89/665 and 92/12) and para. 111 and 134 (concerning IPR Enforcement Directive 
2004/48) above.
18 See para. 174 above.
19 See in particular subsection 6.2.3 above.
20 See in particular para. 223 and 226 above.
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Product Liability Directive are typically confronted with many obstacles.21 
These obstacles include the length of the proceedings, high legal costs, diffi-
culties in obtaining evidence and meeting the required standard of proof, as 
well as problems when seeking to quantify the harm caused by the infringe-
ment. As far as the quantitative aspect is concerned, successful actions for 
damages for infringements of the relevant substantive rules of EU law 
brought under these directives are reported to be generally rather scarce. 
For instance, in 1996 a study found that EU-wide there had been “no more 
than a handful” of damages cases for infringements of EU public procure-
ment law.22 Since there may have been a modest increase, but the overall 
level of damages litigation remains low.23 The situation is largely similar 
where the Product Liability Directive is concerned. Roughly a decade after 
its adoption a study noted that “almost no cases have been reported under this 
directive”.24 Also here an increase has been observed more recently, but again 
the overall numbers of damages actions remain modest and the directive 
is moreover thought to have hardly contributed to this increase.25 In rela-
tion to the IPR Enforcement Directive the Commission observed in 2010 that 
“damages awards in intellectual property cases are not requested by rightholders as 
a matter of course”.26
This suggests that the much-discussed picture of “astonishing diversity 
and total underdevelopment” identified in a study dating from 2004 relating to 
actions for damages for infringement of EU competition law,27 which was 
subsequently echoed by the Commission and provided the basis for its ini-
tiative in this field,28 is not exceptional. It rather seems to be in line with the 
state of play in EU law generally, certain variations between the different 
fields of law and between the different national jurisdictions notwithstand-
ing. That such a situation exists in the abovementioned other fields than 
competition law is all the more striking, given that in those fields EU leg-
islative measures that aim to facilitate the bringing of these actions were 
enacted years or even decades ago. The situation seems to a high extent 
21 E.g. Commission, Green paper on public procurement in the EU, COM(96) 583, pp. 15 
and 19; Commission, Second report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2000) 
893, pp. 13-27; Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public 
procurement, SEC(2006) 557, pp. 12-14; Commission, Staff working document accompa-
nying the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, pp. 21-23; Com-
mission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, July 2013, p. 20.
22 Study Herbert Smith (1996), p. 18. See also Brown (1998), p. 93.
23 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, pp. 16-17. See further para. 86 above.
24 Study McKenna (1994), p. 45.
25 Study Lovells (2003), pp. 31-38. See further para. 200 above.
26 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 21.
27 Study Ashurst (2004), p. 1.
28 Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, p. 4. See further subsection 6.2.3 above.
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comparable where actions for damages brought pursuant to the principle of 
Member State liability are concerned.29
It consequently appears that the secondary EU law at issue here has on 
the whole been at best only modestly successful in this respect. It remains to 
be seen whether the situation will be fundamentally different in relation to 
actions for damages for competition law infringements once the Competi-
tion Damages Directive has been transposed into national law and can thus 
be relied upon by private parties wishing to claim damages for competition 
law infringements. In this field the number of damages actions brought 
appears already to be increasing, even in the absence of applicable EU legis-
lative measures.30
260. That leads to the fourth observation. Across the different fields of law 
at issue in this study there appears to be a discrepancy in the conclusions 
drawn, especially by the Commission, on the basis of the findings referred 
to in the previous paragraph. In particular, the observation that generally 
few actions for damages are brought, that the relevant national laws differ 
and that private parties wishing to bring such actions tend to encounter 
various obstacles has been reason for intense activity in the field of EU com-
petition law. This activity includes the publication of official documents, the 
commissioning of studies, the consultation of stakeholders, an attempt to 
propose a directive that was aborted at the last moment and, eventually, the 
submission of a proposal for and the agreement on the Competition Dam-
ages Directive.31 In this field this remedy is thus clearly the “legal and political 
fashion”.32
In contrast similar activities are notably absent in relation to the three 
other fields mentioned above, where the relevant directives have been in 
place already for years, if not decades. Take the Product Liability Directive. 
As noted above, relatively few damages claims have been brought under 
this directive. Having published a green paper in 1999 with possible mea-
sures aimed at facilitating the bringing of such claims,33 the Commission 
observed in 2001 amongst other things that “[i]n practice it may be difficult to 
29 See Van Dam (2006), p. 40, where it is noted that the applicants bringing actions for dam-
ages pursuant to the principle of Member State liability often “entered the hall of fame, but 
lost the case”. This refers to the fact that in landmark cases such as Francovich, Brasserie du 
Pêcheur and Köbler the applicants were ultimately unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain 
compensation in damages. See also Lock (2012), p. 1675. On the principle of Member 
State liability generally, see para. 59 above. In addition the situation might well be com-
parable where the liability of the EU under Art. 340 TFEU is concerned. See e.g. Kaleda 
(2014), p. 193, regarding actions for damages in the context of public procurement by the 
EU institutions and other EU bodies.
30 See para. 224 above.
31 See in particular subsections 6.2.3 and 5.2.4 above.
32 Milutinovic (2010), p. 143.
33 Commission, Green paper on liability for defective products, COM(1999) 396.
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prove that a product was defective and/or that a causal link exists”.34 It also noted 
there that the legal situation in the Member States differed, including for 
instance the national rules on the disclosure of evidence.35 However neither 
at that time nor at a later stage has this led to any amendments to the direc-
tive or other legislative measures to increase the effectiveness of this remedy 
being proposed. The Commission maintains that there is a lack of evidence 
that the abovementioned divergences cause significant trade barriers or dis-
tortions of competition.36 Yet it seems to have made little effort to obtain 
such evidence.37 Its references to the controversies that existed when adopt-
ing this directive and the delicate balance that it establishes between the 
various interests at stake give the impression that this inaction is at least in 
part motivated by political considerations.38
This contrast between the shortcoming observed and the lack of even an 
attempt of a legislative response is arguably most striking in the field of EU 
public procurement law. Facilitating actions for damages was originally an 
important element of the EU’s private enforcement-facilitating approach in 
this field.39 It seems however that in this field this remedy has over the years 
become particularly ‘unfashionable’. When the Procurement Remedies 
Directives were revised in 2007 it was expressly decided not to concentrate 
on this remedy.40 The Commission explained this choice by arguing that 
damages awards had “little deterrent effect on [contracting] authorities, espe-
cially because [private parties] who feel that their interests have been harmed must 
prove that they had serious chances of being awarded the contract”.41 More gener-
ally, it pointed to the “inherent limits” of damages actions, notably the 
(alleged) absence of real corrective effects, practical difficulties and the 
length and costs of the legal proceedings.42 In other words, here the above-
mentioned obstacles typically encountered by injured private parties seek-
34 Commission, Second report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2000) 893, p. 13. 
See also Commission, Fourth report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2011) 
547, pp. 7-8.
35 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
36 Commission, Fourth report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2011) 547, p. 11. 
See further para. 184 above.
37 Note that the offi cially commissioned study by Study Lovells (2003), pp. 15-28, dates 
from almost a decade earlier.
38 E.g. Commission, Second report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2000) 893, 
p. 12; Commission, Third report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2006) 496, 
p. 6. See European Parliament, Resolution on the Commission green paper on liability for 
defective products, A5-0061/2000; Council, Resolution on amendment of the liability for 
defective products directive, OJ 2002, C 26/2. These latter documents suggest opposing 
views by the two branches of the EU legislature.
39 Cf. e.g. Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, p. 19: 
“the possibility of claims for damages will be a particularly important part of the system”.
40 Instead a new contractual remedy was introduced. See further subsection 3.2.3 above.
41 Commission, Proposal for Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66, 
COM(2006) 195, p. 2.
42 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, p. 12. See also its p. 20 and pp. 26-27.
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ing compensation (costs, burden of proof, quantification, etc.) were cited as 
reasons not to take legislative action on this point, whereas essentially the 
same obstacles were seen as reasons to take such action where infringements 
of competition law were concerned. The particularities of a given field of EU 
law can of course justify a policy choice to concentrate for instance on other 
remedies. Nonetheless the contrast in the approach followed by this same 
institution at around the same time in these two fields of law is striking. 
That applies all the more so in light of the (at best) questionable explanation 
given for this difference.43
261. By means of a concluding remark concerning the above general 
issues, it appears that EU legislative involvement with actions for damages 
for infringements of EU law is a topic that is not without contradictions. This 
remedy is provided for in most of the legislation at issue in this study. It 
generally receives also considerable attention from stakeholders, academics 
and institutional actors alike. But the degree of harmonisation provided for 
is all in all typically rather modest. Moreover in practice this remedy often 
functions in a manner that leaves much to be desired. Whereas the short-
comings observed do not tend to vary much across the various fields of law 
at hand, these findings are in some cases reason for putting a lot of energy 
into trying to address them through the EU legislative measures (competi-
tion law), while in other fields the legislative response has more recently 
been largely muted (product liability law, intellectual property law) or this 
43 See Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procure-
ment, SEC(2006) 557, p. 27 (n. 32). Here it is argued that the situation in procurement law 
is substantially different from notably the one existing in relation to competition law, 
because in the former case the damages are paid from the public purse whereas in the 
latter case compensation is paid by an undertaking. As a matter of fact, this observation 
generally seems correct. However, in the fi rst place, this appears to overlook the fact that 
private undertakings can in certain cases be subject to EU public procurement law, just as 
public bodies can be subject to EU competition law. More importantly, from the perspec-
tive of the private party having suffered damage, any damages award will serve to com-
pensate the harm caused, regardless from which purse it is paid. As such this award does 
have a corrective effect. Furthermore the underlying suggestion that exposing contract-
ing authorities to the risk of fi nancial consequences in cases of infringements does not 
have a corrective or deterrent effect is contestable, to say the least. This suggestion is at 
odds with the logic underlying the principle of Member State liability for infringements 
of EU law, discussed in para. 59 above (even if the provision on actions for damages set 
out in Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13 gives concrete expression to 
precisely this principle of Member State liability; as was clarifi ed in CoJ case C-568/08, 
Combinatie Spijker, discussed in para. 88 above). This argumentation also seems internally 
inconsistent. During the very same 2007 revision of the said directives, the possibility of 
imposing a fi ne on contracting authorities was introduced (Art. 2e(2) Procurement Rem-
edies Directives 89/665 and 92/13). And already since 1993 Art. 2(1)(c) and (5) Utilities 
Remedies Directive 92/13 provides for the possibility of a payment by the contracting 
authorities of a ‘dissuasive sum’. See also Commission, Staff working paper accompany-
ing the green paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, 
p. 9 (n. 3).
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remedy even seems to have largely been given up altogether (public pro-
curement law). Indeed, in this light one may be inclined to agree with Advo-
cate General Sharpston’s description of damages claims as being “generically 
awkward”.44
Yet the above observation relating to the difficulties that the EU legisla-
ture often experiences in trying to agree on measures to facilitate the bring-
ing of actions for damages for infringements of EU law probably goes a long 
way in explaining this at first sight perhaps somewhat confusing state of 
affairs. Most of the aforementioned contradictions may in effect rather be 
paradoxes. At the risk of oversimplification, those difficulties probably 
explain in large part the generally only modestly prescriptive character of 
the EU law provisions in question. For where a particular issue proves con-
troversial, a (political) solution may well be found in addressing it only in 
vague terms, leaving it entirely unaddressed or by inserting an optional pro-
vision.45 Such solutions might in turn well provide at least a partial explana-
tion for the practical problems that injured parties tend to continue to 
encounter when seeking to obtain compensation. It might also explain the 
tendency, where EU legislation on this remedy exists, to either not propose 
further amendments to that legislation or to concentrate on other remedies 
instead. Seen against this background, it also seems hardly surprising that 
the initiative leading to the Competition Damages Directive proved to be 
controversial, just as the observed state of ‘diversity’ and ‘total underdevel-
opment’ at national level that provided the thrust for this initiative seems 
considerably less exceptional, and therefore perhaps also less ‘astonishing’, 
than sometimes seems to be presumed.
7.1.2. Fault
262. The first of five more specific issues relating to the secondary EU law 
on actions for damages under consideration here concerns fault requirements. 
The Procurement Remedies Directives do not expressly address this subject-
matter at all. Under the IPR Enforcement Directive the abovementioned pro-
vision on actions for damages refers to the infringing party having acted 
knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know.46 This is normally under-
stood as a fault requirement of sorts.47 By contrast the absence of a fault 
requirement is central to the ‘strict’ liability approach set out in the Product 
Liability Directive.48 Finally, concerning EU competition law, after having 
considered a number of options, including no-fault liability, in its 2008 white 
paper (and in its 2009 unofficial draft proposal) the Commission suggested 
44 Opinion AG Sharpston case C-432/05, Unibet, para. 49
45 See further para. 394 below.
46 Art. 13(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. Its Art. 13(2) contains an optional rule for 
cases where the infringer did not act knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know.
47 Cf. e.g. Lukas (2008), p. 82.
48 Art. 4 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
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opting for a sort of middle way in the form of a rebuttable presumption of 
fault.49 But in its subsequent proposal for the Competition Damages Direc-
tive this issue was in the end entirely left out, in light of the criticism that 
those earlier suggestions received particularly from the side of businesses.50 
As a result this directive does not address issues of fault, other than a state-
ment in the recitals that the Member States should be able to provide for 
a requirement of this kind, in as far as they comply with the case law of 
the Court of Justice, the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and the 
directive itself.51
The foregoing shows that the question whether and if so, to which 
extent an applicant must demonstrate that the defendant was at fault when 
infringing the applicable rules of EU law in order to obtain compensation in 
damages is answered very differently in the four fields of law under consider-
ation in this study. The more general picture of EU law being “extremely 
heterogeneous”52 on this point therefore also holds true where these four 
fields of law are concerned. In several other acts of secondary EU law a 
range of approaches on fault-related matters can be found. This can involve 
an express fault requirement,53 something in between an express fault 
requirement and the express absent of such a requirement,54 or a rebuttable 
presumption of fault.55
263. The case law of the Court of Justice is also to be considered. Of par-
ticular relevance is the Court’s 2010 ruling in Stadt Graz.56 In that case it was 
clarified that the Procurement Remedies Directives preclude a fault require-
ment established on the basis of national law in relation to damages claims 
brought under these directives, even where national law provides for a pre-
sumption of fault which is for the defendant to rebut. The Court noted that 
the wording of the relevant provisions do not indicate that the infringement 
giving rise to a right to damages is to be connected to fault. It also took 
account of the function that this remedy plays under these directives. It not-
ed that a fault requirement means that an injured party runs the risk of not, 
49 Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165, pp. 6-7.  On the said unoffi cial draft proposal, see para. 220 above.
50 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 35.
51 Recital 11 Competition Damages Directive.
52 Lukas (2008), p. 101.
53 Art. 35a(1) Credit Rating Agencies Regulation 1060/2009, which refers to the commiting 
of infringements “intentionally or with gross negligence”. Cf. recital 33 Regulation 462/2013, 
which inserted this Art. 35a into the regulation. Note however that pursuant to its Art. 
35(4) the terms ‘intention’ and ‘negligence’ are to be interpreted and applied in accor-
dance with the applicable national law.
54 Art. 5 Package Travel Directive 90/314. See further para. 185 above.
55 E.g. Art. 6(1) and (2) Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community framework for electronic 
signatures, OJ 2000, L 13/12 (‘Electronic Signatures Directive’); Art. 20(3) Public Limited 
Liabilities Companies Directive 2012/30.
56 CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz, para. 30-45. See further para. 88 above.
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or only belatedly, being compensated. This was deemed to be contrary to the 
objective of these directives, i.e. ensuring effective and rapid review. This 
ruling is of evident importance for public procurement cases, but it may also 
be of broader relevance. The question is then whether, in analogy to the 
Court’s reasoning in Stadt Graz, a more general argument can be made that 
EU law precludes fault requirements established on the basis of national law 
in relation to actions for damages for EU law infringements. In this respect a 
distinction should be made, it is submitted, between the following two situ-
ations.
In the first place, there is the situation where specific EU legislation con-
cerning liability in damages applies, but does not expressly deal with issues 
of fault. In such cases reasoning similar to Stadt Graz may well be applied. 
Indeed, in Dekker, a case dating from 1990 relating to the Gender Equality 
Directive, the Court of Justice came to a similar conclusion as the one formu-
lated in Stadt Graz.57 There it was also found that the directive in question 
did not allow for a fault requirement. Also this conclusion was based on the 
absence of any explicit reference thereto in the directive in question, com-
bined with the need to safeguard the practical effect of the principles under-
lying it. The Court added in a subsequent case that this applies “no matter 
how easy it would be to adduce proof of fault”.58 This case law thus suggests that, 
where the applicable specific EU legislation provides for civil liability in 
damages without the issue of fault being expressly addressed therein, a fault 
requirement established under national law for the award of damages for 
infringements of the relevant substantive rules of EU law may well be pre-
cluded, no matter how low the threshold to prove fault actually is. It is for 
now an open question how the Competition Damages Directive is to be 
assessed in this light. The fact that it does not contain an express fault 
requirement could be understood to imply that the above logic is also appli-
cable here and that therefore such a requirement is precluded. However in 
this particular case this view seems to be contradicted by the abovemen-
tioned statement in the recitals of this directive that the Member States 
should in principle continue to be able to impose fault-related conditions. 
While the latter therefore appears to be the better view, there is certainly 
some scope for debate in this respect, especially in light of the not unequivo-
cal reference in the recitals to the need to comply with the Court’s case law, 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and the directive itself.
All this is to be distinguished from the second situation, where no spe-
cific EU legislation of the type at issue in Stadt Graz and Dekker applies. This 
thus concerns cases where there is no specific EU law regulating the possi-
bility of bringing actions for damages for infringements of EU law. Then the 
logic followed in those rulings is probably not applicable. After all, as was 
explained above, the outcome in Stadt Graz and in Dekker was based on two 
key considerations. In the first place, arguably the main point was the 
57 CoJ case C-177/88, Dekker, para. 22-25. See Gender Equality Directive 2006/54.
58 CoJ case C-180/95, Draehmpaehl, para. 21.
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absence of an explicit provision on fault in the specific EU legislation at issue. 
The Court of Justice essentially seemed to reason that the decision by the EU 
legislature not to address this issue explicitly as a matter of EU law should 
be taken to mean that there cannot be a requirement of fault under national 
law. In the second place, the result reached was closely tied to the need to 
ensure the effectiveness of the applicable EU legislation regulating the dam-
ages claim. That seems to imply that, where no such EU legislation applies, 
there are no grounds for drawing comparable conclusions. Put differently, 
the interests associated with safeguarding the effectiveness of substantive EU 
law alone is unlikely to be sufficient to justify the conclusion that a fault 
requirement established in national law is as such unacceptable.59 These two 
points therefore both suggest that the said case law does not imply that EU 
law generally precludes a fault requirement in relation to actions for damag-
es for infringements of that law.60 It follows that, at the law stands, in cases 
where EU law does not expressly address this issue, it is to be determined in 
accordance with the applicable national law whether or not such a require-
ment applies (and if so, what it entails), subject to the principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness.61
264. Another potentially relevant line of case law relates to the principle of 
Member State liability.62 In this context the Court of Justice has repeatedly 
addressed the issue of fault. In particular, it held that one of the three condi-
tions for incurring Member State liability in damages is the existence of “a 
sufficiently serious breach” of the applicable rule of EU law.63 Relevant factors 
in this respect include the clarity and precision of the rule in question, the 
measure of discretion, whether there was any intention and whether the 
59 Admittedly, this may be somewhat less clear from Dekker, because that ruling 
(para. 22-25) can be read as indicating that the CoJ was (also) concerned with the effec-
tiveness (practical effect) of the substantive rules in question, and not (only) with the rele-
vant provisions on enforcement. However in CoJ case C-180/95, Draehmpaehl, para. 21, 
the absence of an express fault requirement in the relevant directive is highlighted, rather 
than this effectiveness argument.
60 See also the discussion in para. 64 above on the nascent EU law principle of private party 
liability and the ‘constitutive’ EU law conditions for incurring such liability.
61 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-348/98, Mendes Ferreira, para. 28-29. On the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness, see section 2.2 above.
62 On the principle of Member State liability generally, see para. 59 above. Note that in CoJ 
case C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker, para. 87, it was held that the provision on actions for 
claims of Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13 gives expression to this 
principle of Member State liability. In that case reference is also made to the requirement 
of a suffi ciently serious breach. That raises some questions as to how this ruling relates to 
the aforementioned Stadt Graz ruling. For the present purposes it suffi ces to note that 
there are no indications that this link with Member State liability made in Combinatie Spij-
ker played any role in the Court’s ruling in Stadt Graz in respect of fault requirements. For 
a discussion of these two rulings, see para. 88 above.
63 CoJ joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, in particular para. 51 and 
55-57. It has been observed that for an applicant it is in practice often particularly diffi cult 
to demonstrate that this condition has been met. See Lock (2012), pp. 1693-1697.
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error of law was excusable.64 The Court noted that such factors may well be 
connected with the concept of fault as it exists in a national legal system.65 
Indeed, this test seems to come close to a test of negligence.66 However it 
was also held that, beyond the condition of a sufficiently serious breach, 
there is no scope for any requirement based on fault, whether intentional or 
negligent, for Member State liability to be incurred.67 It further appears that 
the requirement of a sufficiently serious breach applies only where the 
Member State that infringed EU law did so in relation to an issue where it 
had discretion, notably where it exercises its legislative function.68 There is 
case law suggesting that where there is only reduced or no discretion, a 
mere infringement may be sufficient to incur liability.69 In the legal literature 
a parallel has regularly been drawn in this respect between the liability in 
damages of Member States and of private parties. In particular, it is widely 
agreed that in disputes between private parties there is hardly any scope (if 
at all) to require a sufficiently serious breach.70 After all private parties nor-
mally do not have the ‘State-type’ discretion referred to here, as Member 
States when exercising their law-making function.
On that basis it is sometimes suggested that therefore any infringement 
of a rule of EU law by a private party could lead to an obligation to compen-
sate the damage caused, without there being scope for any requirement of 
fault.71 It is however submitted that this view is contestable. For one thing, 
it is open to question whether the abovementioned case law on Member 
State liability can be simplified to the point that, in the absence of discretion, 
it necessarily implies ‘automatic’ (i.e. no-fault) liability.72 The formulation 
used by the Court of Justice on this issue tends to be rather cautious, sug-
gesting that a mere infringement “may” be sufficient. Discretion seems fur-
thermore less and less the only decisive criterion in the relevant case law. 
Instead account can also be taken of other factors, including a duty of care, 
64 Ibid., in particular para. 56.
65 Ibid., para. 78.
66 Cf. Van Dam (2006), p. 254.
67 CoJ joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 75 and 79. See e.g. also 
CoJ joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94, Dillenkofer, para. 28.
68 Ibid., in particular para. 38 and 46. See e.g. also CoJ case C-224/01, Köbler, para. 51-56. In 
this latter case it was clarifi ed that, where breaches of EU law by the judiciary are con-
cerned, the said requirement should be understood as meaning that a manifest infringe-
ment of EU law is required in order to incur Member State liability.
69 E.g. CoJ case C-4/94, Hedley Lomas, para. 28.
70 E.g. Dougan (2004), pp. 37 and 242; Van Gerven (2004a), p. 522; Tridimas (2006), p. 544; 
Komninos (2009), p. 398; Milutinovic (2010), p. 112. For a different approach, see e.g. 
Reich (2010), pp. 126-127.
71 In this sense, see e.g. Opinion AG Van Gerven case C-128/92, Banks, para. 53; Commis-
sion, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 51.
72 In a similar sense, see Eilmansberger (2007), pp. 458-459.
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complexity and intention.73 Indeed, it has been held that, where the non-
contractual liability of the EU under Article 340 TFEU is concerned, “illegal-
ity as such never leads automatically to liability”, while “[t]he convergence [of 
Member State liability and EU non-contractual liability] argument can also be used 
to set aside the idea that no-fault liability might exist in Member State liability”.74 
Unlike discretion, there is no reason to believe that such other factors are 
inherently inapplicable in situations where a private party infringed EU law. 
For another thing, even while there is certainly a degree of parallelism 
between Member State and private party liability for breaches of EU law, it 
is as yet still largely an open question to which extent the abovementioned 
case law on the former can and should be transposed to the context of the 
latter.75 There are certain differences that may well argue against a ‘one-to-
one’ transplant, the issue of discretion not being the least among them.76 It 
follows that the case law on Member State liability may well be of some rel-
evance in the present context, but that it does not necessarily imply that 
there is no scope for a fault requirement in relation to damages claims for 
infringements of EU law brought by one private party against another.
265. As a final point it is worthwhile to consider the effects of the EU rules 
on fault, discussed above. The first observation in this regard concerns their 
effects on national law. It is true that, in the words of the Court of Justice, “the 
concept of fault does not have the same content in the various legal systems” of the 
Member States.77 Nonetheless almost all legal orders of the Member States 
have in common that, as a general rule, they perceive a fault requirement, in 
one form or another, as a criterion for the imputation of damages liability.78 
73 That applies in particular (but not exclusively) as regards the case law on the non-con-
tractual liability of the EU. See e.g. CoJ case C-47/07 P, Masdar, para. 90-91; GC case 
T-437/10, Gap SA granen & producten, para. 15 and 28; GC case T-333/10, ATC, para. 61-63. 
As regards Member State liability, see e.g. Opinion AG Léger case C-224/01, Köbler, 
para. 138-139; CoJ case C-424/97, Haim, para. 42-43. See further Hilson (2005), p. 677; Van 
Dam (2006), pp. 500-504; Biondi & Farley (2009), p. 130; Wakefi eld (2009), p. 406; Gutman 
(2011), p. 723.
74 Aalto (2011), p. 204. On the said convergence, see also para. 59 above.
75 See also para. 64 above.
76 In the words of CoJ joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 42, even 
if we assume that the conditions under which a private may incur liability for damages 
cannot differ from those governing the liability of a Member State, this only applies in 
“like circumstances” and “in the absence of a particular justifi cation” for any such difference.
77 CoJ joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 76 (in the context of 
Member State liability in damages). See also e.g. Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000), 
pp. 300-306; Van Dam (2006), pp. 113-116.
78 Lukas (2008), p. 81; Kellner (2009), p. 139. See e.g. also Opinion AG Cosmos case 
C-348/98, Mendes Ferreira, para. 50; Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the 
white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 50. 
There are exceptions however, e.g. in relation to intellectual property rights. See Study 
European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-d), pp. 1 and 6. In some 
Member States the issue of fault is addressed primarily through the concept of attribu-
tion.
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That means that where EU law precludes such a requirement, the conse-
quences for national law can be significant indeed. It has been seen above 
that this is the case under the Product Liability Directive as well as, as con-
strued by the Court of Justice, the Procurement Remedies Directives and the 
Gender Equality Directive and – arguably – any other comparable act of 
secondary EU law. Accordingly, where secondary EU law precludes a fault 
requirement, national law often needs to be amended and, where this has 
not (yet) been done, national courts must disapply any such national fault 
requirements in concrete cases.
The second observation concerns the effects in practice of the EU rules 
under consideration here. Above it was noted that many different approach-
es in relation to fault requirements can be found in the legislation under 
consideration, ranging from an (almost) explicit fault requirement to an 
(almost) explicit lack of such a requirement, with certain intermediate 
approaches. One would logically presume that where a private party has to 
demonstrate fault for liability to be incurred, it will normally be more diffi-
cult to successfully bring an action for damages. Indeed, this presumption 
was central to the adoption of the Product Liability Directive.79 It also was 
an important element in the reasoning of the Court of Justice in Stadt Graz 
and Dekker.80 However, as was noted earlier, in each of the fields of law at 
issue here successful actions for damages are generally rather scarce.81 That 
applies for actions brought on the basis of EU legislation that imposes a fault 
requirement (e.g. the IPR Enforcement Directive) as much as it does for 
actions brought under EU legislation that insists on the absence of such a 
requirement (e.g. the Product Liability Directive). Therefore, contrary to 
what one might expect, there seems to be no clear relationship between the 
degree of (successful) damages litigation on the one hand and the existence 
or absence of a fault requirement as a matter of EU law on the other hand. 
Even if this does not necessarily mean that it is irrelevant whether or not the 
relevant secondary EU law provides for a fault requirement, the foregoing 
suggests that, in and by itself, this is unlikely to be a decisive factor. In that 
sense the effects of EU legislative intervention in relation to fault should 
probably not be overstated.
79 See e.g. Commission, Proposal for Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(76) 372, 
p. 13: “It is extremely diffi cult or even impossible to [proof fault on the part of the producer]”.
80 See para. 263 above. See e.g. also CoJ joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du 
Pêcheur, para. 79: “[i]mposition of such a supplementary condition [of fault, beyond a suffi ciently 
serious breach] would be tantamount to calling in question the right to reparation founded on the 
[EU] legal order”.
81 See in particular para. 259 above.
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This latter finding can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the 
differences between ‘fault’ and ‘no-fault’ approaches referred to above are 
often not as clear-cut as this terminology might suggest.82 The transition 
between both approaches rather tends to be more fluent.83 Take for instance 
the apparently most ‘extreme’ no-fault (‘strict’) liability approach, set out in 
the Product Liability Directive. Its effects are in fact significantly limited and 
moderated through a range of specific provisions, such as particular defenc-
es, time bars, financial ceilings and limited heads of damages to be compen-
sated.84 Similarly the phrase ‘knowingly or with reasonable grounds to 
know’, laid down in the IPR Enforcement Directive, allows for a range of 
nuanced approaches. Paradoxically the most ‘extreme’ result may well 
emerge where issues of fault have not been dealt with at all in the EU legis-
lation at hand. As has been seen above, this absence of explicit rules was one 
of the reasons for the Court of Justice to rule that the Procurement Remedies 
Directives preclude a fault requirement. These directives thus in effect also 
establish no-fault liability in damages, as is the case in the Product Liability 
Directive. But given that the issue of fault is not expressly addressed in the 
Procurement Remedies Directives, they do not contain limiting or moderat-
ing measures of the sort found in the Product Liability Directive.
7.1.3. Causality
266. Most of the secondary EU law considered in part B goes at least some 
way in making it explicit that, for liability in damages to be incurred, it 
needs to be demonstrated that there is a causal link between the infringement 
at issue and the harm suffered before. Both the IPR Enforcement Directive 
and the Product Liability Directive expressly require such a causal link, be it 
in somewhat different wording. Whereas the former speaks of prejudice suf-
fered “as a result” of the infringement,85 the latter expressly refers to the 
requirement of a “causal relationship” between the defect in the product and 
the damage.86 The Procurement Remedies Directives are less explicit, but it 
is beyond doubt that also in this connection a causality requirement 
82 There are in all likelihood several other factors that are of relevance when explaining the 
lack of a clear correlation between the number of successful damages claims and the 
presence or absence of a fault requirement as a matter of EU law. These probably include 
other applicable rules of EU or national law on issues such as legal standing, limitation 
periods, quantifi cation of harm, etc., as well as ‘unwritten obstacles’, such as cultural 
attitudes towards litigation. On the latter, see further para. 416 below.
83 Lukas (2008), p. 81. See also Van Dam (2006), p. 12.
84 See subsection 5.4.2 above.
85 Art. 13(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
86 Art. 4 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
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applies.87 That also applies in relation to the Competition Damages Direc-
tive, which establishes a right to compensation for anyone who has suffered 
harm “caused by” the infringements at issue.88 This latter rule is essentially a 
codification of the Court’s ruling in Manfredi, where it was held that a pri-
vate party wishing to claim damages for a competition law infringement 
must demonstrate the existence of a “causal relationship” between the harm 
suffered and that infringement.89
A similar picture emerges when we look beyond the EU legislation 
assessed in part B of this study. For instance, much like the IPR Enforcement 
Directive, the Gender Equality Directive refers to the compensation of the 
loss or damage sustained by a person injured “as a result of” discrimination 
on grounds of sex.90 In relation to the principle of Member State liability in 
damages for infringements of EU law the Court of Justice has furthermore 
long made it clear that a causality requirement applies, holding that a “direct 
causal link” must be demonstrated between the damage and the infringe-
ment.91 It has called this an “indispensable condition governing the right to 
compensation”.92 In most national jurisdictions a causality requirement also 
applies in relation to action for damages, even if there can be considerable 
differences in what is understood precisely by this concept.93 All in all it 
therefore seems safe to say that causation is inherent in damages liability.94
267. Providing for a causality requirement is one thing however, clarifying 
how the concept of causality is to be understood precisely can be quite another 
matter. In practice there are many acts or events that can ‘break the causality 
87 A causality requirement is inherent in these directives’ provisions on damages, i.e. Art. 
2(c) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665 and Art. 2(d) Utilities Remedies Directive 
92/13, which speak of the “award of damages to persons injured by the infringement”. See also 
Art. 2(7) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13 on the compensation of bidding costs, dis-
cussed in para. 85 above, where it is stipulated that the applicant must demonstrate that 
its chance of winning the contract in question was adversely affected “as a consequence” of 
the infringement. See also CoJ case C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker, para. 87, where reference 
is made to the requirement of a “direct causal link”.
88 See Art. 1(1) and 1(2) Competition Damages Directive. See also its Art. 2(2), pursuant to 
which a private party that has suffered harm must be placed in a position in which that 
party would have been had the infringement not been committed.
89 CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 61. See further para. 214 above.
90 Art. 18 Gender Equality Directive 2006/54.
91 E.g. CoJ 5 joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 51; CoJ case 
C-118/08, Transportes Urbanos, para. 30. As regards the use of the word ‘direct’ in this con-
nection, although some uncertainty exists, it is not immediately evident that this is meant 
to point to any significant difference in substance as compared to the causality test 
applied in the abovementioned EU legislation or the Manfredi judgment. Note that in CoJ 
case C-557/12, Kone, which builds on Manfredi, the CoJ refers to the existence of “a direct 
causal link” (see para. 33).
92 CoJ case C-420/11, Leth, para. 45.
93 See further e.g. Study Ashurst (2004), pp. 72-74; Van Dam (2006), pp. 270-279; Kellner 
(2009), pp. 142-14.
94 Cf. Durant (2008), p. 47.
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chain’ and can thus prevent (full) liability from being incurred. Just to give 
one example, it may not always be easy to prove that the existence of an 
anti-competitive cartel agreement within the meaning of Article 101(1) 
TFEU caused damage to a particular party that purchased the products to 
which the cartel relates. An applicant having suffered harm may need to 
convincingly address a number of issues when seeking to demonstrate that 
the cartel caused or contributed to the harm, and not certain other factors, 
such as the acts or omissions of third parties (subcontractors, intermediaries, 
etc.) or the own behaviour of the applicant. This can be challenging espe-
cially where the commercial and economic context is complex.
It can therefore be of particular importance how, legally speaking, the 
concept of causation is understood precisely. Yet only the Product Liability 
Directive goes some way in specifying this, and then only on one particular 
point. This directive provides for the possibility of the liability to be reduced 
or even disallowed entirely where there is contributory negligence on the 
side of the party claiming damages (while excluding this where the damage 
is also caused by a third party).95 Apart from this, none of the legal acts con-
sidered in part B specifies in any detail what is meant precisely by the 
requirement of causality. In the recitals of the Competition Damages Direc-
tive it is stated that this is a matter not dealt with in that directive, implying 
that it is in principle left to national law.96
268. Also the Court of Justice seems mostly to take something of a ‘hands-
off’ approach in respect of causality. For instance, rulings that go into detail 
on the requirement of causality that applies in the context of the principle of 
Member State liability are rather scarce.97 In this connection the Court has at 
times applied a requirement of reasonable diligence on the side of the 
injured party in limiting the extent of the loss or damage, whereby a failure 
to do so can break the causality chain in whole or in part.98 This entails a 
particular form of contributory negligence, whereby the negligence of the 
applicant does not relate to the occurrence of the act leading to liability 
being incurred, but rather to the extent of the damage resulting from that 
act. The Court’s finding that this requirement of due diligence on the side of 
the applicant constitutes a general principle common to the legal systems of 
95 Art. 8 Product Liability Directive 85/374. The issue of contributory negligence is not 
always assessed in the context of causality. But these two issues seem in any case closely 
connected. Indeed, this connection is such that it has been held that it is impossible to 
divorce any theory of contributory negligence from the concept of causation. See Van 
Dam (2006), p. 268.
96 Recital 11 Competition Damages Directive.
97 On the principle of Member State liability generally, see para. 59 above.
98 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 84-85; CoJ case 
C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, para. 61.
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the Member States suggests that it can be applied more broadly.99 It can 
therefore probably also be invoked in relation to the EU legislation dis-
cussed in part B. Other than that, the Court has however restricted itself to 
clarifying that the applicable test is whether the damage claimed “flows suf-
ficiently directly from the breach of [EU] law to render the [Member] State liable to 
make it good”.100 This provides only limited further precision as to the precise 
meaning of the concept of causality.101 Indeed, it has been observed that, 
while the Court tends to maintain control over the other conditions that 
apply in this regard, it seems to have ‘decentralised’ this aspect of the Mem-
ber State liability test by typically leaving it to the national courts to deter-
mine the question of causation.102
Furthermore in Manfredi, which concerned the liability of private parties 
for infringements of competition law, the Court held that – in the absence of 
EU rules governing this matter – it is for the domestic legal system of each 
Member State to prescribe the detailed rules on the application of the con-
cept of a causal relationship, provided that the principles of equivalence and 
effective are observed.103 In other words, while in this case the existence of a 
causality requirement was established as a matter of EU law, the precise 
meaning of this concept was left to be determined, in principle, in accordance 
with the applicable rules of national law. Subsequent case law seems to indi-
cate that the standard set by national law will only be deemed to be incom-
patible with EU law in rather ‘extreme’ cases, such as where in certain cir-
cumstances the causal link is by definition considered to have been broken 
under that law, without allowing for any assessment of the circumstances of 
the case at hand.104 Considering the general lack of precision on this subject-
matter in the abovementioned EU legislation, it therefore seems not unlikely 
that the Court will take a comparable stance where questions of causality 
under that legislation are concerned.
99 This principle has also been applied in relation to the non-contractual liability of the EU. 
See e.g. CoJ case 145/83, Adams, para 53-54; CoJ joined cases C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mul-
der, para. 26 and 33; GC case T-437/10, Gap SA granen & producten, para. 81. Cf. e.g. also 
Study Expert group on European contract law (2011) (Art. 166-167).
100 CoJ case C-446/04, Test Claimants, para. 218. See also CoJ case C-319/96, Brinkmann, 
para. 29. In this respect the CoJ’s case law on the non-contractual liability of the EU, with 
which the case law on Member State has converged, as discussed in para. 59 above, occa-
sionally offers more clarifi cation. For a discussion, see Gutman (2011), pp. 725-734. See 
also Durant (2008), pp. 56-79.
101 Even if this is rather broadly formulated as well, more helpful may be the following 
description that the requirement of causality has been met where “the damage arises direct-
ly from the conduct of the wrongdoer and does not depend on the intervention of other causes, 
whether positive or negative. That means that the cause may not be too remote or too broad and 
unspecifi c. It also means that intervening causes, such as contributory negligence of the applicant, 
may break the chain of causation”. See Van Gerven (2004b), p. 238.
102 Biondi & Farley (2009), p. 55. See e.g. also Lock (2012), pp. 1697-1698.
103 CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 64. See further para. 214 above.
104 CoJ case C-557/12, Kone, para. 33.
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269. It follows that under the secondary EU law at issue, as well as in EU 
law more generally, the concept of causality tends to be somewhat of a black 
box. This is not the same as saying that it has no meaning whatsoever how-
ever. Given that the aforementioned EU legislation expressly provides for 
such a requirement it cannot simply be disregarded. That being so, arguably 
the condition sine qua non should be seen as a minimum standard.105 Yet apart 
from that, and its importance in practice notwithstanding, it may well be 
that there is actually only limited need and scope for providing further details 
as regards the causality test at EU legislative level. For, while submitting the 
required proof that the applicable causality requirement has been met can be 
problematic in practice and ‘decentralising’ this aspect to the national level 
inevitably leads to some divergences, to date there generally seems to be no 
clear evidence that the legal notion of causality is problematic from an EU 
law viewpoint. That is to say, it appears not to constitute a serious and struc-
tural bar to successfully bringing actions for damages against a private par-
ty that infringed EU law where the other applicable conditions have been 
met, nor is it clear that the said divergences substantially affect trade or dis-
tort competition.106
Moreover the concept of causality might generally not lend itself well to 
being further pinned down by means of legislative measures. An assessment 
of whether the condition of causality has been met may be principally legal 
in nature, but it is often particularly closely connected to the facts of the case 
at hand. The broad range of circumstances that may be of relevance in a par-
ticular case are often difficult to ‘catch’ in a general rule. It therefore seems 
legitimate – if not inevitable – to leave the national courts some discretion in 
this respect so as to allow for a proper case-by-case assessment, as generally 
tends to be the case under the domestic legal systems of the Member 
States.107 Where concerns from an EU law perspective nonetheless emerge, it 
would appear that they can normally be addressed by either reasoning on 
the basis of the objective and the effectiveness of the EU legislation at issue 
(and thus possibly the conclusion that the inclusion of a causality require-
ment is to imply a condition sine qua non test as a minimum) or else the prin-
ciples of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial protection.108
105  Cf. Opinion AG Kokott case C-557/12, Kone, para. 33-36
106 Cf. e.g. Study European observatory on counterfeiting and piracy (undated-d), p. 4, 
where diffi culties as regards the legal notion of causality were not singled out as a par-
ticular practical diffi culty in intellectual property cases. Nor was further action on this 
point considered necessary in the fi eld of competition law. See C Commission, Staff 
working paper accompanying the green paper on damages actions for breach of EC anti-
trust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, p. 77. In respect of Member State liability, cf. Biondi & Farley 
(2009), pp. 55-57; Lock (2012), pp. 1697-1699.
107 Van Dam (2006), p. 266 (regarding the French, German and English legal system); Kadner 
Graziono & Oertel (2008), p. 465 (regarding the German legal family); Tichý (2008), p. 533 
(regarding the Eastern-European legal family); Troiano (2008), p. 413 (regarding the 
Romanic legal family). See also Study Ashurst (2004), p. 73.
108 On these three principles, see sections 2.2 (equivalence and effectiveness) and 2.3 (effec-
tive judicial protection) above.
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7.1.4. Quantification of damages
270. In order to be compensable the harm suffered as a consequence of the 
infringement of EU law at issue must be quantifiable, i.e. assessable in mon-
etary terms.109 The issue of quantification of the extent of the damage is 
therefore of considerable practical importance. But private parties harmed 
by infringements of rules of substantive EU law at issue often encounter dif-
ficulties in substantiating, to the satisfaction of the competent national court, 
the full extent of the harm that they claim to have suffered.110 Indeed, this 
issue is among the key bottlenecks for successfully bringing actions for dam-
ages. The practical use made of this remedy is therefore likely to increase 
significantly if the applicable EU rules would somehow help to reduce the 
burden on the applicant in this regard.
271. The Competition Damages Directive, which declares this to be a “sub-
stantial barrier” for effectively bringing actions for damages,111 is notewor-
thy for containing a range of measures regarding the quantification of the 
harm.112 These measures relate to the standard and burden of proof that 
apply in this regard, the empowerment of national courts to estimate the 
extent of the damage, a rebuttable presumption that harm is caused and 
assistance by the competent public enforcement authorities. In addition in 
2013 the Commission issued a guidance document to assist the parties to 
the proceedings and the courts seised when they are being confronted with 
quantification issues in a competition law context.113 These measures can 
certainly be helpful for an applicant trying to quantify the harm suffered, 
particularly when they are considered collectively and in combination with 
the measures on the disclosure of evidence for which this directive also pro-
vides.114
Yet on closer inspection these measures may be somewhat less impres-
sive than what might appear at first sight. For instance, the rule that the 
burden and standard of proof that apply in this respect may not render the 
right to damages practically impossible or excessively difficult is no more 
than a restatement of the principle of effectiveness that applies anyway 
under the Court’s case law.115 The obligation for the Member States to 
empower the courts to estimate the harm is further significantly qualified by 
the fact that – different from what the Commission had proposed – it applies 
109 Cf. e.g. Rebhahn (2008), p. 206; Vaquer (2008), p. 30.
110 See e.g. Study Herbert Smith (1996), p. 18; Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 15; Commission, Proposal for the Competition 
Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 18.
111 Recital 41 Competition Damages Directive.
112 Art. 17 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 231 above.
113 See in particular Commission, Practical guide on quantifying harm in actions for dam-
ages based on breaches of Article 101 and 102 TFEU, SWD(2013) 205.
114 On these disclosure measures, see further subsections 6.3.3 above and 8.2.2 below.
115 On the principle of effectiveness, see subsection 2.2.2 above.
p. 288 C. Comparison and contextualisation: remedies and procedures para. 272
only where it is established that the applicant suffered harm and where a 
precise quantification thereof is practically impossible or excessively diffi-
cult. Most Member States moreover already provided for such a power in 
one form or another. The directive’s rebuttable presumption that harm is 
caused in addition only applies in relation to cartels and it leaves open the 
key question to whom that harm was caused. In fact, as it does not address 
the extent of the harm, this is not a rule of quantification properly speaking. 
Finally, the possibility for national competition authorities to assist the 
courts may be an interesting innovation, its effects in practice will however 
largely depend on the assertiveness and available resources of the authori-
ties concerned. This is after all a possibility and not an obligation, subject to 
a request by the court in question.
272. As regards the other fields than competition law at issue here, it must be 
observed that neither the Procurement Remedies Directives, nor the IPR 
Enforcement Directive, nor the Product Liability Directive contain any spe-
cific provision that seeks to address the quantification-related difficulties 
that applicants experience also in these fields. This is not for lack of trying 
on the side of the Commission however. Take for example the Commission’s 
proposal for the Utilities Remedies Directive, dating from 1990. There it was 
suggested setting the compensation for bidding costs at 1% of the value of 
the contract put out to tender, by means of “a limited step designed to ensure 
that in all Member States claims for damages are a realistic possibility”.116 This 
part of the proposal was already limited, in that it was not concerned with 
the issue of compensation for lost profits. The Commission considered that 
“[a] high level of harmonisation of the quantification of damages is an unrealistic 
objective at this stage”.117 Even this was seen as too far-going however. The 
European Parliament (which then only had a consultative role in the legisla-
tive process) insisted that these costs had to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. The Commission therefore decided to drop this suggestion from its 
proposal.
Over a decade later, in 2003, the Commission made a comparable sug-
gestion in its proposal for the IPR Enforcement Directive. There it proposed 
making provision for the payment of damages consisting of a lump sum 
equal to twice the royalties or fees that would have been due had proper 
authorisation been requested to the rightholder instead of the illegal use.118 
116 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, pp. 13 and 
19. See further para. 85 above. The Commission also proposed setting at the same level 
the penalty payment for which Member States can make provision under Art. 2(1)(c) 
Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13 by means of an alternative for interim measures or the 
order to set aside decisions. Also this suggestion was rejected by the EU legislature how-
ever. See further para. 82 above.
117 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, pp. 13 and 
19.
118 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 40 (Art. 
17(1)). See further para. 134 and 135 above.
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The EU legislature however considerably watered down this aspect of the 
proposal. This resulted in the current (optional) provision on lump sum pay-
ments, which refers to the amount of the royalties or fees only by means of 
an example and which does not entail a doubling of that amount.119 Worth 
mentioning is also another rule that the Commission included in this pro-
posal, meant specifically to enlighten the burden on the applicant wishing to 
claim the ‘unfair profits’ made by the infringer. It concerned a rule of evi-
dence that the applicant would only have to prove the amount of the gross 
income achieved by the defendant, after which it would be for the latter to 
provide evidence of its deductible expenses and profits attributable to fac-
tors other than the protected object.120 But the EU legislature struck out also 
this aspect of the Commission’s proposal.
273. The foregoing underlines the Commission’s awareness of the difficul-
ties that applicants experience when seeking to quantify the harm suffered. 
Yet it also illustrates the challenges encountered when trying to address 
them through EU legislative measures. The overall picture that thus emerg-
es is that the EU legislature is generally rather averse of rules that aim to tack-
le these difficulties in a straightforward, but (therefore) also in a rather rigid 
and inaccurate manner, namely by providing for some kind of predeter-
mined and simplified standard or mechanism to calculate what is presumed 
to be the harm caused to an individual applicant. The Competition Damages 
Directive suggests that, subject to certain limitations, rules allowing for 
somewhat more flexibility – such as those providing for certain rebuttable 
presumptions or estimates by the courts – may stand a better chance of 
being adopted. This is probably due to the fact that overly rigid rules can 
lead to overcompensation, which is generally seen as something that is to be 
avoided both at EU and at national level.121
274. In this light it is somewhat ironic that the only instance under consid-
eration where the EU legislature did adopt a rule involving the rigid ex ante 
quantification of damages is the possibility of setting a financial ceiling (of 
€ 70 million) for the amount of damages that may be due under the Product 
Liability Directive.122 This thus entails what is essentially a ‘negative’ rule, 
i.e. a rule that, rather than helping the applicant in a ‘positive’ manner, aims 
instead to protect the defendant by setting an absolute limit for the amount 
of damages due. In the recitals of this directive it is explained that in the 
legal traditions of most Member States it is inappropriate to set such an 
119 Art. 13(1)(b) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
120 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 40 (Art. 
17(2)). See further para. 134 above.
121 See further subsection 7.1.5 below.
122 Art. 16(1) Product Liability Directive 85/374. See e.g. also Art. 30(2) of Annex I to Rail 
Passengers’ Rights Regulation 1371/2007.
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absolute ceiling, but that these traditions differ. It was therefore considered 
to be “possible to derogate from the principle of unlimited liability”.123
This ceiling should probably be seen in light of the fact that the Product 
Liability Directive provides for no-fault (‘strict’) liability. The ‘stricter’ the 
liability in damages, the more justification there arguably is for moderating 
its effects by capping the amount of damages to be paid. Conversely, setting 
such an absolute ceiling may well be seen as inappropriate in cases of less 
‘strict’, fault-based liability.124 That applies all the more so given that in oth-
er fields of EU law the Court of Justice has generally shown itself to be criti-
cal of absolute ceilings, at least when they are established under national 
law.125
7.1.5. Qualification of damages and joint and several liability
275. Whereas the EU legislature can thus be said to be generally somewhat 
hesitant as to the adoption of rules on the quantification, the picture in rela-
tion to the qualification of damages is quite different. The issue here is not 
how much damage is to be compensated, but rather which type of damage is 
compensable under the applicable legislation. In respect of this latter issue it 
did prove possible to adopt EU rules that provide for a degree of precision, 
even if the Commission not always succeeded in having its more ambitious 
proposals adopted and the rules in question tend to differ considerably 
between them.
276. Each of the four directives under consideration here is characterised 
by a distinct approach. First, the approach set out in the Procurement Rem-
edies Directives can be best described as unspecific. The Commission’s 1987 
proposal for the Public Sector Remedies Directive was comparatively ambi-
tious, in that it specified that the compensation due should include the costs 
of unnecessary studies, foregone profits and lost opportunities.126 However 
this aspect of the proposal was left out from the text finally adopted. This 
directive now does not contain any further qualification of the term ‘dam-
age’. The same applies for its sibling, the Utilities Remedies Directive. While 
this latter directive does contain a specific arrangement for the compensa-
tion of bidding costs,127 also in this case the more sensitive – and arguably 
also more important – issue of compensation for lost profits is not addressed. 
123 Recital 17 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
124 See however Art. 35a Credit Rating Agency Regulation 1060/2009, which does not cap 
the civil liability of infringers, but nonetheless allows limiting it in advance, provided 
that the limitation is reasonable and proportionate and allowed under the applicable 
national law.
125 E.g. CoJ case 14/83, Von Colsen, para. 24; CoJ case C271/91, Marshall, para. 34; CoJ case 
C-180/95, Draehmpaehl, para. 40. See also Art. 18 Gender Equality Directive 2006/54.
126 Commission, Proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, COM(87) 134, p. 7 
(Art. 1(3)). See further para. 84 above.
127 Art. 2(7) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13. See further para. 85 above.
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When proposing this latter arrangement in 1990, the Commission had delib-
erately not included a rule on the compensation of lost profits, in anticipa-
tion of difficulties in the legislative process.128
Second, the Product Liability Directive’s rules on the qualification of 
damages are rather selective. Here two heads of damages are specified, 
namely damage caused by death or personal injuries and damage to proper-
ty.129 This directive does not provide any further details on what is under-
stood precisely by these terms. It further leaves the issue of non-material 
damage expressly to be settled in accordance with national law. This is in 
line with what the Commission had originally proposed (even if, at the sug-
gestion of the European Parliament, it later suggested bringing also this lat-
ter head of damage within the directive’ scope).
Third, the position under the IPR Enforcement Directive in respect of the 
qualification of damages is rather mixed. The main rule laid down in this 
directive is that the damages must be “appropriate to the actual prejudice 
suffered”.130 This provision then continues by stipulating that, when setting 
the damages, account is to be taken of “all appropriate aspects, such as the neg-
ative economic consequences, including lost profits which the injured party has suf-
fered, any unfair profits made by the infringer and, in appropriate cases, elements 
other than economic factors, such as the moral prejudice caused to the rightholder by 
the infringement”.131 Yet the directive also foresees the possibility of a lump 
sum approach as an alternative to the aforementioned rule.132 Thus on the 
one hand this directive mentions several elements that can be relevant to the 
setting of damages, while on the other hand it does so in a rather lose and 
non-committal manner.
Lastly, the Competition Damages Directive is relatively detailed as regards 
the available heads of damages. It expressly seeks to ensure that ‘full com-
pensation’ can be awarded, stipulating that this means placing the private 
party having suffered harm in the position in which that party would have 
been had the infringement in question not been committed.133 It further 
specifies that this therefore covers the right to compensation for actual harm 
and loss of profit, plus payment of interest. With respect to the interest due 
the directive leaves the Member States a degree of flexibility however.134
128 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, pp. 13 and 19.
129 Art. 9 Product Liability Directive 85/374. See further para. 177 above.
130 Art. 13(1)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 135 above.
131 Cf. Art. 68 Patent Court Agreement, where a similar rule is provided for, while adding 
however that, to the extent possible, the injured party must be placed in the position it 
would have been in if no infringement had taken place and that the infringer should not 
benefi t from the infringement. On this agreement, see further para. 108 above.
132  Art. 13(1)(b) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 135 above and 
para. 279 below. On an optional basis, Art. 13(2) further allows Member States to provide 
for the recovery of profi ts or the payment of (possibly pre-established) damages in cases 
of infringements where the infringer did not knowingly or with reasonable grounds to 
know engaged in infringing activity.
133 Art. 2 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 230 above.
134 See recital 12 Competition Damages Directive.
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277. Looking beyond these legislative provisions, the case law of the Court 
of Justice suggests that, as a general rule, EU law requires that any loss or 
damage caused by an infringement of EU law can be compensated in full. This 
follows for instance from Veedfald, a case relating to the Product Liability 
Directive.135 The Court of Justice clarified here that, although it is for nation-
al law to determine the precise content thereof, under the abovementioned 
heads of damages for which this directive provides “full and proper compensa-
tion” must be available. This is broadly in line with earlier rulings in other 
fields of EU law. Most notably in Marshall, a case relating to the Gender 
Equality Directive, the Court held that financial compensation must be “ade-
quate, in that it must enable the loss and damage actually sustained as a result of the 
discriminatory dismissal to be made good in full in accordance with the applicable 
national rules”.136 Interestingly the situation may not be fundamentally dif-
ferent where no rules of secondary EU law on damages liability apply. This 
was the case in the 2006 Manfredi ruling relating to actions for damages for 
infringements of EU competition law.137 Here the Court held that, in the 
absence of specific EU rules (given that the Competition Damages Directive 
had at that time not yet been enacted), it is in principle for national law to set 
the criteria for determining the extent of the damages. It added however 
that pursuant to the principle of effectiveness and the right of any individu-
al to seek compensation for loss caused by infringements of the competition 
rules such compensation must cover actual loss, loss of profit as well as 
interest. This thus seems to boil down to a requirement of full compensation; 
as such it has subsequently been codified in the abovementioned provisions 
of the Competition Damages Directive.138
It further seems likely that, unless EU law expressly provides otherwise, 
full compensation in principle also covers non-material damage,139 such as 
pain and suffering.140 It has been said to be an “almost universally accepted 
principle” that, at least where natural persons are concerned, compensable 
harm may in principle also include damage which goes beyond mere pecu-
135 CoJ case C-203/99, Veedfald, para. 25-28. See further para. 178 above. In Opinion AG Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer case C-203/99, Veedfald, it had been argued that this term ‘damage’ is an 
autonomous concept of EU law, but in its ruling the CoJ did not touch upon this point.
136 CoJ case C271/91, Marshall, para. 26. See also e.g. CoJ case C-63/01, Evans, para. 68, 
where a similar line was followed in relation to (what is now) Directive 2009/103/EC 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the 
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, OJ 2010, L 263/11 (‘Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Directive’).
137 CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 92-97. See further para. 214 above.
138 Cf. recital 12 Competition Damages Directive. See also Commission, Proposal for the 
Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, pp. 4 and 13. See further para. 230 
above.
139 Generally speaking, the term ‘non-material damage’ can be understood as referring to 
damage that is not assessable in monetary terms on the basis of any standard fi nancial 
yardstick and that affects personal feelings, such as pain and suffering or loss of reputa-
tion. See Vaquer (2008), p. 39.
140 Cf. Reich (2010), p. 149.
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niary loss.141 Pursuant to the express wording to this effect of the Product 
Liability Directive in Veedfald it was found that this matter is to be deter-
mined by national law.142 By contrast in Leitner, a case relating to the Pack-
age Travel Directive, which does not touch upon this issue expressly,143 the 
Court held that the term ‘damage’ as used in that directive implied that it 
must be possible for non-material damage to be compensated.144 This latter 
ruling is in line not only with what, despite considerable variations, gener-
ally applies under the laws of the Member States.145 It is also consistent with 
case law relating to other instruments of EU law, such as Article 340 TFEU 
on the non-contractual liability of the Union,146 the Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Directive147 and the Air Passengers’ Rights Regulation.148 The Court of Jus-
tice has also held that, in international law, the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘damage’ includes material as well as non-material damage.149 In this light 
the Commission may therefore well be correct in considering that non-mate-
rial damage can also be compensable under the Competition Damages 
Directive.150
278. By means of a last comment, it is noticeable that the two legal acts 
under consideration that specifically concentrate on damages liability, i.e. 
the Product Liability Directive and the Competition Damages Directive, in a 
sense take the general objective of full compensation a step further. Both 
directives provide that, where two or more undertakings are liable for the 
same damage, these parties are jointly and severally liable for that damage.151 
This appears to be in line with the general rule provided for in the national 
laws of the Member States where non-contractual liability (tort) is con-
cerned.152 The Competition Damages Directive specifies that this means that 
the co-infringing undertakings are bound to compensate the damage in full 
141 Opinion AG Wahl case C-371/12, Petillo, para. 39.
142 CoJ case C-203/99, Veedfald, para. 33.
143 Package Travel Directive 90/314. See further para. 185 above.
144 CoJ case C-168/00, Leitner, para. 21-23.
145 See e.g. Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000), p. 140; Opinion AG Tizzano case C-168/00, 
Leitner, para. 30 and 40-42; Study Expert group on European contract law (2011) (Art. 
2(12)); Opinion AG Wahl case C-371/12, Petillo, para. 40; Study European observatory on 
counterfeiting and piracy (undated-d), p. 4.
146 E.g. CoJ case C-308/87, Grifoni, para. 37. In the context of EU personnel disputes, see also 
e.g. CoJ joined cases 169/83 and 136/84, Leussink, para. 18-20; CoJ case C-343/87, Culin, 
para. 29. See further Oliphant (2008), pp. 264-270; Basedow (2010a), p. 459.
147 Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive 2009/103. See CoJ case C-22/12, Haasová, para. 39-50; 
CoJ case C-371/12, Petillo, para. 35. See also EFTA Court case E-8/07, Nguyen, para. 26.
148 Air Passengers’ Rights Regulation 261/2004. See CoJ case C-83/10, Sousa Rodríguez, 
para. 47.
149 CoJ case C-63/09, Walz, para. 27-29. See also Opinion AG Tizzano case C-168/00, Leitner, 
para. 39.
150 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 13.
151 Art. 5 Product Liability Directive 85/375; Art. 11 Competition Damages Directive. See 
further para. 176 and 238 above respectively.
152 See e.g. Vrcek (2010), p. 283.
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and that the injured party has the right to require full compensation from 
any of them. The same essentially follows from the recitals of the Product 
Liability Directive.153
Also on two other points the regime on joint and several liability laid 
down in the Competition Damages Directive is more elaborate than the one 
set out in the Product Liability Directive. To begin with, subject to certain 
conditions, the former directive limits the joint and several liability of three 
categories of undertakings, namely: (i) small and medium-sized enterprises; 
(ii) undertakings having received leniency in the context of public enforce-
ment proceedings and (iii) undertakings that reached a consensual settle-
ment with the injured private party.154 The Product Liability Directive leaves 
the issue of contribution – i.e. the right for the undertaking that was held to 
be jointly and severally liable and thus had to compensate the damage in 
full to recover part of this damages award from the other co-infringing 
undertakings – to national law.155 The Competition Damages Directive in 
contrast expressly provides for a right to recover a contribution. It specifies 
that the amount of that contribution is to be determined in light of the rela-
tive responsibility of the parties concerned for the damage caused. But also 
under this latter directive it is left to national law to establish how this is to 
be determined precisely.156
7.1.6. Punitive damages and other damages going beyond compensation
279. A last issue to be assessed in connection with actions for damages is 
the possibility of providing for damages awards that go beyond the mere 
compensation of the harm suffered, in particular punitive damages.157 In 
this respect it should be underlined at the outset that none of the legal acts 
considered in part B make provision for the award of this type of damages.
That is not to say however that no discussions have taken place on this 
matter. As was noted above, the Commission’s 2003 proposal for the IPR 
Enforcement Directive included a provision that set the damages due at 
lump sum of twice the royalties or fees that would have been due had the 
infringer asked authorisation from the rightholder.158 The Commission’s 
153 Recital 5 Product Liability Directive 85/375.
154 Art. 19 Competition Damages Directive. See also para. 245 above.
155 Most national legal systems provide for such a right of contribution. See Study CEPS, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), p. 516.
156 Recital 33 Competition Damages Directive.
157 For the present purposes the term ‘punitive damages’ also covers what are sometimes 
called ‘exemplary damages’. On punitive damages, see also para. 443 below. The ‘fl ip-
side’, as it were, of the issue discussed above is the award of nominal or symbolic damages. 
The award of the latter damages does generally not seem excluded under EU law, but, as 
was held in CoJ case 26/74, Roquette frères, para. 24, “[t]he fact that the applicant has reduced 
its claim to nominal damages does not relieve it of providing conclusive proof of the damages suf-
fered”. See further Vaquer (2008), pp. 26-28.
158 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 40 (Art. 
17(1)). See further para. 134 and 272 above.
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1996 green paper on public procurement further contained a suggestion to 
make provision for “liquidated damages of a sufficiently dissuasive sum, exceed-
ing the damage suffered”.159 And in the Commission’s 2005 green paper on 
actions for damages for infringements of EU competition law the option of 
doubling the damages in certain cases was raised.160 Each of these suggestions 
was met with mostly negative responses however. Therefore, while the final 
text of the IPR Enforcement Directive does provide for an (optional) provi-
sion on damages awards in the form of lump sums, unlike the Commis-
sion’s proposal, there is no longer a mention of the doubling of the sum in 
question.161 This directive’s recitals moreover emphasise that here the aim is 
not to introduce an obligation to provide for punitive damages.162 As to the 
suggestions made in relation to public procurement and competition law, in 
both instances the Commission did not further pursue them, in light of the 
negative reactions from interested parties.163 Consequently, unlike the 2005 
green paper, the 2008 white paper on competition damages stressed that 
damages awards primary serve a compensatory function, rather than a 
punitive one.164 The same view underlies the Commission proposal for the 
Competition Damages Directive.165
Therefore virtual consensus seems to have emerged that punitive dam-
ages are not to be provided for by EU law.166 It can thus be said that, “[s]een 
from the perspective of [EU] law, compensation for harm suffered as a result of the 
infringement of [EU] law should be appropriate to the harm suffered”.167
280. It is important to note however that the foregoing does not mean that 
punitive damages are necessarily precluded under EU law. The IPR Enforce-
ment Directive’s provision on lump sums, referred to above, includes for 
159 Commission, Green paper on public procurement in the EU, COM(96) 583, p. 15.
160 Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, p. 7.
161 Art. 13(1)(b) IPR Enforcement Directive. See also its Art. 13(2). See para. 135 above.
162 Recital 26 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
163 See para. 86 and 219 above.
164 See para. 217 above.
165 See e.g. Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU 
antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 39-40, where it is said that increasing deterrence is not 
a primary objective of this initiative. Cf. Esteva Mosso (2013), p. 52.
166 Note however that in many national laws provision is made for the award of interest 
over the sum due during the period preceding the trial and the judgment, the effect of 
which has been compared to the availability of punitive damages. See Jones (2003), 
pp. 102-105.
167 Opinion AG Geelhoed joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/01, Manfredi, para. 69. In the con-
text of EU non-contractual liability under Art. 340 TFEU, see e.g. GC case T-260/97, 
Camar, para. 97 and 101, where it is held that: “[i]t is settled case law that compensation for 
loss in the context of non-contractual liability is intended so far as possible to provide restitution 
for the victims” and that “compensation for loss must in principle allow the applicant to be placed 
in the position, fi nancially, in which it would have been if the [EU institution or body concerned] 
had refrained from the unlawful conduct which caused the loss”.
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instance the words “at least”.168 That implies that Member States that wish to 
do so are not barred from making provision for further-going measures 
under national law.169 In the Procurement Remedies Directives and the 
Product Liability Directive the issue of punitive damages is simply left 
unaddressed. This can be taken to mean that the question whether or not 
they are available is in principle left to national law. The Court of Justice, for 
its part, has so far not expressed any principled objections against the avail-
ability of punitive damages under national law. It rather assessed the matter 
primarily under the principle of equivalence.170 Neither can it be said that 
there is consensus in the legal doctrine on the per se unacceptability of puni-
tive damages as a matter of EU law.171
More generally, it would appear that the argument that punitive dam-
ages are to be rejected as being incompatible with European legal tradition (or, 
perhaps, traditions), as is sometimes maintained in the context of the above-
mentioned discussions, is incorrect, or at least incomplete. In fact, there are 
EU legal acts that contain provisions that would appear to provide for com-
pensation going beyond the harm actually suffered.172 More significantly 
perhaps, when the Commission proposed in 2003 to provide in the Rome II 
Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations that puni-
tive damages are against EU public policy, this was rejected by the EU legis-
lature.173 Besides, whilst it is true that in the legal systems of the Member 
States damages awards serve, first and foremost, to compensate a party for 
the injured suffered, this is by no means an absolute rule.174 In many nation-
168 Art. 13(1)(b) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
169 Similarly the statement in its recital 26 that the IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48 does 
not aim to introduce an obligation to provide for punitive damages does not exclude that 
Member States do so under national law.
170 CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 99. See also CoJ joined cases 
C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 90; CoJ case C-174/12, Hirmann, para. 40. 
On the principle of equivalence, see subsection 2.2.1 above.
171 Cf. e.g. Van Gerven (2003b), p. 92.
172 See e.g. Art. 18(2) Plant Variety Rights Implementing Regulation 1768/1995. Here it is 
stipulated that compensation equal to four times the normal license fee can be due. It is 
not explicitly stated that this arrangement aims to punish and deter infringers, but both 
the high amount and the limitation to cases of repeated and intentional infringements 
appear to point in that direction. Cf. also Art. 2(6) Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late 
payment in commercial transactions, OJ 2011, L 48/1, where provision is made for a legal 
interest rate for late payment which is at least eight percentage points above the rate applied 
by the European Central Bank.
173 Commission, Proposal for Rome II Regulation 864/2007, COM(2003) 427, p. 40 (Art. 24). 
Recital 32 of Rome II Regulation 864/2007 provides in essence only that excessive punitive 
damages could be held to be contrary to the public policy of the forum, depending on the 
legal order of the Member State concerned.
174 Cf. e.g. Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000), p. 740; Study Ashurst (2004), p. 80; Study 
View (2004), p. 7; Opinion AG Geelhoed joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, 
para. 68;  Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), p. 417; Komninos 
(2008), pp. 160 and 211; Kellner (2009), p. 138; Milutinovic (2010), p. 119; Hazelhorst 
(2010), p. 767.
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al jurisdictions it is acknowledged that, to a greater of lesser extent, damages 
liability can also fulfil a (secondary) function in deterring and punishing 
infringers.175 A significant number of Member States actually have provi-
sions in place that allow for the award of damages that are, or at least can be, 
considered punitive in nature.176
281. It follows from the foregoing that EU law is largely neutral in respect 
of punitive damages; they are generally not required as a matter of EU law, 
but neither are they necessarily precluded. That said, there appears to be a 
more recent trend towards taking a more restrictive stance as a matter of EU 
law. Most notably the 2014 Competition Damages Directive expressly states 
that “[f]ull compensation under this directive shall not lead to overcompensation, 
whether by means of punitive, multiple or other types of damages”.177 This provi-
sion, which did not feature in the Commission’s proposal, appears to have 
been inserted mainly at the insistence of the European Parliament.178 Simi-
larly, in line with an earlier suggestion to this effect from the side of the 
European Parliament,179 the Commission’s 2013 Collective Redress Recom-
mendation states that “punitive damages […] should be prohibited”.180 The 2012 
Patent Court Agreement also provides that the damages to be awarded in 
the cases covered by the rules in question “shall not be punitive”.181
Thus, where earlier discussions were mainly concerned with opposition 
against requiring the availability of such damages at EU level, which led to 
the largely neutral position referred to above, there now appears to be a 
trend (or at least some first steps in that direction) towards actively prohibit-
ing them under EU law. This trend can probably be ascribed to the fact that 
punitive damages are often associated with the ‘litigation culture’, which is 
said to exist in the United States and which many seek to avoid in the EU.182
282. A last – related yet distinct – observation is that, even apart from the 
aforementioned virtual consensus and the said more recent trend, in several 
respects scope for discussion remains. That is in large part related to the fact 
that there is not always a uniform understanding of what is meant precisely 
by the term ‘punitive damages’. One understanding is that whether or not 
175 Cf. Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000), pp. 25-26, 69 and 741; Van Dam (2006), p. 12 
and 302-303; Kelliher (2008), pp. 10-11.
176 Namely the UK, Ireland, France, Cyprus, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Austria. See para. 137 
and 219 above. See also Kelliher (2008), pp. 10-11.
177 Art. 1(3) Competition Damages Directive.
178 See para. 230 above.
179 European Parliament, Resolution on towards a coherent European approach to collective 
redress, P7_TA(2012)0021.
180 Point 31 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See further para. 190 above.
181 Art. 68(2) Patent Court Agreement. On this agreement, see further para. 108 above. A 
similar rule had already been included in Commission, Proposal for a regulation on the 
Community patent, COM(2000) 412, p. 56 (Art. 44(2)).
182 See further para. 460 below.
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damages awards are to be qualified as ‘punitive’ is to be determined on the 
basis of their objective, i.e. whether or not the aim is to punish and deter 
infringers. This view finds broad support.183 When understood in such an 
‘objective-based’ manner, there indeed appears to be a virtual consensus as 
to the undesirability of punitive damages under EU law. However others 
appear to have a somewhat different understanding of this term. The 
emphasis is then not so much on the objective pursued, but rather on the 
effects in practice of the damages awards. On this latter understanding the 
key issue is whether or not the amount awarded is greater than the damage 
actually suffered by the party receiving it. This distinction can be of particu-
lar relevance whether matters of quantification and qualification of the harm 
are concerned.184
One example of a situation where the relevance of the above distinction 
can come to light relates to the possibility of setting damages as a pre-deter-
mined lump sum. As has been seen, this can be done for instance either as a 
percentage of the value of the public contract at issue in public procurement 
cases or in function of the fees or royalties that would have been due had 
authorisation been requested in intellectual property cases. In competition 
cases one could think of a certain percentage of the total price charged, 
which is presumed to be the ‘overcharge’ caused by the cartel.185 Another 
example relates to the possibility of providing for the award of gain-based 
damages (disgorgement). Put briefly, the latter are damages awarded on the 
basis of the profit made by the defendant as a result of the infringement. 
These ‘unfair profits’ are an element that can be taken into account in vari-
ous Member States, especially for intellectual property-related infringe-
ments but sometimes also in the field of competition law.186 In respect of 
these two fields of law the Commission has suggested establishing or fur-
ther elaborating this possibility as a matter of EU law.187 When the focus is 
183 See e.g. Study Ashurst (2004), p. 80; Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the 
green paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, p. 36; 
Zippro (2009b), p. 432; Milutinovic (2010), p. 119; Hazelhorst (2010), p. 764. See however 
also Kellner (2008), p. 580.
184 On these matters generally, see subsections 7.1.4 and 7.2.5 above.
185 See the Hungarian competition law, referred to in para. 223 above. Note that this latter 
law establishes a (rebuttable) presumption of a price increase as a consequence of the com-
petition law infringement, which is not necessarily the same as the amount of harm suf-
fered.
186 As regards intellectual property law, see Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 14; Study European observatory on counterfeiting 
and piracy (undated-d), pp. 1-4. As regards competition law, see Study Ashurst (2004), 
p. 80; Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), p. 427. See also Com-
mission, Staff working paper accompanying the green paper on damages actions for 
breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, pp. 35-36; Milutinovic (2010), p. 118.
187 Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, p. 7; Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, 
COM(2010) 779, p. 8. Note that under Art. 13(1)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48 
unfair profi ts are already one the relevant aspects to be taken into account when setting 
the damages. See also subsection 8.2.6 below.
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on the objective of the measure in question, it seems evident that none of the 
above measures are to be considered as punitive damages. These rules on 
lump sums are after all essentially meant to reduce the burden on the appli-
cant in terms of the quantification of the harm, so as to make this remedy 
more effective. This leaves the main (compensatory) objective of the dam-
ages award itself unaffected. Likewise, the objective of gain-based damages 
is principally to compensate the injured party as well as to prevent the 
wrongdoer’s unjust enrichment, rather than to punish the latter.188 Provid-
ing for these kinds of measures could however be seen as objectionable if 
one focuses on their possible effects. For in all of the above cases, irrespective 
of the objective pursued, it cannot be excluded that in certain instances the 
sum paid will be higher than the harm actually suffered. Part of the objec-
tions expressed in relation to aforementioned Commission’s proposal for 
the provision on lump sums in the IPR Enforcement Directive seem to be 
attributable to these differences in understanding as to what constitutes 
punitive damages.189 Similarly, in relation to the possibility of taking 
account of unfair profits, it has been stressed that this should not entail a 
‘camouflaged’ form of punitive damages.190
7.1.7. Summary
283. Several contradictions and paradoxes exist in relation to EU legisla-
tion providing for liability in damages for infringements of EU law. On the 
one hand this remedy has been made available in all fields of law and has 
been regulated in most of the legislation under consideration in this study. It 
generally also receives considerable attention in discussions on the private 
enforcement of EU law. On the other hand the provisions in question often 
harmonise the relevant rules of national law only to a limited extent. The 
functioning in practice of this remedy moreover tends to leave much to be 
desired. The EU’s approach on this matter can further vary considerably 
between the different fields of law at issue here. A common feature thats 
may go at least some way in explaining this mixed state of affairs is that 
attempts to adopt EU legislation on actions for damages are often rather 
controversial. They tend to be met with opposition, especially from the side 
of the Member States, but often also from stakeholders and legal scholars.
188 See further e.g. Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000), p. 872; Kelliher (2008), p. 11.
189 See e.g. Meier-Beck (2004), p. 122; Kur (2004), p. 827; Cohen & Mottet Haugaard (2010), 
pp. 376-377; Lakits-Josse (2011), p. 545. See Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 23, where the Commission held that this aspect of its 
proposal did not entail punitive damages, but rather a provision that “allows for compen-
sation based on an objective criterion while taking account of the expenses incurred by the right-
holder”.
190 Meier-Beck (2004), p. 121; Till (2010), p. 136. See also Commission, Responses to the col-
lective redress benchmark consultation, 2008, p. 7, where various stakeholders argue 
against providing for gain-based damages in a collective redress context on the grounds 
that this would entail a form of punitive damages.
p. 300 C. Comparison and contextualisation: remedies and procedures para. 283
More specifically, the issue of fault in relation to actions for damages is a 
particularly thorny one. The approaches followed in the directives assessed 
in part B differ substantially between them, ranging from something 
approaching an explicit fault requirement (IPR Enforcement Directive) to an 
express no-fault approach (Product Liability Directive). Where the legisla-
tion leaves this issue either entirely or mostly unaddressed (Public Procure-
ment Directives, Competition Damages Directive), this can, depending on 
the case at hand, be construed by the Court of Justice as implying that the 
application of a fault requirement under national law is precluded. Consid-
ering that such requirements for liability in damages to be incurred are com-
mon in the laws of the Member States, this can be a far-going conclusion 
indeed. At the same time there are also reasons to believe that the practical 
consequences of these differing approaches should not be overstated. For it 
appears that whether provision is made for no-fault liability, an express fault 
requirement or some sort of intermediate solution, this is in itself not deci-
sive for the degree of successful damages litigation under the directive in 
question. In practice the dividing line between these approaches may well 
be more fluent than what might appear at first sight. Turning to the issue of 
causality, the general lack of structural difficulties and debate that this issue 
raises as a matter of EU law is noticeable. It is generally provided, and wide-
ly accepted, that there must be a causal link between the infringement and 
the damage suffered for liability to be incurred. Even if this can certainly be 
an important issue in practice, the concept of causality remains somewhat of 
a ‘black box’ however, as it has hardly been fleshed out either by the EU 
legislature or by the EU judiciary. It seems that there are generally rather 
few objections – and indeed perhaps also few alternatives – to leaving 
national courts considerable discretion in deciding on a case-by-case basis 
whether or not this requirement has been met.
It has further been seen that the EU legislature can be quite averse of lay-
ing down specific rules that would assist a private party-applicant in quanti-
fying the harm that he claims to have suffered as a consequence of an 
infringement of EU law, especially where these rules are rigid. This is the 
case despite the fact that this has frequently been identified as an important 
practical bottleneck for successfully bringing actions for damages and that 
therefore the Commission has over the years repeatedly proposed rules to 
alleviate this burden on the applicant. The EU’s legislative involvement 
with the qualification of damages, i.e. the question which heads of damages 
are to be compensated, is in contrast typically more substantial. Although 
there are significant differences between them, most of the EU legal acts 
under consideration in this study address this matter with some degree of 
detail. Certainly when read in conjunction with the available case law, it 
appears that, as a general rule, EU law requires that any damage suffered as 
a consequence of an infringement thereof must be compensated in full. Sub-
ject to possible precisions or deviations in the EU legislation at issue, this 
will normally entail an obligation to compensate costs, lost profit and inter-
est, as well as non-material damage. The Product Liability Directive and the 
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Competition Damages Directive further provide for the possibility of sev-
eral infringers being held jointly and severally liable for the full damage 
incurred. This latter directive is alone in also providing for a right of contri-
bution between the infringers concerned in such a case. Finally, although 
none of the EU legislative acts under consideration here provides for puni-
tive damages, this tends to be another contentious topic. The dust now largely 
seems to have settled however. A virtual consensus has emerged that EU 
law should not provide for punitive damages. The position under EU law 
mostly seems neutral, meaning that these kinds of damages awards are nei-
ther required nor precluded. That said, more recently there appears to be a 
trend towards prohibiting them in secondary EU law. Discussions moreover 
continue, notably in relation to possible rules on lump sum awards and 
gain-based damages, in light of a sometimes (overly) broad understanding 
of the term ‘punitive damages’ that relates not to the objective of the dam-
ages award but to its possible effects in practice.
7.2. Actions for injunctions
This section is concerned with the second main ‘(substantive) remedy, namely 
injunctive relief. It is shown below that although this remedy tends to receive 
less attention than actions for damages in discussions on private enforcement 
of EU law, it is of considerable importance. The first subsection in the follow-
ing contains a comparative overview and analysis of the provisions regard-
ing injunctions laid down in the legislation discussed in part B of this study. 
Subsequently the functioning of this remedy in practice and the applicable 
conditions are considered. The final subsection discusses two specific issues, 
namely the possible implications of the foregoing for the private enforcement 
of competition law and the functioning of actions for injunctions in cross-
border situations.
7.2.1. Comparative overview and general remarks
284. Injunctive relief can essentially take two forms, namely the award of 
prohibitive and mandatory injunctions.191 In its first form it entails an order by 
a court or an administrative authority for the defendant to refrain from acting 
in a particular manner that has already led or that would lead to an infringe-
ment of a legal norm. In its second form it refers to a court order to act in a 
certain manner. In that case the order thus entails a positive obligation on 
the defendant, as opposed to a negative one.
191 See e.g. Chisholm (1997), p. 73; Van Dam (2006), p. 301; Komninos (2008), p. 215; Peyer 
(undated), p. 7. Note however that in practice the distinction between both forms of 
injunctive need not be a fundamental one, as this can depend in part on the manner in 
which the applicant formulates its claim and the court seised formulates the operative 
part of its judgment.
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Such prohibitive injunctions are a particularly important remedy for the 
enforcement of EU consumer protection law. This remedy is central to the 
Consumer Injunctions Directive, as its name already indicates.192 Under this 
directive judicial or administrative authorities must be empowered to order 
“the cessation or prohibition of any infringement” of the substantive consumer 
protection rules covered by this legal act, set out in its annex.193 Several oth-
er consumer protection directives also provide for this remedy.194 For 
instance, under to the Unfair Terms Directive it must be possible to “prevent 
the continued use” of unfair terms in consumer contracts.195 A comparable 
arrangement has been laid down in the Unfair Commercial Practices Direc-
tive in connection to the cessation or the prohibition of unfair commercial 
practices.196
EU rules on prohibitive injunctions can further be found in EU intellec-
tual property law. The IPR Enforcement Directive stipulates that it must be 
possible for the competent national courts to issue interlocutory as well as 
‘permanent’ injunctions.197 These interlocutory injunctions serve to prevent 
an imminent infringement of an intellectual property right, to provisionally 
forbid the continuation of an alleged infringement or to make such continu-
ation subject to the lodging of a guarantee.198 Said ‘permanent’ injunctions 
aim to prohibit the continuation of infringements on a permanent basis.199 
In addition, even if in this directive itself the term ‘injunction’ is only used in 
its narrow, prohibitive sense, it also provides for mandatory injunctions.200 
In this respect the IPR Enforcement Directive requires in particular the pos-
sibility for a court to order the seizure, delivery up, recall, definitive removal 
from the channels of commerce or destruction of goods infringing intellec-
tual property law.201 The Infosoc Directive and the proposed Trade Secret 
Directive contain comparable provisions.202
192 See subsection 5.2.1 above. However Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22 also pro-
vides for penalty payments and publicity measures. See further subsections 8.1.3 and 
8.1.4 below respectively.
193 Art. 2(1)(a) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. As was discussed in para. 157 
above, this annex covers most of the body of substantive EU consumer protection law.
194 See para. 160 above.
195 Art. 7(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
196 Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29. See e.g. also Art. 5(3) Mislead-
ing Advertising Directive 2006/114.
197 See subsections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 above.
198 Art. 9(1)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive.
199 Art. 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
200 In the Commission’s proposal for this directive the term ‘injunction’ was used also in its 
broader sense, encompassing also mandatory injunctions. See Commission, Proposal for 
IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 14.
201 Art. 9(b) and Art. 10 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
202 Art. 8(2) and (3) Infosoc Directive 2001/29; Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets 
directive, COM(2013) 813, pp. 21-24 (Art. 9-12).
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The Procurement Remedies Directives do not expressly refer to the pos-
sibility of granting injunctive relief. The possibility to apply for an order to 
set aside an unlawful decision taken in the course of a contract award proce-
dure, set out therein can nonetheless be seen as a mandatory injunction, as it 
concerns the granting of a court order for the defendant to act in a certain 
manner.203 These directives specify that such an order can entail the removal 
of discriminatory specifications in the tender documents. On an interim 
basis, the Procurement Remedies Directives also refer to possible ordering 
of measures aiming to correct the (alleged) infringement or to prevent fur-
ther damage to the interests concerned.204 One could think of the revocation 
by the contracting authority of a decision to exclude a tenderer from the 
contract award procedure, taken in violation of the applicable EU public 
procurement rules.
Finally, concerning the field of EU competition law, suffice to note that 
the Competition Damages Directive does not make provision for actions for 
injunctions. In terms of substantive remedies this directive is only concerned 
with actions for damages.205 Neither is Article 101(2) TFEU of relevance 
here, as it contains only a contractual remedy.206
285. The foregoing indicates that the EU legislative provisions here on 
injunctive relief at issue have two key characteristics. A first characteristic is 
that there is a great deal of variety. At the most general level there is the afore-
mentioned distinction between prohibitive and mandatory injunctions, both 
of which are provided for. And also within these two broad categories there 
is considerable variety. To begin with, the abovementioned prohibitive 
injunctions are not formulated in the same manner, nor are the mandatory 
ones. Moreover also the substance of what can be ordered precisely under 
the provisions of EU law in question tends to differ. In fact, even within one 
and the same field of law what appears to be the same sort of injunction can 
be provided for in diverging terms. This is best illustrated by the provisions 
set out in the various consumer protection directives, referred to above.
A second characteristic is the flexibility that the provisions in question 
tend to leave. In particular, with the partial exception of the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive, those provisions tend to be worded in the rather broad 
terms. Terms such as ‘to order the cessation or prohibition’, ‘to prevent the 
continued use’ or ‘to set aside or to ensure the setting aside’ leave it largely 
to the Member States and to the competent national courts how effect is 
to be given precisely to these rules of EU law. Apart from that, there are 
two instances where an addition degree of diversity can emerge in rela-
203 Art. 2(1)(b) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See subsection 3.2.1 
above. As was noted in para. 62 above, the setting aside of an act or decision contrary to 
EU law can also be seen as a ‘general’ remedy in its own right.
204 Art. 2(1)(a) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
205 See para. 229 above.
206 See subsection 6.1.3 above.
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tion to the question whether the remedy for which EU law makes provision 
applies in the first place. For both the Utilities Remedies Directive and the 
IPR Enforcement Directive contain an optional clause that essentially allows 
for the defendant to ‘buy off’ the specific obligation that may be imposed on 
the defendant by means of an injunction. The former directive provides for 
the possibility of ordering the payment of “a particular sum”, which must 
be dissuasive and ensure effectiveness in preventing injury being caused, 
instead of the setting aside of an unlawful decision.207 The latter directive 
allows for the aforementioned ‘permanent’ injunctions to be replaced by the 
payment of “pecuniary compensation to be paid to the injured party”, subject to 
a number of conditions, such as that the infringer acted unintentionally and 
without negligence.208
286. A first factor that helps explain the state of affairs described above is 
that, inherently, injunctions are to a large extent a ‘tailor-made’ remedy. Even 
though there can also be considerable variety in relation to other remedies 
such as actions for damages, as has been shown in the previous section, their 
essence is rather straightforward: the loss and damage caused by an 
infringement of EU law must be compensated through the payment of a 
certain sum. Measures aimed at halting or preventing such infringements by 
contrast tend to be more closely linked to that infringement itself. Given that 
– certainly across various fields of law but also with each field – these 
infringements of the applicable substantive rules can take many forms, this 
will often also apply for the injunctive relief to be ordered to address them. 
Hence the diverging formulation of the provisions and the leeway that is 
typically left, both of which serve to allow for the tailoring of the measure to 
be imposed as much as possible to the infringement at issue. Here the 
nature, effect and formulation of these measures thus depend to a high 
extent on the specifics of the situation at hand.
A second factor is that the national legal environments in which the above-
mentioned EU legislative measures are to be embedded differ significantly 
between them. Consider for instance the field of consumer protection law. 
As was noted earlier, injunctive relief tends to play an important role here. 
Whereas under certain national legal systems actions for injunctive relief for 
infringements of this law are to be brought before an administrative author-
ity, in other systems the civil courts are competent to rule on these dis-
putes.209 A similar situation exists in relation to public procurement law.210 
These divergences as regards the nature of the applicable law and of the 
competent courts adds an extra ‘layer’ of diversity, in addition to the diver-
207 Art. 2(1)(c) and 2(5) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13.
208 Art. 12 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also Commission, Proposal for a trade 
secrets directive, COM(2013) 813, pp. 23-24 (Art. 12(3)).
209 See para. 158 and 160 above. On the rules on forum generally, see also subsection 9.2.1 
below.
210 See para. 98 above.
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sity that generally often already exists between the various domestic legal 
systems within the EU. These divergences can be a reason for formulating 
the relevant provisions of EU law in such a manner that a minimum degree 
of ‘fit’ is ensured between the EU legislative measures and the legal environ-
ments in which they are to embedded and function after the transposition of 
the directives in question.
A third factor may also play a role in this connection, especially in rela-
tion to mandatory injunctions. It can sometimes be seen as inappropriate for 
a court to prescribe in detail how a defendant is to act. That applies particu-
larly (but not exclusively) where the defendant is a State entity of some sort. 
This factor can be particularly relevant in relation to the Procurement Rem-
edies Directives, where the defendants are normally (semi-)public bodies.211 
For this reason the (mandatory) injunction for which these directives pro-
vide is formulated in such a broad manner (‘to set aside or to ensure the 
setting aside’). The wish not to unduly affect the autonomy of the bodies in 
question also lies behind the possibility, referred to in the previous para-
graph, under the Utilities Remedies Directive to ‘buy off’ any such court 
order by paying a dissuasive sum.212 Where the defendants are typically 
private parties, as is the case under the IPR Enforcement Directive, the issue 
is not so much one of autonomy, but rather of avoiding disproportionate 
outcomes. That was the reason behind the insertion of the possibility of pay-
ing pecuniary compensation instead of awarding a ‘permanent’ injunction, 
which was also discussed in the previous paragraph.213 Elsewhere in EU 
law other illustrations of this potential sensitivity of mandatory injunctions 
can be found. For example, where in a direct action the EU courts annul an 
act of an EU institution, the latter must take the necessary measures to com-
ply with the judgment in question.214 But in this respect the EU courts tend 
to leave it to the institution concerned to decide how to do so.215 To some 
extent comparably, perhaps, under the EU law principle of Member State 
liability the obligation on the latter to make good the consequences of their 
infringements of EU law normally consists of paying pecuniary compensa-
tion and not a (positive) court order for the Member State in question to take 
certain specific measures.216
211 See para. 78 above.
212 See para. 82 above.
213 See para. 132 above.
214 Art. 266 TFEU.
215 See e.g. GC case T-338/08, Stichting Natuur en Milieu, para. 14.
216 Cf. Dougan (2004), pp. 256-258; Prechal (2005), pp. 296-297; Tridimas (2006), p. 539; 
Granger (2007), p. 190; Rebhalm (2008), p. 183; Biondi & Farley (2009), p. 83. Note that the 
retroactive application of national law transposing a directive has at times been held to be 
an acceptable solution, unless the applicants suffered complementary losses due to them 
not being able to benefi t at the appropriate time of the rights granted to them under the 
belatedly transposed directive. See e.g. CoJ case C-94/95, Bonifaci, para. 51-53. On the 
principle of Member State liability generally, see further para. 59 above.
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7.2.2. Injunctions: practice and applicable conditions
287. As regards the practical functioning of the EU legislation on actions for 
injunctions at issue here, it appears that actions of this kind are brought 
rather frequently and successfully under consumer protection directives 
such as the Consumer Injunctions Directive, the Unfair Terms Directive and 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.217 The experiences with the 
actions for injunctions provided for in the IPR Enforcement Directive are on 
the whole also positively assessed by the Commission, stakeholders, practi-
tioners and legal scholars alike.218 Indeed, the Commission has called this 
the directive’s “main enforcement remedy”.219 With respect to the Procurement 
Remedies Directives the situation seems less clear. Yet it nonetheless appears 
that, at least by comparison, it generally is a rather attractive means to 
address alleged infringements, in that also in this domain actions for injunc-
tions tend to be initiated more frequently and with more success than the 
other remedies for which these directives provide.220
Therefore injunctions are on the whole often not only an important pri-
vate enforcement remedy on paper, but also in practice. As such the contrast 
with actions for damages, discussed in the previous section, is particularly 
striking.221 When seeking to explain this relative success, it is important to 
note at the outset that this depends always to some extent on the applicable 
detailed national rules. That applies all the more so given that, as was indi-
cated above, the provisions in question tend to leave considerable leeway to 
the Member States. That said, it seems that – seen from a legal perspective 
and in as far as EU law is concerned – especially the applicable conditions for 
obtaining injunctive relief are likely to play a crucial role in explaining this 
relative success. Or, to be more precise, it seems that the conditions that do 
not apply under the abovementioned EU legislation are of particular impor-
tance. This can be further explained as follows.
288. To begin with, whereas in order to be able to obtain compensation in 
damages an applicant must demonstrate that he suffered harm, it is widely 
assumed that such a requirement does not apply in the case of actions for 
217 See para. 159-160 above.
218 See para. 127 above. This observation concerns prohibitive injunctions; the aforemen-
tioned mandatory injunctions for which this directive makes provisions generally appear 
to be used less frequently.
219 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 14 (regarding interlocutory injunctions).
220 See para. 80-81 and 86 above.
221 See in particular para. 259 above.
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injunctions.222 At first sight this may seem obvious enough. Injunctions typ-
ically seek to prevent or terminate unlawful conduct, with a view to pre-
venting (further) harm from occurring.223 If no compensation in damages is 
claimed, why would there be a need to demonstrate the occurrence of dam-
age? Yet the EU legal acts on which this study concentrates do not address 
this matter expressly. Only the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and 
the Misleading Advertising Directive stipulate that the injunctions provided 
for therein must be available even in cases where there is no proof of actual 
loss or damage.224 Comparable provisions are notably absent in the EU leg-
islation on which this study concentrates.
That leads to the question what the legal consequences are, if any, of this 
absence of such an express statement. In particular, the question is whether 
this implies that a requirement to demonstrate harm could be imposed on 
the basis of national law, should a Member State wish to do so. It is submit-
ted that, in all likelihood, this question is to be answered in the negative. The 
express statement to this effect in the two abovementioned directives should 
probably be seen as a mere confirmation, and not as giving rise to an argu-
ment a contrario that there is scope to apply such a requirement under 
national law where no such express statement is made in the directive in 
question. This view rests on the absence of an express requirement as a mat-
ter of EU law, in combination with the fact that the application of such a 
requirement would probably prevent the objective of the EU rules in ques-
tion from being achieved, as it would considerably raise the threshold for an 
applicant to obtain an injunction. In other words, it would appear that the 
Court’s reasoning relating to a fault requirement in the context of actions for 
damages, set out in the abovementioned rulings such as Stadt Graz and 
Dekker, can be ‘transplanted’ to the present context.225
It might appear that in L’Oréal v. eBay the Court of Justice took a differ-
ent view, pursuant to which this subject-matter would essentially be left to 
be regulated by national law. For in that case it was held that “the rules for the 
operation of the injunctions for which the Member States must provide under the 
third sentence of Article 11 [IPR Enforcement Directive], such as those relating to 
the conditions to be met and the procedure to be followed, are a matter of national 
law”.226 However this statement only relates to the directive’s provision on 
actions for injunctions against third parties.227 As the Court recalled in its rul-
222 E.g. Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 196; Eilmansberger (2007), p. 433; Cauffman (2010), 
p. 59. In several Member States account is taken however of the potential harm occurring 
in the absence of this remedy being granted, particularly in relation to the award of inter-
im relief. See e.g. Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights, July 2013, pp. 15-16.
223 Cf. CoJ case C-167/00, Henkel, para. 39 and 48.
224 Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29; Art. 5(3) Misleading Advertis-
ing Directive 2006/114.
225 CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz; CoJ case C-177/88, Dekker. See para. 263 above.
226 CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, para. 135. See further para. 131 above.
227 See further para. 130 above.
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ing, the recitals of the IPR Enforcement Directive specify that the conditions 
for this specific form of injunctive relief should be left to be set by national 
law.228 The directive does not contain any similar provisions in relation to 
the other forms of injunctive relief set out in this directive. Already on this 
basis it would seem that the above statement by the Court cannot be gener-
alised so as to apply to all provisions of secondary EU law on actions for 
injunctions. Moreover in L’Oréal v. eBay the Court also underlined that the 
relevant rules of national law must respect a number of EU law require-
ments, including that they allow for the directive’s objective being achieved 
and that they respect the applicant’s right to an effective remedy.229 
Although this issue was not further addressed in this judgment, a national 
law requirement to prove damage for an injunction to be granted may well 
be seen as being incompatible with these EU law requirements. It is submit-
ted therefore that, on closer reading, this judgment does not generally inval-
idate the view set out above; in fact, it may rather confirm it. Yet this case 
nonetheless provides a useful reminder that each situation must be assessed 
on its own merits and that the starting point of each analysis remains the 
wording of the EU legislation at issue, including where relevant the recitals.
289. A further issue is whether in relation to actions for injunctions the said 
directives allow for a fault requirement, in one form or another, to be set 
under national law.230 Of the abovementioned EU legal acts containing pro-
visions on injunctive relief, the Consumer Injunctions Directive, the Unfair 
Terms Directive, the Procurement Remedies Directives and the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive are largely silent on this matter. Again, only the Unfair Com-
mercial Practices Directive and the Misleading Advertising Directive deal 
with this issue expressly. These two latter directives stipulate that no proof 
of intention or negligence on the side of the defendant is required for this 
form of relief to be granted.231 It would appear however that, following 
essentially the same reasoning as the one set out in the foregoing paragraph, 
this is unlikely to point to any difference in substance between any of the 
abovementioned directives.
The resulting conclusion that, for injunctions to be granted under the EU 
law provisions at issue, the applicant cannot be required to demonstrate that 
the defendant was at fault, finds further support in the Court’s ruling in 
228 Recital 23 IPR Infringement Directive 2004/48. See CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, 
para. 135. Cf. also CoJ case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien, para. 43 (relating to the injunc-
tions referred to in Art. 8 Infosoc Directive 2001/29).
229 CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, para. 136 and 142. Cf. CoJ case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel 
Wien, para. 44.  On the fundamental right to an effective remedy under Art. 47 Charter, 
see further para. 43 above.
230 For a more elaborate assessment of the issue of fault in relation to actions for damages, 
see subsection 7.1.2 above. That assessment would appear to be also largely applicable 
here, mutatis mutandis, subject to the above comments.
231 Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29; Art. 5(3) Misleading Advertis-
ing Directive 2006/114.
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Stadt Graz, discussed earlier.232 It will be recalled that in this case it was held 
that the Procurement Remedies Directives preclude a fault requirement in 
relation to actions for damages. However, although this was not expressly 
stated, here the Court also implied that that these directives equally pre-
clude such a requirement in relation to the other remedies set out therein, i.e. 
also for actions for injunctions.233 In addition, unlike for actions for damag-
es, it appears that most national legal systems do not require proof of fault 
for injunctions to be granted.234 This would seem to make the conclusion all 
the more likely that the abovementioned directives are not to be understood 
as implying such a requirement. It also suggests that the view that the said 
directives actually preclude the application of such a requirement is unlikely 
to lead to significant controversies.
Once again it could conceivably be argued that the IPR Enforcement 
Directive is different in this respect. As was noted earlier, it includes an 
(optional) arrangement on pecuniary compensation as an ‘alternative mea-
sure’ to be imposed instead of the ‘permanent’ injunctions foreseen in this 
directive.235 This alternative is only available where the infringer acted 
“unintentionally or without negligence”. From this one could deduct, a con-
trario, that for those injunctions themselves to be granted, normally a 
requirement of the infringing party having acted intentionally or negligent-
ly applies, or at least that the application of such a requirement is not neces-
sarily precluded. Yet, then again, one could also argue on the basis of the 
presence in this directive of an express provision on fault in relation to 
actions for damages,236 and the absence of such an express provision in rela-
tion to actions for injunctions, that in the latter instance no such requirement 
can apply. Consequently, while some uncertainty exists in this respect, also 
with respect to this directive the better view appears to be that there is in 
principle no scope for a fault requirement in relation to actions for injunc-
tions.
290. The absence of an obligation for the applicant to demonstrate that he 
suffered loss or damage or that the defendant was at fault for injunctive 
relief to be granted makes this remedy easier to obtain, not only in the sense 
that the legal threshold is lower in respect of these two points, as discussed 
above. This normally also has indirect repercussions that are beneficial to pri-
vate party-applicants. For instance, where such a party does not need to 
demonstrate harm, neither can there be any discussion on the qualification 
or quantification thereof. It also follows that there is no requirement of a 
causal link between the infringement and the damage. Moreover, as a conse-
232 CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz. See further para. 88 and 263 above.
233 CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz, para. 39. In a similar sense, see Kotsonis (2011b), p. NA62.
234 Van Dam (2006), p. 301 (regarding English, French and German law). See also Peyer 
(undated), p. 20 (regarding German law in a competition context).
235 Art. 12 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 132 and 285 above.
236 Art. 13 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 262 above.
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quence of the absence of all of these requirements, proceedings for injunc-
tions will mostly also be less lengthy and less costly as compared to in par-
ticular actions for damages.237 It has already been seen that these legal and 
practical factors are often important thresholds in relation to the latter rem-
edy.238 A final point to be noted here is that, again different from damages 
awards, injunctive relief can normally be granted by means of interim mea-
sures, i.e. in proceedings which can lead to a decision with provisional 
effects and which are normally (relatively) speedy, uncomplicated and not 
overly costly.239 In that sense the relative success referred to above is proba-
bly partially a shared success of the remedy discussed here and that of inter-
im measures.
7.2.3. Competition law and cross-border litigation
291. A first further specific issue to be discussed here is the question what 
the foregoing implies specifically for the discussions on the private enforce-
ment of EU competition law. As was observed earlier, while Article 101(2) 
TFEU only provides for a contractual remedy, in terms of substantive rem-
edies the Competition Damages Directive is exclusively focused on ensuring 
compensation in damages. Indeed, actions for damages have long had the 
Commission’s particular attention in this context.240 Where EU legislative 
involvement is concerned, actions for injunctions therefore do not play a 
role in this field. Yet it would be wrong to presume that this choice not to 
include measures on injunctive relief in the Competition Damages Directive 
is somehow obvious or inevitable. Both the directive itself and the Commis-
sion documents preceding acknowledged that – in this field of law as in any 
other – private enforcement can also take place through the bringing of 
actions for injunctions.241 In fact, the important role that this latter remedy 
can play also with respect to competition law infringements is widely 
acknowledged in the legal literature.242 This is not surprising, especially in 
light of the aforementioned relative attractiveness of injunctive relief for 
potential applicants when compared to actions for damages. Practical expe-
rience in Germany suggests for instance that, for private parties affected by 
competition law infringements, especially the (relatively) low costs and flex-
237 Cf. Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 196; Eilmansberger (2007), p. 433; Cauffman (2010), 
p. 59.
238 See in particular para. 259 above.
239 On interim relief, see further subsection 8.2.1 below.
240 See para. 209-210 and 260 above.
241 See Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, pp. 3-4; Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white 
paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 7 (n. 5); 
recital 3 Competition Damages Directive.
242 E.g. Komninos (2008), p. 215; Eilmansberger (2007), p. 437; Cauffman (2010), p. 60; Whish 
& Bailey (2012), p. 301; Hjelmeng (2013), p. 1011; Louis (2014), p. 87; Ottervanger (2014), 
p. 18; Ratliff (2014), p. 272; Wisking, Dietzel & Herron (2014), p. 187.
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ibility associated with injunctive relief makes this the preferred private 
enforcement remedy.243 It is also reported to have a significantly higher suc-
cess rate than actions for damages.244 It further appears that private parties 
affected by infringements of EU law are in practice not seldom more inter-
ested in bringing to an end to those infringements than in obtaining com-
pensation for the damage suffered as a consequence thereof. This has been 
observed to be the case for instance in relation to infringements of EU intel-
lectual property law.245 There seems little reason to believe that this would 
be fundamentally different where infringements of EU competition law are 
concerned.246
This being so, it is remarkable not only that the Commission decided to 
exclude from its initiative on the private enforcement of EU competition law 
other remedies than actions for damages and especially injunctions, but also 
that this choice has never been properly explained.247 One can therefore only 
speculate as to the reasons that underlie the current “shadowy existence” and 
“[astonishing] neglect of this remedy on the policy level”.248 A factor may have 
been the influence from the approach to the private enforcement of competi-
tion law taken in the United States, where damages claims tend to play a 
central role. This may in particular have had an effect on the academic 
debate.249 Another factor could be that landmark rulings of the Court of Jus-
tice, such as Courage, on which the Commission’s initiative built,250 related 
only to the possibilities for the private parties concerned to claim damages. 
However it is submitted that this latter factor would provide a largely unsat-
isfactory explanation in legal terms. For the Court’s reasoning in Courage 
may well be applicable beyond the narrow confines of actions for damages. 
Indeed, already in 2003 Advocate General Jacobs argued that this reasoning 
243 S. Peyer (undated). Here it is also reported however that few such actions are brought in 
England. See also Peyer (2012), p. 350.
244 Peyer (2012), p. 353.
245 Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, July 2013, p. 7.
246 Cf. Cauffman (2010), p. 59; Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 301.
247 In Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the green paper on damages actions 
for breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, pp. 9-11, this issue is discussed in some 
detail, without however actually explaining the choice made to concentrate exclusively 
on actions for damages.
248 Peyer (undated), pp. 1 and 51.
249 Cf. Opinion AG Van Gerven case C-128/92, Banks, para. 44. See e.g. Jones (1999); Jones 
(2003), p. 94.
250 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage. The same applies for CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, 
Manfredi. On these two cases and their relevance in the present context, see para.213-214 
above. Similarly in Opinion AG Van Gerven case C-128/92, Banks, referred to in para. 211 
above, attention concentrated on actions for damages. Cf. Commission, Staff working 
paper accompanying the green paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules, 
SEC(2005) 1732, p. 9, where reference is made to the Courage judgment as well as the AG’s 
opinion in Banks.
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is essentially equally applicable to actions for injunctions.251 Also the Court’s 
ruling in Muñoz, which related to the field of EU agricultural law, would 
seem to point in that direction.252 The Court’s reasoning in this latter case is 
very similar to the one followed in Courage, but the question at issue con-
cerned not actions for damages but civil proceedings more generally. A third 
factor could lie in the underlying objective, for instance in terms of which 
types of infringements are to be addressed or the anticipated deterrent or 
corrective effects of such actions. However it seems uncertain whether clear 
conclusions could be drawn on any of these points.253 In any case there are 
at present no indications that an in-depth assessment thereof underpins the 
choice to concentrate the Commission’s legislative initiative, which resulted 
in the adoption of the Competition Damages Directive, solely on actions for 
damages. The directive’s narrow scope in terms of private enforcement rem-
edies may well be seen as a missed opportunity.
292. A second specific point relating to actions for injunctions constitutes 
essentially an important qualification of the aforementioned relative success 
thereof as a private enforcement remedy. Very little use tends to be made of 
this remedy in cross-border situations, i.e. in situations where the applicant 
and the defendant reside or are established each in another Member State. A 
prime example relates to the provision on so-called ‘intra-EU infringements’ 
laid down in the Consumer Injunctions Directive.254 Under this directive 
a qualified entity from one Member State may in certain cases bring an 
action for an injunction in another Member State. One could say that the 
very essence of this directive is to facilitate precisely these kinds of actions. 
But in 2008 the Commission concluded that the effect given to this provi-
sion has so far been “disappointing”.255 This seems somewhat of an under-
statement, given that at the time the mechanism had been used in no more 
than two instances EU-wide. It appears that since then this situation has 
251 Opinion AG Jacobs joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOB Bun-
desverband, par. 105. In Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the green paper 
on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, p. 9 (n. 2), reference 
was made to this opinion, seemingly in a concurring manner. In a similar sense, see Peyer 
(undated), pp. 10-14.
252 CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz. For a discussion of this case and a comparison with Courage, 
see para. 61 and 65 above respectively.
253 It has e.g. been suggested that damages actions might be more suitable in relation to car-
tels, whereas injunctive relief may be more suitable with respect to abuse of market pow-
er and anticompetitive vertical constraints. See Peyer (2011), p. 655; Peyer (undated), 
p. 46. However others have argued e.g. for concentrating efforts regarding the facilitation 
of private enforcement not on ‘hard-core’ competition law infringements, but rather on 
‘grey area’ cases. See Eilmansberger (2007), p. 478.
254 Art. 4 Consumer Injunctions Directive. See further para. 155 below.
255 Commission, First report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2008) 756, 
pp. 5-9.
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hardly improved, if at all.256 Another example is the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive. The Commission has observed that the relative success of this direc-
tive’s provisions on injunctive relief does not seem to extend to cross-border 
situations,257 while stakeholders identify cross-border infringements as a 
significant and increasing concern.258 As regards the Procurement Remedies 
Directives, applications for cross-border reviews in procurement cases, of 
which actions for injunctions typically make up a considerable share, have 
been found to be scarce.259
It is important to note that these findings probably do not stand on their 
own. Within the EU generally only a relatively limited amount of cross-bor-
der litigation takes place, regardless of what form of relief is sought precise-
ly.260 The above observations are therefore likely to reflect a broader issue. 
Arguably this difference between ‘domestic’ and ‘cross-border’ litigation is 
only more striking where injunctions are concerned, because these latter 
actions are comparatively successful in situations that are confined to one 
Member State. This limited degree of cross-border litigation is often 
explained by pointing to the (anticipated) extra costs, delays and complica-
tions connected to bringing an action for an injunction before a court in 
another Member State.261 To some extent this may say as much about the 
perceptions and expectations in this regard as it does about actual experi-
ences in practice. Actual experiences with cross-border litigation are after all 
limited. It also does not seem self-evident that cross-border litigation is nec-
essarily overly complex, in an age where all legal systems are influenced by 
EU law and many law firms have branches in several Member States or are 
part of international networks. But fully justified or not, perceptions and 
expectations of this kind still matter, as they can play an important role in a 
private party’s decision as to whether or not to initiate private enforcement 
proceedings in another Member State. Linguistic differences can obviously 
be a relevant factor too.262
256 Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 6. See further para. 159 above.
257 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 18.
258 See e.g. Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, July 2013, p. 8. See also para. 127 and 130 above.
259 See e.g. Commission, Responses to the consultation on the operation of national review 
procedures in the fi eld of public procurement, 2004 (economic operators and lawyers).
260 See e.g. Rosas & Armanti (2010), pp. 172-173; Loos (2011), p. 499-502. This fi nding also 
extends to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. See e.g. European Parliament, 
Study on cross-border alternative dispute resolution in the EU, June 2011, p. 9.
261 Cf. e.g. Eurobarometer, Consumer redress in the EU, August 2009, p. 39: “Consumers anti-
cipate that the diffi culties they would experience in their home countries would be multiplied if 
they were to seek out information on redress mechanisms and the processes consumers need to fol-
low in order to seek compensation for cross-border complaints. As a result, consumers are even less 
likely to pursue these complaints”.
262 Cf. Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 13; Stadler (2013b), p. 151.
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That being so, the Commission seems to prefer addressing the above 
situation through measures of broader application rather than in the sectoral 
legislation at issue in this study.263 It seems to have largely vested its hopes 
in improvements that may result from EU legislation applicable to litigation 
in civil and commercial matters, such as the 2001 Brussels I Regulation on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments or the 2007 
Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations.264 
These regulations contain several specific rules for the fields of law under 
consideration in this study.265 Complementary measures have also been 
taken, such as the establishment of the European judicial network in civil 
and commercial matters.266 An important objective of this network is the 
dissemination of information with a view to facilitating effective access to 
justice.267 While all these measures can undoubtedly be helpful for a private 
party that considers bringing a case before a court in another jurisdiction,268 
it would seem that there are limits to what can be expected in this regard. 
For example, these measures are mostly limited to litigation in civil and 
commercial matters.269 They will therefore be of little help in proceedings 
under administrative law. Neither have they been designed to address col-
263 See in particular Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on 
damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 9; Commission, 
First report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2008) 756, pp. 8-9; Com-
mission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 635, 
p. 12.
264 Brussels I Regulation 44/2001; Rome II Regulation 864/2007.
265 Concerning Brussels I Regulation 44/2001, see in particular its Art. 15-17 (regarding con-
sumer contracts) and 22(4) (regarding intellectual property rights). See also Art. 2(a), 35 
and 42 New Brussels I Regulation 1215/2012. According to its recital 25, this new regula-
tion is meant to cover also the orders referred to in Art. 6 and 7 IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive 2004/48. Concerning Rome II Regulation 864/2007, see in particular its Art. 5 
(regarding product liability), 6(3) (regarding restrictions of competition) and 8 (regarding 
intellectual property rights).
266 Cf. Decision 2001/470/EC establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and com-
mercial matters, OJ 2001, L 168/35.
267 See also the European e-Justice website and the European Judicial Atlas in civil matters, 
available via https://e-justice.europa.eu/home.do?action=home&plang=en and http://
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/judicialatlascivil/html/index_en.htm, respectively.
268 However the rules set out in Brussels I Regulation 44/2001 can also lead to unintended 
(and what many would consider undesirable) consequences. The most well-known 
example is the possible pre-emptive exercise of jurisdiction in application of the lis pen-
dens rule (see its Art. 27), known as ‘torpedo’ actions. This entails bringing a case before a 
court that may not have jurisdiction (typically seeking a declaration of non-infringe-
ment), in a jurisdiction where proceedings can take a long time to be completed. In this 
manner the jurisdiction of another national court in the EU can be pre-empted. See Com-
mission, Report on Brussels I Regulation 44/2001, COM(2009) 174, pp. 6-7. See further 
e.g. Gardella (2008), p. 181. On this subject-matter in relation to New Brussels I Regula-
tion 1215/2012, see Nielsen (2013), pp. 518-522.
269 As such they do not apply to actions brought by or against public authorities acting in the 
exercise of their powers or situations otherwise regulated by administrative law. See Art. 
1(1) Brussels I Regulation 44/2001; Art. 1(1) Rome II Regulation 864/2007. See e.g. CoJ 
case C-292/05, Lecouritou, para. 28-34; CoJ case C-406/09, Realchemie, para. 38-44.
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lective redress situations.270 These measures may further help clarify certain 
legal aspects that are relevant to cross-border litigation (which court is com-
petent, which law applies, etc.), but they do little to address the aforemen-
tioned practical concerns that are cited to explain the limited degree of cross-
border litigation (perceptions, costs, linguistic differences, etc.).271
7.2.4. Summary
293. Actions for injunctions are an important private enforcement remedy 
in several respects. Most of the EU legal acts facilitating the private enforce-
ment of EU law under consideration here provide for this remedy. It takes a 
particularly prominent place in the consumer protection directives (Con-
sumer Injunctions Directive, Unfair Terms Directive, Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive), but relevant provisions can also be found in the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives and the IPR Enforcement Directive. The pro-
visions in question are rather diverse however, both in what they entail pre-
cisely and in the manner in which they have been formulated. This can 
probably be ascribed to ‘case-by-case nature’ of this remedy, the variety in 
the domestic legal enforcement environments in which these provisions are 
to be embedded and, in some cases, the sensitivity associated with injunc-
tive relief especially where it concerns an order by the court for the defen-
dant to take certain particular measures. Actions for injunctions are more-
over also an important remedy in the sense that its functioning in practice is 
mostly positively assessed. The difference in this regard with actions for 
damages is particularly striking. In all likelihood this is closely linked to the 
conditions that have to be met – and especially those that need not to be met 
– for injunctive relief to be granted. Even if the directives under consider-
ation here are largely silent on this issue, which admittedly leaves some 
scope for debate, there are good grounds to believe that an applicant is not 
required to demonstrate that he has suffered loss or damage as a conse-
quence of the infringement, nor that the defendant was at fault when com-
mitting the infringement. This considerably enlightens the burden on the 
private party-applicant, both directly (lower legal threshold) and indirectly 
(speedier proceedings, lower costs). Combined with the fact that this reme-
dy can often be obtained by means of interim measures, this probably goes 
a long way in explaining this remedy’s relative success in practice.
270 See Stadler (2013a), pp. 484-488.
271 Small Claims Regulation 861/2007 may e.g. be of some help in this respect, but its practi-
cal use is limited due to it covering claims with a monetary value of no more than € 2000. 
Reference can further be made to Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11, discussed in 
para. 194 above. But this directive essentially provides for an alternative to litigation 
before the courts, while it is moreover limited to consumer disputes only.
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These findings lead to two specific further remarks. In the first place, the 
question arises why the Competition Damages Directive does not contain any 
provisions on injunctive relief. To date this question has largely been left 
unanswered. The decision to exclude this remedy from this directive does 
not seem self-evident, especially given that actions for injunctions can be of 
considerable practical importance also in this domain and that in legal terms 
such a narrow approach does not seem necessary. In the second place, the 
aforementioned relative success of this remedy is qualified by the generally 
limited use that tends to be made of it in cross-border contexts. The Consumer 
Injunctions Directive sought to specifically address this through its arrange-
ment on ‘intra-EU infringements’, but it has not been very successful in this 
regard. None of the other EU legal acts at issue here contain specific mea-
sures on this point. Neither is their introduction being contemplated. Given 
that these findings probably reflect a broader issue, it is understandable that 
hopes are mainly vested in improvements that may result from (compara-
tively recent) EU legislation of broader application seeking to facilitate 
cross-border litigation, such as the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome II 
Regulation. Even if these latter regulations contain provisions that have 
been specifically designed to apply to infringements of the type at issue 
here, it remains for now to be seen whether this will suffice to properly 
address this situation.
In the previous chapter the relevant EU rules on actions for damages and 
on actions for injunctions have been considered. By means of a continua-
tion of the comparative and contextual analysis set out there, the present 
chapter turns to the remaining remedies for private enforcement purposes 
laid down in the selected EU legislation discussed in part B of this study. To 
that end this chapter consists of two sections. In the first section below the 
third and final ‘main’ (substantive) class of actions distinguished here, i.e. 
contractual remedies, is analysed. The following section then discusses the 
‘other’ remedies laid down in the said legislation.
8.1. Contractual remedies
This section concentrates on actions intended to make good infringements 
of EU law by seeking to nullify or to otherwise make ineffective the contrac-
tual arrangements entered into by the parties concerned, which are referred 
to here as contractual remedies. After a brief overview, the terminology used 
in the legislation at issue as well as the nature and practical functioning of 
this remedy are discussed. The following subsection then assesses, first, in 
further detail the flexibility left to the Member States in relation to this rem-
edy and, second, the position of the parts of the contract that are not incom-
patible with EU law. In the third and final subsection attention turns to the 
regime applicable to what are called ‘excluded’ contracts, i.e. contracts that 
fall entirely outside the scope of the EU rules at issue here, but which are 
covered by primary EU law.
8.1.1. Terminology, nature and functioning in practice
294. Contractual remedies can be found in three of the four fields of law 
under consideration in part B, namely EU public procurement, consumer 
protection and competition law. Each time this remedy has been set out in 
different terms however. Since their revision in 2007, whereby the relevant 
provision was introduced, the Procurement Remedies Directives speak of 
the possible ‘ineffectiveness’ of concluded contracts.1 By contrast the main 
provision in the field of consumer protection law, laid down in the Unfair 
1 Art. 2d(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further subsection 
3.2.3 above.
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Terms Directive, refers to contracts that are ‘not binding’ on the private par-
ty concerned.2 In other consumer protection directives different terms are 
used, such as contracts being ‘rescinded’ or the possibility of ‘withdrawal’ 
from a contract (while this latter term is moreover used in different legal acts 
with two apparently distinct meanings).3 Finally, in relation to competition 
law infringements, Article 101(2) TFEU speaks of contracts being ‘automati-
cally void’.4
This evidently raises the question what explains this divergent terminol-
ogy. Departing from the presumption that it is preferable to use consistent 
terminology across the entire body of EU law wherever possible, the ques-
tion also emerges to which extent there may be scope for a more coherent 
approach in this respect.5 These questions are answered by subsequently 
considering in the following the terms used in each of the three abovemen-
tioned provisions of EU law.
295. An appropriate starting point is the term ‘automatically void’ within the 
meaning of Article 101(2) TFEU. This seems the most obvious candidate for 
broader application in acts of secondary EU law providing for contractual 
remedies. This term has after all been in use since the entry into force of the 
EEC Treaty in 1958. It is moreover the only concept to have primary law 
status.6 The Court of Justice has furthermore over the course of the years 
had the opportunity to clarify the meaning of this term.7 In particular, it has 
held that this term is an autonomous concept of EU law. As such it has a 
particular meaning, independent from the laws of the Member States. It has 
retro-active effects (ex tunc), meaning that, when this provision is success-
fully invoked, it is as if there had never been a contract in the first place. 
These effects are also absolute, i.e. they apply in principle vis-à-vis all parties 
to the contract as well as third parties.
2 Art. 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See further subsection 5.3.1 above.
3 Art. 3(2), (5) and (6) Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44; Art. 4(5) and (6) Package Travel 
Directive 90/314. See further para. 171 above. Cf. the use of ‘withdrawal’ e.g. in Art. 6 
Distance Marketing Directive 2002/65, Art. 14 Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48 and 
Art. 9 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83. There this term appears to have a different 
meaning than in Art. 4(5) and (6) Package Travel Directive 90/314.
4 See subsection 6.1.3 above. Art. 101(2) TFEU relates to “agreements and decisions” that are 
prohibited pursuant to that article. For reasons of simplicity and ease of comparison, here 
the emphasis is only on the effects of this provision on contracts.
5 On issues of coherence and fragmentation more generally, see section 10.4 below.
6 See also Art. 264 TFEU. There it is stated that if an act of an EU institution or other body is 
annulled pursuant to Art. 263 TFEU, the EU courts shall declare that act to be “void”. 
Note that this latter provision speaks of acts being “declared” void, whereas the former 
refers to prohibited anti-competitive agreements or decisions being “automatically” void.
7 See para. 207 above.
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296. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Commission’s pro-
posal for the Unfair Terms Directive, dating from 1990, contained the term 
‘void’.8 However the Member States represented in the Council subsequent-
ly changed this to the current term, i.e. ‘not binding’.9 Already in itself ‘not 
binding’ is a more neutral legal term than ‘void’. Especially in combination 
with the express reference to national law, which was also inserted in the 
Unfair Terms Directive by the EU legislature, this leaves the Member States 
more scope when transposing this provision in national law. Although there 
can be some debate on this point, it would appear that, unlike the term 
‘automatically void’ within the meaning of Article 101(2) TFEU, this allows 
for instance for the possibility of leaving the past application of the contract 
intact (ex nunc). In any case at national level a wide range of concepts are 
currently used to give effect to this provision (non-existence, revocability, 
voidability, unenforceability).10
It can further be noted that the absolute effect associated with the term 
‘void’ could lead to evidently undesirable outcomes when applied here. 
Such an effect may generally be appropriate pursuant to, say, a price-fixing 
agreement between two undertakings caught by the prohibition laid down 
in Article 101(1) TFEU. However in cases covered by the Unfair Terms Direc-
tive the ‘standard’ contract at issue is in effect imposed on the consumer, 
who finds himself generally in a weak position vis-à-vis his contracting party 
(the latter being a seller or supplier acting in a professional capacity). It 
would then be contrary to the aim of protecting consumers if also the latter 
could free himself from his contractual obligations by invoking the conse-
quences of the unfairness of a term, for the drafting of which he himself is 
responsible. In these cases this remedy should thus only be invoked for the 
benefit of the consumer. Put differently, the desired result under this direc-
tive is relative, not absolute.11 This is reflected in the use of the words not 
binding “on the consumer”.
297. The story behind the use of the term ‘ineffectiveness’ in the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives is not dissimilar. Also in this case the Commis-
sion proposal was significantly more prescriptive than the text of the legal 
act eventually adopted. Most notably the Commission had suggested using 
the term ‘invalid’. It had also proposed including certain precisions as 
regards its meaning under EU law, in principle providing for absolute 
effects.12 However once more the EU legislature (in particular the Member 
States represented in the Council) opted for using a less precise term, i.e. 
8 Commission, Proposal for Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(90) 322, p. 69 (Art. 3); 
Commission, First amended proposal for Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(92) 66, 
p. 11 (Art. 7).
9 See para. 164 above.
10 See para. 165 above.
11 Cf. Van Gerven (2003b), p. 57.
12 Commission, Proposal for Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66, 
COM(2006) 195, p. 24 (Art. 2f(2) and (3)).
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‘ineffectiveness’.13 Unlike the Commission’s proposal, the Procurement 
Remedies Directives now also stipulate expressly that the consequences of a 
contract being considered ineffective are provided for by national law. They 
further stipulate that this national law may either provide for retroactive 
cancellation of all contractual obligations (i.e. ex tunc) or limit the scope of 
the cancellation to those obligations which still have to be performed (i.e. ex 
nunc). As a result, the domestic laws of the Member States give effect to this 
EU law provision in diverging manners.14 In line with the Commission’s 
proposal there is in this case no ‘automatic’ effect, in the sense that a preced-
ing finding by a court or another review body is required for the contract to 
be considered ineffective.15
Furthermore also in this case there are certain particular characteristics 
that, to a certain extent, set a typical procurement case apart from a typical 
competition case. Most notably, different from Article 101 TFEU, under the 
EU public procurement rules the conclusion of the contract as such does not 
constitute an infringement. In this case the infringement rather relates to the 
pre-contractual stage, i.e. the selection of the private party-contractor by the 
contracting authority. This is connected to the fact that the former is not sub-
ject to these rules in the first place. That said, it is questionable whether 
these differences justify granting the private party concerned particular pro-
tection in this respect, as essentially occurs under the Unfair Terms Direc-
tive. For one thing, in procurement cases both parties to the contract operate 
on a professional basis. It seems not unreasonable to expect from the private 
party-contractor a degree of knowledge and diligence as regards the correct 
application of the law by the contracting authority.16 That applies all the 
more so because the cases covered by the Procurement Remedies Directives 
concern public contracts with a significant value and the infringements in 
question are by definition very serious.17 For another thing, in these cases 
any such protection would necessarily come at the expense of third parties, 
namely the private party’s (potential) competitors. For having the contract 
considered ineffective normally results in the contracting authority putting 
the contract out to (re-)tender, allowing these parties a (renewed) possibility 
to compete.18 All in all in this case there would thus seem to be considerably 
13  See para. 91 above.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Pursuant to the case law of the CoJ a tenderer is expected to be reasonably well-informed 
and normally diligent. See e.g. CoJ case C-19/00, SIAC, para. 43. Cf. also the diligence 
required on the side of the undertaking concerned in state aid cases; see e.g. CoJ case 
C-24/95, Alcan, para. 25.
17 As regards the value of the contracts in question, as was explained in para. 69 above, cer-
tain threshold values must be exceeded for the substantive rules in question to apply. As 
regards this limitation to the most serious infringements, see further para. 90 above.
18 Cf. recital 14 Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66, where it is observed 
that this is “the most effective way to restore competition and to create new business opportuni-
ties”.
para. 298 Chapter 8. Contractual and other remedies p. 321
less convincing legal or factual reasons for not opting for an approach simi-
lar to Article 101(2) TFEU.19
298. In contrast to the abovementioned legal acts, no contractual remedy 
has been included in the IPR Enforcement Directive. This illustrates that this 
remedy is somewhat more selective, or less general, than the two remedies 
discussed in the previous chapter. Whereas actions for damages and actions 
for injunctions are (or at least can be) in principle relevant in relation to any 
infringement of EU law, providing for a contractual remedy obviously only 
makes senses where the relevant infringements have what could be called a 
‘contractual dimension’ of some sort. In the field of intellectual property 
law, this dimension of the infringements in question is normally limited. 
That is to say, although this can be different in certain specific cases, the 
infringements of intellectual property law that the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive seeks to address do not typically – and certainly not necessarily – result 
from or relate to a contractual relationship.20
In the three other aforementioned fields of law under consideration the 
situation is different. In public procurement cases the conclusion of a con-
tract between the contracting authority and the selected tenderer is both the 
very objective and the logical conclusion of the preceding contract award 
procedure. The fact that public procurement law has been infringed in the 
course of this procedure will often imply that the contract should not have 
been concluded with the tenderer in question, or at least that not all inter-
ested private parties have had a fair chance of winning it. As was noted 
earlier, the continuous application of the contract also means that it will not 
be put out to tender again. As regards the Unfair Terms Directive, the rele-
vance of contractual issues is somewhat different in nature, but no less evi-
dent. After all this directive seeks to prevent the use of unfair terms used in 
‘standard’ consumer contracts. Where such terms are used nonetheless, it is 
not illogical to provide for a contractual remedy to address their continuous 
application. Finally, concerning the EU competition rules, the very fact that 
two or more undertakings concluded an anti-competitive (cartel) agreement 
can constitute a violation of Article 101(1) TFEU. Also in this case the impor-
tance of contractual remedies is therefore almost a given.
The selective character of this remedy is not only evident from a com-
parison between the various aforementioned fields of law. It often also 
applies within the abovementioned fields. This can be best illustrated with 
reference to the field of EU competition law. The importance of contractual 
remedies may almost be a given in relation to certain type of infringements 
of this law, but this by no means applies for all infringements. The prohibi-
tion set out in Article 101(1) also covers anti-competitive concerted practices 
that do not involve the conclusion of a contract. Moreover substantive EU 
competition law also entails the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position, 
19 In a similar sense, see Clifton (2009), p. 170.
20 See further para. 109 above.
p. 322 C. Comparison and contextualisation: remedies and procedures para. 299
set out in Article 102 TFEU. Yet the contractual remedy provided for in Arti-
cle 101(2) TFEU does not extend to contracts concluded in violation of Arti-
cle 102 TFEU, whereas this latter article itself does not contain an equivalent 
provision.21 And also the scope of the contractual remedy laid down in the 
Procurement Remedies Directives is limited. It applies only to the contracts 
concluded pursuant to what the EU legislature considered to be the most 
serious infringements.22 This implies that many other infringements of the 
substantive EU public procurement rules cannot lead to this provision being 
invoked.23 Only under the Unfair Terms Directive (and many other consum-
er protection directives) does the remedial provision at issue here coincide 
with the relevant substantive rules, both of which have been laid down in 
the same legal act.24
299. When the use of the aforementioned contractual remedies use in prac-
tice is considered, the situation appears to be somewhat mixed. The afore-
mentioned diversity and selectivity also come to light here. To begin with 
Article 101(2) TFEU, this provision tends to be used rather frequently and 
effectively in litigation between private parties. But this use is mainly 
‘defensive’, i.e. by one of the parties to the contract that seeks to avoid being 
bound by an obligation set out in the contract concerned. This remedy is 
little used in an ‘offensive’ manner. Third parties may generally have little 
incentive to do so. And at least where particularly serious (‘hard-core’) vio-
lations of Article 101(1) TFEU are at issue, the same mostly goes for the 
undertakings that are party to the contract, as this would evidently expose 
their illegal behaviour.25
Concerning the contractual remedy provided for in the Unfair Terms 
Directive, its use is necessarily ‘offensive’, in that it can only lead to the con-
sumer concerned not being bound. Nonetheless in 2000 the Commission 
called the system thus established “very ineffective”.26 It noted that the 
undertakings that include unfair terms in their contracts typically stand to 
lose little where this remedy is applied. This has been linked to the afore-
mentioned flexibility that the Directive leaves to the Member States in this 
respect.27 Moreover, as the Commission also observed, its effectiveness 
21 See para. 207 above. For a discussion of the possible contractual consequences of a viola-
tion of Art. 102 TFEU, see para. 303 below.
22 See further para. 90 above.
23 For a discussion of the possible contractual consequences of other violations of EU public 
procurement law, see para. 304 below.
24 This does not mean that the scope of the contractual remedy set out in this directive is 
particularly wide. Rather the scope of the substantive rules is relatively narrow. Given 
that here the substantial and the remedial rules of EU law coincide, the same then conse-
quently applies for the said remedy.
25 See para. 208 above.
26 Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(2000) 248, p. 35. See further 
para. 170 above.
27 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), p. 347.
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relies to a large extent on consumers being aware of their rights, which is in 
practice often not the case.28 The Court of Justice has picked up on the latter 
point. In particular, central to its Océano Grupo case law, discussed earlier, is 
the thought that the objective of this contractual remedy would not be 
achieved if it were left to the consumer to raise himself the unfair nature of 
a term in a consumer contract.29 The Court pointed in this connection to the 
deterrent effect that high lawyer’s fees may have on consumers and the fact 
that these consumers themselves may not be aware of their rights. It thus 
seems to consider that this remedy could only properly function in practice 
if a third party, including a national court acting of its own motion, actively 
intervenes.30
Finally, it is for now too early to adequately assess the functioning in 
practice of the contractual remedy of ineffectiveness set out in the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives, given its relatively recent introduction.31 It 
would appear nonetheless that this remedy has considerable potential as an 
‘offensive’ private enforcement instrument. The typical private parties con-
cerned (i.e. rejected bidders or other undertakings that might be interested 
in the contract at issue) will often have the knowledge, the means and also 
an incentive to bring legal proceedings seeking to have the contract in ques-
tion being declared ineffective. It can also have an important deterrent effect 
for the contracting authorities that are subject to the EU’s public procure-
ment. Having said that, there are also several factors that imply that this 
remedy might well be used less frequently in practice. These factors are both 
legal (e.g. limitation to most serious infringements, flexibility as to the pre-
cise effects, multiple exceptions, limitation periods) and practical (e.g. pos-
sible absence of evidence and information concerning ‘illegal direct awards’, 
general hesitance to sue) in nature.
All this suggests that, although contractual remedies of the type at issue 
here can certainly have a role to play in practice, particularly as they are cur-
rently provided for in the abovementioned provisions of primary and sec-
ondary EU law they are not without limitations as a remedy in private 
enforcement proceedings.
28 See also ibid., p. 434.
29 CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and C-244/98, Océano Grupo. See further para. 167 and 168 
above.
30 On own motion judicial review generally, see further subsection 9.2.4 below. Another 
option can be a third party, such as a consumer association, bringing a ‘representative’ 
action under Art. 7(2) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. Read together with Art. 7(1) and 6(1) 
of this directive, an action of this kind could lead to a fi nding of a term being unfair and 
therefore not binding with certain erga omnes effects. See CoJ case C-472/10, Invitel, 
para. 38-40.
31 See further para. 93 above.
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8.1.2. Member States’ flexibility and non-infringing provisions
300. It has been noted in the previous subsection that in relation to the 
contractual remedies discussed here especially the Unfair Terms Directive 
and the Procurement Remedies Directives leave considerable flexibility to 
the Member States. That facilitates the ‘embedment’ of these provisions of 
EU law into the latter’s respective bodies of national law. This applies both 
with regard to the transposition of the relevant provisions of the aforemen-
tioned directives in national law and the subsequent application of the 
resulting national laws by all parties concerned more generally. There can 
thus be good reasons for allowing for a degree of flexibility. As Advocate 
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomor observed in relation to the more general ques-
tion which legal consequences are to be drawn at the national level from the 
fact that EU law has been infringed, “[t]he Court’s case law could, in theory, 
have had recourse to some of the legal categories well known in the general theory of 
law (such as, for example, ‘non-existence’, ‘invalidity’, ‘nullity’, ‘ineffectiveness’, 
‘loss of force’, ‘illegitimacy’ or other similar categories) in order to identify the defect 
which affects national provisions where they are incompatible with the [EU] legal 
order. […] However, the Court has carefully avoided employing such concepts in its 
decisions, no doubt because it is aware that the choice of any of these concepts – 
whose meaning, moreover, varies from one legal system to another – is more a mat-
ter for the individual legal systems”.32 Considerations of this type arguably 
carry particular weight in relation to contractual remedies, given that con-
tract law has mostly been left to be regulated by the Member States. Indeed, 
the Court of Justice has held that “the question of the conclusions to be drawn in 
the main proceedings […] as regards the severity of the sanction under the applica-
ble national law, such as nullity or unenforceability of the contract […], is a ques-
tion governed by national law, in particular as regards the rules and principles of 
contract law which admit or adjust that sanction in order to render its severity 
proportionate to the particular defect found”.33
But this flexibility can still have important downsides. It is important to 
note that the above statements by the Advocate General and the Court of 
Justice related to situations where no specific rules of EU law applied. In 
such a situation recourse is had, by default as it were, to national law.34 The 
same need not to apply where EU law does address this issue specifically, at 
least to some extent, as is the case in the situations under consideration here. 
The very point of providing for a contractual remedy there is after all to 
32 Opinion AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer joined cases C-10/97 and C-22/97, IN.CO.GE ‘90, 
para. 18-19. This statement was made in connection to the case law of the CoJ holding 
that, in case of an infringement of EU law, the relevant provision of national law must be 
disapplied, as set out in particular in CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal, discussed in para. 57 
above.
33 CoJ case C-159/00, Sapod, para. 52.
34 In relation to contractual remedies specifi cally, see further subsection 8.1.3 below. On the 
relationship between the EU legislation at issue here and national law more generally, see 
subsection 10.1.3 below.
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harmonise, at least to some extent, the relevant national laws and to specify, 
as a matter of EU law, the consequences for a concluded contract of an 
infringement of EU law.35 In those cases the desire to ensure a degree of flex-
ibility can seem to be as much related to a (political) desire to ‘shield’ the 
field of contract law as much as possible from EU legislative intervention, 
than that it is related to any inherent (legal or factual) imperative. Either 
way, this flexibility may put at risk the objectives of the very harmonisation 
which the EU legislative measures in question seek to achieve. It is one thing 
to leave Member States with flexibility as to how a certain result is to be 
achieved in their respective legal systems.36 But it is quite another thing 
where this flexibility relates to the result itself. It follows from the discussion 
in the previous subsection that the latter (also) appears to have occurred 
here. For instance, whether a contractual remedy has effects ex nunc or rath-
er ex tunc is evidently not merely a matter of form or details. It rather touch-
es upon the essence of EU law measure in question. It might be too far-going 
to speak of purely ‘fictitious harmonisation’ that allows the Member States 
to pursue “fundamentally divergent approaches under the camouflage of a platitu-
dinous framework measure”, but it certainly is not too far off either.37
The Procurement Remedies Directives offer a good illustration of the 
complex compromises that may be required when seeking to balance the 
potentially conflicting desires for an effective EU law remedy on the one 
hand and retaining a certain margin of manoeuvre at national level on the 
other hand.38 As was noted above, these directives stipulate expressly that 
the consequences of a contract being considered ineffective are determined 
by national law and that this may entail effects either ex nunc or ex tunc. But 
in the recitals the result sought is specified, namely that “the rights and obliga-
tion of the parties under the contract should cease to be enforced and performed”.39 
These directives also provide that in case of ex nunc effects certain ‘alterna-
tive penalties’, such as fines, must be imposed in addition,40 which implies 
that both options are not treated as fully equivalent. They further offer addi-
tional flexibility via a provision holding that ineffectiveness need not follow 
where there are “overriding reasons relating to the general interest”,41 yet this 
potential loophole is then in turn narrowed as much as possible by speci-
35 Cf. e.g. Commission, Proposal for Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66, 
COM(2006) 195, p. 2: “In the absence of legislative action at [EU] level, the very different situations 
among the Member States with regard to the effectiveness of review procedures available to enter-
prises would continue to exist or even be aggravated. Situations of legal uncertainty and serious 
and repeated infringements of the [substantive] public procurement Directives would continue”.
36 As is generally the case where an EU legal act takes the form of a directive pursuant to 
Art. 288 TFEU.
37 Weatherill (2000), p. 96.
38 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13 has similarly been described as being the result of “a deli-
cate compromise”. See Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(2000) 
248, p. 5.
39 Recital 21 Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66.
40 Art. 2d(2) and Art. 2e(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
41 Art. 2d(3) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
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fying in a rather restrictive manner what these reasons are (and what not) 
and there is a requirement to impose alternative penalties also in that case.42 
Not dissimilarly the Court of Justice has acknowledged that the Member 
States have “a certain degree of autonomy” when defining the applicable legal 
arrangements concerning the concept of ‘not binding’ within the meaning of 
the Unfair Terms Directive.43 But it stressed at the same time the importance 
of ensuring the full effectiveness of, and achieving an outcome consistent 
with, the objectives pursued by the provision of EU law in question.44 The 
latter implies that a national court that finds that a contract term is unfair 
must “draw all the consequences that follow under national law, so that the con-
sumer is not bound”.45 The Court has made similar statements in relation to 
other contractual remedies in the field of consumer protection law.46
301. The assessment thus far has focused on the provisions of the contract 
that were deemed to violate EU law. A connected issue is the position of 
what could be called the ‘non-infringing provisions’ of the contract in ques-
tion. In other words, what is the fate of contractual provisions that them-
selves do not imply a violation of EU law, but that are part of a contract that 
includes other provisions that are deemed not to be compliant? When 
assessing the provisions under consideration here it becomes clear, once 
more, that the approaches followed in the three EU law provisions under 
consideration here differ considerably between them.
First, in relation to the Procurement Remedies Directives one could 
speak of the general rule being an all-or-nothing approach. Under these 
directives it must be ensured that, where a sufficiently serious infringement 
has been established, “a contract” is considered ineffective.47 This remedy 
thus seems to relate in principle to entire contract.48 That is not surprising. 
42 Art. 2d(3) and Art. 2e(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
43 CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 62.
44 E.g. ibid., para. 72.
45 CoJ case C-453/10, Pereničová, para. 30.
46 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-350/03, Schulte, para. 66-69 and 92. Here the CoJ ruled in a similar 
manner in relation to the abovementioned right of ‘withdrawal’, provided for in (what is 
now) Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83. It concluded that the result sought must cor-
respond to the restoration of the status quo ante.
47 Art. 2d(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
48 Also this rule is not without an exception however. Pursuant to Art. 2d(2) Procurement 
Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13, when specifying the precise legal consequences 
of the ineffectiveness, national law may either provide for the retroactive cancellation of 
“all contractual obligations” or limit this to “those obligations which still have to be performed”. 
In the latter case ‘alternative penalties’ within the meaning of Art. 2e must be provided 
for. These include, besides fi nes, also the shortening the duration of the contract. Under 
this latter provision account may be taken of “the extent to which the contract remains in 
force”. It follows that this possible exception thus does not allow for considering some 
provisions of the contract ineffective and others effective. Rather it allows in essence for 
distinguishing between the parts of the contract that already have been performed and 
the parts that are still to be performed. This dividing line is thus purely factual, without it 
being related to the legal content of the provisions at issue.
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Public procurement law applies particularly at the pre-contractual stage. 
That means that the contested contract as such will normally be the result of 
the earlier defective contract award procedure or the unjustified absence of 
such a procedure. There is therefore normally not one particular provision 
of that contract that violates EU law. It follows that the question of severance 
between the ‘infringing’ and the ‘non-infringing’ provisions of the contract 
will not arise in a typical public procurement case.
Second, the Unfair Terms Directive approaches this subject-matter dif-
ferently, in a manner that can be described as restraint. This directive states 
expressly that “the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if 
it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms”.49 The Court of 
Justice has clarified this further.50 It duly noted that the objective pursued 
consists in “restoring the balance between the parties while in principle preserving 
the validity of the contract as a whole, not in abolishing all contracts containing 
unfair terms”.51 This can thus be understood as a preference for leaving the 
‘non-infringing’ provisions of the contract unaffected whenever possible. 
Whether or not this is possible, is principally to be determined at national 
level. It has further been held that this directive does not imply that the 
national court could or should annul the entire contract containing an unfair 
term. Nor is the national court allowed to amend the contract; all it can do in 
this respect is to delete the unfair term.52 Consequently here the general rule 
is that the remainder of the contract is meant to continue to bind the parties. 
This is understandable, considering that such unfair terms typically take the 
form of unbalanced (one-sided) rights in terms of liability, termination, 
amendment or compliance.53 These issues thus relate to matters that are 
ancillary to the main subject-matter of the contract, i.e. the purchase of cer-
tain goods or services by the consumer.54
Third and finally, concerning Article 101(2) TFEU, EU law can be said to 
be largely neutral as to the continued application of the ‘non-infringing’ pro-
visions of the contract in question. It is noticeable that this provision itself 
does not contain any particular specifications on this point. The Court of 
Justice has long made clear that the extent to which severance is possible is 
one of the further consequences of the finding of a contract being void, 
which is to be settled under national law.55 Further guidance, comparable to 
that provided related to the Unfair Terms Directive discussed above, is nota-
bly absent. Presumably this ‘neutrality’ nonetheless finds its limits where 
the effectiveness of this rule of EU law might be at risk.
49 Art. 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See e.g. also Art. 15 Consumer Rights Directive 
2011/83, which provides that the exercise of the ‘rights of withdrawal’ provided for in this 
latter directive also has the effect that “any ancillary contracts shall be automatically terminated”.
50 See para. 166 above.
51 CoJ case C-453/10, Pereničová, para. 31.
52 CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 64-71.
53 See the annex to Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See further para. 163 above.
54 Cf. recital 19 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
55 CoJ case 56/65, Société Technique Minière, p. 250. See further para. 207 above.
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8.1.3. Excluded contracts
302. At the end of the previous subsection it has been assessed what, as a 
matter of EU law, the position is of the ‘non-infringing’ provisions of con-
tracts that fall within the scope of the aforementioned EU rules providing 
for a contractual remedy. A related yet distinct question is what the position 
is of contracts that fall entirely outside the scope of the rules on contractual 
remedies at issue here. This question is relevant for several reasons. On the 
general level, an assessment of the position of such ‘excluded contracts’ sheds 
light on what applies in situations where no specific EU legislative action 
has (yet) been taken on this point. It may also help to clarify the nature of 
this remedy. Besides, and more specifically, this question is of direct practi-
cal relevance in relation to the EU legislation discussed above. It has already 
been seen earlier that the scope of those rules is in fact rather limited. That 
leaves open the question how to deal with contracts that have been con-
cluded in violation of the applicable rules of substantive EU law, without 
this situation being expressly covered by the EU legislative provisions dis-
cussed in the two foregoing subsections.
303. Let us begin once more by considering the situation under EU compe-
tition law. It has already been seen that Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits the 
abuse of a dominant position, does not contain a contractual remedy similar 
to the one set out in Article 101(2) TFEU.56 This thus leaves unanswered the 
question what, as a matter of EU law, the position is of contracts concluded 
in breach of Article 102 TFEU, in particular whether they are nonetheless 
also ‘automatically void’ or whether they can continue to apply.
The Court of Justice has so far not expressly addressed this question. It 
has been argued in the legal literature however that the absence of a provi-
sion similar to Article 101(2) TFEU is not decisive and that a similar result 
can, and indeed should, be achieved through interpretation.57 One line of 
reasoning relies on the finding by the Court that Article 102 TFEU, read in 
conjunction with the principle of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) 
TEU, “imposes a duty on Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any mea-
sure which would deprive [Article 102 TFEU] of its effectiveness”.58 A (slightly) 
different approach starts by pointing to the particular background and 
nature of Article 102 TFEU. On this reading the absence of an equivalent to 
Article 101(2) TFEU can be explained by the fact that – different from cartels 
and other concerted practices – the abuse of a dominant position does not 
usually take the form of a contract. The aforementioned absence should 
therefore not be understood as deliberately differing from Article 101 TFEU 
in this respect. Where the abuse of a dominant position exceptionally does 
56 See para. 201 above.
57 E.g. Eklöf & Pehrson (2008), p. 196.
58 CoJ case 13/77, INNO,  para. 31. See further Milutinovic (2010), pp. 11 and 148. In a simi-
lar sense, see Temple Lang (2008), pp. 101-102.
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take the form of a contract, the argument goes, it should still be deemed to 
be automatically void, by analogy to Article 101(2) TFEU, so as to safeguard 
the effectiveness of the prohibition concerned.59
In both cases it is thus essentially argued that, in the situation described 
here, the concluded contract must be terminated.60 These views largely 
build on judgments such as Simmenthal and Francovich, discussed earlier in 
this study.61 It will be recalled that in the former case it was essentially held 
that national courts must have the power to “set aside national legislative pro-
visions which might prevent EU rules from having full force and effect”, so as to 
safeguard the effectiveness of EU law.62 In the latter case the Court of Justice 
ruled that pursuant to the duty of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) 
TEU “Member States must take all appropriate measures, whether general or par-
ticular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligation under [EU] law. Among these is the 
obligation to nullify the unlawful consequences of a breach of [EU] law”.63 A simi-
lar line of reasoning is also followed in certain more recent cases relating to 
other fields of EU law.64
304. Turning to EU public procurement law, it has already been noted that 
the relevant contractual remedy is limited to only the most serious infringe-
ments, notably illegal direct awards of public contracts and awards during a 
mandatory standstill period.65 When considering the question what applies 
in relation to contracts concluded pursuant to other infringements, the first 
point of reference is the Court’s ruling in Commission v. Germany, discussed 
earlier.66 This case concerned the Procurement Remedies Directives as they 
stood before the introduction of the contractual remedy of ineffectiveness 
in 2007. Here the Court of Justice held in essence that neither the possible 
legitimate expectations of the undertaking with whom the contract had been 
concluded, nor the principles of pacta sunt servanda and legal certainty could 
be relied upon in order to justify the Member State concerned not taking 
the necessary measures to give effect to the Court’s earlier finding that the 
applicable EU public procurement rules had been infringed in the course of 
the foregoing contract award procedure. At first sight this case law might 
59 Komninos (2008), p. 159.
60 For reasons of simplicity, in this subsection the term ‘terminate’ is used in a general man-
ner, i.e. without implying any particular type of legal effect under EU or national law.
61 See para. 57 and 59 above respectively.
62 CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal, para. 22.
63 CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, para. 36. Here reference was made to CoJ 
case 6/60, Humblet, p. 572, where it had been held that “[i]f the Court rules in a judgment 
that a legislative or administrative measure adopted by the authorities of a Member State is con-
trary to [EU] law, that Member State is obliged, by virtue of [the provision of the ECSC Treaty 
that corresponds with the principle of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) TEU], to rescind 
the measure in question”.
64 E.g. CoJ case C-41/11, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, para. 42-46; CoJ case C-518/11, UPC 
Nederland, para. 59-63.
65 See further para. 90 above.
66 CoJ case C-503/04, Commission v. Germany. See further para. 89 above.
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thus seem to hint at a general obligation to terminate contracts concluded 
after a non-compliant contract award procedure. However this case was 
decided in the context of infringement proceedings brought by the Com-
mission against a Member State. These proceedings are essentially a matter 
between the various public authorities concerned, without there being a role 
for private parties.67 It is evident from the Court’s reasoning that this fact 
played an important role in this case, as this allowed it to leave aside the 
aforementioned principles.68 For this reason one should be careful, it is sub-
mitted, in drawing general conclusions on the basis of this case.
More enlightening is therefore the Court’s ruling in Wall, which dates 
from 2010.69 This case concerned a contract award procedure that fell entire-
ly outside the scope of the EU’s directives on public procurement. It was 
instead decided on the basis of EU Treaties’ fundamental freedoms, in par-
ticular the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services, from 
which the Court of Justice already deduced an obligation of transparency.70 
In Wall the Court first observed that, where this latter obligation has not 
been respected, “all necessary measures would have to be taken, in accordance 
with the national legal system of the Member State concerned, to restore the trans-
parency of the procedure, which might extend to a new award procedure”.71 
Although no explicit reference was made, this wording clearly echoes earlier 
rulings in cases such as Francovich, referred to in the previous paragraph. 
But in Wall the Court had also been asked expressly whether, as a matter of 
EU law, there is an obligation to terminate the contract at issue. The Court 
essentially answered this question in the negative. It held that this matter is 
to be settled on the basis of the domestic legal system, subject to the princi-
ples of equivalence and effectiveness.72 According to the Court, the said pro-
visions of the EU Treaties do not require such termination “in every case of an 
alleged breach”.73 This ruling evidently leaves various questions unan-
swered.74 Yet it nonetheless suggests that there is no unqualified rule under 
primary EU law to the effect that contracts that were concluded following 
67 See subsection 2.4.1 above.
68 See CoJ case C-503/04, Commission v. Germany, para. 36.
69 CoJ case C-91/08, Wall.
70 Ibid., para. 33-36, and the case law cited there. See also Commission, Interpretative com-
munication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject 
to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives, OJ 2006, C 179/2.
71 Ibid, para. 42.
72 Ibid., para. 63-65.
73 Ibid., para. 65.
74 E.g. the statement that termination is not required ‘in every case’ does not exclude that 
this may nonetheless be required in certain cases. The following question is then of course 
in which cases there is such an obligation and in which cases there is not.
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infringements of the applicable substantive EU law must always be termi-
nated.75
It seems unlikely that the insertion in 2007 of the aforementioned provi-
sion on ineffectiveness in the Procurement Remedies Directives fundamen-
tally alters this picture in respect of contract that are covered by these direc-
tives but that do not fall within the scope of that provision. Indeed, there are 
good reasons to believe that primary EU law does not require those con-
tracts to be terminated. First, only this outcome would appear to do justice 
to the EU legislature’s express decision to restrict the contractual remedy of 
ineffectiveness to contracts concluded after only the most serious infringe-
ments of substantive EU public procurement law. Second, the Procurement 
Remedies Directives provide for a carefully balanced regime in this respect, 
including certain exceptions.76 Therefore, if an obligation to terminate con-
tracts were to be assumed also for situations falling outside the scope of the 
said provision on ineffectiveness, then the paradoxical situation could 
emerge that the regime applicable to the most serious infringements of EU 
public procurement law is more lenient the one that applies to all other – 
less serious – cases. Third, (also) after their revision the Procurement Reme-
dies Directives explicitly refer to national law to decide the effects of con-
cluded contracts concerning situations falling outside the scope of the 
provision on ineffectiveness.77 If anything, these legislative developments 
thus seem to confirm the aforementioned conclusion that there is no ‘univer-
sal’ EU law obligation to terminate contracts of the type at issue in this sub-
section.
305. In EU consumer protection law the scope of the substantive rules and 
that of the contractual remedy often coincide, which implies that a contract 
that is covered by the substantive rules of the Unfair Terms Directive will 
also be covered by the contractual remedy for which this directive provides. 
It follows that the issue of ‘excluded’ contracts plays less of a role here.78 
Still issues similar to those discussed above can arise in relation to the effects 
given to the provision constituting the contractual remedy. Take the 2010 
judgment of the Court of Justice in Friz.79 This case related to a consumer 
75 This is all the more noticeable given that Wall did not concern a ‘horizontal’ relationship 
between two private parties, but rather a situation whereby one of the parties to the con-
tract was a public authority. As such the latter is undoubtedly bound by the abovemen-
tioned provisions of the EU Treaties and the principle of sincere cooperation. On the dis-
tinction between of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ situations and its relevance in the present 
context, see further section 11.2 below.
76 See para. 92 above.
77 Art. 2(7) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665 and Art. 2(6) Utilities Remedies Direc-
tive 92/13. These provisions also stipulate that, on an optional basis, Member States may 
provide that in the situations referred to here, the powers of the review bodies are limited 
to awarding damages.
78 Cf. however Art. 15 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83 concerning ‘ancillary’ contracts.
79 CoJ case C-215/08, Friz.
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protection directive on contracts negotiated away from business premises 
(‘doorstep selling’), which has since been incorporated in the Consumer 
Rights Directive. The former directive granted consumers the right to 
“renounce the effects of his undertaking” by sending a notice within a certain 
time period, which “[releases] the consumer from any obligations under the can-
celled contract”.80 In Friz, the Court first recalled that the termination by a 
consumer of a contract normally entails a restoration of the status quo ante 
for all parties to the contract.81 However it then added that “in certain spe-
cific cases” it is not precluded that the consumer has to bear “certain conse-
quences resulting from the exercise of his right of cancellation”.82 The Court 
reached that conclusion with reference to the relevant rule of national law 
that intended to ensure, in accordance with “the general principles of civil 
law”, a satisfactory balance and a fair division of risks among the various 
interested parties.83 Once more this ruling leaves several questions unan-
swered.84 But it nonetheless underlines that, at least in certain cases, account 
can be taken of general principles of (national) civil law when determining 
the effects to be given to the rule of EU law at issue.85
306. What then is the overall picture that emerges on the basis of the forego-
ing? To begin with, the issues discussed here are complex, especially where 
they relate to the relationship and interaction between EU law and national 
contract law, as is inevitably the case where contractual remedies of the type 
under consideration here are concerned.86 Much remains to be clarified, 
which is a task that typically falls upon the Court of Justice. But this institu-
tion too has been criticised for not providing sufficient clarity and coherence 
80 Art. 5 Doorstep Selling Directive 85/577. This directive further specifi ed that the legal 
effects of such renunciation are governed by national law (see its Art. 7). This directive 
has since been replaced by Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83.
81 CoJ case C-215/08, Friz, para. 45. In this sense, see also CoJ case C-350/03, Schulte, 
para. 88.
82 Ibid.
83 CoJ case C-215/08, Friz, para. 48-49. Here it was also noted that this allowed the con-
sumer in question to recover his holding while taking on a proportion of the risks inher-
ent to any capital investment and enables third parties not to have to bear the fi nancial 
consequences of the termination, which occurred following the signature of a contract to 
which they were not party.
84 E.g. it is uncertain which types of cases qualify as ‘special’ for the present purposes, what 
the ‘certain consequences’ entail precisely and which ‘general principles of private law’ 
the CoJ actually referred to.
85 In other cases the CoJ has come to similar conclusions. See e.g. CoJ case C-412/06, Hamil-
ton, para. 42; CoJ case C-489/07, Messner, para. 26. This latter case concerned the provi-
sion on ‘withdrawal’ from a contract, set out in Art. 6 Directive 97/7, which has since also 
been replaced by Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83. See however also CoJ case 
C-209/12, Endress, para. 30-31.
86 For a more in-depth discussion, which falls outside the scope of this study, see e.g. Storme 
(2007), p. 233; Hartkamp (2010a), p. 527; Reich (2010), p. 142; Safjan & Miklaszewicz 
(2010), p. 475.
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when addressing the issues mentioned above.87 What does seem clear how-
ever is that – different from what is sometimes suggested – it should proba-
bly not too readily be assumed that the principles of (civil) law, such as pacta 
sunt servanda, the protection of the rights of third parties and legitimate 
expectations and the freedom of contract, will always and unconditionally 
be sacrificed at the altar of effectiveness of EU law and sincere cooperation. 
There can, of course, be little doubt that the latter considerations generally 
constitute persuasive and powerful arguments in an EU law context.88 Rul-
ings such as Simmenthal and Francovich have long made this clear. But these 
cases related primarily to legislative or administrative measures taken by the 
public authorities of the Member States. It may well be that the reasoning 
employed there does not lend itself to a simple ‘one-to-one’ transfer to situ-
ations which are concerned with contracts concluded with or between private 
parties, as cases such as Wall and Fritz seem to illustrate. That applies all the 
more so because the EU courts have equally acknowledged the fundamental 
importance of the aforementioned principles.89 For all the issues that remain 
to be clarified, it would rather seem that the Court is seeking to achieve a 
sort of balance between the various interests at stake.90 It may well be seen 
as appropriate to leave the Member States in this connection a certain mar-
gin of manoeuvre, to be exercised within relatively broad boundaries set by 
EU law, so as to provide for a solution that is compatible with their respec-
tive domestic legal systems.91
Finally, it appears that the precise legal and factual circumstances of the 
case at hand are likely to determine to a high extent the outcome in an indi-
vidual case. It may for instance make a difference whether the contract in 
question has been concluded either between a public and a private party 
(e.g. in a public procurement case) or in an entirely ‘horizontal’ context (e.g. 
in a consumer protection or competition case).92 A connected factor that has 
87 See e.g. Clifton (2009), p. 168; Basedow (2010a), pp. 454-460; Harmathy (2010), p. 429; 
Weatherill (2012), pp. 1298 and 1303-1305.
88 On considerations related to effectiveness, see also section 11.1 below.
89 In CoJ case C-162/96, Racke, para. 49, the principle pacta sunt servanda was e.g. held to be 
“a fundamental principle of any legal order”. See e.g. also GC case T-154/01, Distilleria F. Pal-
ma, para. 45. The principle that acquired rights must be respected and the principle of 
legitimate expectations have also been recognised as fundamental principles of EU law. 
See e.g. CoJ case C-168/09, Flos, para. 50. On several occasions the CoJ has further under-
lined the importance of the principle of freedom of contract, as an element of the broader 
fundamental right to conduct a business guaranteed under Art. 16 Charter. See e.g. CoJ 
case C-240/97, Spain v. Commission, para. 99-100; CoJ case C-283/11, Sky Österreich, 
para. 42-43.
90 Cf. Hartkamp (2010b), p. 256.
91 Cf. Opinion AG Sharpston case C-209/12, Endress, para. 38-39. Note e.g. also the express 
reference to the procedural autonomy of the Member States in CoJ case C-41/11, Inter-
Environnement Wallonie, para. 45.
92 Even if this is not immediately clear from Wall, as was noted in para. 304 above. It also 
follows from the foregoing that it may well matter whether or not the questions under 
consideration here emerge in the context of infringement proceedings, as was also noted 
there.
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already been touched upon is whether or not the infringed rule of EU law 
imposes obligations on all parties to the contract.93 Conceivably the behav-
iour or (relative) position of the parties concerned can also be of relevance.94 
Yet another relevant factor can be whether the infringed rule of EU law is 
mandatory in nature,95 as may be the case in fields such as consumer 
protection,96 free movement,97 competition98 and gender equality.99
8.1.4. Summary
307. The Procurement Remedies Directives, the Unfair Terms Directive (as 
well as various other consumer protection directives) and Article 101(2) 
TFEU regarding certain competition law infringements all provide for a con-
tractual remedy, whereas the IPR Enforcement Directive does not. Where 
provision is made for this remedy in EU law, the approaches followed differ 
considerably between them. That is already evident from the terminology 
used; the three aforementioned legal acts speak of ‘ineffectiveness’, ‘not 
bound’ and ‘automatically void’ respectively. But this diversity extends 
beyond mere terminology. Most notably there are differences with respect to 
the ‘absolute’ or ‘relative’ and the ex nunc or ex tunc effects of this remedy. 
93 In particular, EU public procurement law imposes in principle obligations only on the 
contracting authority and not to the latter’s private party-contractor, whereas all parties 
to the contested contract can be subject to Art. 101 TFEU.
94 E.g. it may matter whether one of the parties is a consumer or where the parties are other-
wise in an unequal position. As explained in para. 297 above, there may also be less rea-
son to protect acquired rights pursuant to a public contract concluded with a professional 
party following a clearly defective contract award procedure. Cf. CoJ case C-209/12, End-
ress, para. 30, where it was held that an undertaking cannot rely on reasons of legal cer-
tainty in order to redress a situation caused by its own failure to comply with a require-
ment under EU law. Cf. e.g. also CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 32-33.
95 Cf. Basedow (2010a), p. 451, who considers that most EU legal acts dealing with issues of 
substantive private law are mandatory. As regards the issue of EU law being mandatory 
and/or of public policy (‘d’ordre public’), particularly connected to a court raising that 
rule of law of its own motion, see also subsection 9.2.4 below.
96 Cf. e.g. Art. 6(2) and recital 22 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13; Art. 12 Product Liability 
Directive 85/374. For a critical discussion of the (‘unilaterally’) mandatory nature of EU 
law on consumer contracts generally, see Eidenmuller et al. (2011), pp. 1079-1090.
97 Cf. e.g. CoJ case 58/80, Dansk Supermarked, para. 17. Note that, even if there may well be a 
need to differentiate between the EU Treaties’ free movement provisions, this ruling 
seems diffi cult to reconcile e.g. with the aforementioned Wall judgment (regarding the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services). See also Opinion AG 
Sharpston case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais, para. 43 (regarding the free movement of 
workers), where it was held that “it is clear from the Court’s case law that Article [45 TFEU] 
does indeed cover restrictions on freedom to contract if they are such as to preclude or deter a nati-
onal of one Member State from exercising his right to freedom of movement in another Member 
State, at least as long as they derive from actions of public authorities or rules aimed at regulating 
gainful employment in a collective manner”. See also para. 451 below.
98 Cf. para. 204 above.
99 Cf. CoJ case 43/75, Defrenne, para. 39. For an application of the rule set out in the afore-
mentioned Simmenthal judgment (see para. 57 above)  to a collective labour agreement, 
see e.g. CoJ case C-184/89, Nimz, para. 19-20.
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The question what the fate is of the other, non-infringing provisions of the 
contract is also answered differently. The abovementioned legislation also 
differs in the extent to which the above issues are determined by EU law (as 
opposed to by national law) in the first place. Not surprisingly, these differ-
ences are also reflected in the manner in which this remedy tends to be used 
in practice.
In relation to the contractual remedies under consideration heterogene-
ity is thus the key word. On the one hand several of these differences can be 
explained by the differing legal and factual environments in which these 
remedies typically operate. For instance, whereas ‘absolute’ effect (i.e. vis-à-
vis all contract parties as well as third parties) seems entirely appropriate in 
relation to the competition law infringements at issue here, the same can be 
said of the ‘relative’ effect (i.e. only protecting the consumer) foreseen in the 
Unfair Terms Directive. And whereas it is understandable that under the 
latter directive the contractual remedy is limited to the unfair term in ques-
tion while leaving the remainder of the contract unaffected, it is equally 
understandable that under the Procurement Remedies Directive it relates in 
principle to the entire contract. On the other hand, these different contexts 
and objectives by no means make this heterogeneity always unavoidable or 
appropriate. The relevant differences between EU competition and public 
procurement law would for example not seem to be such as to preclude a 
greater degree of consistency between these two regimes. The arrangement 
found in the Procurement Remedies Directives is however characterised by 
a set of complex compromises, leaving many aspects to be determined by 
national law. This illustrates that, besides the aforementioned legal or fac-
tual reasons, another relevant factor ‘shaping’ the legislation at issue is the 
tension that can exist between the wish to provide for an effective contrac-
tual remedy as a matter of EU law on the one hand and the desire to prevent 
too great an “incursion of EU law into the heartland of national contract 
thinking”100 on the other hand.
This tension is not only evident in relation to the EU legislative mea-
sures under consideration here. It is also visible outside the – generally rath-
er limited – scope of those measures, for instance as regards infringements 
of Article 102 TFEU or other infringements of EU public procurement law 
than the most serious ones to which the Public Procurement Remedies 
Directives’ contractual remedy applies. Although much remains to be clari-
fied in this respect, it appears that the Court of Justice tends to seek to 
achieve a balance between the various interests at stake. On the one hand 
ensuring the effectiveness of EU law and the duty of sincere cooperation are 
undoubtedly of paramount importance. On the other hand that does not 
mean however that these considerations necessarily ‘trump’ arguments 
based on leaving the Member States a certain margin of manoeuvre in the 
field of contract law and, in particular, on the application of fundamental 
100 Cf. Weatherill (2005), p. 115.
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principles of (civil) law, such as pacta sunt servanda, the protection of the 
rights of third parties, legitimate expectations and the freedom of contract, 
where relevant. Especially where contractual remedies are concerned, for 
the EU judiciary, as for the EU legislature, a carefully balanced case-by-case 
assessment thus mostly seems preferable to a cruder one-size-fits-all 
approach.
8.2. Other remedies
This second section is concerned with the remedies set out in the EU legisla-
tion assessed in part B other than the actions for damages, actions for injunc-
tions and contractual remedies already discussed in the foregoing. It con-
cerns interim relief, measures on the disclosure of evidence, recurring 
penalty payments, publicity measures and measures related to legal costs. 
As is shown below, several of these remedies can also be of considerable 
importance to a private party that has initiated or that considers initiating 
private enforcement proceedings. These latter remedies can nonetheless be 
distinguished from the ‘main’ (substantive) remedies discussed earlier on 
several grounds. To begin with, with the exception of interim relief, these 
‘other’ remedies are generally less broadly provided for in the EU legisla-
tion under consideration. In addition they tend to be concerned with more 
specific issues and therefore have a more limited scope of application. Last-
ly, they are not ‘self-standing’. That is to say, as is explained below, either as 
a matter of law or in practice, the remedies discussed below are essentially 
all ancillary to a main claim of some sort being brought in the legal proceed-
ings concerned. At the very end of this section it is briefly noted that certain 
other remedies are notably absent from the legislation at issue.
8.2.1. Interim relief
308. As regards interim relief, the Procurement Remedies Directives’ 
regime is most elaborated in this respect. The provision in question is for-
mulated in a rather broad and general manner.101 It speaks of “interim mea-
sures with the aim of correcting alleged infringements and preventing further dam-
age to the interests concerned”. Further precision is added through three 
additional clauses. First, it is provided that the said measures must be made 
available “at the earliest opportunity and by way of interlocutory procedures”. 
Second, these directives stipulate that this includes “measures to suspend or to 
ensure the suspension of the procedure for the award of a public contract or the 
implementation of any decision taken by the contracting authority”. Third, they 
contain a separate (optional) provision on the weighting of the various inter-
ests at stake, which allows Member States to provide that account is taken of 
101 Art. 2(1)(a) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further para. 80 
above.
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“the probable consequences of interim measures for all interests likely to be harmed, 
as well as the public interest” and “not to grant such measures when their negative 
consequences could exceed their benefits”.102 While the application of such a bal-
ance of interests test is not uncommon in proceedings for interim relief,103 
none of the below directives contains a similar provision.
Several other directives nonetheless also require this remedy to be made 
available to aggrieved private parties. The IPR Enforcement Directive con-
tains two specific references to the granting of interim relief. One of the ‘pro-
visional and precautionary measures’ foreseen concerns the possibility of 
granting interlocutory injunctions aimed at preventing imminent infringe-
ments or prohibiting the continuation thereof.104 Under this directive the 
national court seised must further be empowered to “order prompt and effec-
tive provisional measures to preserve relevant evidence”, such as the detailed 
description or the physical seizure of the allegedly infringing products.105 
And whereas the Product Liability Directive is silent in this respect, most 
consumer protection directives assessed in part B of this study also provide 
for this remedy. Here the formulation is generally less specific and less com-
mittal however. Under the Consumer Injunctions Directive the cessation or 
prohibition of an infringement must be ordered “with all due expediency” and 
“where appropriate” by way of summary procedure.106 The Unfair Commer-
cial Practices Directive specifies that an “accelerated procedure” must be made 
available, while leaving it to the Member States to decide whether that 
should entail a procedure leading to an outcome with interim or with defin-
itive effects.107
It follows that, while the scope and the level of detail provided for may 
differ, most of the legislation considered in part B of this study provide for the 
possibility for the national court to grant interim relief in one form or anoth-
er. Of the fields of EU law at issue here only in relation to competition law 
infringements no such EU law provisions can be found on interim measures 
available to private parties that consider themselves harmed. For neither 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, nor the Competition Damages Directive contains 
any rule in this regard.
102 Art. 2(5) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665 and Art. 2(4) Utilities Remedies Direc-
tive 92/13.
103 A similar weighting of the interests at stake takes place in proceedings for interim mea-
sures before the EU courts. See e.g. GC Order case T-392/02 R, Solvay v. Council, para. 120-
127; GC Order case T-37/04 R, Azores v. Council, para. 192-195. Cf. e.g. also Art. 62(2) Pat-
ent Court Agreement; Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, COM(2013) 
813, pp. 21-22 (Art. 10(2)); Peyer (undated), pp. 23 and 32-33 (concerning interim relief in 
the German and the English legal systems respectively).
104 Art. 9(1)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 126 above.
105 Art. 7(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 121 above.
106 Art. 2(1)(a) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further para. 156 above.
107 Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29. See e.g. also Art. 5(3) Mislead-
ing Advertising Directive 2006/114. See further para. 160 above.
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309. The fact that most legal acts under consideration in this study contain 
provisions on interim relief is consistent with the general emphasis that the 
Court of Justice tends to place on the availability of this remedy in the EU 
legal order. It did so most notably in cases such as Factortame and Unibet, 
discussed earlier.108 With reference to these two earlier cases the Court of 
Justice observed more recently that “it is apparent from settled case law that a 
national court seised of a dispute governed by [EU] law must be in a position to 
grant interim relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be 
given on the existence of the rights claimed under [EU] law”.109 Essentially the 
same applies in litigation before the EU courts themselves.110 In the latter 
connection it has been held that “the purpose of interlocutory proceedings is to 
guarantee the full effectiveness of the final future decision, in order to ensure that 
there is no lacuna in the legal protection provided by the Court of Justice”.111
These statements not only underline the fundamental importance that is 
attached to the availability of interim relief in the EU legal order. They also 
give an indication of why this is considered important. These measures serve 
in essence to safeguard the rights of private parties conferred to them by EU 
law. In particular, without interim relief being available, pending a defini-
tive ruling in the dispute at hand the situation ‘on the ground’ may well 
evolve in such manner that this latter ruling will prove to be devoid of prac-
tical effects. This would, in the words of the Court, lead to a “lacuna in the 
legal protection” of the private parties concerned. In other words, the function 
of interim relief is to “preserve the ability to grant effective relief by final judg-
ment or to maintain or otherwise regulate the status quo” in situations where this 
is deemed necessary.112
310. The issue of interim relief is thus to be distinguished, but nonetheless 
closely connected to the rapidity with which the proceedings on the merits are 
being decided. Put simply, the less time is needed to complete these latter 
proceedings, the less need there generally is for the award of interim mea-
sures. This is well illustrated by the provisions of the consumer protection 
directives outlined above. For both the Consumer Injunctions Directive and 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive place the emphasis primarily on 
the rapid resolution of the dispute. It is only in this context that reference 
is made to interim relief, which is to be made available ‘where appropri-
ate’ or where the Member State concerned decides to do so respectively. In 
that sense the availability of interim relief can thus said to be of secondary 
importance under these directives, the main issuing being ensuring speedy 
108 CoJ case C-213/89, Factortame; CoJ case C-432/05, Unibet. See further para. 58 above.
109 CoJ case C-416/10, Križan, para. 107.
110 Art. 279 TFEU.
111 CoJ Order case C-278/13 P(R), Pilkington, para. 36.
112 International institute for the unifi cation of private law (‘UNIDROIT’), Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure (Art. 8(1)), available via http://www.unidroit.org/eng-
lish/principles/civilprocedure/ali-unidroitprinciples-e.pdf.
para. 311 Chapter 8. Contractual and other remedies p. 339
proceedings. Whether this rather ‘loose’ approach in consumer protection 
cases suffices to have the intended effect in practice is however another mat-
ter.113 In any case the more recent Collective Redress Recommendation is 
worded similarly.114
This also explains why this remedy has been most elaborated in the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives. For in public procurement cases the speedy 
resolution of a dispute, if only provisionally, is often particularly important, 
notably where the review of decisions relating to the contract award proce-
dure are concerned (e.g. the decision to exclude a tenderer for failure to meet 
the applicable requirements, or the contract award decision). Indeed, one of 
the key objectives of these directives is to ensure that decisions taken in rela-
tion to contract award procedures can be reviewed “as rapidly as possible”.115 
Consider for instance the situation where a contracting authority decided to 
award a public contract for the construction of a building to an undertaking. 
Where a competitor seeks to have that decision annulled for infringements 
of the public procurement rules, the award may already have led to the (par-
tial) execution of the contract by the time the court seised takes a decision in 
the proceedings on the merits. Even if the latter then agrees with the appli-
cant, it is unlikely to order the demolition of the building. This could thus 
deprive the applicant from its right to effective review. Rapid proceedings 
generally and the availability of interim measures in particular are therefore 
often a key concern in a public procurement context.
Compare this to a typical intellectual property dispute covered by the 
IPR Enforcement Directive. Clearly, as in almost all cases, the speedy conclu-
sion of the proceedings is certainly also of interest here. For that reason this 
directive stipulates for example in a general manner that there should be no 
“unwarranted delays”.116 However there is normally no ‘general’ urgency of 
the sort that tends to exist in public procurement cases, as described above. 
Rather in typical cases under the IPR Enforcement Directive the urgency 
tends to relate to more specific issues, such as the halting of an infringement 
or ensuring that relevant evidence is not being destroyed. For that reason 
the aforementioned interim measures foreseen in the IPR Enforcement 
Directive are more narrowly focused on those specific issues in the manner 
indicated above.
311. Accordingly interim measures serve in particular to bridge the period 
needed to settle the dispute in the case at hand in a definitive manner and to 
preserve any rights in this respect. This illustrates that the provisional and 
113 See the critical comments made in this connection by stakeholders, set out in Commis-
sion, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 635, pp. 12 
and 15.
114 Point 19 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See further para. 190 above.
115 Art. 1(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further para. 72, 78 
and 100 above. See also subsection 9.2.5 below.
116 Art. 3(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 144 above. See also subsec-
tion 9.2.5 below.
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‘dependent’ character of this remedy. That is to say, the term ‘interim relief’ 
refers first and foremost to the effects of the relief sought by the applicant, 
while leaving it open what the measures to be ordered might entail in con-
crete terms. Legally speaking, the granting of interim relief does not lead to 
a definitive settlement of the dispute. As the Court has held, “by its nature, an 
interim measure does not finally determine the legal situation”.117 Often an appli-
cation for interim measures will therefore be preceded or accompanied, or at 
least followed, by an action on the merits of the case. Interim measures 
retain their provisional character, even in cases where the parties to the dis-
pute consider that there is no longer a need to bring or to continue the pro-
ceedings on the merits.118 Put differently, while de facto the result may well 
be a final settlement, de jure the dispute has then only have been settled 
provisionally.
It is noticeable in this connection that the aforementioned directives are 
largely silent on the precise relationship between the proceedings for inter-
im relief and the proceedings on the merits. Only the IPR Enforcement 
Directive addresses this issue with some detail. Here it is said that the provi-
sional measures to preserve evidence foreseen in this directive are to be 
made available “even before the commencement of proceedings on the merits of the 
case”.119 Although the Procurement Remedies Directives do not address this 
point expressly, the Court of Justice has held that they preclude making the 
filing of an application for interim measures dependent on a requirement 
that proceedings on the merits must first have been brought.120 That applies 
even where the latter is mere a formality. According to the Court, such a 
requirement would mean that the system of interim judicial protection 
offered is inadequate.121 It follows that the presumption may be that an action 
for interim measures is preceded or accompanied by an action on the merits, 
but that at least under the abovementioned directives this cannot be required 
as a matter of EU law. In that sense the ‘dependent’ nature of this remedy 
therefore only goes that far.
312. As to the question what these interim measures can entail in terms of 
content, under the EU legislation referred to above they tend involve the 
granting of injunctions on a provisional basis.122 For instance, the IPR 
117 CoJ case C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker, para. 61. See e.g. also Peyer (undated), p. 6.
118 Cf. CoJ case C-53/96, Hermès International, para. 44 (regarding the provisional measures 
provided for in Art. 50 TRIPS Agreement).
119 Art. 7(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. No such statement is made in Art. 9(1)(a) 
IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48 however.
120 CoJ case C-214/00, Commission v. Spain, para. 99-100.
121 Notably this ruling seems to be at odds with the rules applicable in proceedings before 
the EU courts themselves, which require, for an application for interim measures under 
Art. 279 TFEU to be admissible, that an action on the merits is pending. See Art. 160 CoJ 
Rules of procedure, OJ 2012, L 265/1. Cf. Pijnacker Hordijk, Van der Bend & Van 
Nouhuys (2009), p. 562.
122 On actions for injunctions generally, see further section 7.2 above.
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Enforcement Directive foresees the granting of interlocutory injunctions 
“intended to prevent any imminent infringement of an intellectual property right, 
or to forbid, on a provisional basis […] the continuation of the alleged infringements 
of that right”.123 The possibility under this directive for a court to order pro-
visional measures to preserve evidence is also a (specific) form of injunctive 
relief. The same essentially applies under the aforementioned consumer 
protection directives and the Collective Redress Recommendation. This is 
especially evident from the link established under the Consumer Injunctions 
Directive between interim relief and “the cessation or prohibition of an 
infringement”.124 The same will normally apply under the Procurement Rem-
edies Directive, even if here the relevant provision has been drafted in a 
more general manner. All this illustrates that, generally speaking, interim 
measures lend themselves well to bringing an (alleged) infringement to a 
(provisional) halt and/or to prevent the occurrence of damage in one form 
or another.
By contrast interim relief is normally not available in relation to actions 
for damages.125 As a general rule, damages claims are not seen as particularly 
urgent, as no irreparable damage will be done in the absence of interim 
relief being granted.126 The objective in those cases is after all to obtain mon-
etary compensation. Even if such a claim is upheld only after a considerable 
time period, the award of damages can still have the effect of compensating 
the applicant for the injury suffered. Thus, certain exceptions aside, in those 
cases the ‘facts on the ground’ are not presumed to be evolving in such a 
manner, that they justify the granting of interim relief. Once again this is 
also the position before the EU courts.127 It may be presumed that this is the 
reason why the EU legislation discussed above does not provide for interim 
relief in relation to actions for damages. For the same reason it is also not 
surprising that neither the Product Liability Directive nor the Competition 
Damages Directive contains any provisions on interim relief, as in terms of 
substantive remedies these two legal acts are concerned exclusively with 
actions for damages.
It is less clear where to place contractual remedies in this respect.128 A pri-
ori there seems to be no reason to presume that, inherently, the continuous 
application of a contract could not lead to serious and irreparable damages. 
In that sense contractual remedies differ from damages claims. From this 
123 Art. 9(1)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
124 Art. 2(1)(a) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
125 On actions for damages generally, see further section 7.1 above.
126 Cf. e.g. CoJ joined cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen, para. 29: 
“purely fi nancial damage cannot, as the Court has held on numerous occasions, be regarded in 
principle as irreparable”.
127 E.g. CoJ Order case C-278/13 P(R), Pilkington, para. 50: “Damage of a pecuniary nature can-
not, otherwise than in exception circumstances, be regarded as irreparable since, as a general rule, 
pecuniary compensation is capable of restoring the aggrieved person to the situation that obtained 
before he suffered the damage”.
128 On contractual remedies generally, see further section 8.1 above.
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perspective the granting of interim measures thus need not be excluded. Yet 
this question remains largely unaddressed in the legislation under consider-
ation here. Arguably this is related to the flexibility that is mostly left to the 
Member States in determining the precise effects of invoking the contractual 
remedies in question.129 It may not always be possible to invoke or establish 
these effects by means of measures that only apply provisionally. Where this 
is otherwise, given its broad formulation, the aforementioned provision on 
interim relief laid down in the Procurement Remedies Directives could con-
ceivably also be applied, in principle, in relation to the contractual remedy 
for which these directives provide.130 The Unfair Terms Directive in contrast 
does not contain any provisions on interim relief, while it does provide for a 
contractual remedy.131 Still one could well imagine a situation where a con-
sumer would suffer serious and irreparable damage if he were to continue 
to be bound by such a term during the full duration of ordinary court pro-
ceedings. Also under this latter directive interim measures might thus be 
called for. It appears that in this case a solution would need to be found 
primarily on the basis of the applicable national law, subject however to the 
principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial protection.132
313. In summary, interim relief is a remedy that is of considerable impor-
tance in the present context. Most legal acts at issue here require the avail-
ability of this form of relief, even if the relevant provisions can be either 
broadly formulated (Procurement Remedies Directives), more narrowly 
targeted (IPR Enforcement Directive) or rather rudimentary and largely 
optional (Consumer Injunctions Directive, Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive). This corresponds with the importance attached to the availability 
of this remedy in the EU legal order generally as a means to ensure that the 
rights of private parties based on EU law can be effectively enforced. Differ-
ent from the ‘main’ remedies discussed in the foregoing, interim measures 
are provisional and ‘dependent’ in character however. For one thing, the 
‘demand’ for this remedy will typically be greater where proceedings on 
the merits take a long time to conclude. For another thing, in legal terms, 
they only lead to a provisional settlement of the dispute in question. For 
a final settlement an action on the merits is necessary. At the same time, at 
least under the Procurement Remedies Directives and the IPR Enforcement 
Directive, their ‘dependent’ nature does not mean that the applicant can be 
required to have already initiated an action on the merits. Finally, as to the 
content of this remedy, the measures in question mostly entail the granting 
of injunctions of a certain type. They are not available in relation to actions 
129 See in particular subsection 8.1.2 above.
130 Art. 2d Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further subsection 3.2.3 
above.
131 Art. 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See further subsection 5.3.1 above.
132 Cf. CoJ case C-415/11, Aziz, para. 57-63. As regards the said principles, see also sections 
2.2 (equivalence and effectiveness) and 2.3 (effective judicial protection) above.
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for damages, which explains the absence of this remedy in the Product Lia-
bility Directive and the Competition Damages Directive.
8.2.2. Disclosure measures
314. When discussing measures on the disclosure of evidence and other 
relevant information in the context of private enforcement proceedings, two 
directives are the natural points of reference, namely the IPR Enforcement 
Directive and the Competition Damages Directive.133 The former sets out 
three types of measures in this regard. To begin with, it provides that a 
defendant may be ordered by the competent national court to present (i.e. 
disclose) certain evidence lying within its control.134 In cases of infringe-
ments committed on a commercial scale, the communication of banking, 
financial or commercial documents may be ordered. In the second place, it 
must be possible for a court to order certain measures to preserve relevant 
evidence.135 This may include the detailed description, taking of samples or 
physical seizure of goods or the materials or implements used to produce or 
distribute them. Finally, defendants and certain third parties can be ordered 
under this directive to provide information on the origin of the infringing 
goods or services and the distribution networks used, such as the name of 
the producers and distributors, the quantities produced or the prices 
obtained.136
The Competition Damages Directive’s disclosure regime has been 
inspired on the one found in the IPR Enforcement Directive.137 It is therefore 
comparable in several respects. The Competition Damages Directive estab-
lishes the main rule that national courts must be able to order the defendant 
or a third party to disclose evidence.138 This is to be done upon request by 
either the applicant or the defendant. There are specific limitations concern-
ing the disclosure of evidence included in the file of a competition authority, 
as well as corresponding restrictions on the use of that evidence.139 This 
directive also addresses the issue of preserving evidence.140 But it does so in 
a different manner than the IPR Enforcement Directive. Rather than relying 
on court orders to ensure preservation, it foresees penalties to be imposed 
inter alia in cases where a party destroys relevant evidence.
133 See further subsections 4.2.1 and 6.2.3 above. Cf. also Art. 3(6) International Bar Associa-
tion (‘IBA’), Rules in the taking of evidence in international commercial arbitration, 1 
June 1999, available via http://www.int-bar.org.
134 Art. 6 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
135 Art. 7(1) Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
136 Art. 8 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
137 Cf. Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165, p. 5; Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, 
COM(2013) 404, p. 14.
138 Art. 5 Competition Damages Directive.
139 Art. 6 and 7 Competition Damages Directive.
140 Art. 8 Competition Damages Directive.
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The above two directives are exceptional. The Procurement Remedies 
Directives, the Consumer Injunctions Directive, the Unfair Terms Directive 
and the Product Liability Directive all do not contain provisions that are 
even remotely similar. Neither does any other act of secondary EU law 
appear to provide for measures on the disclosure of evidence inter partes that 
are comparable to the regimes on this subject-matter set out in the two 
abovementioned directives.
315. That raises the question why the two abovementioned fields of EU 
law have been singled out for particular EU legislative action on this point, 
whereas the other aforementioned directives remain entirely silent on this 
point. This question comes all the more to the fore in light of the generally 
rather positive assessment by stakeholders of the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive’s regime on the disclosure of evidence, which suggests that it might 
also be helpful for the purposes of private enforcement in other fields.141 
The answer is, in a nutshell, that access to evidence is generally deemed 
to be of particular importance in private enforcement proceedings relat-
ing to infringements of EU law on intellectual property and competition, 
more so than in relation to other infringements of substantive EU law. With 
respect to this first field of law, the EU legislature has called this importance 
“paramount”.142 In this connection reference is often made to the fact that the 
evidence and information that is crucial to a private party wishing to initiate 
private enforcement proceedings for an infringement of its rights, is typical-
ly only in the possession of the infringer. Intellectual property right infringe-
ments are moreover regularly committed on a commercial scale, involving 
organised crime.143 Therefore, unless the (potential) applicant is given access 
in one way or another, he may well experience very considerable difficul-
ties when trying to take legal action pursuant to an alleged infringement. In 
some cases these difficulties may be such, that the private party concerned 
is practically barred from doing so. Largely similar arguments have been 
made in connection to competition law infringements. Here the EU legis-
lature considers that evidence is an “important element” for bringing actions 
for damages, in particular in light of the complexity and facts-intensity of 
competition cases, whereas such litigation is “characterised by an information 
asymmetry”, meaning that relevant evidence and information is often only in 
the possession of the infringer or a third party.144 Also in this case infringe-
ments can be committed in a secretive and professional manner.145
141 See para. 123 above.
142 Recital 20 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 119 above.
143 See para. 109 above.
144 Recitals 13 and 14 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 233 above.
145 See para. 205 above.
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Is this reasoning convincing, in the sense that it sets these two fields of 
law apart from other infringements of EU law? An obvious objection is that 
many (potential) private party-applicants tend to be confronted with the 
abovementioned evidence-related difficulties, regardless of the subject-mat-
ter of the case.146 It may for example be equally important and equally diffi-
cult for a private party that suspects that a contract has been directly award-
ed to a competitor in violation of the EU public procurement rules to obtain 
the evidence and information necessary to substantiate its claim. However 
contracting authorities will normally be under an obligation to act in a trans-
parent manner and to provide reasons for their decisions.147 Moreover a pri-
vate party that wishes to bring a claim under, say, the Unfair Terms Directive 
or the Product Liability Directive may – at least as compared to the afore-
mentioned infringements in competition or intellectual property cases –
often indeed be less dependent on the infringer. The content of a term in a 
consumer contract is plain for all parties concerned to see. The assessment 
of whether that term is unfair may not always be easy, but it does not typi-
cally depend on evidence or information that is solely in the possession of 
the alleged infringer or a third party. Similarly, while it may be far from easy 
to determine and demonstrate the defectiveness of a product (and the dam-
age caused as a consequence of that defect), there is no reason to believe that 
this cannot be done without involving the alleged infringer or a third party. 
Infringements of these latter rules are probably also to a lesser extent typi-
cally committed in a professional and concealed manner.
Although the above reasoning involves a high degree of generalisa-
tion, 148 it would appear that, all in all, there are therefore grounds for distin-
guishing intellectual property and competition law from the other fields of 
EU law mentioned above. Whether or not these differences are such that EU 
interference and the ‘fragmenting’ effect on national procedural law that 
will almost inevitably be the consequence of these sector-specific regimes 
146 Cf. Bruns (2011), p. 130. See e.g. also Grassie (2014), p. 682, where the absence of any rules 
in this regard in Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, COM(2013) 813, is 
seen as a notable missing element.
147 Cf. Art. 2 Public Sector Procurement Directive 2004/18 and Art. 10 Utilities Procurement 
Directive 2004/17. Cf. e.g. also CoJ case C-406/08, Uniplex, para. 30-32.
148 There seems e.g. no reason to presume that all (or even most) infringements of intellectu-
al property or competition law are committed in a secretive and professional manner. 
Also, in many instances the applicants may in fact well have certain relevant pieces of 
evidence either in their possession or can have access thereto. That particularly applies as 
regards ‘follow-on’ competition actions, where the private enforcement action is brought 
pursuant to a fi nding of an infringement by a public enforcement authority and where 
the applicant can thus benefi t, at least to some extent, from the efforts made by the com-
petent public enforcement authorities (if not through obtaining access to their fi le, than at 
least through these authorities’ decisions fi nding an infringement of the substantive rules 
at issue).
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are to be taken for granted remains a matter for (political) debate.149 Further, 
where no such EU legislative measures on the disclosure of evidence and 
information apply, these issues remain regulated primarily by ‘ordinary’ 
national law. The latter may or may not provide for similar measures.150 Yet 
it is not to be forgotten that also in these cases EU law requirements can play 
a significant role. Most notably under the principle of effectiveness a nation-
al court may be required to order certain measures of inquiry foreseen by 
national law, including imposing an obligation on the defendant or a third 
party to produce a particular document.151
316. Generally speaking, the importance for a private party that claims to 
be affected by an infringement of EU law to be able to obtain access to all 
relevant evidence and information is thus rather clear. But there is also 
another side to this matter, which relates to the resulting burden as well as 
the risk of abuse associated with rules on the disclosure of evidence of the 
type discussed above. That is to say, any such disclosure obligations almost 
inevitably constitute a burden on the parties which are subject to them, 
while overly generous disclosure rules can also lead to abuses. The parties 
subject to the disclosure order may well have a legitimate interest in keeping 
certain information to themselves, or at least in preventing the opposing 
party in private enforcement proceedings from being granted access thereto. 
That applies especially where the parties involved in the dispute are com-
petitors. Giving insight in an undertaking’s internal production process, dis-
tribution channels, pricing policy or other commercially sensitive informa-
tion can obviously be problematic. More generally, there can be a risk of 
so-called ‘fishing expeditions’, i.e. a strategy to elicit in an unfocused man-
ner, through very broad discovery requests, information from another party 
in the hope that some relevant evidence might be found. Concerns of this 
kind were raised particularly in relation to the Competition Damages Direc-
tive.152 Yet they may well apply more generally.153 Indeed, also in relation to 
the IPR Enforcement Directive’s regime the risk of abuse has been noted.154 
149 Doubts on these points were expressed e.g. in the context of the consultations relating to 
a possible initiative in the fi eld of EU competition law, referred to in para. 219 above. On 
issues of coherence and fragmentation at national level more generally, see further sub-
section 10.4.2 below.
150 According to Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of 
the EU antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 19, national rules regarding access to evidence 
are “the primary example of divergence”. See also European Parliament, Study on collective 
redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 29.
151 E.g. CoJ case C-526/04, Laboratoires Boiron, para. 55. See further para. 38 above.
152 See e.g. Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 23-24.
153 See e.g. CoJ case C-450/06, Varec, in relation to EU public procurement law.
154 Commission, Responses to the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, July 2011, 
p. 19. See further para. 123 above.
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Here especially the difficulties connected to involving third parties have 
become visible.155
The IPR Enforcement Directive and the Competition Damages Directive 
both seek to address these concerns by establishing a balance between the 
various interests at stake. They do so in various manners. A first – and fun-
damental – safeguard comes in the form of judicial oversight. An order by 
the national court seised is required before any evidence or information is to 
be disclosed. These courts are thus expected to exercise strict control,156 in 
line with the legal traditions of most Member States.157 Second, under both 
directives it is for the party seeking such an order to first present reasonably 
available evidence supporting its claim (‘fact pleading’).158 In other words, 
the court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable case before ordering 
disclosure. Third, both regimes require confidential information (and, in 
competition cases, also information covered by legal professional privileges) 
to be protected.159 Fourth, in light of the aforementioned concerns, espe-
cially the Competition Damages Directive limits the disclosure orders to 
either specified pieces of evidence or categories of evidence circumscribed 
as precisely and as narrowly as possible and requires the court seised to 
make a proportionality assessment, inter alia in light of the scope and costs 
of disclosure, especially for third parties, also so as to prevent non-specific 
searches.160 Although more implicitly, similar requirements would appear to 
apply under the IPR Enforcement Directive.161 Finally, the Competition 
Damages Directive requires that the parties subject to the possible disclosure 
order are given an opportunity to be heard.162 This latter safeguard is how-
ever not foreseen in the IPR Enforcement Directive. Quite to the contrary, in 
the sense that, where measures relating to the preservation of evidence are 
concerned, this latter directive expressly provides that such measures can in 
some situations be ordered without the other party have been heard.163
155 See para. 124 above.
156 Recital 15 Competition Damages Directive.
157 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 14. 
See also Bruns (2011), p. 129.
158 See Art. 6(1) and 7(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48; Art. 5(1) Competition Damages 
Directive. Art. 8(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48 requires a ‘justifi ed request’.
159 Art. 6(1) and (2), 7(1) and  8(3)(e) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48; Art. 5(5) and (6) 
Competition Damages Directive. See also Art. 5(3)(c) and Art. 8(1)(c) Competition Dam-
ages Directive.
160 Art. 5(3) Competition Damages Directive.
161 Art. 6(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48 refers more generally to “specifi ed evidence “, 
while its Art. 8 refers to “a justifi ed and proportionate request”. See also the ‘general rules’ 
laid down in Art. 3(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, discussed in para. 157 above 
and subsection 9.2.5 below, which requires, among other things, proportionality and 
safeguards against abuses when applying the measures set out in this directive.
162 Art. 5(7) Competition Damages Directive.
163 Art. 7(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/18. See further para. 121 above.
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317. In summary, both the IPR Enforcement Directive and the Competition 
Damages Directive provide for a rather elaborate regime on the disclosure of 
evidence and information. None of the other legal acts assessed contain pro-
visions that are even remotely similar. Having adequate access to relevant 
evidence and information is obviously of importance to any private party 
that may wish to initiate private enforcement proceedings for an (alleged) 
infringement of EU law, regardless of its subject-matter. However there is a 
case to be made that the difficulties that these parties encounter in this 
regard tend to be more serious where (alleged) infringements of intellectual 
property law and competition law are at stake, given that in those cases the 
relevant evidence and information is typically in the sole possession of the 
infringer and/or of certain third parties and the infringements may well be 
committed in a concealed and professional manner. Whether or not these 
arguments are seen as sufficient to justify the establishment of specific EU 
legislative measures in these two fields (and possibly other fields with com-
parable characteristics) but not in others depends mainly on the importance 
that one attaches to retaining a coherent and uniform set of rules on disclo-
sure at national level. Rules on disclosure of the type provided for in the IPR 
Enforcement Directive and the Competition Damages Directive can further 
raise concerns about disproportionate burdens and possible abuses. It 
would appear however that on the whole both directives provide for ade-
quate safeguards in this respect. These safeguards include judicial oversight, 
fact-pleading, the protection of confidential information and a requirement 
to specify and limit the orders as much as possible.
8.2.3. Recurring penalty payments
318. Regardless of what the competent court decides in a private enforce-
ment case (or in any other case, for that matter), this decision will only have 
effect in practice where it is effectively complied with. An instrument to ensure 
compliance with such decisions is a penalty payment, typically imposed on a 
recurring basis, for instance per day that the non-compliance continues. Once 
this remedy has been imposed, a certain amount will be due if and when 
the party to the proceedings concerned does not comply with the judgment 
rendered within a set time period. Unlike damages awards, it seeks to ensure 
the (timely) compliance with the judgment in question; it therefore does not 
aim to compensate any loss or damage caused by the infringement itself. 
That is illustrated by the fact that if the party subject to this measure com-
plies with the judgment in a correct and timely manner, no payment will be 
due. As the Court of Justice has held, the aim is to place the defendant under 
“economic pressure which induces it to put an end to the breach established”.164
164 CoJ case C-177/04, Commission v. France, para. 91. This statement was made in relation to 
Article 260(2) TFEU, pursuant to which a (recurring) penalty payment can be imposed on 
a Member State where the latter has not taken the necessary measures to comply an ear-
lier fi nding of an infringement by the CoJ. For another example of recurring penalty pay-
ments in a public enforcement context, see Art. 5 and 24 Competition Regulation 1/2003.
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319. As regards the EU legislation considered in part B of this study, provi-
sion is made for this remedy in two legal acts. The most detailed arrange-
ment has been laid down in the Consumer Injunctions Directive. One of the 
remedies to be made available pursuant to that directive is “an order against 
the losing defendant for payments into the public purse or to any beneficiary desig-
nated in or under national legislation, in the event of failure to comply with the 
decision within a time limit specified by the courts or the administrative authorities, 
of a fixed amount for each day’s delay or any other amount provided for in national 
legislation, with a view to ensuring compliance with the decisions”.165 In addition 
the IPR Enforcement Directive also refers to recurring penalty payments on 
two particular points, namely in relation to interlocutory and ‘permanent’ 
injunctions.166 In the latter case it is specified that this is to be done “with a 
view to ensuring compliance”.
Whereas the other directives under consideration in this study do not 
make provision for this remedy, the Procurement Remedies Directives illus-
trate that the same subject-matter can also be addressed in a different man-
ner. These latter directives require, more generally, that the Member States 
ensure that the decisions taken by the courts and other review bodies can be 
effective enforced.167 Similar provisions can be found elsewhere in EU 
law.168 On a similar note the Commission’s Collective Redress Recommen-
dation refers to penalty payments as one of several types of possible sanc-
tions against the losing defendant that serve to ensure compliance with the 
court order in question.169
320. For the present purposes three further comments can be made in rela-
tion to recurring penalty payments. First, this remedy is ancillary in nature, 
in that it is not a proper self-standing measure. As was set out above, it serves 
to ensure that the court’s decision, as requested by the applicant, is com-
plied with. Accordingly no penalty payment can be imposed if the applicant 
did not also bring another, self-standing claim that was upheld by the court 
seised. More specifically, the aforementioned provisions of the Consumer 
Injunctions Directive and the IPR Enforcement Directive make clear that 
these payments are typically ancillary to actions for injunctions. As was the 
case with interim measures, discussed earlier,170 they are not connected to 
actions for damages. Once again that also explains why neither the Product 
165 Art. 2(1)(c) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further para. 156 above.
166 Art. 9(1)(a) and 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 126 and 130 
above respectively. See also Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, 
COM(2013) 813, p. 25 (Art. 15).
167 Art. 2(8) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further para. 99 above.
168 See e.g. Art. 102 Community Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009. On this provision, see CoJ 
case C-235/09, DHL Express, para. 59. See e.g. also Commission, Proposal for a regulation 
on the protection of individuals with regards to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, COM(2012) 11, p. 90 (Art. 74(5)).
169 Point 20 Collective Redress Recommendation. See further para. 190 above.
170 See para. 312 above.
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Liability Directive nor the Competition Damages Directive makes any men-
tion of recurring penalty payments, given that these two directives focus 
exclusively on actions for damages in as far as substantive remedies are con-
cerned.
Second, the legislative history of especially the Consumer Injunctions 
Directive suggests that EU involvement with this remedy can be a rather 
sensitive affair.171 Most notably, at the insistence of the Member States, the 
abovementioned reference to penalty payments laid down in that directive 
is preceded by the phrase “in so far as the legal system of the Member State con-
cerned so permits”. This remedy therefore must only be provided for under 
this directive to the extent that the domestic law of the Member State in 
question allows this. Largely comparably the IPR Enforcement Directive 
stipulates in this respect that recurring penalty payments must be available 
“where appropriate” and “where provided for under national law”.172 The use of 
phrases of this kind makes the provisions in question in effect rather non-
committal, which in turn can mean that their effects in practice can be uncer-
tain and difficulties with respect to the enforcement of court rulings under 
the legal acts can remain.173
Third, and related to the previous point, is the fact that recurring penalty 
payments are viewed very differently in the various national jurisdictions 
across the EU.174 A clear majority of Member States provides for this remedy 
in one form or another. But English domestic law for instance does not pro-
vide for a remedy of this type (although the rules of ‘contempt of court’ can 
to some extent fulfil a comparable function). Both French and German law 
do, but there are significant differences between these two legal systems. In 
particular, under German law a (recurring) penalty payment is due to the 
State, whereas in France it is normally to be paid to the private party-appli-
cant. Most other jurisdictions in the EU largely follow one of these three 
basic models. It appears that where the EU legislation at issue touches upon 
recurring penalty payments, it has been drafted in such a manner that all 
three models can be retained. As explained above, there is mostly no require-
ment to introduce this remedy where domestic law does not already provide 
for it. The Consumer Injunctions Directive refers in addition to “payments 
into the public purse or to any beneficiary designated in or under national legisla-
tion”. It follows that neither the German nor the French approach is pre-
cluded under this directive. Without addressing this matter expressly, the 
IPR Enforcement Directive also leaves it open to whom the penalty pay-
ments are to be made where they are due.
171 See para. 156 above.
172 Note that this latter phrase has been included in Art. 11, but not in Art. 9(1)(a) IPR 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
173 Cf. Study University of Leuven (2007), pp. 341; Commission, Second report on Consumer 
Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 635, pp. 13-14.
174 See further Jongbloet (2003), pp. 198-242; Study University of Bielefeld (2008), pp. 611 
and 622-624; Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 13.
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321. In summary, where there are concerns as to the compliance by losing 
parties with judgments issued in private enforcement cases, notably those 
whereby injunctive relief is granted, the inclusion of EU legislative provi-
sions on recurring penalty payments can offer a solution. At present, the 
Consumer Injunctions Directive sets out this remedy with a considerable 
degree of detail, whereas it is also mentioned in some provisions of the IPR 
Enforcement Directive. However at national level there are diverging under-
standings of what this remedy entails. Some national jurisdictions are even 
unfamiliar with the very concept of recurring penalty payments. Combined 
with an apparent reluctance on the side of the Member States to deviate 
from these different domestic legal traditions, this seems to significantly 
reduce this remedy’s potential as an instrument to ensure compliance in 
situations where this is deemed necessary. Indeed, the relevant provisions of 
the two abovementioned directives are in effect largely dependent on 
national law, both as to whether penalty payments can be imposed in the 
first place and as to what this entails precisely.
8.2.4. Publicity measures
322. The term ‘publicity measures’ refers for the present purposes to the 
possibility for the court competent to rule on a private enforcement action to 
order the publication of either its decision in the case before it or of other rel-
evant texts giving publicity to the infringement that was established. While 
no such measures have been foreseen in either the Procurement Remedies 
Directives or the Competition Damages Directive, in the two other fields of 
EU discussed in this study provision has been made for this remedy as a 
matter of EU law.
This remedy features most prominently in the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive. This directive requires the Member States to ensure that the competent 
national courts can order “appropriate measures for the dissemination of infor-
mation concerning the decision, including displaying the decision and publishing 
it in full or in part”.175 These measures are to be imposed at the request of 
the applicant and implemented at the expense of the party found to have 
infringed the intellectual property right at issue. On an optional basis
 Member States may also make provision under this directive for “additional 
publicity measures which are appropriate to the particular circumstances, includ-
ing prominent advertising”. A largely similar regime has been included in 
the Commission’s proposal for a trade secrets directive.176 The Consumer 
Injunction Directive contains a similar remedy, which is to be ordered “where 
appropriate”.177 Apart from the publication of the decision itself, this directive 
also refers to the possibility of “the publication of a corrective statement with a 
view to eliminating the continuing effects of the infringement” being ordered. 
175 Art. 15 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
176 Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, COM(2013) 813, p. 24 (Art. 14).
177 Art. 2(1)(b) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
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Comparable – optional – arrangements can be found in other consumer pro-
tection directives, such as the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.178
323. The recitals of the IPR Enforcement Directive explain that the purpose 
of these publicity measures is to act as a “supplementary deterrent” and to 
“contribute to the awareness of the public at large”.179 This makes two things 
clear. In the first place, this remedy is essentially meant to fulfil only a sup-
plementary function. Although such publication can be of relevance, a private 
party will not initiate private enforcement proceedings merely to have a 
judgment published. The object of the legal proceedings will typically be a 
substantive claim of some sort, whether it is for compensation in damages, 
injunctive relief or at least a declaration by the court seised that an infringe-
ment occurred.180
In the second place, this remedy serves a dual purpose of informing and 
deterring. It can accordingly be expected to be normally most effective where 
the general public is directly affected by the infringements at issue and/or 
where the infringing party is sensitive to the harm to its reputation that may 
result from the publication. This explains its inclusion in the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive and in the aforementioned consumer protection directives, 
as in these two fields these two conditions will often be met. Likewise, nei-
ther is it entirely surprising that no such remedy has been laid down in the 
Procurement Remedies Directives. In public procurement cases infringe-
ments can certainly affect the public at large, but this occurs mostly only in 
an indirect manner. Moreover the (semi-)public bodies that are subject to 
these rules are on the whole probably not sensitive to negative publicity in 
the same manner as commercial, consumer-oriented undertakings may be. 
This logic also suggests that at least in some cases publicity measures could 
be a relevant remedy in relation to infringements of EU competition law.181 
This remedy has so far not been part of the Commission’s private enforce-
ment agenda in this field however. It therefore does not feature in the Com-
petition Damages Directive.
324. To the foregoing one should add that this remedy tends to play only a 
rather modest role in practice. It generally receives little attention in relation to 
the IPR Enforcement Directive.182 In respect of the Consumer Injunctions 
Directive it appears not be used very frequently.183 This may be due in part 
to the generally rather vague and non-committal wording of the abovemen-
178 Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29. See e.g. also Art. 5(4) Mislead-
ing Advertising Directive 2006/114.
179 Recital 12 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
180 On declaratory relief, see also subsection 8.2.6 below.
181 On the possible relevance of reputational effects in a competition law context, cf. Study 
CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), pp. 152-153.
182 See para. 139 above.
183 Study University of Leuven (2007), pp. 341-342.
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tioned provisions. The use of terms such as ‘appropriate’ measures, ‘includ-
ing’, ‘where appropriate’ and of optional provisions means that much is left 
to be determined by the Member States and their courts.184 The situation 
might have been different had the possibility for a court to order ‘prominent 
advertising’ or the publication of a ‘corrective statement’ been required as a 
matter of EU law, rather than leaving this to the Member States on an 
optional basis. Having said that, it seems fair to acknowledge that there are 
on the whole few indications that publicity measures can make more than a 
modest contribution to the private enforcement of EU law. Crucially the 
interest in this remedy from the side of the private parties concerned seems 
mostly limited.185 This may well be connected to its aforementioned dual 
purpose of informing and deterring, which may generally be only of limited 
interest to a private party that is being confronted with an infringement of 
EU law. Arguably, especially in light of this purpose, it is more suitable as a 
public enforcement instrument.186
325. In summary, EU law provisions on publicity measures can be found in 
the field of intellectual property law (IPR Enforcement Directive) and con-
sumer protection (Consumer Injunctions Directive, Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive). This remedy, which mostly fulfils a supplementary 
function, is meant to serve the dual purpose of informing the public about 
infringements and deterring infringers. It will therefore normally be most 
effective in situations where the general public is directly affected by the 
infringements in question and/or where the infringing parties are sensitive 
to the reputational damage that may result from such publications. That 
suggests that there may also be some scope to use this remedy in other 
fields, such as competition law, whereas it may be less suitable for instance 
in public procurement cases. That said, probably partly as a consequence of 
the non-committal manner in which this remedy tends to be set out in the 
aforementioned EU legislation at hand, its practical significance is generally 
rather modest. All in all it appears that publicity measures can play a rele-
vant, largely supplementary role in certain specific cases, but it is unlikely to 
be of major importance across the board for the private enforcement of EU 
law.
184 For an application by the EU courts, see GC case T-19/07, Systran, para. 331 (annulled for 
reasons that are not of relevance here in CoJ case C-103/11 P, Systran). Here the GC held 
that the issuing of a press release by the GS itself should suffi ce in response to the appli-
cant’s request for an order to have the judgment published, at the defendant’s expense, in 
specialist journals and reviews and on specialist websites.
185 See however Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, 
COM(2012) 635, p. 15.
186 Cf. e.g. Art. 30 Competition Regulation 1/2003.
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8.2.5. Measures on legal costs
326. Stakeholders, practitioners, legal scholars and the Commission have 
all regularly noted that high legal costs can be an important obstacle in practice 
for the application of the EU legislative measures discussed in this study. 
These costs generally entail especially lawyer’s fees, but they can also arise 
in the form of court fees or deposits and costs for involving experts. High 
legal costs have been observed to be a significant discouraging factor for 
initiating legal proceedings under the Procurement Remedies Directives, the 
IPR Enforcement Directive and the Product Liability Directive.187 Indeed, in 
relation to the enforcement of intellectual property rights this has been 
called a “key deterring factor” for initiating legal proceedings, particularly for 
small and medium-sized enterprises.188 Similar observations have been 
made in connection to the Consumer Injunctions Directive189 and EU com-
petition law,190 as well as more generally the private enforcement of con-
sumer protection law191 and civil litigation.192 Financial considerations have 
also been identified as an important element in the discussions on collective 
redress.193 The EU courts, from their side, have also regularly acknowledged 
the importance of legal costs in relation to the private enforcement of EU 
law. A good example is the aforementioned Océano Grupo case law issued 
under the Unfair Terms Directive, where the Court of Justice noted that (rel-
atively) high legal costs can deter consumers from raising themselves the 
unfairness of a term in a consumer contract.194 The EU courts have at times 
also taken account of this element in their assessments of rules of national 
law under the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial 
protection.195 In certain cases this latter principle can also require the provi-
sion of legal aid to the parties to the proceedings.196
187 See para. 86 and 87 (concerning Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13), 
127 and 138 (concerning IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48) and 184 (concerning Prod-
uct Liability Directive 85/374) above respectively.
188 Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, July 2013, p. 9.
189 Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 11. See further para. 159 above.
190 E.g. Study Ashurst (2004), pp. 8-9 and 92-96; Vrcek (2010), p. 292; Danov & Becker (2013), 
p. 77.
191 E.g. Loos (2011), p. 491. See also para. 152 above.
192 E.g. Tulibacka (2009), p. 1533; Hodges, Vogenauer & Tulibacka (2010), p. 7
193 E.g. Civil Consulting (2008b), p. 4. See further para. 187 and 188 above.
194 CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and C-244/98, Océano Grupo, para. 26, where reference is made 
specifi cally to lawyers’ fees. Later rulings in this connection refer more generally to the 
costs of legal proceedings. See e.g. CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 54. 
See further para. 167 and 168 above.
195 E.g. CoJ case C-78/98, Preston, para. 60; CoJ case C-63/01, Evans, para. 53-55 and 76-78; 
CoJ case C-268/06, Impact, para. 51; CST Order case F-55/08 DEP, De Nicola, para. 36. On 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness generally, see section 2.2 above. On the 
principle of effective judicial protection generally, see section 2.3 above.
196 CoJ case C-279/09, DEB, para. 36.
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Such concerns related to high legal costs emerge most notably 
– although certainly not exclusively – in relation to the EU law provisions 
seeking to facilitate the bringing of actions for damages. This is obviously the 
case where the Product Liability Directive and the initiative leading to the 
Competition Damages Directive are concerned, given that both directives 
concentrate on this remedy. But also with respect to the EU legal acts that 
provide for several (substantive) remedies, such as the Procurement Rem-
edies Directives and the IPR Enforcement Directive, have the abovemen-
tioned concerns mostly – although not exclusively – been raised in relation 
to their provisions on actions for damages. Indeed, high legal costs were 
amongst the reasons why in the context of the 2007 revision of the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives the Commission decided not to focus on (further) 
facilitating damages claims for breaches of the EU public procurement rules, 
but rather to concentrate on other remedies instead.197 The underlying rea-
son is that the bringing of actions for damage tends to lead to rather com-
plex and lengthy proceedings. This often translates into high legal costs. 
Another regularly heard complaint is that, even when damages are award-
ed, the sums in question tend to be (relatively) modest. When a substantial 
part of those sums is needed to cover lawyers’ bills and other legal expenses, 
this can of course significantly reduce the attractiveness of this remedy.
327. Although the situation can differ considerable between the Member 
States,198 there can therefore be little doubt that, generally speaking, legal 
costs can be a significant obstacle for the private enforcement of EU law. One 
would thus expect this issue to be addressed, at least to some extent, in the 
EU legislation under consideration in this study. But this is generally not the 
case. The legislation at issue is mostly silent on the issue of legal costs.
There is only one notable exception however. For the IPR Enforcement 
Directive addresses this issue in a general as well as in a specific manner. It 
stipulates that, generally, the measures, procedures and remedies to ensure 
the enforcement of the intellectual rights covered by this directive may not 
be “unnecessarily complicated or costly”.199 More specifically, this directive also 
requires Member States to ensure that “reasonable and proportionate legal costs 
and other expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a general rule, be borne 
by the unsuccessful party, unless equity does not allow this”.200 The Court of Jus-
tice has clarified that this implies that the infringer “must generally bear all the 
financial consequences of his conduct”.201
197 See para. 87 above.
198 Cf. e.g. Opinion AG Kokott case C-260/11, Edwards, para. 21. See further Hodges, Voge-
nauer & Tulibacka (2010).
199 Art. 3(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. On this ‘general rule’, see further para. 144 
above and subsection 9.2.5 below.
200 Art. 14 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 138 above.
201 CoJ case C-406/09, Realchemie, para. 49.
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Yet, notable as it may be, it cannot be said that this directive’s regime on 
legal costs is an unqualified success.202 The continuing complaints by stake-
holders about high legal costs in intellectual property cases suggest that it 
has not been very effective in addressing the aforementioned concerns. In all 
likelihood this is related to broad manner in which this EU law provision 
has been formulated. The term ‘reasonable and proportionate legal costs 
and other expenses’ obviously provides only limited clarity about the sorts 
and the level of the costs to be compensated. The provision in question is 
also (merely) a ‘general rule’ and it expressly allows for deviations for rea-
sons of equity. Indeed, this formulation is so broad that, although there are 
certain exceptions and it remains in the end for the Court of Justice to estab-
lish whether or not this view is correct, most Member States did not con-
sider it necessary to amend their pre-existing rules of national law in order 
to comply with it. It is therefore hardly surprising that its effects in practice 
have mostly been limited. This broad formulation is largely a consequence 
of the objections raised during the legislative process by certain Member 
States as well as the European Parliament against too far-going EU involve-
ment with rules on legal costs.
328. It can further be noted that comparable discussions took place in other 
fields than intellectual property law, especially in relation to what was to 
become the Competition Damages Directive. Initially the Commission 
raised the option of providing for a rule that would limit the legal costs to be 
paid by the unsuccessful applicant (‘one-way fee-shifting’).203 This sugges-
tion received considerable criticism however.204 The Commission subse-
quently decided to exclude this issue entirely from its legislative initiative. 
Instead its 2008 white paper merely ‘encouraged’ the Member States to 
amend their domestic rules where necessary.205 In line with the Commis-
sion’s proposal the eventual Competition Damages Directive therefore does 
not contain any rules on legal costs. The Commission’s proposal in 2005 to 
include a (conditional) form of one-way fee-shifting in the Small Claims 
Regulation was similarly rejected by the EU legislature.206 And while the 
202 See para. 138 above.
203 Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, p. 9. Under the rule proposed there an unsuccessful applicant would 
only have to pay legal costs where he acted in a manifestly unreasonable manner by 
bringing the case. Mentioned is also the option of granting the national court the discre-
tionary power to order at the beginning of the proceedings that the applicant will not be 
exposed to any costs recovery in case the action proves unsuccessful.
204 Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 74. Cf. Study CEPS, Erasmus Universi-
ty Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), pp. 181-183.
205 Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165, pp. 9-10. See also Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the 
white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 75.
206 Commission, Proposal for Small Claims Regulation 861/2007, COM(2005) 87, p. 16 (Art. 
14(2)). See further Loos (2011), p. 507.
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rules on civil redress set out in the Commission’s 2013 proposal for a trade 
secrets directive are mostly comparable to those of the IPR Enforcement 
Directive, rules on legal costs are notably absent from this proposal.207
The Collective Redress Recommendation, which is concerned with 
infringements of EU law more generally, does address the issue of legal 
costs.208 It recommends that Member States ensure, first, that the party that 
loses a collective redress action reimburses necessary legal costs borne by 
the winning party and, second, that contingency fees are not permitted.209 
However this recommendation is only that; a recommendation by the Com-
mission. As such it is not an act of the EU legislature and it is not legally 
binding.210 And even apart from that also in this case the wording used is in 
fact rather broad and flexible. Most notably the first recommendation men-
tioned above applies “subject to the conditions provided for in the relevant 
national law”, while with respect to the latter recommendation it is said 
expressly that exceptions are permitted.
329. Therefore, while the importance of legal costs-related issues for the 
private enforcement of EU law is not in doubt, these issues are paradoxically 
hardly addressed in a meaningful manner in EU legislation relating to private 
enforcement proceedings. Only the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, provides another scarce 
example of EU legislative action on this point.211 Overlooking the foregoing, 
it appears that two factors play an important role in explaining this state of 
affairs.
A first factor is that on the side of the EU legislature (not only the Coun-
cil, but also the European Parliament) there appears to be a general feeling 
that these matters are best left to be regulated at national level.212 In this con-
207 Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, COM(2013) 813.
208 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. On this recommendation, see further 
para. 190 above
209 Points 13 and 30 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. Under a system based 
on ‘contingency fees’ (or other forms of ‘success fees’) lawyers’ fees are charged not inde-
pendently from the outcome of the proceedings, but e.g. as a percentage of the damages 
award if the action in question proves to be successful.
210 See para. 191 above.
211 Art. 11(4) Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92. Here it is stated that the 
review procedures provided for in that directive shall be “not prohibitively expensive”. The 
CoJ has held that this implies that “the costs of proceedings must neither exceed the fi nancial 
resources of the person concerned nor appear, in any event, to be objectively unreasonable”. In this 
respect an objective analysis is required, whereby account may be taken of a range of cir-
cumstances (situation of the persons concerned; prospect of success; importance of what 
is at stake; complexity of the relevant law and procedure; potentially frivolous nature of 
the claim; existence of a legal aid scheme or a costs protection regime). See CoJ case 
C-260/11, Edwards, para. 40-48. See also CoJ case C-427/07, Commission v. Ireland, 
para. 92-94; CoJ case C-530/11, Commission v. UK, para. 33-72. For another form of EU 
legislative involvement with issues of legal costs, see Legal Aid Directive 2003/8.
212 In a similar sense, see e.g. Arrowsmith (2005), pp. 1436-1437.
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nection reference is regularly made to the principle of subsidiarity.213 The 
aforementioned objections raised during the legislative process relating to 
the IPR Enforcement Directive’s provision on legal cost were largely moti-
vated on these grounds.214 In relation to the Commission’s competition law 
initiative several respondents objected to EU interference that would lead to 
sector-specific rules on legal costs that would differ from those applicable in 
other civil cases.215 As the European Parliament held with respect to a pos-
sible EU initiative on collective redress, “Member States are to determine their 
own rules on the allocation of costs”.216
A second factor is that the possibility of establishing EU rules on legal 
costs tends to be particularly sensitive where the contemplated rules are 
seen as capable of encouraging a ‘litigation culture’. This latter term refers, 
broadly speaking, to a situation whereby litigation between private parties 
takes place to a degree that is considered unreasonable and undesirable.217 
This especially plays a role where the contemplated EU rules would entail a 
deviation from the ‘loser pays’ principle. While the latter is certainly not 
absolute, it is widely accepted as the general point of departure for the allo-
cation of legal costs between the parties to a dispute.218 One of its key func-
tions is to establish a threshold for unmeritorious litigation.219 It does so 
mainly by creating a degree of financial risk for the (potential) applicant, 
which leads to a ‘case selection effect’.220 Thus the Commission held in 2008 
that a possible judicial collective redress procedure should “avoid elements 
213 On this principle, see also para. 389 below.
214 See para. 138 above.
215 See e.g. the responses to the 2005 green paper submitted by the German, UK and Dutch 
authorities in the context of the consultations referred to in para. 219 above.
216 European Parliament, Resolution on towards a coherent European approach to collective 
redress, P7_TA(2012)0021, para. 20. See also European Parliament, Resolution on the 
white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2009)0187, 
para. 20.
217 See further para. 460 below.
218 As regards the relevant rules established at EU level, see e.g. Art. 16 Small Claims Regula-
tion 861/2007; Art. 138 CoJ Rules of procedure, OJ 2012, L 265/1; Art. 85(1) Community 
Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009; Art. 70(1) Community Designs Regulation 6/2002. As 
regards the rules applicable at national level, see e.g. Commission, Staff working paper 
accompanying the white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
SEC(2008) 404, p. 17 (n. 26); Hodges, Vogenauer & Tulibacka (2010), p. 17; European Par-
liament, Study on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 31. See also UNIDROIT, 
Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (Art. 25), available via http://www.unidroit.
org/english/principles/civilprocedure/ali-unidroitprinciples-e.pdf.
219 Cf. e.g. Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective 
redress, SEC(2011) 173, p. 9.
220 Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), p. 222. Cf. e.g. also Andrews 
(2005), p. 181. On the relationship between this ‘loser pays’ principle and the degree of 
litigation and the costs related thereto, see further Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rot-
terdam & LUISS (2007), pp. 176-181. There it is explained in essence that, as compared to 
a situation where the parties bear their own costs, this principle can indeed reduce the 
likelihood of litigation, but that it can also discourage the bringing of meritorious suits 
and increase average total spending on legal costs by the parties.
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which are said to encourage a litigation culture […], such as […] contingency 
fees”.221 This view found wide support in the subsequent consultation.222 
Along similar lines the European Parliament noted in 2012 that “there can be 
no action without financial risk” and that under the Member States’ rules “the 
unsuccessful party must bear the costs of the other party in order to avoid the prolif-
eration of unmeritorious claims”.223 Indeed, it has been observed that devia-
tions from this ‘loser pays’ principle, notably in the form of contingency 
fees, tend to be met with strong cultural resistance.224 That is the case despite 
the fact that such arrangements can also have certain positive effects, espe-
cially in terms of improved access to court for private parties that are affect-
ed by infringements of the substantive rules at issue.225 It is for that reason 
that, despite such resistance, in several Member States (e.g. Sweden, Ger-
many) certain forms of contingency fees were introduced in recent years.226 
It is probably no coincidence that the aforementioned – adopted – provision 
of the IPR Enforcement Directive is largely consistent with this ‘loser pays’ 
principle, whereas the rule that the Commission – unsuccessfully – suggest-
ed for competition law infringements and for small claims entailed a devia-
tion from this principle. For similar reasons the Collective Redress Recom-
mendation not only expressly refers to this principle,227 it also states that 
“the lawyer’s remuneration and the method by which it is calculated [should] not 
create any incentive to litigation that is unnecessary from the point of view of the 
interest of any of the parties”,228 just as it limits the abovementioned recom-
mendation not to permit contingency fees to situations where this would 
risk creating an incentive to such unnecessary litigation.229
330. In summary, it is widely acknowledged that financial considerations 
generally and rules on legal costs specifically can be an important factor in 
relation to the private enforcement of EU law. That applies especially, 
although not exclusively, with respect to actions for damages. However the 
EU legislation under consideration addresses this subject-matter only to a 
very limited extent. Despite earlier suggestions, the Competition Damages 
Directive is silent on this point. The Collective Redress Recommendation 
221 Commission, Green paper on consumer collective redress, COM(2008) 794, p. 12.
222 Commission, Responses to the consultation and hearing on collective redress, October 
2011, p. 15.
223 European Parliament, Resolution on towards a coherent European approach to collective 
redress, P7_TA(2012)0021, para. 20.
224 Hodges, Vogenauer & Tulibacka (2010), p. 25.
225 See e.g. Opinion AG Poiares Maduro case C-94/04, Cipolla, para. 94. See also Leskinen 
(2011), p. 87. For a broader assessment, see Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
& LUISS (2007), pp. 201-205, where it is concluded that the legal and economic literature 
is split as to the impact of contingency fees on litigation expenditure, settlement rates and 
the quality of the lawsuits fi led.
226 Leskinen (2011), p. 89.
227 Point 19 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
228 Point 29 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
229 Point 30 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
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does address legal costs, but the recommendations in question are rather 
loosely formulated and this document is moreover not legally binding. Only 
the IPR Enforcement Directive contains a binding rule of EU law on the allo-
cation of legal costs between the parties. Yet this rule has been formulated so 
broadly that, at least to date, it has had at most only a limited effect in prac-
tice. All in all it appears that the prospect of EU legislative intervention in 
relation to issues of legal costs remains a sensitive matter. This can be 
ascribed, in the first place, to the fact that many consider that rules this is 
best left to national law for reasons of subsidiarity and the internal coher-
ence of the domestic legal systems. In the second place, views on this sub-
ject-matter tend to be shaped by an aversion of anything that could be seen 
as encouraging a ‘litigation culture’, in particular possible deviations from 
the ‘loser pays’ principle for the allocation of legal costs or the use of contin-
gency fees for the remuneration of lawyers.
8.2.6. ‘Unregulated’ remedies: declarations, unjust enrichment, restitution
331. At the end of this second and final chapter on the remedies provided 
for in the secondary EU law assessed in this study it is appropriate to note 
that the domestic laws of the Member States tend to provide for remedies 
other than the ones discussed above, which can nonetheless also be of rele-
vance for the purposes of the private enforcement of EU law. The answer to 
the question whether and to which extent such ‘unregulated’ remedies are 
foreseen evidently depends on the legal system of the each individual Mem-
ber State. Generally speaking, these remedies can include, to begin with, 
declaratory relief. In this case an applicant essentially simply requests the 
court to express itself on a particular legal question. This remedy is inter alia 
available in England and Wales, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands.230 In addi-
tion one could think of claims brought by private parties that are founded 
on the unjust enrichment of the (alleged) infringer of EU law and/or for the 
restitution of unduly paid sums. Actions of this kind can be available inter 
alia in Germany, the Czech Republic, England and Wales, the Netherlands 
and Spain.231 They typically involve the payment of certain monetary sums, 
but they can nonetheless be distinguished from the actions for damages dis-
cussed earlier. For they concentrate not on the harm caused on the side of 
the applicant, but on the gains made by the defendant. Whether or not the 
latter was at fault tends to be of lesser importance, if at all. German law also 
provides for a specific procedure for the ‘skimming-off’ of profits made as a 
result of certain infringements in actions brought by designated third parties 
(business or consumer associations), while the sums awarded flow to the 
public budget. This latter aspect probably explains why this procedure is 
230 Barone & Amore (2010), p. 347; Callol (2010), p. 385; Lunsingh Scheurleer et al. (2010), 
p. 370; Smith, Maton & Cambell (2010), p. 311.
231 Callol (2010), p. 374; Lunsingh Scheurleer et al. (2010), p. 389; Smith, Maton & Cambell 
(2010), p. 310; Bejek (2011), pp. 49-50; Peyer (2012), p. 334.
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reportedly little used.232 Whilst an in-depth assessment of these ‘unregulat-
ed’ remedies and their potential in private enforcement proceedings of vari-
ous kinds falls outside the scope of this study, it can still be of relevance to 
note the following three points.
332. In the first place, in certain cases there may well be grounds for includ-
ing the abovementioned remedies in EU private enforcement-related legisla-
tion of the type at issue in this study. As regards declaratory relief, there 
admittedly appears to be generally limited ‘demand’ for this remedy where 
the private enforcement of EU law is concerned. Nonetheless in certain cases 
a ‘mere’ declaration that there has been an infringement can conceivably still 
be of importance to the private parties concerned. That may be so not only 
for symbolic reasons, but for instance also as a basis for subsequently nego-
tiating a settlement between the parties to the dispute as to the further con-
sequences to be drawn from that finding. This can, either de jure or de facto, 
thus function as part of a ‘two-stage’ procedure, whereby the illegality of the 
behaviour and the liability of the infringer is first established and whereby 
thorny questions, such as the quantification of the damage,233 can then 
either be left to be settled out-of-court, or to be addressed at a second stage 
of the same legal proceedings or in separate proceedings.234 The use of 
declaratory relief in its negative form has also been reported in competition 
cases.235 In that case an undertaking requests the court to state that certain 
behaviour is not contrary to a particular rule of law and/or does not incur 
liability.
Concerning restitution, two broad categories can be distinguished for 
the present purposes.236 First, there is what could be called ‘pure’ restitution. 
Such an action can typically be brought as a ‘follow-up’ (or addition) to a 
successful contractual remedy of the type discussed above, for instance to 
recover sums paid under a contract that is automatically void within the 
meaning of Article 101(2) TFEU or a term in a consumer contract that has 
been deemed to be unfair and therefore not binding on the consumer in 
question.237 One could also think of actions brought by the customers of 
undertakings for the repayment of the ‘overcharges’ that resulted from those 
232 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 74-75. See also Micklitz (2011b), p. 115; Peyer (2012), p. 336.
233 See in particular subsection 7.1.4 above.
234 Cf. Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, p. 8; Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the green paper 
on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, p. 42. See also Com-
mission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 74 (concerning a proposed Austrian law).
235  Siragusa (2014), p. 248.
236 Cf. Van Gerven (2003b), pp. 63-64. See also Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000), pp. 770-
816 and 872.
237 On these contractual remedies, see in particular subsection 8.1.1 above.
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undertakings having participated in a cartel.238 Second, there is what is 
sometimes called ‘restitutionary damages’. Here the emphasis is not so 
much on the repayment of sums paid by the applicant, but rather on the 
gains made as a consequence of the infringements at issue. Actions of this 
kind may well be attractive private enforcement remedies, because it can 
sometimes be less problematic from a quantification point of view and/or 
because of the deterrent effects for the infringers concerned. Indeed, there is 
research suggesting that the chances of success of actions for restitution can 
be considerably higher than those of ‘classical’ damages claims that concen-
trate on the harm caused.239
333. In the second place, the above examples already illustrate that these 
‘unregulated’ remedies can be closely connected with the ones that are 
expressly provided for in the EU legislation under consideration in this 
study. Indeed, it may not always be easy to draw a dividing line between 
them. This seems inevitable in a situation where the rules on some remedies 
are (to some extent) harmonised at EU level, whereas other remedies remain 
entirely unregulated as a matter of secondary EU law. For example, declara-
tory relief can resemble the publicity measures discussed earlier.240 Or take 
the IPR Enforcement Directive. Its rules on actions for damages expressly 
stipulate that account can be taken of the ‘unfair profits’ of infringers when 
setting the amount of damages due and that the Member States may pro-
vide for a procedure for the recovery of profits made by the infringer.241 This 
thus seems to point to a restitutory element, even if this should still be seen 
in light of the overall emphasis that this directive places on the ‘classical’ 
compensatory function of damages awards.242 As was noted earlier, already 
at present there are discussions as to whether these rules could and should 
be extended so as to concentrate (even) more on the gains made by the 
infringer, rather than on the harm caused to the private parties concerned.243
The Competition Damages Directive provides another illustration of the 
questions that can arise in this connection. As its title (“Directive […] on cer-
tain rules governing actions for damages […]”) already makes clear, this direc-
tive concentrates on actions for damages.244 The scope of its regime on the 
disclosure – and on the non-disclosure – of certain evidence is expressly 
limited to these actions.245 Should this be taken to mean that leniency applica-
238  Cf. Hjelmeng (2013), p. 1011.
239  See Peyer (2012), p. 354. Here a 50% success rate for restitution claims relating to comple-
tion law infringements in Germany is reported, which is considerably higher than for the 
actions for damages assessed in that study.
240 See subsection 8.2.4 above.
241 Art. 13(1)(a) and (2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 135 above.
242 See the fi rst subparagraph of Art. 13(1) and recital 26 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
243 See para. 137 and 282 above.
244 For a defi nition of the term ‘actions for damages’, see Art. 4(4) Competition Damages 
Directive.
245 Art. 5(1) and 6(1) Competition Damages Directive. See further subsection 6.3.3 above.
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tions are not necessarily barred from being disclosed in a private enforce-
ment action in which restitution is claimed under national law, or are these 
proceedings covered by the directive as well? Judging by the wording of the 
above provisions, one would be inclined to answer this last question in the 
negative. But that seems difficult to reconcile with the objectives of this 
directive generally and this provision on the non-disclosure of these docu-
ments specifically.246 Similar questions can for instance arise in relation to 
the effects in legal proceedings for restitution of infringement decisions by 
national competition authorities and the directive’s provisions on limita-
tions periods.247
334. Lastly, the fact that the abovementioned remedies are not expressly 
provided for in the secondary EU law at issue in this study does not mean 
that EU law generally has no role to play in this respect. In particular, if pri-
vate parties have an EU law right to damages in situations where their rights 
vested in that law are infringed, why would there not be an EU law right to 
restitution? As discussed earlier, a ruling such as Muñoz might well be 
understood as pointing in that direction.248 That applies all the more so 
because there is already a considerable body of case law by the Court of 
Justice, pursuant to which the private parties concerned are entitled to the 
repayment of charges levied contrary to EU law by public authorities.249 The 
Court has seemed careful in distinguishing this right to restitution from the 
right to damages under the principle of Member State liability.250 This dis-
tinction has been criticized for being artificial and untenable,251 which con-
firms that it can be difficult to draw a dividing line between the remedies at 
issue here. In any case it seems a comparatively limited step to transpose 
this logic to ‘horizontal’ situations, i.e. apply it in legal proceedings where 
one private party claims restitution from another private party on the 
grounds that the original payment was made as a consequence of an 
infringement of EU law, just as what was done in Courage with the principle 
of Member State liability.252
Unjust enrichment may well be a particularly complex concept in this 
connection however, essentially because it works in two ways. It is one thing 
to consider it unjustified for a party that infringed EU law to be enriched, 
246 See para. 226 and 235 above respectively.
247 Art. 9 and 10 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 243-244 above respec-
tively.
248 CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz. See further para. 61 and 65 above.
249 See e.g. CoJ case 199/82, San Giorgio, para. 12; CoJ case C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World, 
para. 93. See further Dougan (1999), p. 233; Milutinovic (2010), pp. 159-170.
250 See e.g. CoJ case C-66/95, Sutton, para. 23-24; CoJ case C-591/10, Littlewoods, para. 23. As 
regards the principle of Member State liability, see further para. 59 above.
251  Milutinovic (2010), p. 165. In a similar sense, see Dougan (1999), p. 262.
252 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage. See further para. 60, 63-64 and 213 above. In CoJ case 
C-242/95, GT-Link, para. 58-59, the CoJ already appeared to set a step in that direction, 
although there it was also emphasised that it concerns a public undertaking.
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but it is quite another thing whether it then also follow that it is justified that 
the private party affected by that infringement is to be awarded more than 
the damage that it suffered as a consequence of that infringement. The latter 
would after all also seem to entail unjust enrichment. The Court of Justice 
seems receptive to arguments of this kind. In its abovementioned case law 
on unduly levied charges it has essentially accepted that this could be a rea-
son for not repaying those charges.253 And in Courage it expressly ruled that 
EU law does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the 
protection of rights guaranteed by EU law does not entail unjust enrich-
ment.254 The aforementioned discussions concerning restitution-related ele-
ments under the IPR Enforcement Directive also largely turn around this 
point. In this connection it can also to be noted that the Competition Dam-
ages Directive expressly precludes overcompensation, “whether by means 
of punitive, multiple or other types of damages”.255
Matters are complicated further where the private party requesting res-
titution may be to blame as well, to a greater or a lesser extent, for the 
infringement in question.256 Questions of this kind can occur in competition 
cases, for example when an undertaking that itself participated in the for-
bidden cartel requires restitution from a fellow cartel participant for pay-
ments made under a void contract. One could also think of restitution claims 
relating to public contracts that were illegally directly awarded (i.e. without 
public tendering in violation of the applicable EU public procurement rules) 
and that can therefore be considered ineffective under the Procurement 
Remedies Directives.257 Again the Court’s case law suggests that claims of 
this kind can be rejected on the basis of the principle that a litigant should 
not profit from its own illegal behaviour.258 This touches upon the theme of 
contributory negligence, which under the Product Liability Directive can be 
reason to reduce or disallow liability, as well as questions of diligence and 
causality more generally.259
335. In summary, the main point here is that the overview of the remedies 
set out in this study is certainly not exhaustive. Although this can vary sig-
nificantly, national law can, and often does, provide for other, ‘unregulated’ 
remedies that can also be of importance for private enforcement purpos-
es. Examples include declaratory relief, unjust enrichment and restitution. 
Especially this latter remedy can be relevant here. In its ‘pure’ form, it can 
for instance act as a ‘follow-up’ to the contractual remedies discussed in 
253 E.g. CoJ case 199/82, San Giorgio, para. 13; CoJ case C-309/06, Marks & Spencer, para. 41.
254 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 30. See also CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, 
Manfredi, para. 94.
255 Art. 2(3) Competition Damages Directive.
256 Cf. Van Gerven (2003b), pp. 83-84.
257 Art. 2d(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further subsection 
3.2.3 above.
258 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 31.
259 Art. 8(2) Product Liability Directive 85/374. See further para. 182, 267 and 268 above.
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this study. In the form of ‘restitutionary damages’ it can be a ground for 
reclaiming gains made by the infringer that can be attributed to the infringe-
ment, rather than the harm caused as a consequence of the infringement in 
question as is the case in a ‘classical’ damages action. In practice it may not 
always be easy to distinguish between these ‘unregulated’ remedies and the 
remedies expressly provided for in the EU legislation at issue in this study. 
Unjust enrichment can moreover be a particularly complex issue in this con-
text, as it can act as a double-edged sword. For it can serve as a ground for 
reclaiming payments made to an infringer of EU law, but also as a ground 
for the latter to argue that this claim is to be rejected as it would lead to over-
compensation of the applicant.

This chapter continues the comparative and contextual analysis of the EU 
legislation and other relevant developments discussed in part B commenced 
in the two previous chapters. It does so by analysing, in the two sections 
below, a range of procedural provisions and other issues that either have 
been laid down in the said legislation or that are otherwise of relevance in 
this connection, especially in light of the case law of the Court of Justice.
9.1. Scope, legal standing, limitation periods and rules of evidence
This first section subsequently addresses the relevant rules on four proce-
dural and related issues, i.e. the scope of the legislation under consideration, 
legal standing, limitation periods and rules of evidence.
9.1.1. Scope
336. The importance of the rules on scope set out in the secondary EU law 
at issue here lies, first and foremost, in the fact that they determine in respect 
of which substantive rules the remedies and procedures provided for can be 
relied upon. When overlooking this legislation, in essence the following two 
approaches can be distinguished.
The first approach is that the scope of the particular private enforce-
ment-related legislation essentially coincides with that of the substantive 
rules of EU law in question. This approach is (inherently) followed in cas-
es where the said measures have been laid down in the substantive legal 
acts themselves, i.e. in the Unfair Terms Directive and the Product Liability 
Directive.1 A similar logic underlies the Procurement Remedies Directives. 
For each of these two latter directives corresponds to one of the two direc-
tives with substantive rules on public procurement.2 Yet the substantive EU 
public procurement rules laid down in the Defence Procurement Directive 
are not covered. Instead the text of the Procurement Remedies Directives 
has essentially been ‘copied into’ into this latter directive, with some lim-
ited adaptations.3 Slightly different is the Consumer Injunctions Directive. 
1 See subsections 5.3.1 and 5.4.1 above.
2 Art. 1(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. These directives also cover 
infringements of the recently adopted Concessions Awards Directive 2014/23. See fur-
ther para. 94 above.
3 Art. 55-64 Defence Procurement Directive 2009/81.
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The annex to this directive lists a range of substantive EU consumer protec-
tion directives, the infringement of which could trigger legal action under 
the Consumer Injunctions Directive.4 This approach should be understood 
against the background of the EU consumer protection acquis being scat-
tered across many different legal acts.5 Consequently this directive does not 
come into play following any infringement of substantive EU consumer pro-
tection law. Nonetheless, particularly since this list has been gradually been 
extended over the years, a large proportion of substantive EU consumer 
protection law is now covered by this directive. 
The second approach, laid down in the IPR Enforcement Directive, dif-
fers more substantially from the former. To begin with, the delimitation of 
the scope of this directive is wide, without however being very precise. This 
directive applies in essence to “any infringement” of intellectual property 
rights, whereby the recitals add that the directive’s scope should be as wide 
as possible.6 More significant for the present purposes is however that the 
IPR Enforcement Directive applies not only to infringements of intellectual 
property rights provided for by EU law, but also those provided for by 
national law. Infringements of rights granted on the basis of rules of ‘purely’ 
national laws (i.e. rules of national laws other than those transposing EU 
directives) are therefore also covered as a matter of EU law. A comparable 
‘mixed’ approach is also provided for in Competition Damages Directive, as 
it covers not only infringements of EU competition law, but also of certain 
provisions of national competition law.7
337. It would appear that, generally speaking, the former is the more logi-
cal approach. After all, generally speaking, the key objective of the EU legis-
lation at issue here is facilitating the effective enforcement of EU law.8 
Although this need not be excluded, it may moreover not always be imme-
diately evident that also covering rules of ‘purely’ national law is justified 
from an internal market perspective, as is required under the legal basis that 
is relied upon in virtually all cases, i.e. Article 114 TFEU.9 As the Commis-
sion held in its proposal for the IPR Enforcement Directive, the EU’s involve-
ment with enforcement-related issues would be a “logical extension” of its 
4 Art. 1(2) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further para. 157 above.
5 See para. 151 above.
6 Art. 2(1) and recital 13 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. The Commission’s list of 
intellectual property rights covered may be helpful in practice, but it is neither legally 
binding nor exhaustive. At the same time the Commission’s 2013 proposal for a trade 
secrets directive contains its own set of – largely similar – private enforcement-related 
rules to address unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of trade secrets. See Commis-
sion, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, COM(2013) 813. See further para. 140 above.
7 Art. 1(1) in conjunction with Art. 4(1) and (2) Competition Damages Directive. See 
para. 227 above.
8 See further para. 383 and 438 below.
9 See further para. 382 below.
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involvement with the substantive law at issue.10 Or, as the European Parlia-
ment noted in relation to consumer redress, “the substantive rights conferred 
by [EU] legislation […] must be supplemented by appropriate procedural mecha-
nisms to ensure their enforcement”.11 The question is therefore in particular 
why that approach is not consistently followed.
In this connection it can first be noted that the Commission’s proposal 
for the IPR Enforcement Directive was in fact only concerned with rights 
based on EU law. The provision, pursuant to which infringements of intel-
lectual property rights provided for by ‘purely’ national law are also cov-
ered, referred to above, was introduced by the EU legislature.12 Precisely the 
contrary had in fact happened earlier, at the time of the adoption of the first 
of the two Procurement Remedies Directives. In this latter case the Commis-
sion had proposed to cover also infringements of ‘purely’ national laws on 
public procurement, but the EU legislature (then only the Council) did not 
take up this part of the proposal.13 And also in respect of the Competition 
Damages Directive a change of approach can be observed. Originally, the 
Commission’s initiative was limited to infringements of EU law only. As has 
been explained above, the subsequent decision to cover also certain rules of 
national competition law seems to have been motivated, at least in part, by 
the fact that this provided a justification for involving the European Parlia-
ment in the legislative process as a proper co-legislator, something on which 
it had long insisted.14 The foregoing indicates that, when determining the 
scope of the EU legislation at issue here, it is not always easy to discern a 
clear and consistent line. It appears that, in addition to strictly legal and 
policy-related ones, considerations of a political nature can also play a role. 
At the very least, the choices made in this connection seem to merit further 
reflection and explanation.
Having said that, the practical implications of the above discussions and 
the decision as to whether or not to cover also certain rules of ‘purely’ 
national substantive law should not be overstated either. As to intellectual 
property law, the EU’s involvement with the substantive rules in this 
domain is very extensive.15 That implies that relatively few intellectual 
property rights are provided for solely by ‘purely’ national law. That being 
so, the decision to cover all infringements of the applicable substantive rules 
can be seen not only as a comparably modest, but arguably also as a sensible 
one, given that this ensures that the same regime applies across the board.16 
It can further legitimately be argued that competition law is somewhat of a 
particular case in this respect. For under the Competition Damages Direc-
10 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 5.
11 European Parliament, Resolution on consumer redress, OJ 1987, C 99/203, recital C.
12 See further para. 140 above.
13 See further para. 94 above.
14 See para. 227 above.
15 See para. 108 above.
16 See also subsection 10.4.2 below.
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tive not all infringements of the relevant rules of substantive national law 
are covered; this directive covers only situations where pursuant to the 
Competition Regulation there is a requirement of the parallel application of 
substantive EU and national competition law.17 That means that its coverage 
of national law is restricted and moreover that this selected approach can be 
justified with reference to the need to avoiding different remedial and pro-
cedural rules being applied in one and the same legal proceedings.18
338. A separate issue in relation to scope is the infringement of which provi-
sions of the rules of substantive law covered can lead to the remedies set out 
in the aforementioned EU legislation being invoked. The role of the concept 
of a ‘right’ is of particular importance in this regard.19 Under the said legis-
lation it is not always evident that it is the infringement of a right, conferred 
on a private party by the relevant rule of substantive EU (or national) law, 
that can ‘trigger’ the application of this legislation. Under the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive the existence and subsequent infringement of an intellectual 
property right is clearly the central concept.20 By contrast the Procurement 
Remedies Directives and the Consumer Injunctions Directive do not make 
reference to the concept of a ‘right’ at all.21 The Procurement Remedies 
Directives stipulate essentially that it must be ensured that decisions taken 
by the contracting authorities may be reviewed on the grounds that they 
have infringed EU law in the field of public procurement.22 The Consumer 
Injunctions Directive similarly defines the concept of an ‘infringement’ as 
any act contrary to the directives listed in its annex which harms the collec-
tive interests of consumers.23 These directives thus appear to ‘skip’ the step 
whereby the question is asked whether the substantive rule of EU law that 
has been infringed actually confers a (legally enforceable) right on the pri-
vate parties in question.24
17 Art. 3(1) Competition Regulation 1/2003. See further para. 203 above.
18 See recital 10 Competition Damages Directive. See also Commission, Proposal for the 
Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, pp. 12-13.
19 As set out in para. 21 above, in this study the concept of a ‘right’ refers to a legal position 
which a party recognised as such by the law may have and which in its normal state can 
be enforced by that party against others before a court of law.
20 See in particular Art. 2(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
21 The Competition Damages Directive is somewhat ambiguous in this respect. It speaks 
generally of infringements of EU or national competition law, but it also places particular 
emphasis on private parties’ right to full compensation. Its recital 3 explains that Art. 101 
and 102 TFEU have direct effect and create rights and obligations for the private parties 
concerned. See also para. 199 above.
22 Art. 1(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
23 Art. 1(2) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
24 Note that this state of affairs is arguably somewhat better understandable where Con-
sumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22 is concerned, given that, as discussed in para. 154 
above, this directive is exclusively concerned with the protection of the collective – and 
not the individual – interests of consumers (see its Art. 1(1)). However it would appear 
that, collective or not, these interests can only be deemed to be affected where the rights 
that the substantive EU law at issue grants to these private parties are infringed.
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That is remarkable because, ambiguous as the concept of a ‘right’ may 
be in EU law,25 it is a fundamental requirement for a rule of EU law to be 
enforceable by a private party before either a European or a national court. 
By concentrating on remedies without (explicitly) addressing the issue of 
rights these directives seem to disregard the link that exists between both 
concepts. The general position is that each right conferred ought to be 
accompanied by a remedy ensuring that it is capable of being enforced (ubi 
ius, ibi remedium). Conversely it seems to make little sense for the EU legisla-
ture to require the availability of certain remedies in the absence of the exis-
tence of a right. The importance of the question of conferral of rights is illus-
trated by the case law of the Court of Justice relating to the principle of 
Member State liability. One of the conditions for incurring such liability is 
that the rule of law that has been infringed was intended to confer rights to 
private parties.26 Against this background it seems unlikely that the EU leg-
islature meant to take a different line under the said directives. Probably it is 
simply presumed here that the substantive rules at issue confer rights on pri-
vate parties. Although this does not necessarily hold true in relation to all 
provisions set out in these directives,27 this presumption mostly seems justi-
fied, as (subsequent) case law has made clear.28 This is in line with the posi-
tion in EU law more generally, in the sense that this law, as construed by the 
Court of Justice, is often rather ‘generous’ in conferring rights.29
339. In summary, the question which substantive rules are covered by the 
private enforcement-related EU legislation at issue here is answered differ-
ently in the various legal acts. These acts tend to cover most, although not 
always all, substantive rules of EU law that apply in the fields concerned. 
However the scope of the IPR Enforcement Directive and the Competition 
Damages Directive is broader, in that they also cover certain provisions of 
(‘purely’) national law. Although in both cases arguments can be given for 
this extended scope, from a legal perspective this latter approach does not 
seem self-evident. Indeed, it appears that in this regard political consider-
ations can sometimes play as much a role as strictly legal ones. Furthermore, 
different from what one would expect, not all legal acts under consideration 
25 See para. 21 above. On the relationship between direct effect and the conferral of rights in 
the EU legal order, see also para. 31 above.
26 See para. 59 above.
27 See e.g. Art. 75 Public Sector Procurement Directive 2004/18 and Art. 8a Unfair Terms 
Directive 93/13 on the provisions on the submission of information by the Member States 
to the Commission, or Art. 13 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29 on the 
Member States’ obligations to lay down penalties and to ensure that they are being 
enforced. Provisions of this type are unlikely to be qualifi ed as conferring rights. Cf. e.g. 
CoJ case C-159/00, Sapod, para. 61-62; CoJ case C-222/02, Paul, para. 40-46.
28 See para. 70 and 151 above.
29 See e.g. the CoJ’s rulings on environmental matters. See e.g. CoJ case C-131/88, Commis-
sion v. Germany, para. 7; CoJ case C-72/95, Kraaijeveld, para. 56; CoJ 1996, case C-298/95, 
Commission v. Germany, para. 16; CoJ case C-420/11, Leth, para. 32. See further para. 446 
below.
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establish the infringement of a right as the central criterion that can ‘trigger’ 
the application of the remedies and procedures set out therein. Unlike the 
IPR Enforcement Directive, where this concept plays a central role, espe-
cially the Procurement Remedies Directives and the Consumer Injunctions 
Directive do not refer to the concept of a ‘right’ at all. Instead they refer more 
generally to infringements of the relevant substantive rules. This is unlikely 
to point to any difference in substance however. Rather it simply appears to 
be presumed (generally correctly) that the said rules confer rights on the 
private parties concerned.
9.1.2. Legal standing
340. At first glance it might appear that the provisions on legal standing 
(locus standi, i.e. the rules on ‘who can sue’) in the legislation under consid-
eration typically harmonises to a high extent the national laws concerned. Take 
for instance the Procurement Remedies Directives. There it is specified that 
“any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and 
who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement” has standing to 
bring a case.30 The IPR Enforcement Directive is at least as detailed. It sets 
out four categories of persons having legal standing to initiate actions under 
that directive, namely rightholders, licensees, collective rights management 
bodies and professional defence bodies.31 Issues of legal standing are further 
at the very heart of the Consumer Injunctions Directive. This latter directive 
seeks to ensure that ‘qualified entities’ (such as consumer associations) from 
one Member State can initiate legal actions in another Member State in cases 
of ‘intra-EU infringements’ of the substantive consumer protection rules at 
issue.32 The Unfair Terms Directive also addresses the issue of legal stand-
ing. It specifies that persons or organisations having a legitimate interest in 
protecting consumers must be able to initiate legal proceedings under that 
directive.33 Finally, pursuant to the Competition Damages Directive “anyone 
who had suffered harm caused by an infringement” of the relevant competition 
rules is to be entitled to bring an action for damages.34 This term ‘anyone’ is 
to be understood broadly, covering consumers, undertakings (including 
‘indirect purchasers’) as well as public authorities.35
341. However the abovementioned provisions nonetheless mostly contin-
ue to leave significant leeway to the Member States. This is ensured through 
the insertion of additional clauses that refer, in one way or another, to 
national law. These clauses mostly came about upon insistence of the Mem-
30 Art. 1(3) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further para. 95 above.
31 Art. 4 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 141 above.
32 Art. 4 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further para. 154-155 above.
33 Art. 7(2) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See further para. 160 above.
34 Article 1(1) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 241 above.
35 Cf. recital 12 Competition Damages Directive.
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ber States represented in the Council. The Procurement Remedies Directives 
expressly stipulate for example that it is for the Member States to estab-
lish the applicable “detailed rules” in this respect. As to the IPR Enforcement 
Directive, in relation to three out of four categories of persons having legal 
standing (i.e. licensees, collective rights management bodies and profes-
sional defence bodies) the phrase is added “in so far as permitted by and in 
accordance with the provisions of the applicable law”. In respect of the fourth 
category (i.e. rightholders) only the latter part of this phrase has been added. 
This indicates arguably that (only) these rightholders must in any case have 
legal standing on the basis of this directive, while in that case the applicable 
detailed rules remain a matter of national law. As regards the three other 
categories of persons, even the question of whether they have legal standing 
as such seems to be determined by national law.36
A largely similar picture emerges when the Consumer Injunctions Direc-
tive is considered in further detail. Under this directive it remains for the 
Member States to determine which ‘their’ qualified entities are, meaning 
that it does not create a harmonised EU rule of legal standing for consumer 
associations.37 It is true that this directive requires that ‘foreign’ qualified 
entities, i.e. entities considered qualified to initiate legal proceedings in 
accordance with the rules of another Member States than the one where pro-
ceedings are brought, in principle have legal standing across the EU. How-
ever the national court seised remains entitled to examine whether the pur-
pose of the qualified entity in question justifies it taking action in that 
specific case. In other words, the ‘mutual recognition’ mechanism for the 
legal standing of these entities that this directive establishes is not unquali-
fied, but it is subject to an additional verification in concrete cases. In addi-
tion from the abovementioned provision in the Unfair Terms Directive it 
follows that national law essentially determines which party has a legiti-
mate interest. For here it is stated that having a legitimate interest “under 
national law” is required. Comparable statements can be found in other con-
sumer protection directives and elsewhere in secondary EU law.38 Only the 
Competition Damages Directive does not contain any such explicit reference 
to national law where matters of legal standing are concerned.
342. It follows that the actual harmonising effect of the EU involvement 
with issues of legal standing is typically more modest than what might appear 
at first sight. That applies even more so because, apart from the abovemen-
tioned clauses, more often than not the above provisions mainly seem to 
confirm – rather than amend or otherwise affect – already existing national 
36 In this sense, see Reinbothe (2010), p. 14; Lakits-Josse (2011), p. 527.
37 Cf. Betlem (1999), p. 414.
38 E.g. Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29; Art. 5(1) Misleading 
Advertising Directive 2006/114; Art. 17(2) Gender Equality Directive 2006/54; Art. 3(2) 
Free Movement of Workers Enforcement Directive 2014/54.
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rules.39 The Procurement Remedies Directives’ requirement of the applicant 
having a (legitimate) interest was for instance inserted expressly with a view 
not “jeopardise” the logic of the existing legal systems of the Member States.40 
Something similar can be said in relation to the IPR Enforcement Directive. 
As set out above, under this directive the legal standing of rightholders is 
regulated most extensively as a matter of EU law. But in the various national 
legal systems precisely this category of applicants is normally capable of 
initiating legal proceedings under national law anyway.41 A holder of an 
intellectual property right is after all evidently concerned by, and will gener-
ally have a legitimate interest in acting upon, an (alleged) infringement of its 
right. This may be less self-evident for the other categories listed in this 
directive, especially as regards collective rights management bodies and 
professional defence bodies.42 And precisely in relation to these categories 
this directive continues to leave a great deal of flexibility to the national 
legal systems.
It further follows from the foregoing that the Competition Damages 
Directive harmonises the relevant national rules to a comparatively high 
extent, given that it does not contain an express reference to national law in 
this regard. However on this point this directive seems to do little more than 
codifying the earlier case law of the Court of Justice.43 For in cases such as 
Courage and Manfredi it has long been held that “any individual” must be able 
to claim compensation for the damage suffered as a consequence of an 
infringement of the EU competition rules.44 Seen from this perspective, also 
in this case the actual degree of harmonisation realised is thus in effect more 
limited than what might appear at first sight. This probably also explains 
why legal standing-related issues generated relatively little debate when 
adopting this directive. In this connection discussions focused especially on 
39 See e.g. also the statement made by the Commission and Greece at the time of the adop-
tion of Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665: “the term ‘interest’ in [the provision on legal 
standing of this directive] is equivalent in the Greek legal system to the concept of ‘legitimate 
interest’ as consistently defi ned by the decisions of the Greek Council of State”. See Council, doc. 
7490/89, p. 10.
40 Council, doc. 7834/89 ADD 1, p. 7.
41 Cf. e.g. Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin (2010), p. 58. A majority of Member States are none-
theless reported to have amended their national laws in this regard pursuant to the adop-
tion of IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See Commission, Staff working document 
accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 6.
42 Cf. e.g. Art. 47 Patent Court Agreement, pursuant to which the rightholder (i.e. the patent 
proprietor) and the holder of an (exclusive) licence are entitled to bring actions, whereas 
for other persons and bodies reference is made to national law. On this agreement, see 
para. 108 above. Cf. e.g. also Art. 104 Community Plant Variety Rights Regulation 
2100/94, pursuant to which actions for infringements may be brought by the holder and, 
in principle, persons enjoying exploitation rights.
43 Cf. recital 12 Competition Damages Directive.
44 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 24; CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, 
para. 59 and 61. See further para. 213 and 214 above respectively.
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collective redress, an issue that was eventually not addressed in the direc-
tive.45
343. Comparatively modest as the abovementioned provisions on legal 
standing may thus be, this does not mean that they are of no importance. 
That applies especially when account is taken of the (potential) role of the 
Court of Justice in interpreting these provisions. This point is best illustrated 
with reference to the Fritsch case, which concerned the application of the 
aforementioned provision on legal standing laid down in the Procurement 
Remedies Directives.46 Under the national law applicable in the case at hand 
a dispute had first to be brought before a non-judicial conciliation commit-
tee for the applicant to have legal standing. The directives’ provision being 
silent on this matter, the Court of Justice was asked whether such a rule is 
permitted. It answered in the negative. Specifically as regards the express 
reference to national law made in this provision, it held that this “does not 
authorise [the Member States] to give the term ‘interest in obtaining a public con-
tract’ an interpretation which may limit the effectiveness of that directive”.47 This 
suggests that the effects of such an explicit reference to national law are not 
absolute. In particular, where the effect that is given thereto is such that in 
the eyes of the Court the effectiveness of the EU legal act in question might 
be at risk, it may well be brushed aside rather easily.
It remains for now an open question whether reasoning similar to that 
set out in Fritch is applicable in relation to the other provisions on legal 
standing discussed above. If so, this could obviously increase the degree of 
harmonisation actually achieved. Generally speaking, the potential to come 
to a rather extensive interpretation of these provisions on legal standing cer-
tainly seems to be present. Jurisprudential developments in relation to other 
fields of EU law, such as environmental law and state aid law, suggest that 
the Court might well be prepared to exploit this potential.48 That could 
apply particularly when the provisions in question are interpreted in light of 
the principle of effective judicial protection, set out in the Charter.49 Such 
45 See e.g. Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 13-22. Cf. recital 12 Com-
petition Damages Directive. See further para. 225 above. The issue of collective redress 
has instead been addressed in Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396, discussed 
in para. 190 above. As discussed in para. 240 above, another legal standing-related issue 
that generated some debate concerns the position of indirect purchasers.
46 CoJ case C-410/01, Fritsch, para. 28-34. See also the other CoJ case law relating to the pro-
vision on legal standing of Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13, dis-
cussed in para. 95 above.
47 Ibid., para. 34.
48 In relation to (what is now) Art. 11 Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92, 
see e.g. CoJ case C-263/08, Djurgården, para. 40-52; CoJ case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske 
zoskupenie, para. 51; CoJ case C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, 
para. 46; CoJ case C-72/12, Altrip, para. 42-54. In relation to Art. 107 TFEU, see e.g. CoJ 
case C-174/02, Streekgewest Westelijk Noord-Brabant, para. 18-20.
49 Art. 47 Charter. See further para. 43 above.
p. 376 C. Comparison and contextualisation: remedies and procedures para. 343
‘Charter-consistent’ interpretation may well mean that the applicable legal 
standing requirements are not to be interpreted too restrictively.50
The aforementioned Muñoz ruling is arguably of particular importance 
in this connection.51 On the one hand in this case the Court appeared to sig-
nal that it wished to allow a relatively broad category of private parties the 
possibility to bring a case for an (alleged) infringement of certain quality 
standards for agricultural products set by EU law. It (implicitly) rejected 
Advocate General Geelhoed’s suggestion to apply here the – restrictive – 
test of whether the applicant was directly and individually concerned, 
which applies to direct actions before the EU courts.52 If that is the situation 
in a case where no specific private enforcement-facilitating EU legislation 
applies, it seems doubtful whether the Court would take a more restrictive 
line where such legislation applies. On the other hand in Muñoz the Court 
also seemed careful to stress that it must be possible for competitors of the 
infringing undertaking to enforce the applicable rules by means of civil pro-
ceedings. Arguably this served to emphasise that, as a matter of EU law, not 
necessarily any third party is entitled to bring a private enforcement action.53 
Indeed, many understand this reference in Muñoz as hinting at a require-
ment of the applicant having a sufficient interest to act.54 There are also other 
rulings that appear to go in this direction,55 although, as was noted above, in 
its Courage case law the Court has so far consistently emphasised that “any 
50 On ‘Charter-consistent’ interpretation, see further para. 467 below.
51 CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz. See further para. 61 above.
52 On these direct actions under Art. 263 TFEU, see para. 3 above. See Opinion AG Geel-
hoed C-253/00, Muñoz, para. 67-76. The CoJ’s ruling in Muñoz on this point seems under-
standable, not only considering the restrictiveness of the test under Art. 263 TFEU, but 
also given that, if one wishes to make an analogy, it might be more appropriate to instead 
apply the test for legal standing relating to the EU’s non-contractual liability under Art. 
340 TFEU. Under this latter provision no requirement of direct and individual concern 
applies. See e.g. Gutman (2011), pp. 703-708. For possible other analogies, specifi cally in a 
competition law context, see Milutinovic (2010), pp. 222-228.
53 This is related to the question whether and if so, in which cases, as a matter of EU law, a 
requirement exists pursuant to which an applicant must fall within the protective scope of 
the rule of law that is allegedly infringed for him to be able to rely thereon in the course of 
law (‘Schutznorm’). Such a requirement exists, in various forms, in Member States such as 
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal. See Van Gerven (1995), p. 696. See 
further e.g. Prechal (2005), pp. 122, 238-239 and 284; Tridimas (2006), p. 480; Eilmansberg-
er (2007), pp. 463-467; Leczykiewicz (2010a), pp. 278-279; Reich (2010), p. 127.
54 Biondi (2003), pp. 1248-1249; Dougan (2004), p. 43. Cf. Temple Lang (2008), p. 98. In a 
similar sense, see Opinion AG Geelhoed C-253/00, Muñoz, para. 63, 65 and 76.
55 E.g. CoJ case C-132/05, Commission v. Germany (Parmesan cheese), para. 68-71, discussed in 
para. 55 above. See also e.g. CoJ joined case C-261/01 and C-262/01, Van Calster, para. 64; 
CoJ case C-237/07, Janecek, para. 39; CoJ case C-426/05, Tele2 Telecom, para. 38; CoJ joined 
cases C-165/09 to C-167/09, Stichting Natuur en Milieu, para. 100. Note that also under 
Art. 263 TFEU a distinction is made between the tests for legal standing and for having 
an interest in bringing legal proceedings. The latter requires that there must a vested and 
present interest, evaluated at the date on which the action is brought, which exists only if 
the action, if successful, is likely to procure an advantage for the party who has brought 
it. See e.g. GC case T-79/12, Cisco systems, para. 34 and 35.
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individual” is in principle entitled to bring such an action.56 It follows that, 
while several issues remain to be clarified in this connection, generally 
speaking, there are grounds to believe that the Court may well be prepared 
to interpret the abovementioned provisions rather extensively, while at the 
same time seeking to prevent creating an actio popularis.57
344. In summary, the picture as regards legal standing is rather mixed. On 
the one hand the fact that almost all legal acts under consideration in this 
study address this issue in some detail is testimony to the importance that is 
attributed thereto in the present context. Ensuring that private parties have 
the legal capacity to act before the competent national courts is evidently a 
precondition for any effort to facilitate the private enforcement of EU law to 
be successful. In this sense the provisions discussed here signal both an 
understandable and an important inroad into the realm of national proce-
dural autonomy. On the other hand these provisions have generally been 
drafted in such a manner that they continue to leave Member States very 
significant leeway to maintain or establish their domestic rules on legal 
standing. Although they set out a common minimum standard, the resulting 
threshold is typically rather low and moreover relies in many respects on 
national law. This difficulty in harmonising this subject-matter in a mean-
ingful manner may be due precisely to the fact that the question which par-
ties have access to court is such a crucial issue, going to the heart of any legal 
system and touching upon its underlying values and preferences. Be this as 
it may, the very fact that there are certain rules of EU law in place, together 
with their often somewhat ambiguous wording, implies that considerable 
scope for interpretation is left to the Court of Justice. Although the case law 
available to date is limited and not always free of ambiguity either, the 
Court may well be inclined to construe the provisions in question rather 
broadly, while at the same time arguably seeking to avoid creating an actio 
popularis.
9.1.3. Limitation periods
345. Where a dispute emerges, it is in the interest of all parties concerned 
to know by which date a possible legal action needs to be brought. For a 
(potential) applicant this evidently marks the moment before he must act, 
56 See in particular CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 62-64, discussed 
in para. 214 above. There the CoJ added the phrase “where there is a causal relationship”. 
Whereas in practical terms the outcome may be similar, legally speaking, the question 
whether an applicant has a suffi cient interest to be considered admissible in a particular 
case is however to be distinguished from the question whether this party, once having 
been considered admissible, can demonstrate that the harm suffered was caused by the 
alleged infringement. On the requirement of a causal link, see further subsection 7.1.3 
above.
57 Kornezov (2014), p. 258, where the prevention of actio polpularis is linked with the separa-
tion of powers, at least in as far as legislative acts are concerned.
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if he wishes to do so. For the (potential) defendant, as well as for interested 
third parties, this marks the moment by which, in the absence of an action 
having been brought, they are ‘safe’. Accordingly, as the Court of Justice has 
consistently held, it is in the interest of legal certainty to set reasonable limita-
tion periods.58 Indeed, such periods also apply for litigation before the EU 
courts themselves. Actions for damages for the EU’s non-contractual liabil-
ity must for example be brought before those courts within five years from 
the occurrence of the event giving rise thereto.59 This period begins to run 
at the moment at which the decision produces its effects vis-à-vis the par-
ties concerned, i.e. when the harm actually materialises in relation to these 
parties.60
The foregoing implies not only that limitation periods can be of consid-
erable importance in the present context, it also underlines that setting rules 
on this subject-matter is to a high extent a balancing act between the various 
interests at stake.61 Just as setting too strict rules would be detrimental to the 
possibilities of private parties to initiate legal proceedings for infringements 
of EU law before the competent national courts, imposing excessively long 
limitation periods can cause disproportionate harm to the interests of the 
(potential) defendants and certain third parties. It would further be mistak-
en to concentrate only on the length of these periods. The question at which 
moment they begin to run can be at least as important, as can the precise 
nature of the periods in question and the circumstances in which they are to 
be applied. All of these issues come to light when considering the following 
legal acts.62
346. Take, to begin with, the IPR Enforcement Directive, which is very brief 
on this point. That is to say, it only provides for a general reference to the 
need to avoid “unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays”.63 It does not 
set out any specific rules on limitation periods.64 This stands in market con-
trast with the comparatively detailed manner in which this directive regu-
lates many other matters under discussion in this study. In part this can 
probably be ascribed to the lack of a general and ‘inherent’ urgency in the 
typical private enforcement disputes covered by this directive.65 At the same 
58 E.g. CoJ case C-30/02, Recheio, para. 18. See further para. 38 above.
59 See Art. 46 of Protocol No. 3 to the TFEU on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union.
60 E.g. CoJ case C-460/09 P, Inalca, para. 60.
61 Cf. Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), pp. 535-536.
62 Rules on limitation periods are notably absent from the consumer protection directives 
under consideration here, such as Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22 and Unfair 
Terms Directive 93/13.
63 Art. 3(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. On this ‘general rule’, see further para. 144 
above and subsection 9.2.5 below.
64 Cf. Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, COM(2013) 813, p. 20 (Art. 7), 
which does contain a rule on limitation periods.
65 See also para. 310 above.
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time the interests of the parties wishing to enforce their intellectual property 
rights being the dominant policy concern here and existing limitation peri-
ods set on the basis of national law generally not being seen as an obstacle to 
be addressed, presumably, no need was felt to impose any particular 
requirements in this respect at EU level.
347. In contrast limitation periods play a particularly important role in pub-
lic procurement cases. The contracting authority and the preferred bidder 
normally have a legitimate interest in concluding and executing the public 
contract in question as soon as possible and therefore in possible challeng-
es by third parties (notably other bidders) being brought without delay.66 
The latter will nonetheless need to some time to determine whether they 
wish to, and can, contest the contracting authority’s decision and if so, to 
prepare an application. Since their revision in 2007 the Procurement Rem-
edies Directives therefore expressly allow for the setting of a range of limi-
tation periods.67 This is in line with earlier case law of the Court of Justice 
to this effect.68 The length of these periods differs depending on the type of 
review sought, but they are generally very short. These directives foresee 
three types of limitation periods, which vary depending on the type of relief 
sought. First, there is a minimum period of 10 or 15 days (depending on the 
means of communication used) for requests for review of the legality of the 
contracting authority’s decision, counting from its notification to the private 
party concerned.69 Second, the minimum time period for actions seeking the 
ineffectiveness of a concluded contract has been set at either 30 days (upon 
notification of the party concerned) or six months (upon the conclusion of 
the contract).70 Third, in relation to actions for damages no specific limitation 
periods have been laid down as a matter of EU law. This is thus one of the 
other situations where the relevant limitation periods are expressly left to be 
determined by nation law.71
Noticeable is further the explicit requirement laid down in the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives that the abovementioned notifications to the pri-
vate party concerned must include the reasons for the decision in question. 
This reflects the thought that there can be no effective judicial protection – 
and the relevant limitation period can therefore not begin to run – until the 
private party concerned has been properly informed. Again this is in line 
with earlier case law of the Court of Justice, both in respect of the principle 
of effective judicial protection generally and public procurement cases spe-
66 See para. 72 and 78 above. See e.g. CoJ case C-230/02, Grossmann, para. 38, discussed in 
para. 95 above.
67 See further para. 96 above.
68 E.g. CoJ case C-470/99, Universale Bau, para. 71-79; CoJ case C-327/00, Santex, para. 48-66; 
CoJ case C-241/06, Lämmerzahl, para. 50-64.
69 Art. 2c Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
70 Art. 2f(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
71 Art. 2f(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
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cifically.72 In this manner this requirement to adequately inform the private 
parties concerned acts as a sort of counter-balance for the short limitations 
periods that can apply in public procurement cases.
348. Time periods are also of relevance in relation to proceedings brought 
under the Product Liability Directive. The main issue here is however one of 
limiting the effects in time of the no-fault (‘strict’) liability for which this direc-
tive makes provision and not so much ensuring rapid review as such.73 
Accordingly this directive specifies two distinct types of time limits. In the 
first place, it sets out an ‘ordinary’ limitation period for the bringing of actions 
for damages under the directive.74 Its duration is comparatively short, 
namely three years. Unlike most of the other periods discussed in this sub-
section, this is moreover not a minimum period. This means that national 
law cannot provide for a longer period. The directive specifies that this lim-
itation period begins to run on the day on which the applicant becomes 
aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of the damage, the defect 
and the identity of the infringer. Issues relating to the suspension or inter-
ruption of this period are expressly left to national law.
In the second place, the Product Liability Directive provides for another 
time period, at the expiry of which the rights of the (potential) applicant are 
extinguished.75 Different from the aforementioned ‘ordinary’ limitation peri-
od, this latter period starts to run from the moment that the product has 
been put into circulation. Awareness on the side of injured private parties 
thus plays no role in this connection. The possible effects of this rather strict 
rule for these parties are offset to some extent by the longer duration of this 
period (ten years) and by the specification that no rights are extinguished if 
legal proceedings have been brought in the meantime. This latter rule 
ensures that, at least in this respect, the possible long duration of these legal 
proceedings does not come at the expense of the private party that filed a 
damages claim under this directive.
349. Finally, one of the key objectives of the Competition Damages Direc-
tive is facilitating the bringing of actions for damages, with a view to ensur-
ing that injured private parties can obtain full compensation.76 The afore-
mentioned quest to establish an appropriate balance between the various 
interests at stake also underlies this directive’s rules on limitation periods.77 
However here the emphasis is on ensuring that these periods do not “unduly 
hamper the bringing of actions for damages”, particularly in ‘follow-on’ actions 
72 See e.g. CoJ case 179/84, Bozzetti, para. 17 (concerning the principle of effective judicial 
protection); CoJ case C-406/08, Uniplex, para. 30-32 (concerning public procurement 
law). See e.g. also CoJ case C-19/13, Fastweb, para. 58-60.
73 See further para. 181 above.
74 Art. 10 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
75 Art. 11 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
76 Art. 1(1) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 226 above.
77 Cf. Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 16.
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(i.e. actions for damages brought pursuant to an earlier infringement deci-
sion by the competent public enforcement authority).78 As a consequence 
this directive’s provision on limitation periods is rather ‘claimant-friendly’.79
It is stipulated that the applicable limitation periods shall not begin to 
run before the injured party knows or can reasonably be expected to know: 
(i) the behaviour and the fact that it constitutes an infringement; (ii) that this 
infringement caused harm to that party; and (iii) the identity of the infringer. 
In this manner a comparatively high threshold has been set. In particular, 
this requirement of knowledge also of the fact that the behaviour qualifies as 
an infringement is an addition as compared to the abovementioned rule of 
the Product Liability Directive. The wording used moreover seems to imply 
that (even) higher thresholds could in principle be set under national law. 
Another illustration is the rule that limitation periods must be at least five 
years. Not only is this period longer that the one foreseen in the Product 
Liability Directive (although in itself not unusually long), it is also a mini-
mum period. Finally, specific to competition, cases but therefore no less 
important, is the rule that limitation periods are to be suspended (or inter-
rupted) if a public enforcement authority initiates proceedings, for the dura-
tion of at least one year after those proceedings are terminated. This latter 
rule facilitates the bringing of ‘follow-on’ actions, which can consequently 
be brought sometimes many years after the infringement was committed.
350. In summary, the secondary EU law discussed in part B regularly sets 
out harmonised rules on limitation periods with a considerable degree of 
detail. Broadly speaking, these periods all serve to ensure legal certainty. Yet 
the rules in question tend to be tailored each time to the specific character-
istics and (perceived) needs of the typical situations at hand. For example, 
under the Procurement Remedies Directives the main interest is to ensure 
that cases are brought rapidly. The limitation periods applicable in these 
cases are therefore mostly short, making it particularly important for the 
applicant to be adequately informed before they start to run. The Product 
Liability Directive illustrates in turn a situation where the periods primarily 
serve as a sort of temporal counterbalance against a particularly strict form 
of liability. Here the limitation period is not only comparatively short (three 
years), but it is also accompanied by an additional period (of ten years) after 
which all relevant rights are extinguished. In respect of this latter period 
any awareness, or lack thereof, on the side of the injured party plays no role. 
Finally, in relation to competition law infringements the main concern is 
to encourage the bringing of successful damages claims. The Competition 
Damages Directive is therefore rather ‘claimant-friendly’. It sets a compara-
tively high threshold for the moment at which the period begins to run, the 
period itself is not short (five years) and moreover only a minimum, and 
there is a ‘generous’ rule on its suspension. Secondary EU law thus provides 
78 Recital 32 Competition Damages Directive.
79 Art. 10 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 244 above.
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by no means for a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to limitation periods. Rather 
the variety in dominant concerns means that the balance is struck each time 
in a somewhat different manner, leading a variety of detailed rules, particu-
larly as regards the starting point, length and suspension of these periods.
9.1.4. Rules of evidence
351. Above it has already been discussed which measures related to the 
disclosure of evidence that might be relevant in private enforcement proceed-
ings are provided for in the EU legislation at issue.80 The present subsection 
concentrates by contrast on the rules of evidence, i.e. the rules on the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof between the parties to the proceedings and on 
the manner in which the presented evidence is to be assessed by the nation-
al court seised. Although distinct, rules on disclosure and rules of evidence 
are related. Difficulties for a private party in obtaining the evidence needed 
to substantiate its claims are mainly problematic where the burden of proof 
is on this party. Such difficulties may be reason for the legislature to alleviate 
this burden, reverse it, provide for a lower standard of proof or create the 
possibility for the court seised to take decisions of this kind in certain cases. 
Both types of the measures can thus be different ways to address similar 
problems. Also more generally it is self-evident that rules of evidence can be 
crucial in determining the outcome of a private enforcement action, as they 
determine essentially who needs to proof what and how the evidence sub-
mitted is weighted by the court.
352. Overlooking the legislation assessed in part B of this study, it appears 
however that the (potential) importance of this subject-matter has generally 
not been a reason for the EU legislature to address rules of evidence in any 
detail. Rules of this kind are mostly not provided for. It seems for the most part 
to be simply presumed that, in accordance with the relevant national law, it 
is for each party to substantiate its claims and for the national court seised to 
assess the evidence brought before it.81 Few, if any, specific obligations tend 
to imposed in this respect as a matter of EU law. That does not mean that EU 
law is irrelevant however. For one thing, the rules of national law at issue 
may not be such as to prevent the objectives of the EU legislation in question 
from being achieved.82 For another thing, the familiar boundaries flowing 
from the EU law principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judi-
cial protection apply.83 On the basis of these principles the Court of Justice 
80 See subsection 8.2.2 above.
81 Cf. UNIDROIT, Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (Art. 21), available via 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/civilprocedure/ali-unidroitprinciples-e.
pdf.
82 See e.g. CoJ case C-479/12, Gautzsch, para. 40-41 (concerning the burden of proof under 
Community Designs Regulation 6/2002).
83 On these principles, see further sections 2.2 (equivalence and effectiveness) and 2.3 (effec-
tive judicial protection) above.
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has already issued several rulings relating to rules of evidence.84 But it does 
mean that the situation under the EU legislation at issue is largely similar to 
the general point of departure in cases where no such specific secondary EU 
law applies. In that sense this legislation does little to alter the status quo 
ante. All the same, a more detailed assessment of this legislation does reveal 
a number of noteworthy points concerning the applicable rules of evidence.
353. The first of these points is that the Product Liability Directive could be 
seen as deviating from the above general rule that this matter is mostly left 
to the domestic legal systems of the Member States. Its key provision holds 
that “[t]he injured person shall be required to prove the damage, the defect and the 
causal relationship between defect and damage”.85 Here EU law therefore obvi-
ously determines the burden of proof. It would appear however that this 
more a matter of drafting technique than one of substance. That is to say, the 
essence of this provision is to lay down the principle of ‘strict’ liability, 
which implies that it is not of relevance whether the producer of the defec-
tive product in question is at fault or not for liability in damages to be 
incurred under this directive.86 In this case the EU legislature opted for for-
mulating this in positive manner, i.e. listing the elements that must be 
proved – and presumably first submitted, although the directive is notably 
silent on this point – by the applicant for liability to be incurred under this 
directive. A negative formulation, stating that no fault requirement applies, 
would seem to have been conceivable as well. The Unfair Commercial Prac-
tices Directive stipulates for instance that the remedy for which that direc-
tive provides (in that case injunctive relief) must be available “even without 
proof of […] intention of negligence on the part of the trader”.87 None of this 
appears meant to indicate a difference in substance.
In other words, the essence here seems not so much that the applicant 
must demonstrate the elements listed in the above provision. That is gener-
ally presumed. The key is rather that the issue of whether the producer of 
the defective product is at fault is irrelevant and therefore need not to be 
proved (nor, presumably, first submitted) by the party that brings the pri-
vate enforcement proceedings. A similar comment applies with respect to 
the Procurement Remedies Directives.88 Likewise it is of course not without 
relevance that the Product Liability Directive specifies that the defendant 
must prove the existence of the possible exonerating circumstances listed in 
84 See in particular para. 38 and 47 above.
85 Art. 4 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
86 See para. 175 above.
87 Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29. See also para. 289 above.
88 Art. 2(7) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13 concerning actions for damages for the costs 
of preparing the bid and participating in the contract award procedure, discussed in 
para. 85 above. Also here the essence is not so much that the applicant must prove the 
listed elements (infringement, real chance, causal relationship). The key is rather what 
has not been listed, i.e. a requirement for the applicant to demonstrate that he would have 
actually won the contract but for the infringement.
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this directive, including the so-called ‘development risk defence’.89 Yet it 
would again probably be wrong to perceive this rule of evidence per se. The 
essence of this provision is rather that such defences are available under this 
directive. That being so, it seems rather self-evident that it is then for the 
defendant to raise this defence and to substantiate his claims in this regard.
354. Turning to EU competition law, the Competition Regulation contains a 
provision on the burden of proof that is relevant not only in public enforce-
ment proceedings, but also for private enforcement cases.90 It follows from 
this provision that in legal proceedings before national courts the burden of 
proving an alleged infringement of Articles 101 or of 102 TFEU rests on the 
private party bringing the claim. It is also stipulated here that, where the 
defendant claims the benefit of Article 101(3) TFEU, it is for that party to 
proof that the applicable conditions are fulfilled.91 This is thus another rath-
er scarce example of EU law providing for a rule of evidence where private 
enforcement proceedings are concerned. However, in terms of content, all 
that these rules appear to do in essence is confirming that it is in principle 
for the applicant to proof the infringement that he alleges to have been com-
mitted, whereas the defendant must proof the existence of an exonerating 
circumstance on which he may wish to rely. That hardly seems remarkable. 
That is illustrated by the fact that it remains possible for a defendant to 
argue and demonstrate that there are objective justifications for an infringe-
ment of Article 102 TFEU or that the behaviour in question on balance ben-
efits consumers, although neither Article 102 TFEU itself nor the Competi-
tion Regulation expressly provides for such a rule.92 Under the Competition 
Regulation rules on the standard of proof moreover remain to be deter-
mined by national law.93
Arguably of greater interest are therefore the rules of evidence set out in 
the more recent Competition Damages Directive. This directive relies quite 
heavily on rules of evidence of various types, designed to alleviate the bur-
den on the applicant. Three such rules stand out in particular. First, there are 
the rules on the effects of an infringement decision of a national competition 
authority (or a review court), pursuant to which these decisions are either 
“deemed to be irrefutably established” or “at least prima facie evidence”.94 Second, 
where cartel infringements are concerned, the directive provides for a rebut-
table presumption that this infringement caused harm.95 Third, the directive 
89 Art. 7 Product Liability Directive 85/374. See further para. 180 above.
90 Art. 2 Competition Regulation 1/2003. See further para. 203 above.
91 On Art. 101(3) TFEU, see further para. 200 above.
92 See para. 201 above.
93 Recital 5 Competition Regulation 1/2003.
94 Art. 9 Competition Damages Directive. This difference depends on whether it concerns a 
decision by an authority of the same Member State as the court before which the private 
enforcement action is brought or rather a decision by an authority from another Member 
State. See further para. 243 above.
95 Art. 17(2) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 231 and 271 above.
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addresses the issue of possible ‘passing-on’ of the harm in part through 
establishing certain specific rules of evidence. In short, the so-called ‘pass-
ing-on defence’ is made available to alleged infringers, whereby it is speci-
fied that in such a case the burden of proof is on the party invoking it.96 
‘Indirect purchasers’ are also entitled to bring actions for damages under 
this directive, in which case the burden of proving the existence and the 
extent of the pass-on rests with these parties, them being the applicants.97 
However, in those cases an indirect purchaser is “deemed to have proven” that 
a passing-on to him occurred where he has shown that the defendant com-
mitted an infringement resulting in an ‘overcharge’ (i.e. a price increase 
resulting from the infringement) and that he purchased goods or services 
that were the subject of that infringement.98 This rule is the made subject to 
a possibility for the defendant to “demonstrate credibly to the satisfaction of the 
court” that the overcharge was not, or not entirely, passed-on to the indirect 
purchasers concerned.99 This is therefore essentially another (conditional) 
rebuttable presumption.
355. When considering the present subject-matter in a broader perspective, it 
is on the one hand evident that the above rules – particularly those set out in 
the Competition Damages Directive – constitute a deviation from the afore-
mentioned tendency of the EU legislature to leave it primarily to the Mem-
ber States to determine the rules of evidence that apply in private enforce-
ment proceedings. The IPR Enforcement Directive provides a good 
illustration of this tendency. In its 2003 proposal for this directive the Com-
mission had – not unlike the Competition Damages Directive – suggested 
the inclusion of a rather innovative rule of evidence designed to tackle a 
particular problem, namely the quantification of the recoverable ‘unfair 
profits’ made by an infringer.100 Under this proposed rule the applicant 
would have to provide evidence only with regard to the amount of the gross 
income achieved by the defendant. The latter would then be allowed to sub-
mit evidence of its deductible expenses and profits attributable to other fac-
tors than the infringement. The EU legislature did not retain this aspect of 
the proposal however. As a consequence the IPR Enforcement Directive is 
largely silent on this subject-matter.101
On the other hand it should be acknowledged that the above rules are 
for the most part not entirely exceptional. The Competition Damages Direc-
tive’s rule on the ‘passing-on defence’ resembles for instance the rule on the 
aforementioned ‘development risk defence’ set out in the Product Liability 
96 Art. 13 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 239 above.
97 Art. 14(1) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 240 above.
98 Art. 14(2) Competition Damages Directive.
99 Art. 14(2) Competition Damages Directive.
100 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, pp. 38-39 
(Art. 17(2)). See further para. 134 and 272 above.
101 Apart from a sporadic reference, such as in Art. 9(3) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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Directive. As far as issues of evidence are concerned, this seems primarily a 
matter of laying down the general rule that the party wishing to rely on an 
exonerating circumstance must prove the existence thereof. Many other 
expressions of this rule can be found elsewhere in EU law.102 Neither are the 
abovementioned rebuttable presumptions unique. Similar rules of EU law 
already exist in other domains, especially in relation to the issue of fault.103 
A particular example can be found in the Gender Equality Directive, which 
requires the Member States to ensure, in accordance with their national judi-
cial systems, that when an applicant establishes “facts from which it may be 
presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the 
[defendant] to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal 
treatment”.104 It is arguably the Competition Damages Directive’s rule on the 
effects of decisions by national competition authorities in private enforce-
ment proceedings that is most remarkable, as no comparable provision of 
EU law appears to exist at present. That being so, it may not be coincidence 
that it is precisely this latter rule that proved to be one of the most controver-
sial elements of this directive and that was in the end considerably watered 
down by the EU legislature.105
356. In summary, the EU legislation at issue only sporadically lays down 
rules of evidence. It mostly seems to be presumed that, in accordance with 
the applicable national law, it is in principle for the applicant to substantiate 
its claims and, where relevant, for the defendant to do the same where the 
latter raises specific issues in its defence, whereas it is for the national court 
to assess and weigh the evidence brought before it. It is true that both the 
Product Liability Directive and the Competition Regulation touch upon 
these matters to some extent. But these legal acts essentially do little more 
than confirming the aforementioned presumption rather than that they pro-
vide for a deviation thereof. More remarkable are the rules of evidence set 
out in the Competition Damages Directive, notably as regards the effects of 
infringement decisions by national competition authorities, its rebuttable 
102 E.g. Art. 23(2) Data Protection Directive 95/46; Art. 5(3) Air Passengers’ Rights Regula-
tion 261/2004; Art. 37(1) of Annex I to Rail Passengers’ Rights Regulation 1371/2007. See 
e.g. also Art. 6(9) Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83 and Art. 5(4) Air Passengers’ Rights 
Regulation 261/2004, pursuant to which the burden of proof that certain (information) 
obligations have been complied with is on the parties to which this obligation applies.
103 E.g. Art. 6(1) and (2) Electronic Signatures Directive 1999/93; Art. 20(3) Public Limited 
Liabilities Companies Directive 2012/30. See further para. 263 above. Note that for com-
petition cases the Commission had originally suggested to provide for a similar rebutta-
ble presumption of fault, allowing the defendant to demonstrate an excusable error. See 
Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165, pp. 6-7.
104 Art. 19 Gender Equality Directive 2006/54. See e.g. also Art. 8 Directive 2000/43/EC 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin, OJ 2000, L 180/22 (‘Racial Equality Directive’). See e.g. CoJ case C-127/92, 
Enderby, para. 13-19; CoJ case C-400/93, Specialarbejderforbundet I Danmark, para. 24.
105 See para. 243 above.
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presumption of harm having been caused and its rules relating to the ‘pass-
ing-on’ of harm. Where rules of evidence are concerned this latter directive 
goes further than the other legislation at issue. With the exception of the rule 
on the effects of infringements decisions, comparable provisions can how-
ever be found elsewhere in EU law.
9.2. Forum, settlements, judicial review and general rules
This second section is concerned with the private enforcement-rules laid 
down in the EU legislation under consideration relating to five additional 
procedural issues, namely forum,106 rules meant to facilitate out-of-court 
settlements, the standard of judicial review, own motion judicial review and 
what is referred to here as the relevant ‘general rules’.
9.2.1. Forum
357. It has been set out in part A of this study that the adjudication of 
claims brought by private parties for infringements of EU law by other pri-
vate parties is primarily entrusted to the courts of the Member States.107 The 
Court of Justice has consistently held that – in the absence of specific EU 
rules – it is in principle for each Member State to designate the courts having 
jurisdiction to rule on such claims and to establish the applicable detailed 
rules (principle of national procedural autonomy).108 The EU law principle 
of effectiveness can come into play for example where a domestic system 
has been designed in such a manner that it might lead to procedural compli-
cations or other disadvantages making it impossible or excessively difficult 
for a private party to exercise its rights vested in EU law.109 The fundamen-
tal right to effective judicial protection, set out in the Charter, further implies 
a general requirement for the national courts concerned to be independent 
and impartial.110 Nonetheless the limits set by EU law in this regard are 
mostly rather broad.
When considering the EU legislation assessed in part B of this study, it 
appears that the situation is for the most part not fundamentally different 
where such legislation applies. Issues related to forum generally, and the 
designation of the body competent to decide on the case particularly, are 
mostly left to the Member States. Indeed, in relation to the Unfair Terms 
Directive the Court has held that this directive regulates neither which 
106 As was noted in para. 22 above, in this study the term ‘forum’ is understood to refer to 
the body competent to rule on the private enforcement actions brought under the EU 
legislation at issue.
107 See subsection 1.1.1 above.
108 See in particular CoJ case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5. See further section 2.1 above.
109 E.g. CoJ case C-63/01, Evans, para. 44-58; CoJ case C-268/06, Impact, para. 51-53. See fur-
ther para. 38 above.
110 Art. 47 Charter. See further para. 43 and 45 above.
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court is to have territorial jurisdiction, nor the number of instances of juris-
diction.111 Accordingly none of the directives in question requires for 
instance the designation of specialised courts or the creation of specialised 
chambers within the competent national courts. This is the case despite the 
fact that such an approach is not uncommon at Member State level, for 
example for public procurement disputes or in relation to competition law 
infringements.112 Still, when overlooking that EU legislation, a distinction 
can be made in this connection between the following two groups of legal 
acts.
358. The first group of legal acts consists of the Product Liability Directive, 
the IPR Enforcement Directive and the Competition Damages Directive. The 
former does not touch upon the issue of which body is to rule on the prod-
uct liability claims brought under this directive. This is by implication in 
principle entirely left to the Member States. The situation is largely similar 
where the IPR Enforcement Directive is concerned. This directive is margin-
ally more detailed however, given that at vary instances it speaks of “judicial 
authorities”.113 It can be deduced that the competent bodies should at least be 
judicial in character, without this having been specified this any further 
however. Next the Competition Damages Directive is yet again somewhat 
more detailed, be it in an indirect manner. Under this latter directive the 
claims in question are to be brought before a “national court”, i.e. a court or 
tribunal of a Member State within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU on the 
preliminary reference procedure.114 This cross-reference implies that the 
case law of the Court of Justice regarding this Treaty article is, as it were, 
‘imported’. Consequently, while the body competent to rule on the damages 
claims brought under this directive need not necessarily be judicial in char-
acter, when determining whether it qualifies as such, account is taken 
among other things of whether the procedure before that body is inter partes 
and whether it is independent.115
Pursuant to all of the abovementioned directives belonging to this first 
group, even if this is not expressly required as a matter of EU law, the pre-
sumption is that the actions brought are to be decided on by the civil courts 
of the Member States. The Product Liability Directive and the Competition 
Damages Directive are both focused on ensuring compensation in damages. 
As the Commission noted in connection to the latter directive, “[a]warding 
compensation is […] within the domain of national courts and of civil law and 
procedure”.116 While the IPR Enforcement Directive also foresees other forms 
of relief, the cases brought under this directive also typically concern dis-
111 CoJ case C-413/12, ACICL, para. 28 and 30.
112 See para. 98 and 242 above respectively.
113 See Art. 6-13 and 15 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
114 Art. 4(9) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 242 above.
115 See further para. 22 above.
116 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 2.
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putes between two private parties regarding substantive law that is usually 
qualified as civil law.117
359. The second group of legal acts consists of the Procurement Remedies 
Directives and a number of consumer protection directives (other than the 
Product Liability Directive’), notably the Consumer Injunctions Directive, 
the Unfair Terms Directive and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
These directives differ from the abovementioned ones in that they leave the 
Member States an express choice when designating the competent forum. 
They offer the Member States essentially two options.118
The first possibility is to designate a body that is judicial in character. 
Whilst this is again not specified in the directives in question, actions under 
the abovementioned consumer protection directives are normally be 
brought before the civil courts.119 In cases covered by the Procurement Rem-
edies Directives it is not uncommon for Member States to attribute compe-
tence to the administrative courts or to ‘split’ the jurisdiction between these 
two types of courts.120 Either way, where a Member State designates a judi-
cial body, again no further specific EU law requirements apply.121
As an alternative the abovementioned directives also allow the Member 
States to designate a non-judicial body. The said consumer protection direc-
tives refer in this respect expressly to such a body being an ‘administrative 
authority’. The Procurement Remedies Directives leave it open what sort of 
body this should be. This can thus be an administrative authority, but it 
could for example also be an arbitration board. This flexibility probably 
reflects the already existing wide variety in the bodies competent to resolve 
public procurement disputes at national level. Given that in public procure-
ment cases the defendants are typically (semi-)public bodies and rapid 
review is a particular concern, in practice many Member States provide for 
a form of non-judicial review in first instance, mostly before an administra-
tive authority of some sort.122 The Unfair Terms Directive does not contain 
any further detailed rules that apply to these non-judicial bodies. But espe-
cially the Procurement Remedies Directives, as well as the Unfair Commer-
117 See further para. 142 above.
118 Art. 2(9) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13; Art. 2(1) Consumer Injunc-
tions Directive 2009/22; Art. 7(2) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13; Art. 11(1) Unfair Com-
mercial Practices Directive 2005/29. See e.g. also Art. 5(1) Misleading Advertising Direc-
tive 2006/114.
119 See para. 158 and 160 above.
120 See para. 98 above. Such a ‘split’ is expressly allowed under Art. 2(2) Procurement Rem-
edies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
121 CoJ case C-413/12, ACICL, para. 28-30.
122 See para. 98 above.
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cial Practices Directive, do go into further detail.123 The rules set out in these 
latter directives differ to some extent between them, yet they have in com-
mon that they essentially require that, if not in first instance then at least on 
appeal, the claims brought are decided by a body that is independent and 
impartial. They also provide for procedural safeguards, such as the right of 
the parties to be heard and an obligation to provide reasons in writing for 
the board’s decisions. Furthermore they require that the possibility of mak-
ing a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice is ensured, if only on 
appeal.124 That means that also in this case the relevant requirements set by 
the Court are ‘imported’ in an indirect manner.
360. The foregoing suggests that the need felt by the EU legislature to reg-
ulate forum-related matters varies, depending on the type of body desig-
nated by the Member States to rule on the private enforcement actions in 
question. Whenever a judicial body is designated, regardless of whether it is 
a civil or an administrative court, the EU legislature appears not to be par-
ticularly concerned about matters such as the conduct of the proceedings, 
the precise judicial architecture or safeguards in terms of independence and 
impartiality. Otherwise specific requirements would have been inserted on 
these points. In all of the abovementioned cases this was not even proposed 
however. Neither has it been an issue that otherwise came up, for instance in 
assessments by the Commission, academic studies or consultations of stake-
holders. This seems to imply that the parties concerned mostly have consid-
erable confidence that these matters can in principle safely be left to national 
law. By contrast there is not always such confidence when the Members 
States are given the possibility to designate a non-judicial body as the compe-
tent forum. In the latter case safeguards in terms of independence and 
impartiality and fairness of the proceedings are at times (although not 
always) prescribed with a considerable degree of detail as a matter of EU 
law, either expressly or indirectly via a reference to Article 267 TFEU.
361. In summary, the EU legislature tends to get involved only to a very 
limited extent with matters of forum generally and the designation of the 
body competent to rule on the actions in question specifically. These matters 
are mostly left to be regulated by the Member States. Some of the legal acts 
under consideration (Product Liability Directive, IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive, Competition Damages Directive) are based on a presumption that the 
123 Art. 2(9) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13; Art. 11(3) Unfair Commer-
cial Practices Directive 2005/29. See further para. 98 and 160 above respectively. See e.g. 
also Art. 5(5) Misleading Advertising Directive 2006/114. As to Consumer Injunctions 
Directive 2009/22, in light of its recital 9, it arguably requires equivalent standards in 
cases where a Member States opts for designating a non-judicial body. See further 
para. 158 above.
124 Under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29 this is implicit in the require-
ment that appeal to a judicial authority must be possible. In Procurement Remedies 
Directives 89/665 and 92/13 this requirement is made explicit (see their Art. 2(9)).
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Member States designate their civil courts. These acts are almost entirely 
silent in this respect. Other acts (Procurement Remedies Directives, Con-
sumer Injunctions Directive, Unfair Terms Directive) leave the Member 
States an express choice between designating either a judicial or a non-judi-
cial body, probably because here the situations in the various jurisdictions 
within the EU is more diverse. These judicial bodies can in practice be either 
an administrative or a civil court, whereas these non-judicial bodies are typi-
cally administrative authorities of some kind. What all of these acts have 
in common however is that they appear to reflect a considerable degree of 
confidence on the side of the EU legislature in the judicial authorities of the 
Member States, whereas that is much less so where non-judicial bodies are 
allowed to rule on the private enforcement actions in question. For in the lat-
ter case EU law does at times provide for a number of specific requirements 
relating to the designation and functioning of these non-judicial bodies.
9.2.2. Rules facilitating settlements
 362. Few would contest that reaching an amicable settlement between the 
parties to a dispute will in many cases be preferable to litigation. Not only 
may this help safe costs, time and energy on the side of the parties con-
cerned, it is also attractive from the perspective of procedural economy.125 
For this reason many national legal systems have been structured in such a 
manner as to encourage out-of-court settlements being reached before a 
final judgment is rendered.126 Several of the legal acts under consideration 
here also seek to do so, with a view to avoiding unnecessary litigation. This 
occurs essentially in two distinct manners.
363. A first such manner is to require the potential private party-applicant 
to first address the opposing party before initiating legal proceedings. While 
the IPR Enforcement Directive, the Product Liability Directive, the Unfair 
Terms Directive and the Competition Damages Directive do not contain any 
rules on pre-trial contacts of this kind, several of the other directives dis-
cussed in part B of this study do. The Consumer Injunctions Directive 
speaks of the possibility of ‘prior consultation’. It provides in essence that 
Member States may require, before injunction proceedings can be brought, 
the potential applicant to try to achieve the cessation of the alleged infringe-
ment in consultation with the potential defendant (with the possible further 
involvement of a ‘qualified entity’ within the meaning of this directive).127 
125 Cf. e.g. European Parliament, Study on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 76.
126 See e.g. Van Rhee (2005), p. 187; European Parliament, Study on collective redress in anti-
trust, June 2012, p. 33. See e.g. also CoJ joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini, 
para. 64 (regarding the Italian legal system); Bowsher & Moser (2006), p. 196 (regarding 
the English legal system). See also UNIDROIT, Principles of Transnational Civil Proce-
dure (Art. 23), available via http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/civilproce-
dure/ali-unidroitprinciples-e.pdf.
127 Art. 5 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further para. 158 above.
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The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive simply speaks of the possibility 
to “require prior recourse to other established means of dealing with complaints”, 
including those established under industry codes of conduct.128 Finally, 
under the Procurement Remedies Directives a private party-applicant may 
be required to first notify the opposing party (i.e. the contracting authority 
concerned) of its intention to seek review.129
It is noticeable that these directives providing for this possibility of 
requiring pre-trial contacts are mostly the same directives that expressly 
allow for administrative review in one form or another, as was discussed in the 
previous subsection.130 Conversely the directives that do not (expressly) con-
tain rules on pre-trial review tend to presume that the cases brought on the 
basis thereof are to be adjudicated by the competent national civil courts.131 
This thus suggests a link between administrative review and requiring the 
establishment of pre-trial contacts, whereas in relation to proceedings before 
civil courts such a requirement appears not to be deemed appropriate.
364. In addition out-of-court settlements can also be encouraged by pro-
viding for mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution. This largely serves 
the same aims as the rules on pre-trial contacts referred to above, but here 
the presumption is that the parties concerned cannot resolve the dispute 
between them. The intervention of an outside entity, not being a court (or an 
administrative authority fulfilling a similar function), is thus required. On 
the whole the EU legislation at issue here touches upon this latter issue only 
very sparingly. Acts such as the IPR Enforcement Directive, the Consumer 
Injunctions Directive, the Unfair Terms Directive and the Product Liability 
Directive all do not contain rules related to alternative dispute resolution. As 
regards public procurement law, the situation is somewhat mixed. On the 
one hand in 2007 the ‘conciliation procedure’, for which one of the two Pro-
curement Remedies Directives provided and which was meant to facilitate 
the out-of-court resolution of disputes, was abolished.132 On the other hand, 
as has been discussed above, these directives’ rules on forum have been 
drafted in such a manner that, subject to certain conditions, they allow for 
cases being decided by review bodies other than courts or administrative 
authorities, such as arbitration boards.133
128 Art. 11(1) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29. See further para. 160 above.
129 Art. 1(4) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. In addition, pursuant to 
Art. 1(5) of these directives the Member States may also require the private party con-
cerned to fi rst seek review with that contracting authority. This possibility of ‘internal 
review’ is related to the fact that in public procurement disputes the defendant tends to 
be a (semi-) public body. See further para. 98 above.
130 See para. 359 above.
131 See para. 358 above.
132 See para. 101 above.
133 See para. 98 and 359 above.
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The interest at EU level for facilitating alternative dispute resolution 
seems to be increasing however. This is illustrated by two more recent devel-
opments. First, in 2013 the Consumer ADR Directive was adopted.134 This 
directive seeks to ensure that EU-wide in all economic sectors alternative 
dispute resolution procedures are available for consumer disputes. These 
procedures are to be easily accessible and should offer adequate safeguards 
in terms of independence, impartiality and speed, among other things. Sec-
ond, the Competition Damages Directive, adopted in 2014, contains rules on 
consensual dispute settlement (covering alternative dispute settlement as 
well as out-of-court settlements between the parties). That is to say, while 
these latter rules clearly aim to encourage these forms of dispute resolution, 
this directive does not require the establishment of such mechanisms as 
such. Rather it is concerned with the effects of such settlements (and the 
attempts to reach them) on the legal proceedings covered by the directive.135
365. By means of a first additional comment, the optional nature of the 
abovementioned provisions of EU law can be noted. This comes to light in 
two distinct manners for each of the two types of measures discussed above. 
Where pre-trial contacts are concerned, the said provisions essentially estab-
lish an option for the Member States. EU law does not require potential appli-
cants to establish such contracts with a view to exploring the possibility of 
an amicable settlement. Rather this decision is left to each individual Mem-
ber State, the EU legislation in question merely making it explicit that that 
such a requirement is not precluded as a matter of EU law.136 But where a 
Member States has chosen to exercise this option, the private party con-
cerned will normally be bound by it in accordance with the applicable rules 
of national law. Concerning alternative dispute resolution, the Consumer 
ADR Directive does not leave the Member States any choice, in that they are 
required to take certain measures to facilitate the out-of-court settlement of 
disputes.137 However under this directive the use of these mechanisms is 
optional for the private party concerned. The mechanisms established under 
this directive are therefore to be used by consumers on a voluntary basis.138 
134 Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11. See further para. 194 above.
135 Art. 18 and 19 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 245 above.
136 Note that this does not necessarily mean that, where this has not been made explicit in the 
EU legislation at issue, the Member States are precluded from imposing a requirement to 
establish pre-trial contacts between the parties on the basis of (‘purely’) national law. The 
main difference is that in the latter situation discussion could arise as to whether the 
requirement is compatible with the objectives of the EU legislation at issue and, where 
relevant, the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial protection, dis-
cussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 above.
137 Even if the Member States are left considerable discretion as regards the manner in which 
they give effect to their obligations under this directive. See e.g. Art. 5(3) and (4) Con-
sumer ADR Directive 2013/11.
138 Art. 1 Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11.
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That is also the most common situation where (‘purely’) national law pro-
vides for procedural rules of this kind.139 The outcome of the alternative 
dispute resolution process is moreover not necessarily binding on the par-
ties concerned.140 Similarly, in connection with the Competition Damages 
Directive, the Commission expressly rejected the option of obliging a private 
party to make an attempt to settle the dispute in an alternative manner.141 
It follows that the EU law at issue can allow for a legal requirement to first 
address the opposing party, but it does not foresee an obligation to first sub-
mit the matter to a third party, i.e. an alternative dispute resolution body.142
366. A further additional comment is that the EU legislature appears to 
have been aware of some of the possible disadvantages associated with encour-
aging pre-trial contacts and alternative dispute resolution in the manners 
described above.143 Most notably such efforts will inevitably lead to certain 
delays, which in turn could have further adverse consequences. Most of the 
abovementioned directives seek to address the risks in this regard, be it in 
different manners. The Consumer Injunctions Directive sets a maximum 
time period for the duration of the prior consultations between the parties. 
If no cessation of the infringement has been achieved within two weeks after 
the reception of the request for consultation, the private party concerned is 
free to bring an action without further delay. The Procurement Remedies 
Directives seek especially to prevent delays that might allow the disput-
ed public contract to be concluded in the meantime or which may lead to 
the applicant being time-barred. The aforementioned obligation to notify 
therefore does not affect the standstill period during which the contracting 
authority may not conclude the contract, nor does it affect any other time 
limits for review.144 The Competition Damages Directive similarly provides 
that limitation periods for initiating legal proceedings are to be suspend-
ed for the duration of the consensual dispute resolution process.145 It also 
empowers the national court seised to suspend the legal proceedings where 
they already started, subject to a maximum of two years.146
139 See para. 193 above.
140 See e.g. also points 25-26 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See further 
para. 190 above.
141 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 35.
142 This is also what would appear to follow from CoJ case C-410/01, Fritsch, para. 28-34; CoJ 
joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini, para. 52-60. See further para. 95 and 38 above 
respectively.
143 For a discussion of potential disadvantages of settlements and alternative dispute resolu-
tion more generally, see para. 444 below.
144 On the said limitation periods and this standstill period, see further subsection 3.3.2 
above. Similarly these directives require that the aforementioned prior ‘internal review’ 
involves the immediate suspension of the possibility to conclude the contract.
145 Art. 17(1) Competition Damages Directive. See e.g. also point 27 Collective Redress Rec-
ommendation 2013/396 , discussed in para. 190 above.
146 Art. 17(2) and (3) Competition Damages Directive.
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These rules all essentially give effects to the position that a private party 
affected by an alleged infringement should not be penalised for making use 
of mechanisms that aim to facilitate an amicable settlement of the dispute at 
hand.147 However the EU legislature appears to have still a somewhat nar-
row perception of the said possible disadvantages. For one thing, especially 
for consumers it may not always be easy to proof that they contacted the 
opposing party before initiating legal proceedings and thus meet a require-
ment to this effect that may apply.148 This concern remains unaddressed in 
the abovementioned directives. For another thing, the Court of Justice seems 
to take a broader view when assessing national rules providing for recourse 
to consensual dispute settlement procedures under the principles of effec-
tiveness and effective judicial protection. In this context the Court has 
looked at whether any such arrangement leads to significant disadvantages 
for the applicant not only in terms of possible delays and the legal conse-
quences that this may have, but also in light of other practical or legal fac-
tors that may be relevant, such as additional costs.149
367. In summary, the EU legislation under consideration sometimes 
expressly allows the Member States to impose a requirement on a private 
party that may wish to bring a private enforcement case to first establish 
‘pre-trial contacts’ with the opposing party so as to explore the possibility 
of an amicable settlement (Procurement Remedies Directives, Consumer 
Injunctions Directive, Unfair Commercial Practices Directive). Although 
most directives at issue here do not address this point, there further appears 
to be an increasing interest at EU level in facilitating alternative dispute res-
olution. This is illustrated not only by the adoption in 2013 of the Consumer 
ADR Directive, but also by the inclusion of certain rules aimed at encourag-
ing (but not requiring) consensual dispute settlement in the 2014 Competi-
tion Damages Directive. Still all of the above provisions are characterised 
by a degree of ‘optionality’, to be exercised either by the Member States 
(pre-trial contacts) or by the private parties concerned (alternative dispute 
resolution). Furthermore, while consensual dispute resolution can certainly 
have advantages for the parties concerned as well as for the courts, notably 
in terms of costs and speed, efforts to reach an out-of-court settlement can 
also have negative consequences, especially for potential applicants. The EU 
legislature has taken certain measures to address such concerns where pos-
sible delays and the legal consequences thereof are concerned (maximum 
period for consultations, standstill periods, suspension of limitation peri-
ods and legal proceedings). But no account is taken of other, more practical 
issues that can arise in this connection, such as difficulties in proving that 
pre-trial contacts actually took place or the additional costs associated with 
the efforts to reach an out-of-court settlement.
147 Cf. GC case T-407/07, CMB Maschinenbau, para. 103.
148 Loos (2011), pp. 493-494.
149 CoJ case C-63/01, Evans, para. 44-58; CoJ joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini, 
para. 52-66. See further para. 38 and 45 above respectively.
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9.2.3. Standard of judicial review
368. In a sense a discussion of the standard of judicial review to be applied 
by the national court in cases brought under the EU legislation assessed in 
part B of this study can be very short indeed, as no requirements whatsoever 
have been set out therein. None of the legal acts in question expressly 
addresses this issue with any degree of detail. At most some very general 
references can be found, for instance where the Competition Damages 
Directive refers to something having to be demonstrated “credibly to the sat-
isfaction of the court”.150 Neither have any provisions of EU law on this sub-
ject-matter providing for a degree of detail been proposed or even seriously 
discussed in relation to this legislation. There is however some case law 
available from which certain indications might be deduced as to what is 
required from the national courts in this respect as a matter of EU law.
369. Most notably in Hospital Ingenieure the Court of Justice expanded on 
the standard of judicial review to be applied under the Procurement Reme-
dies Directives.151 In this case the defendant (a contracting authority) had 
decided to withdraw an invitation to tender after several private parties had 
already submitted a bid. One of these parties contested this decision, argu-
ing that it was discriminatory. A question that emerged in the resulting liti-
gation was whether the review exercised by the national court seised could 
be limited to whether or not the contested decision was arbitrary. The Court 
of Justice held that, in light of their objective, the scope of the judicial review 
exercised in cases brought under the Procurement Remedies Directives can-
not be interpreted restrictively. Even where the contracting authority has a 
wide discretion, it must be possible to verify the compatibility of such a 
decision with the relevant substantive EU public procurement rules. Accord-
ing to the Court, in the absence of any indications to the contrary, the letter 
and the spirit of the Procurement Remedies Directives do therefore not per-
mit the conclusion that the Member States can limit the review of the legal-
ity of a contested decision to whether or not it is arbitrary. Without using 
these words, the Court thus appeared to consider that the said directives 
preclude ‘marginal’ judicial review.
370. There is other case law that relates to situations where EU law is 
alleged to have been infringed, but where no specific secondary EU law of 
the type under consideration in this study applies. In these situations the 
standard of judicial review provided for under national law is to be assessed, 
where relevant, under the EU law principles of equivalence, effectiveness 
and effective judicial protection.152 A prominent example of a case where the 
150 Art. 14(2) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 240 above.
151 CoJ C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure, para. 57-64.
152 On these principles, see sections 2.2 (equivalence and effectiveness) and 2.3 (effective 
judicial protection) above.
para. 371 Chapter 8. Contractual and other remedies p. 397
Court of Justice made such an assessment is the 1999 Upjohn ruling.153 This 
case concerned the judicial review of national decisions revoking marketing 
authorisation for certain medicinal products. The Court found in essence 
that a national rule providing that these decisions were not subject to ‘full’ 
judicial review, whereby the court seised substitutes its own assessment of 
the facts and of the scientific evidence for the contested assessment made by 
the competent national authorities, did not infringe the principle of effec-
tiveness.
It is noticeable that in reaching this conclusion the Court drew a parallel 
with the review by the EU courts of decisions taken by the EU institutions 
and bodies involving complex assessments. In the latter context it has con-
sistently been held that the judicial review exercised does not entail a ‘full’ 
review in the aforementioned sense, at least as regards matters in relation to 
which the EU institutions concerned have discretion. In those cases the EU 
courts typically restrict themselves to examining the accuracy of the find-
ings of facts and law, as well as to verifying that the contested decision is not 
vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers and that the bounds of 
discretion have not clearly been exceeded.154 Upjohn thus seems to imply 
that the review exercised by the national courts seised in cases such as the 
ones at issue there need to be, as a matter of EU law, only modestly intru-
sive. Indeed, this ruling has been understood as the Court having declined 
an invitation to raise the standards of judicial review across the EU.155
371. It is not immediately evident how the two abovementioned rulings 
relate to each other and consequently which broader conclusions can be drawn 
from them. Whereas it appears to follow from Hospital Ingenieure that ‘mar-
ginal’ review is insufficient, Upjohn implies that ‘full’ judicial review is not 
required. The existence of discretion on the side of the body that had taken 
the contested decision might be a relevant factor, but this is unlikely to 
explain the difference in outcome in these two cases.156 One view is there-
fore that what the Court of Justice required in Hospital Ingenieure was some-
thing more than a mere marginal (arbitrariness) review, but without neces-
153 CoJ case C-120/97, Upjohn, para. 30-37. See also para. 38 above.
154 See ibid., para. 34, for further references. As regards the standard of judicial review in 
relation to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the fundamental rights 
guaranteed under the Charter, see subsection 10.1.2 below. Note that, as was touched 
upon in para. 45 above, a stricter test applies in legal proceedings involving the imposi-
tion of penalties for infringements of the EU competition rules.
155 Tridimas (2001), p. 82.
156 In Hospital Ingenieure the contested decision concerned a matter where pursuant to 
national law the contracting authority enjoyed a wide discretion, which the CoJ appeared 
to accept. This therefore does not seem to set this case apart from Upjohn. Moreover, 
according to the approach consistently followed by the EU courts in cases where the EU 
institutions themselves act as contracting authorities, these authorities enjoy a broad 
margin of assessment and the judicial review is consequently limited. See e.g. GC case 
T-407/07, CMB Machinenbau, para. 115-116; GC case T-461/08, Europaïki Dynamiki, 
para. 100 and 137.
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sarily entailing full review of the sort at issue in Upjohn. Such a ‘middle way’ 
in terms of the intensity of the review exercised by the court may well be 
conceivable. This is largely speculative however, especially because any 
positive indication of what may be required under the Procurement Reme-
dies Directives was entirely absent in Hospital Ingenieure. This also leaves 
open the question whether it any substantial difference whether or not sec-
ondary EU law of the type at issue here applies.
A possible alternative reading of these two rulings is that under the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives a higher standard of judicial review is 
required than the one that would apply in ‘ordinary’ cases where no second-
ary EU law of this kind applies and which are therefore to be assessed under 
the aforementioned principles. If this latter reading is correct, then it would 
basically be the mere existence of such secondary EU law – and in particular 
the need to safeguard the objective that it seeks to achieve – that implies that 
such a higher standard is required. After all, as was noted above, the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives do not contain any express provisions on this 
matter. This reading would then also seem to suggest that the Court of Jus-
tice may well come to conclusions similar to the one reached in Hospital Ing-
enieure when interpreting the other EU legislation under consideration in 
this study. For none of these acts expressly addresses the issue of the stan-
dard of judicial review to be applied either. Moreover, certain differences 
notwithstanding, the overall objectives of this legislation are to a high extent 
comparable.157
372. In summary, the standard of judicial review to be exercised by the 
national courts seised in cases brought under the EU legislation assessed in 
this study is not regulated in any detail in that legislation. The case law of 
the Court of Justice makes clear that this does not necessarily mean that EU 
law does not impose certain requirements in this respect however. Most 
notably the application of a test of whether or not the contested act by the 
defendant is arbitrary was found to be incompatible with (the objective of) 
the Procurement Remedies Directives. It may be that this implies that judi-
cial review in cases covered by these directives – and arguably the other EU 
legislation at issue here – must be more stringent than in cases where no 
such specific secondary EU law applies and that are therefore to be assessed 
under the EU law principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judi-
cial protection. However further clarification must be awaited before any 
firm conclusions can be drawn on this point.
157 See in particular para. 383 below. One such difference that may be relevant in this connec-
tion is that the review exercised under Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 
92/13 typically concerns acts by (semi-)public bodies and not acts of other private par-
ties, which in turn can imply, depending on the domestic legal system, that the relevant 
cases are to be brought before administrative, rather than civil, courts. See also para. 98 
above.
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9.2.4. Own motion judicial review
373. Apart from the question which standard of review a national court 
should apply in cases brought before it, discussed above, another question 
relates to whether, as a matter of EU law, that court may or must raise of its 
own motion (ex officio) – i.e. without one of the parties to the dispute having 
done so – certain points of EU law that may be relevant for deciding the case 
at hand. An in-depth assessment of this complex and, it appears, not yet 
fully settled matter falls outside the scope of this study.158 Nonetheless this 
question has come up regularly in relation to the EU legislation discussed in 
part B. Indeed, the Court’s most remarkable line of case law on this subject-
matter has been issued precisely in relation to some of this legislation. A 
brief consideration is therefore in place.
374. In this regard it should be noted at the outset, in the first place, that 
under the domestic laws of most Member States their national courts gener-
ally have been assigned a passive role in proceedings between private par-
ties.159 Although there are certain differences between these laws, it is prin-
cipally left to the parties to the proceedings to ‘frame’ the dispute and to 
submit the relevant legal arguments to support their respective claims. As 
the Court of Justice has noted, this reflects prevailing conceptions concern-
ing the relations between the State and the individual, it safeguards the 
rights of defence and it ensures the proper conduct of proceedings.160 This 
does not mean that this passive role is absolute however. Most notably in 
many jurisdictions the courts seised are required to raise of their own 
motion points of law that are considered to be of fundamental importance 
and therefore a matter of public policy (d’ordre public). That is also the situa-
tion before the EU courts, where proceedings are also inter partes. These lat-
ter courts are required to raise of their own motion certain matters of public 
policy, such as a failure to state reasons for a contested decision. But unless 
the parties to the proceedings raise these points, they do not verify for 
instance whether an action brought is time-barred or whether a contested 
decision is compatible with EU competition law.161
158 For further references on this subject-matter specifi cally in relation to Unfair Terms Direc-
tive 93/13, see para. 167 above. More generally, see e.g. Ancery (2012); Snijders (2014).
159 For an overview, see Van Rhee (2005), pp. 189-193. See also Stuyck (2011), p. 513. Cf. 
UNIDROIT, Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (Art. 10(1)), available via http://
www.unidroit.org/english/principles/civilprocedure/ali-unidroitprinciples-e.pdf.
160 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 21; CoJ joined cases 
C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 35.
161 Cf. e.g. CoJ case 20/88, Roguette frères, para. 12; CoJ case C-386/10 P, Chalkor, para. 64-66; 
CoJ case C-510/11 P, Kone, para. 30-32; CoJ case C-224/12 P, Netherlands v. Commission, 
para. 97. See however also CoJ case C-530/12 P, OHIM v. National Lottery Commission, 
para. 44-45.
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A second preliminary remark is that the secondary EU law discussed in 
this study does not expressly oblige these courts to deviate from the above-
mentioned general rules established on the basis of the domestic laws of the 
Member States. The question whether such own motion judicial review is 
possible, precluded or obligatory as a matter of EU law is simply not 
addressed in any of the legal acts in question. It appears that the same applies, 
possibly certain limited exceptions aside,162 for other acts of secondary EU 
law.
A last point concerns the case law of the Court of Justice, considered at a 
general level. It appears to follow from this case law that, as a general rule, 
EU law does not require national courts to abandon the predominantly pas-
sive role assigned to them on the basis of national law either.163 However 
especially the EU law principle of equivalence can require a deviation from 
this general rule in certain cases.164 It follows from this principle that, where 
a national court must raise certain rules of its own motion pursuant to 
national law, it must also raise comparable rules of EU law. Straightforward 
as this may sound, in the present context this principle has sometimes led to 
rather extensive interpretation. On occasion the Court has ruled that the par-
ticular role of the concept of public policy – which, as was noted above, in 
many national legal systems requires courts to abandon their passive role –
can oblige these courts to intervene of their own motion where EU law is 
at stake. It reached this conclusion by stressing inter alia the fundamental 
nature and importance of the EU rules at issue.165 Thus, by insisting on a 
broad interpretation of the (national law) concept of public policy, under the 
principle of equivalence an ‘indirect’ route to an obligation to raise certain 
points of EU law has been construed. This is necessarily limited however to 
situations where national law provides for an obligation to raise issues of 
public policy of their own motion in the first place.
375. Turning more in detail to the fields of law at issue in this study, even 
if the rules of secondary EU law do not provide any express obligations in 
this regard, an assessment of three key cases relating to the present subject-
matter nonetheless exposes certain differences. First, there is the GAT case 
concerning EU public procurement law.166 In this case the Court of Justice 
162 Cf. Storskrubb (2008), p. 232, who argues that the role assigned to national courts under 
Small Claims Regulation 861/2007 in assisting applicants fundamentally changes their 
traditionally passive role. See also point 9 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
163 CoJ case 70/77, Simmenthal, para. 10; CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijn-
del, para. 16-22; CoJ joined cases C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 28; CoJ case 
C-2/06, Kempter, para. 45.
164 On this principle, see further subsection 2.2.1 above.
165 E.g. CoJ case C-126/97, Eco Swiss, para. 36-39; CoJ case C-40/08, Asturcom, para. 49-55. 
Underlying this issue is the question how the CoJ approaches concept(s) of ‘public poli-
cy’ (‘d’ordre public’) and ‘mandatory rules’. See further Prechal (1998), pp. 689-705; Sni-
jders (2009), pp. 142-145; Schebesta (2010), pp. 864-877.
166 CoJ case C-315/01, GAT, para. 46-55. See further para. 88 above.
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ruled in essence that it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State 
to determine whether, and in which circumstances, a national court seised in 
an action brought under the Procurement Remedies Directives may raise of 
its own motion an infringement of EU law. It was found that neither the 
objective of these directives, nor any of their specific provisions precludes a 
rule of national law pursuant to which the court seised is to raise such points 
of its own motion. The Court added however that under these directives an 
action for damages cannot be dismissed on the ground, raised ex officio, that 
the contract award procedure had been anyway been unlawful (and that 
therefore no damages were due, for lack of causality). For this would be 
incompatible with the directives’ objectives of ensuring rapid and effective 
review for aggrieved private parties.
This ruling thus seems to contrast with the case law in the fields of EU 
consumer protection law (in particular the Unfair Terms Directive) and EU 
competition law (in particular Article 101 TFEU). As regards the former, in 
the Océano Grupo case law, discussed earlier, the Court held in essence that 
the national court seised is in principle obliged to raise of its own motion the 
unfairness of a term in a consumer contract, so as to ensure that consumers 
are given effective protection.167 In this respect the Court pointed to the 
often weak position of consumers and the nature and importance of the 
public interest underlying consumer protection in the EU legal order. As 
regards the latter, even if no particular secondary EU law comparable to the 
abovementioned directives applied, in Eco Swiss, a case that has also already 
discussed earlier, the Court confirmed the existence of a similar obligation, 
at least in relation to proceedings for the annulment of an arbitration 
award.168 In this context the fundamental importance attributed to the EU 
rules concerned was noted, which contributed to the conclusion that they 
constitute matters of public policy – at least for the purposes of the proceed-
ings at issue in that case – which, as was explained above, a national court 
may have to raise of its own motion.169
376. The next question is then of course what explains the differences that 
emerge when comparing the above case law. It may be tempting to conclude 
that consumer protection law and competition law are to be considered of 
exceptional importance in the EU legal order, and that therefore these points 
of law must be raised by a national court of its own motion, whereas the 
same would not, or at least not necessarily or to the same extent, apply in 
167 CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and C-244/98, Océano Grupo, para. 22-29. See further para. 167-
168 above.
168 CoJ case C-126/97, Eco Swiss, para. 36-41. See further para. 204 above.
169 It remains to be clarifi ed whether this fi nding can simply be transposed to cases that do 
not concern proceedings for the annulment of an arbitration award, especially consider-
ing the different nature of the concept of public policy. See further para. 204 above. Note 
also that, as was indicated in para. 374 above, in legal proceedings before the EU courts 
possible infringements of EU competition law are not considered as a matter of public 
policy that must be raised of the court’s own motion.
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relation to other fields of law, such as public procurement law. However this 
view does not seem to provide a satisfactory explanation. To start with, even 
if the above case law makes it clear that the nature and importance of the EU 
rules at issue can certainly be a relevant factor, as it stands, it hardly allows 
for such an unambiguous conclusion.170 At least for now many uncertainties 
remain, especially in terms of the precise legal basis for imposing such an 
obligation on national courts in the said cases. Moreover EU public procure-
ment law is rooted in the EU Treaties’ fundamental freedoms, notably those 
of establishment and to provide services.171 This makes it unlikely that these 
rules should somehow be deemed ‘less fundamental’ than EU law on con-
sumer protection and competition.
It is submitted that the different approaches and outcomes in the three 
abovementioned rulings are better explained in another manner. Three 
points should be noted in this connection. First, the questions referred dif-
fered. In GAT the Court of Justice was asked whether EU law precluded 
review of the national court’s own motion. Even if the subsequent consider-
ations by the Court were formulated in general terms, they should arguably 
still be understood in that light. That means that it is not excluded that, in 
other public procurement cases, the Court will rule that EU requires such 
own motion review, as it did in Océano Grupo and Eco Swiss. Second, in GAT 
the Court may have stressed that this question is to be settled primarily in 
accordance with national law, it nonetheless superimposed certain EU law 
requirements, derived from the need to safeguard the objective of the EU 
legislation in question. In that sense the difference between GAT on the one 
hand and Océano Grupo and Eco Swiss on the other hand seems more cos-
metic than fundamental. Third, and probably most importantly, in each of 
the three abovementioned cases the relevant EU law requirements appeared 
to serve primarily the protection of the rights of the private parties initiating 
the legal proceedings. From this perspective the principal difference 
between these cases is that this very same consideration argued in favour of 
active judicial intervention as a matter of EU law in Océano Grupo and Eco 
Swiss, whereas in the specific factual circumstances of GAT it argued against 
it (given that in this latter case an ex officio finding of an earlier infringement 
could mean that the damages claim was to be dismissed).
The fact that the reasoning and the conclusions reached differed in the 
three abovementioned rulings should therefore not distract from the fun-
damental objective that the Court of Justice consistently seeks to achieve, 
namely the effective protection of rights that private parties derive from EU 
law in proceedings before their respective national courts. The Court has 
long insisted on this generally being one of the key tasks of the national 
170 Cf. Opinion AG Poiares Maduro, joined cases C-222/05 to C-225/05, Van der Weerd, 
para. 27-29.
171 See para. 70 above.
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courts in the EU legal order.172 This consideration also underpins its posi-
tion that, where national law provides for discretion for the court to raise 
points of its own motion, this should be understood as an obligation where 
points of EU law are concerned.173 This reading is moreover consistent with 
other cases where similar issues emerged. Most notably in Heemskerk it was 
found that, at least where the principle of no reformatio in pejus is enshrined 
in national procedural law, a national court is not obliged to raise issues of 
EU law of its own motion where this would have the effect of leaving the 
private party-applicant worse off than if he had not done so.174 The Court 
made it clear in this case that this applies even where this may lead to nega-
tive consequences for certain matters of general interest protected by EU 
law (in the case at hand: animal welfare and the EU’s financial interests).
377. In summary, from a purely legislative perspective the question wheth-
er and if so, in which circumstances, a national court may or must raise cer-
tain points of EU law of its own motion (ex officio) is a rather straightforward 
one. For the EU legislation under consideration here leaves this topic entire-
ly unaddressed. But the case law of the Court of Justice makes it clear that in 
reality the situation is considerably more complex. Whereas it has been held 
that the Procurement Remedies Directives can in some cases preclude such 
own motion review, in relation to the Unfair Terms Directive and Article 101 
TFEU the Court has insisted that the national courts seised can be obliged, as 
a matter of EU law, to do precisely that. This case law tends to be casuistic 
and not always unambiguous. Several issues therefore still remain to be 
fully clarified. It would nonetheless appear that it is not primarily the nature 
or importance of the EU law at stake that underlies the imposition of certain 
EU law requirements in this respect. Rather, apart from applications of the 
principle of equivalence, the central unifying factor behind the Court’s 
seemingly diverging case law appears to be its desire to ensure the effective 
protection of the rights of private parties derived from EU law in proceed-
ings before the courts of the Member States.
172 E.g. CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal, para. 16; CoJ Opinion 1/09, Patent Court Agreement, 
para. 66 and 68. Note that here the emphasis tends to be on the rights of the private party-
applicant. Where the defendant is also a private party, the latter’s rights (which may or may 
not derive from EU law) typically receive less attention. See further para. 456 below.
173 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 13-14; CoJ case C-72/95, 
Kraaijeveld, para. 58; CoJ joined cases C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 29-32; 
CoJ case C-40/08, Asturcom, para. 54.
174 CoJ case C-455/06, Heemskerk, para. 44-48. See further Geursen (2009), p. 131. See e.g. also 
CoJ case C-87/90, Verholen, para. 11-16; CoJ case C-18/13, Maks Pen, para. 33-39.
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9.2.5. General rules
378. In part B of this study a number of ‘general rules’ were identified. This 
term refers to broadly formulated legislative provisions that deal not so much 
with certain specific issues, but rather apply generally to the matters covered 
by the legal act in question. Such general rules can be found primarily in 
the Procurement Remedies Directives and in the IPR Enforcement Directive. 
The former provide that it must be ensured that decisions can be reviewed 
“effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible”.175 In the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive it is stated that the measures, procedures and remedies set 
out therein must be “fair and equitable and [...] not be unnecessarily complicated 
and costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays”.176 The lat-
ter directive also provides that those measures, procedures and remedies 
must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” and that they must be applied 
in such as manner so as to provide for safeguards against their abuse.177
379. One might be inclined to overlook these provisions, considering their 
broad and general wording and the more detailed rules set out in the 
remainder of the abovementioned directives. It appears however that they 
can – at least potentially – fulfil an important function, in particular where 
interpretation of these directives is required. In the case of the Procurement 
Remedies Directives this effect is somewhat blurred in light of the fact that 
the Court of Justice has at times identified the above general rule as these 
directives’ objective.178 Where it is seen as such, the importance that the 
Court attached to this rule is less remarkable. For the Court generally tends 
to give considerable weight to the objective that an EU legal act seeks to 
achieve when interpreting it.179 For practical purposes it matters little how-
ever whether the requirement of effective and rapid review is seen as a ‘gen-
eral rule’ or as the objective of the Procurement Remedies Directives. Either 
way it can play an important role. That was the case for instance in the 
Court’s finding that these directives preclude a fault requirement in relation 
to actions for damages180 and that they allow for limitation periods to be set 
175 Art. 1(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further para. 100 
above.
176 Art. 3(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 144 above.
177 Art. 3(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
178 See para. 74 above.
179 It is e.g. settled case law that, when interpreting provisions of EU law or determining 
their scope, account is to be taken not only of their wording, but also of their context and 
objectives. See e.g. CoJ case C-323/03, Commission v. Spain, para. 23; CoJ case C-306/12, 
Spedition Welter, para. 17. Also, any discretion left to the Member States may not be used 
in such a manner as to compromise the objectives pursued by the act of EU law in ques-
tion. See e.g. CoJ case C-145/10, Painer, para. 107.
180 CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz, para. 43. See further para. 88 above.
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with respect to the bringing of legal proceedings by private parties under 
these directives.181
The potential significance of the abovementioned general rules set out in 
the IPR Enforcement Directive may be even greater. A good example is the 
Court’s ruling in L’Oréal v. eBay, discussed earlier.182 Here it was held in 
essence that an injunction sought under this directive (requiring an online 
intermediary to actively monitor all the data of each of its customers in 
order to prevent any future infringement of intellectual property rights) 
would not be compatible with the abovementioned requirement that the 
remedies granted must be fair, proportionate and not excessively costly. 
Many other situations are conceivable where these general rules can fulfil a 
similar interpretative function, especially where the directive does not 
expressly regulate certain matters, such as limitation periods or the standard 
of judicial review to be exercised.183 They can also serve as an important 
interpretative aid in relation to specific provisions of this directive, for 
example its rules on actions for damages or on the presentation and preser-
vation of evidence and information.184
380. In summary, the general rules laid down in the Procurement Remedies 
Directives and the IPR Enforcement Directive may be broadly and some-
what vaguely worded, they can nonetheless – or perhaps precisely for that 
reason – play an important role in resolving questions of interpretation relat-
ed to these directives, especially where they do not expressly regulate a par-
ticular issue or where their more detailed provisions leave scope for discus-
sion.
181 E.g. CoJ case C-230/02, Grossmann, para. 37-38. See further para. 95 and 347 above.
182 CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, para. 139. See further para. 131 above.
183 See subsections 9.1.3 and 9.2.3 above respectively.
184 See subsections 7.1.1 and 8.2.2 above respectively.





One could say that the three foregoing chapters that together made up part 
C of this study were essentially concerned with the question of how the pri-
vate enforcement of EU law is facilitated by the EU legislature in terms of 
remedies and procedural provisions. As part of the final part D, the present 
chapter 10 considers a number of broader aspects that emerge in this con-
nection. The questions addressed here can be summarised as the ‘how’ 
(understood more broadly), ‘when’ and ‘why’ of EU legislation facilitating 
private enforcement of EU law. More specifically, it is first assessed what, 
from a legal perspective, the EU legislature’s scope is to enact secondary law 
of the type at issue in this study. Attention then turns to the political and 
policy aspects and facilitating factors that can be of relevance in this respect. 
The questions addressed are thus essentially whether the EU has the legal 
empowerment, a sufficient policy reason as well as the necessary political 
will to enact legislative measures related to the private enforcement of EU 
law. Next the added-value of these legislative measures is considered, par-
ticularly as compared to legislative inaction at EU level. In the last subsec-
tion of this chapter the ‘how’ of the EU legislation at issue is re-assessed, this 
time particularly in terms of coherence and fragmentation. The following 
chapter 11 seeks to ‘zoom out’ even further and put in perspective the phe-
nomenon of private enforcement generally and EU legislation on this sub-
ject-matter specifically. The final chapter 12 summarises this study’s main 
findings and formulates conclusions.
10.1. The EU’s legal scope to act
When considering the EU legislation at issue in this study more generally, 
an important question from a legal perspective is that of the EU legislature’s 
scope to act under the EU Treaties. In this connection three specific issues 
are addressed in the below subsections. First, there is the question of the 
legal basis for the EU to act in this regard. Second, the legal constraints on 
the EU are assessed in as far as these constraints are associated with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Charter. Finally, the significance of the principle of nation-
al procedural autonomy in the present context is (re-)considered.
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10.1.1. Legal basis issues
381. Of fundamental – and indeed constitutional1 – importance in relation 
to the EU’s scope to legislate on a particular subject-matter is the question 
whether and if so, to which extent the EU Treaties contain a sufficient legal 
basis for the intended act. That applies for the adoption of secondary EU law 
generally and it certainly also applies in the present context. The importance 
and sensitivity of this question in relation to private enforcement-related EU 
legislation is illustrated by the critical comments that have regularly been 
made in relation to possible legislative action on matters such as collective 
redress and the private enforcement of EU competition law.2 
The requirement of a legal basis derives from the principle of conferral, 
pursuant to which the EU can act only within the competences conferred 
upon it by the Member States in the EU Treaties to attain the objectives set 
out therein.3 Competences not conferred upon the EU remain with the 
Member States.4 The EU Treaties list and categorise the areas of EU compe-
tence.5 Many particular legal bases have been set out in accordance with this 
general distribution of competences. Each act of secondary EU law needs to 
be rooted in such a legal basis. In most cases the legal basis concerns a spe-
cific sector or subject-matter, such as the protection of personal data, the 
establishment of a common agricultural policy or the pursuit of certain envi-
ronmental objectives.6 Where a legal basis for a particular legal act is lacking 
or where it is exceeded, that act is open to being annulled by the Court of 
Justice.7 It is settled case law that the choice of legal basis must be based on 
objective factors that are amendable to judicial review and that include in 
particular the aim and the content of the intended legislative measure in 
question.8
382. Two partial exceptions aside, the legal basis used for all legal acts 
assessed in part B of this study is Article 114 TFEU. The Procurement Reme-
dies Directives, the IPR Enforcement Directive, the Consumer Injunctions 
Directive and the Unfair Terms Directive have all been adopted on the basis 
of this article.9 The first partial exception is the Product Liability Directive, 
1 See e.g. GC joined cases T-458/10 to T-467/10 and T-471/10, McBride, para. 25.
2 See para. 189 and 219 above respectively.
3 Art. 4(1) TEU.
4 Art. 5(2) TEU.
5 Art. 2-5 TFEU.
6 See Art. 16(2), Art. 43(2) and Art. 192 TFEU respectively.
7 See Art. 263 TFEU as regards direct actions before the EU courts. Its second subparagraph 
specifi es that one of the grounds for annulment is a lack of competence. An ‘indirect’ 
route for establishing the invalidity of secondary EU law is the preliminary reference 
procedure set out in Art. 267 TFEU. See further para. 3 above.
8 E.g. CoJ case C-155/91, Commission v. Council, para. 7; CoJ case C-440/05, Commission v. 
Council, para. 61; CoJ case C-301/06, Ireland v. Parliament and Council, para. 60.
9 See para. 73, 112, 153 and 162 above respectively.
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which has been adopted under Article 115 TFEU. But this does not consti-
tute a divergence that is of further relevance here, because the differences in 
terms of substance between Article 114 and 115 TFEU are limited and the 
use of this latter article is due to the fact that Article 114 TFEU did not yet 
exist at the time that the Product Liability Directive was proposed and 
adopted.10 The subsequent amendment of this directive in 1999 was based 
on Article 114 TFEU.11 The other partial exception is the Competition Dam-
ages Directive, as this directive rests on a dual legal basis, i.e. not on Article 
114 alone, but also on Article 103 TFEU. The background of the addition of 
this latter article in this particular case has already been discussed earlier.12
Article 114 TFEU empowers the EU legislature to “adopt the measures 
for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market”. This illustrates that, notwithstanding the 
fact that the EU is mostly empowered to enact secondary law in relation to 
specific sectors or subject-matters, the EU Treaties sometimes confer powers 
in a more broadly formulated manner. That does not imply however that 
the powers conferred on the EU under this article are unlimited. As is evi-
dent from its wording, this provision requires in particular a link with the 
EU’s internal market. In its landmark Tobacco Advertising judgment (2000), 
the Court of Justice elaborated on this requirement.13 This case concerned 
a challenge, brought by Germany, of the legality of a directive on tobacco 
advertising, which had been adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.14 The 
Court held that this article does not vest in the EU legislature a general power 
to regulate the internal market. A mere finding of certain disparities between 
the relevant laws of the Member States and of an abstract risk of obstacles 
to the exercise of the EU Treaties’ fundamental freedoms or of distortions of 
competition liable to result therefrom does not suffice to justify its use. The 
Court underlined that instead EU legislation adopted on the basis of Article 
114 TFEU must genuinely have as its object the improvement of the conditions 
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. Any alleged dis-
tortion of competition that the legislation concerned seeks to eliminate most 
be appreciable. This does not necessarily exclude the use of this article to 
prevent the emergence of future obstacles, provided however that this emer-
10 Article 114 TFEU was not inserted in the EU Treaties until 1987 (Single European Act). To 
the extent relevant in the present context, Art. 114 and 115 TFEU are worded mostly in a 
similar manner, a key difference being that the former article allows for the adoption of 
legislation by qualifi ed majority voting instead of the unanimity required under the latter 
article.
11 See Product Liability Amending Directive 1999/34.
12 See para. 228 above. In relation to Art. 103 TFEU, see also para. 386 below.
13 CoJ case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco advertising), para. 83-83 and 
106.
14 Directive 98/43/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco 
products, OJ 1998, L 213/9.
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gence is likely and that the EU legislative measures in question are designed 
to prevent these obstacles from emerging. In the case at hand the Court 
found that these conditions had not been met. It therefore annulled the direc-
tive. In subsequent case law the Court dealt with similar questions, essen-
tially confirming and expanding on the line set out in Tobacco Advertising.15
383. In this light all legal acts considered in part B of this study rely in 
essence on two key considerations. In the first place, they all highlight – be it 
to a greater or lesser extent – the existence of certain divergences between the 
relevant laws of the Member States. It is then typically noted that this leads 
to a distortion of competition and a fragmentation of the internal market, 
which in turn is the justification for the EU to take legislative action with 
a view to reducing these divergences. While the Procurement Remedies 
Directive and the Product Liability Directive do not go into much detail on 
this point, this logic has for instance been set out quite extensively in the 
IPR Enforcement Directive. Its recitals speak of the existence of “major dis-
parities as regards the means of enforcing intellectual property rights”, which are 
said to be prejudicial to the functioning of the internal market and to make 
it impossible to ensure that these rights enjoy an equivalent level of protec-
tion throughout the EU.16 The IPR Enforcement Directive therefore aims “to 
approximate legislative systems so as to ensure a high, equivalent and homogeneous 
level of protection in the internal market”.17 Likewise in the recitals of the Com-
petition Damages Directive it is said that “marked differences” exist between 
the laws of the Member States, which lead to an “uneven playing field”.18 This 
directive seeks to “reduce the differences” between these laws and to “prevent 
the emergence of wider differences”.19 Considerations of this kind can also be 
found in the Unfair Terms Directive. After having observed that there are 
“marked divergences” between the relevant laws of the Member States, it is 
noted there that “uniform rules of law in the matter of unfair terms” should be 
adopted.20
A second key consideration is the justification of the harmonised rules in 
terms of effectiveness. For example, the IPR Enforcement Directive recalls the 
need for “effective means of enforcing intellectual property rights” and for ensur-
ing that the substantive law on intellectual property is “applied effectively”.21 
Along the same lines the Competition Damages Directive states that the said 
divergences “affect the substantive effectiveness” of the EU right to compensa-
15 E.g. CoJ case 491/01, British American Tobacco; CoJ case C-217/04, UK v. Parliament and 
Council; CoJ case C-380/03, Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco advertising II); CoJ 
case C-155/04, Alliance for National Health; CoJ case C-301/06, Ireland v. Parliament and 
Council; CoJ case C-58/08, Vodafone; CoJ case C-270/12, UK v. Parliament and Council.
16 Recital 7 and 8 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 112 above.
17 Recital 10 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also para. 113 above.
18 Recital 7 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 223 and 228 above.
19 Recital 9 Competition Damages Directive.
20 Recitals 3 and 10 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See further para. 163 above.
21 Recital 3 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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tion for infringements and leads to the “uneven enforcement” of this right.22 As 
the Commission noted in its proposal, this directive “seeks to ensure the effec-
tive enforcement of the EU competition rules”, against the background of the 
idea that such private enforcement contributes to ensuring compliance with 
these rules.23 It similarly follows from the recitals of the Procurement Reme-
dies Directives that these directives aim to ensure the “effective application” of 
the substantive rules at issue, whereby the importance of the availability of 
“effective remedies” at the national level is also stressed.24 The purpose of the 
measures provided for in the Consumer Injunctions Directive is essentially to 
ensure that “the effectiveness of national measures transposing the [substantive EU 
consumer protection directives concerned] […] is [not] thwarted” in cross-border 
situations.25 Such a focus on effectiveness may be somewhat less clearly 
articulated in the Product Liability Directive and the Unfair Terms Directive, 
probably because these directives contain substantive as well as remedial 
and procedural rules, but they nonetheless also make it clear that the over-
arching aim is to contribute to the effective protection of consumers.26
384. The fact that Article 114 TFEU is the legal basis for virtually all EU 
legislation considered in this study does not mean that its use has always 
been accepted in an unquestioned manner. In particular, the following two 
types of concerns occasionally emerged in this connection. 
The first concern relates to the abovementioned requirement of a suffi-
cient link with the internal market. Concerns of this type were raised in par-
ticular during the legislative process in relation to the Unfair Terms Direc-
tive and the Product Liability Directive27 and occasionally also in the legal 
literature.28 This has however on the whole not been a major topic of debate. 
In fact, considering the central importance of this internal market require-
ment under Article 114 TFEU, it can be seen as remarkable that this issue has 
been raised so sparingly in relation to the EU legislation at issue. Neither 
22 Recitals 7 and 8 Competition Damages Directive.
23 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 2.
24 Recitals 1 and 4 Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665 and recitals 1 and 3 Utilities 
Remedies Directive 92/13. See also recital 81 Concessions Awards Directive 2014/23, 
which explains that the scope of the Procurement Remedies Directives must be extended 
so as to cover also infringements of that directive by pointing to the need “to ensure ade-
quate judicial protection of candidates and tenderers in the concession award procedures, as well 
as to make effective the enforcement of this Directive”.
25 Recital 4 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
26 Recital 13 Product Liability Directive 85/374; recital 10 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
27 As regards Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, see Council, doc. 4176/91, pp. 2-3; Council, 
doc. 4904/91, p. 2 and its annex. As regards Product Liability Directive 85/374, critical 
comments in this regard were initially voiced from the side of the European Parliament. 
See European Parliament, doc. 246/78, pp. 6-9. However this position was subsequently 
reversed; see European Parliament, doc. 71/79.
28 As regards Product Liability Directive 85/374, see e.g. Whittaker (2005), p. 439. Cf. 
Weatherill (2012), pp. 1306-1310 (in relation to a number of other (substantive) consumer 
protection directives).
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have any legal challenges been brought before the EU courts for any alleged 
failure to meet this requirement. This can be explained by the fact that the 
link between the internal market and the substantive rules of EU law to 
which the said legislation relates is rather evident.29 That being so, the adop-
tion of additional EU rules relating to the enforcement of those substantive 
rules – by means of a “logical extension”30 of, or a “corollary”31 to, those sub-
stantive rules – may also generate comparatively little debate on this point.32
The second concern relates in essence to the question whether this article 
can be used as a basis for EU legislative measures that harmonise national 
law on (civil) procedure. The issue here is not so much whether the EU is com-
petent at all, but rather whether Article 114 TFEU is the most appropriate 
legal basis for any such intended legislative intervention. Concerns of this 
type emerged in 2003 in relation to the proposal for the IPR Enforcement 
Directive. Several Member States raised the question whether, given that 
many of its provisions relate to matters of civil procedural law,33 the draft 
directive should not (also) be based on Article 81 TFEU concerning judicial 
cooperation in civil matters.34 The Commission had already answered this 
question in the negative.35 The legal service of the Council subsequently 
agreed. In essence the latter pointed out that the draft directive did not seek 
to establish harmonised rules eliminating cross-border obstacles to the good 
functioning of civil proceedings in general.36 It rather sought to harmonise 
remedies and procedures only in so far as necessary to achieve a particular 
sectoral aim, namely to ensure that intellectual property rights enjoy effective 
and equivalent protection throughout the EU.37 This intervention proved 
sufficient to settle the matter within the Council. Comparable discussions, 
with comparable outcomes, took place in connection to the Consumer Injunc-
tion Directive38 and the Competition Damages Directive.39
29 See para. 70 (concerning substantive EU public procurement law), para. 108 (concerning 
substantive EU intellectual property law), para. 149-151 (concerning substantive EU con-
sumer protection law) and para. 199-201 (concerning substantive EU competition law).
30 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 5.
31 Reinbothe (2010), p. 6.
32 Cf. e.g. also European Parliament, Resolution on consumer redress, OJ 1987, C 99/203, 
recital C: “the substantive rights conferred by [EU] legislation on the consumer must be supple-
mented by appropriate procedural mechanisms to ensure their enforcement”.
33 Cf. para. 142 above.
34 See Council, doc. 6052/04, p. 7. The relevant provision of the EU Treaties at the time was 
Art. 65 EC. This provision is not exactly identical to its successor, Art. 81 TFEU, but these 
differences are only of limited relevance here. See also para. 432 below.
35 Given that it had based its proposal solely based on Art. 114 TFEU. See further Commis-
sion, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, pp. 16-17.
36 Cf. recital 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
37 Council, doc. 6299/04, p. 2.
38 See Council, doc. 7562/98. In this case the UK made a statement on this matter, accepting 
the outcome that this directive was to be based on Art. 114 TFEU, while underlining that 
“it does not accept [EU] competence in the fi eld of civil judicial procedure”.
39 See Council, doc. 16176/13; Council, doc. 15983/13, p. 2. See further para. 219 and 228 
above.
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385. In and by itself, the modest degree of debate and the absence of legal 
challenges, referred to above, do not necessarily mean that the legality of 
the use of Article 114 TFEU for the present purposes is established beyond 
doubt. That is after all only for the Court of Justice to decide. The foregoing 
nonetheless seems to allow for the conclusion that the parties concerned 
mostly agree on the use that can be made of this article so as to adopt EU 
legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law. Although a case-
by-case assessment in light of the aim and the content of each intended leg-
islative measure always remains required, legal basis issues therefore cer-
tainly need not be an absolute bar for the EU to enact legislation on private 
enforcement-related matters.
386. That applies all the more so because, its frequent use in the present 
context notwithstanding, Article 114 TFEU is not necessarily the only pos-
sible legal basis for the adoption of EU legislation of the type at issue here. 
Depending on the case at hand, other articles of the EU Treaties may offer 
more specific (and therefore in principle preferable) alternatives. Article 103 
TFEU provides an example thereof in as far as EU legislative measures giv-
ing effect to EU competition law are concerned. In fact, it is widely agreed 
that Article 103 TFEU is the most evident legal basis for the adoption of an 
act of secondary EU law that is specifically concerned with the private 
enforcement of EU competition law.40 The Competition Damages Directive 
demonstrates that the Commission as well as the EU legislature essentially 
concur with this view, even though, as was noted earlier, in this particular 
case Article 103 has been used together with Article 114 TFEU, in light of the 
fact that the directive also relates to infringements of certain rules of nation-
al competition law.41 The possible relevance of other articles than Article 114 
TFEU is further illustrated by other acts of secondary EU law that address 
private enforcement-related matters. The Gender Equality Directive has for 
example been based on Article 157(3) TFEU concerning social policy, where-
as the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive has been established 
under Article 192(1) TFEU concerning the environment.42
387. As a final point it is to be noted that in the EU legal system the choice 
of legal basis is not only decisive for the question whether the EU is compe-
tent to act. It also determines the applicable legislative procedure for the adop-
tion of the proposed legal act in question. Of particular importance in this 
connection are the relative powers granted to the EU’s two main institutions 
where the adoption of secondary EU law is concerned, i.e. the Council and 
40 See para. 228 above.
41 See further para. 228 above.
42 Gender Equality Directive 2006/54; Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
2011/92.
p. 416 D. Broader aspects, perspectives and conclusions para. 389
the European Parliament.43 Under the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ these 
two institutions essentially decide jointly.44 As its name indicates, this proce-
dure is prescribed most commonly. But the EU Treaties can also require a 
‘special legislative procedure’ to be followed.45 That is for example the case 
under Article 103 TFEU. This article demands only the consultation of the 
European Parliament, thus leaving it to the Council to adopt the acts estab-
lished on this basis. As such the choice of legal basis can be a cause of inter-
institutional differences of opinion and potential conflicts at EU level, as the 
developments relating to the Competition Damages Directive illustrate.46
10.1.2. Subsidiarity, proportionality and fundamental rights
388. Apart from the principle of conferral that underlies the requirement of 
a sufficient legal basis, as was set out in the previous subsection, there are 
two other noteworthy principles that can constrain the EU’s capacity to act, 
namely the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Article 5 TEU 
foresees what could be called a ‘three-step-test’ in relation to the existence 
and exercise of EU competences, addressing in essence first the question 
whether the EU Treaties allow the EU to act (conferral, discussed above), 
then the question whether the EU is better placed to act than the Member 
States individually (subsidiarity) and finally the question whether the 
intended EU measure is a suitable means in relation to the objective sought 
(proportionality).
389. More specifically, pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, in areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence,47 the EU can act “only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at 
[EU] level”.48 Put simply, even where the EU has been conferred the neces-
sary powers, the intended EU action must thus have added-value before 
these powers can be exercised. In legal terms the importance of this princi-
43 In addition the choice of legal basis can be of importance for the applicable voting require-
ments in the Council, including whether a quality majority or unanimity is required. It 
may be assumed that this latter issue played a role in the abovementioned discussions on 
whether IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48 and Consumer Injunctions Directive 
2009/22 should be based either on Art. 81 or 114 TFEU (although since the revision of this 
former article, i.e. ex Art. 65 EC, this distinction is no longer equally relevant in this 
regard).
44 See Art. 289(1) and 294 TFEU.
45 See Art. 289(2) TFEU.
46 See para. 219 and 228 above.
47 See Art. 3 TFEU, which contains a (relatively short) list of the areas where the EU has 
exclusive competence. It includes “establishing of the competition rules necessary for the func-
tioning of the internal market” (point b).
48 Art. 5(3) TEU. See further Tridimas (2006), pp. 183-188; Craig & De Búrca (2011), 
pp. 94-100; Craig (2012b), p. 72.
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ple is however rather limited. The EU courts tend not to employ a high stan-
dard of judicial review in this regard when deciding on the legality of acts of 
secondary EU law.49 This means that the legal relevance of the principle of 
subsidiarity is mainly procedural. It implies among other things an obliga-
tion to consult widely,50 to involve national parliaments51 and to explain 
why it is considered to have been complied with.52 This principle has there-
fore been called “par excellence a political principle, which seeks to influence the 
legislative process ex ante [and which has had] virtually no impact as a ground for 
[judicial] review”.53
As regards the EU legislation and initiatives discussed in part B of this 
study, interested parties, including some Member States, have regularly 
invoked the principle of subsidiarity when objecting to certain (aspects of) 
suggested or proposed measures. This occurred for example in relation to 
the IPR Enforcement Directive, both in general and in relation to its rules on 
legal costs.54 Subsidiarity-related concerns were also voiced in connection to 
possible EU legislative involvement with issues of collective redress and the 
initiative that led to the Competition Damages Directive.55 It follows from 
the foregoing that concerns of this kind are probably best understood as 
expressions of political or policy-related concerns as to whether or not it is 
seen as appropriate or desirable for the EU to exercise its competences con-
cerning the matters in question.56 That is not to suggest that concerns of this 
type are not to be taken seriously. To the contrary, there is no question that 
the existence or absence of sufficient political will and support by stakehold-
ers is a crucial requirement for the adoption of any legislation.57 The point 
here is rather that this is not a matter of the legality of the exercise of the 
EU’s competences in a strict sense.
390. In accordance with the principle of proportionality the content and 
form of EU action may further not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the EU Treaties.58 This proportionality test, which also extends 
to the EU’s law-making activities, thus essentially concerns the issue of how 
the EU makes use of its power to act, once it has been established that it is 
49 E.g. CoJ case C-84/94, UK v. Council, para. 55; CoJ case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament 
and Council, para. 32-33; CoJ case C-491/01, British American Tobacco, para. 177-185; GC 
case T-526/10, Inuit, para. 80-85 (appeal pending; see CoJ case C-398/13 P, Inuit).
50 Cf. Art. 2 Protocol (No 2) to the EU Treaties on the application of the principles of subsid-
iarity and proportionality.
51 Cf. Protocol (No 1) to the EU Treaties on the role of national parliaments in the EU.
52 Cf. e.g. recital 31 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
53 Tridimas (2006), p. 183.
54 See para. 116 and 138 above respectively. On these rules on legal costs, see also subsection 
8.2.5 above.
55 See para. 189 and 219 above respectively.
56 In a similar sense, see Komninos (2008), pp. 46-48.
57 See also subsection 10.2.1 below.
58 Art. 5(4) TEU. See further Tridimas (2006), pp. 177-180; Craig & De Búrca (2011), pp. 526-
533.
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both competent and best placed to do so. It appears that, although this prin-
ciple has in other contexts regularly been invoked to contest the legality of 
secondary EU law, contrary to the two aforementioned principles of confer-
ral and subsidiarity, proportionality does not emerge as an issue that tends 
to be frequently invoked in connection to the legislation at issue in this 
study.
Suffice to note therefore that, in areas that involve political, economic 
and social choices and where complex assessments are to be made, the 
Court of Justice allows the EU legislature a broad discretion, limiting its 
review to verifying the absence of any manifests errors, misuse of power or 
manifest excess of the bounds of that discretion.59 The EU legislature must 
base its choices on objective criteria and, where relevant, examine whether 
the objectives pursued by the measure chosen are such as to justify even 
substantial negative economic consequences for certain undertakings.60 Yet, 
as long as the measures adopted by the EU legislature are not manifestly 
inappropriate for achieving the objective pursued, the Court does not sub-
stitute its own assessment for that of the appropriateness or otherwise of 
these measures.61 The standard of judicial review is thus limited, especially 
where divergent interests are to be reconciled and options are thus to be 
selected within the context of the policy choices which are the legislature’s 
responsibility.62
391. A different kind of legal constraint for the EU legislature when enact-
ing private enforcement-related legislation of the type at issue here concerns 
the need to respect fundamental rights.63 Earlier in this study it has already 
been noted that the role and especially the visibility of fundamental rights in 
EU law has increased since the Charter became legally binding in 2009.64 
The obligation for the EU to respect the rights set out in the Charter implies 
that also the secondary law adopted by its legislature must be ‘Charter-
compliant’.65
At the same time the case law has made it clear the fundamental rights 
that are typically at issue here (such as, as the case may be, the protection of 
personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the protection of intellec-
tual property and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial66) are not 
59 E.g. CoJ case C-84/94, UK v. Council, para. 58; CoJ case C-491/01, British American Tobacco, 
para. 123; CoJ case C-344/04, IATA, para. 80; CoJ case C-58/08, Vodafone, para. 52. See 
also, more generally, e.g. CoJ case C-127/07, Arcelor Atlantique, para. 57-59; CoJ case 
C-601/11 P, France v. Commission, para. 142.
60 E.g. CoJ case C-58/08, Vodafone, para. 53.
61 E.g. CoJ case C-150/94, UK v. Council, para. 83.
62 E.g. ibid., para. 89.
63 As regards a number of more specifi c fundamental rights-related issues that can emerge 
in the present context, see also subsections 11.2.5 and 11.2.6 below.
64 See para. 43 above.
65 Cf. Art. 51(1) Charter.
66 See Art. 8, 16, 17(2) and 47 Charter respectively.
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absolute.67 In the words of the Court of Justice, they “do not constitute unfet-
tered prerogatives”.68 In its Article 52(1) the Charter expressly allows for the 
limitation of the exercise of the rights laid down therein in the general inter-
est or to protect the rights of others, provided that the limitation is laid 
down in law, the essence of the fundamental right concerned continues to be 
respected and the restriction is proportional to the objective pursued.
It remains to be fully clarified how ‘strict’ the Court of Justice’s review is 
when verifying whether acts of secondary EU law are consistent with the 
Charter. On the one hand the Court has acknowledged in this context that 
the EU legislature can enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.69 On the other 
hand the case law available to date suggests that this margin can actually be 
rather limited and that the judicial review exercised by the Court can conse-
quently be rather strict. This will depend on factors such as the area con-
cerned, the nature of the rights at issue and the seriousness of the interfer-
ence with those rights.70 That being so, although it remains difficult to 
determine this in the abstract and further clarification in the case law will 
need to be awaited, as it stands the overall impression is that acts of second-
ary EU law are generally more likely to be annulled for lack of respect for 
fundamental rights than for an insufficient legal basis or incompatibility 
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.71
10.1.3. National procedural autonomy revisited
392. A further question that can arise in relation to the foregoing is what 
role is left, if any, for the principle of national procedural autonomy. This 
principle has already been introduced in part A of this study.72 The findings 
of part B of this study confirm, in a nutshell, that the Member States have no 
proper ‘autonomy’ as regards matters related to remedies and procedures 
applicable in proceedings before their national courts, in the sense that the 
EU would necessarily be barred from legislating on these matters. As this 
study illustrates, over the years a broad range of EU legislative measures 
relating to precisely these matters have been adopted at EU level. These 
67 E.g. CoJ case C-275/06, Promusicae, para. 61-69; CoJ joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, 
Schecke, para. 48; CoJ case C-283/11, Sky Österreich, para. 45 and 60; CoJ case C-399/11, 
Melloni, para. 49.
68 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini, para. 63; CoJ case C-418/11, Texdata, 
para. 84.
69 CoJ joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi, para. 360.
70 CoJ joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, para. 47-48.
71 E.g. whereas annulments for lack of a suffi cient legal basis or infringements of the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity and proportionality generally remain (very) scarce, in the above-
mentioned rulings in Kadi, Schecke and Digital Rights Ireland the CoJ annulled the acts in 
question for failure to respect the applicable fundamental rights (even if in the latter case 
it had ruled earlier that the legal basis chosen for the act in question was suffi cient; see 
CoJ case C-301/06, Ireland v. Parliament and Council). Cf. Craig & De Búrca (2011), pp. 372-
378.
72 See section 2.1 above.
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measures touch upon matters as diverse as the requirements for liability in 
damages to be incurred, the availability of interim relief, rules on legal costs, 
the limitation periods that apply for the bringing of legal proceedings and 
the forum competent to hear the private enforcement actions brought under 
this legislation.73 That the EU need not be barred from acting is also con-
firmed by the discussion in the two preceding subsections, where it was 
found that neither the requirement of a sufficient legal basis, nor the princi-
ples of subsidiary and proportionality nor the requirement to respect funda-
mental rights need to be insurmountable obstacles. In that sense the princi-
ple of national procedural autonomy has no further role to play. Nonetheless 
three further comments can be made against this background on this prin-
ciple and its relevance in the present context.
393. In the first place, it may be helpful to distinguish between two types 
of EU activities in private enforcement-related matters, namely law-making 
and judiciary activities. To begin with the latter, where a preliminary ques-
tion is referred to the Court of Justice concerning the rules that regulate the 
enforcement of EU law at national level, this institution must provide an 
answer on the basis of the law as it stands. Although this study might seem 
to suggest otherwise, the fact remains that in many instances no particular 
rule of secondary EU law applies that addresses the remedial and proce-
dural matters that may arise in this respect. In those cases, by default as it 
were, national law takes central stage.74 In that sense the Member States 
possess a degree of ‘autonomy’ concerning these matters, subject to the lim-
its set by the EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness.75 It is in 
this context that the Court of Justice regularly refers to the principle of 
(national) procedural autonomy.
This should not be misunderstood to mean however that – where there 
is a sufficient legal basis and the principles of subsidiarity and proportional-
ity are respected – the EU is barred from legislating on private enforcement-
related matters. The 1976 Rewe judgment itself, which lay the legal founda-
tions of the principle of national procedural autonomy, already made this 
clear. For there the Court noted that “[w]here necessary, Articles [114 to 117 and 
352 TFEU] enable appropriate measures to be taken to remedy differences between 
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States if they are likely to distort or harm the functioning of the internal market”.76 
The Court has since made this (even) more explicit. In 1994 it was asked to 
rule on inter alia the distribution of competences between the EU and the 
Member States in relation to the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement. This 
agreement touches upon many of the issues that are also addressed in the 
73 See section 7.1 and subsections 8.2.1, 8.2.5, 9.1.3 and 9.2.1 above respectively.
74 Cf. Milutinovic (2010), p. 312. See also para. 27 above.
75 On these two principles, see section 2.2 above. The principle of effective judicial protec-
tion can also come into play in this context, as was discussed in section 2.3 above.
76 CoJ case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5. See further para. 26 above.
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IPR Enforcement Directive.77 In the context of these proceedings several 
Member States argued that, given that the TRIPS Agreement includes vari-
ous measures relating to remedies and procedures applicable in proceedings 
before their respective national courts, this is a Member State competence. 
The Court rejected this argument however. It held that “[i]f that argument is 
to be understood as meaning that all those measures are within some sort of domain 
reserved for the Member States, it cannot be accepted. The [EU] is certainly compe-
tent to harmonise national rules on those matters, in so far as, in the words of Arti-
cle [115 TFEU], they ‘directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal 
market”.78
In other words, also with respect to possible legislative measures taken 
by the EU the principle of national procedural autonomy can perhaps be 
best understood as a default rule. The essence here is not so much one of the 
autonomy of the Member States. The key question is rather whether or not 
the EU is competent to act and if so, to which extent it has exercised these 
competences. This is not fundamentally different from any other intended 
or actual EU legislative activity, regardless of whether it concerns matters 
that are substantive or procedural in nature.79 Where the EU legislature has 
not (or not yet) acted, it is for the Member States to take all necessary mea-
sures to enable the private parties concerned to effectively exercise their 
rights based on EU law.80 It follows, as was the case with the principle of 
subsidiarity,81 where opposition against possible EU legislative action on 
private enforcement-related matters is expressed in terms of national proce-
dural autonomy, it is perhaps better understood as a policy or a political 
concern rather than a strictly legal one.
394. In the second place, even where EU legislation of the type at issue 
here has been adopted, in many respects ‘purely’ national rules (i.e. rules of 
national law other than those transposing a directive) on remedial and pro-
cedural matters continue to be of considerable importance. For this legisla-
tion often leaves considerable space for what could be called ‘residual’ auton-
omy on the side of the Member States. That is to say, the scope of this EU 
legislation and the level of detail provided for on the matters covered may 
mean that the degree of EU involvement can be seen as remarkable and far-
going when compared to most other fields of EU law. But the degree of EU 
involvement with the applicable remedial and procedural rules generally 
still remains rather modest when compared to the bodies of written and 
unwritten rules on these matters that apply at the domestic level. It is evi-
77 See para. 118 above.
78 CoJ Opinion 1/94, WTO, para. 104. Although reference is made here to Art. 115 TFEU, 
there can be no doubt that this observation also extends, in principle, to Art. 114 TFEU. 
On the relationship between these two articles, see also para. 382 above.
79 Cf. Art. 4(1) and 5(2) TEU; Art. 2(2) TFEU.
80 Cf. Art. 4(3) and 19(1) TEU.
81 See para. 389 above.
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dent that this EU legislation by no means amounts to a complete and 
exhaustive procedural code. In that sense a significant scope for autono-
mous decision-making at national level typically remains, even where EU 
legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law has been adopted.
It is to be noted in this connection that all EU legal acts discussed in the 
foregoing are directives. That implies that the Member States are inherently 
left with some leeway. For in the EU legal order a directive is binding as to 
the result to be achieved, but it leaves the choice of form and methods to the 
Member States when transposing the EU rules concerned into national 
law.82 It is true that this does not mean that directives cannot set out exten-
sive, detailed and exhaustive rules and thus limit the Member States’ scope 
for manoeuvre to a high extent. However this has on the whole not been the 
approach followed in the directives under consideration here. The Unfair 
Terms Directive states for instance that “as they now stand, national laws allow 
only partial harmonisation to be envisaged”.83 Similarly the Consumer Injunc-
tions Directive declares, rather modestly, that “some degree of approximation of 
national provisions” is needed.84 The IPR Enforcement Directive may further 
be comparatively ambitious in seeking to ensure a high, equivalent and 
homogeneous level of protection across the EU, but it also provides that the 
Member States remain free to establish national rules on the matters covered 
that are more favourable for rightholders.85 The Commission has therefore 
described this directive as “a minimum but standard toolbox”.86 Similarly it has 
held that its initiative concerning the private enforcement of EU competition 
law aims to achieve “effective minimum protection”.87
The Product Liability Directive may be somewhat of an outlier in this 
regard, given that the Court of Justice has held that it entails ‘complete’ (or 
‘maximum’) harmonisation.88 This implies that Member States cannot adopt 
diverging measures concerning issues falling within its scope. It that sense, 
this directive is more prescriptive and significantly limits the Member 
States’ flexibility. It is questionable however whether this finding corre-
sponds with the EU legislature’s intention when adopting the directive.89 
More importantly, in this case this hardly means that the Member States no 
longer have any scope for manoeuvre. For one thing, the Product Liability 
82 Art. 288, third subparagraph TFEU. According to the CoJ’s case law, it follows from this 
provision that when the Member States transpose a directive they have the obligation to 
ensure that it is fully effective, whilst retaining a broad discretion as to the choice of meth-
ods. See e.g. CoJ case C-389/08, Base, para. 24-25.
83 Recital 12 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
84 Recital 7 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
85 Art. 2(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
86 Commission, Report on IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2010) 779, p. 5.
87 Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165, p. 2.
88 E.g. CoJ case C-183/00, González Sánchez. See further para. 174 above.
89 Cf. Council, Resolution on amendment of the liability for defective products directive, 
OJ 2002, C 26/2. At the time of adoption of Product Liability Directive 84/374 the Council 
was the sole legislator.
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Directive contains several optional provisions, for example on the availabil-
ity of the ‘development risk defence’ and the possibility to ‘cap’ the amount 
of damages due.90 By leaving it to the Member States to decide whether or 
not they wish to enact these provisions in their respective national laws, 
those laws will almost inevitably continue to differ; at best only the margins 
are narrowed. For another thing, the number of issues exhaustively regu-
lated by this directive is rather limited. This means that on many other rele-
vant private enforcement-related matters that could arise in this connection 
the Member States remain in principle at liberty to set their own rules.
Consequently, although the scope and intensity of the EU involvement 
thus differs per directive, the EU legislation at hand generally leaves the 
Member States a significant degree of flexibility. It does so in particular in 
three manners. A first such manner is not to deal with a given issue at all, or 
not in any detail. For example, contrary to the Commission’s earlier inten-
tions, apart from an occasional reference in its recitals, the Competition 
Damages Directive does not address issues of fault, collective redress, cau-
sality and legal costs.91 And, despite earlier suggestions to be more specific, 
the Procurement Remedies Directive largely leave it open which heads of 
damages are to be compensated.92 A second manner is to include an express 
reference to national law. One could think of the IPR Enforcement Directive’s 
rules on legal standing. The reference to national law contained therein 
leaves many issues to be decided at the level of the Member States.93 The 
Unfair Terms Directive similarly refers to national law in connection to the 
contractual remedy for which it provides.94 A third manner is the inclusion 
of optional provisions. It has already been noted above that the Product Lia-
bility Directive does so on several occasions. The Consumer Injunctions 
Directive offers another example, as it allows the Member States to decide 
whether or not to impose a requirement of ‘pre-trial’ contacts between the 
parties.95
395. In the third place, as was explained above, the EU legislation at issue 
in this study may often leave the Member States considerable ‘residual’ 
autonomy. But as soon as the subject-matter in question is considered to fall 
within the scope of this legislation, it is no longer covered by the principle 
of national procedural autonomy. The aforementioned ‘residual’ autonomy 
thus only constitutes ‘procedural autonomy’ within the meaning of the 
90 Art. 15(1)(b) and Art. 16 Product Liability Directive 85/374 respectively. See further 
para. 180 and 183 above respectively.
91 See para. 225 above.
92 See para. 84-85 above. See also subsection 7.1.5 above.
93 Art. 4 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 141 above. See also subsec-
tion 9.1.2 above.
94 Art. 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See para. 164-166 above. See also section 7.2 
above.
95 Art. 5 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further para. 158 above. See also sub-
section 9.2.2 above.
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Court’s Rewe case law where the subject-matter at issue is not covered by 
the said legislation. In all other cases, to use the Court’s words in Rewe, there 
is no longer an “absence of [EU] rules on the subject”.96 Accordingly in the lat-
ter cases the national laws concerned are not subject to the comparatively 
(although by no means always97) more ‘lenient’ test under the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, but rather to the principle of primacy of EU law.98 
Put differently, the EU legislation at issue here may be concerned with reme-
dial and procedural matters, but it still concerns EU law. As such it is not to 
be treated any differently from EU law that addresses matters of substantive 
law.
It follows that the mere fact that this EU legislation exists can be of con-
siderable importance, even if this legislation leaves the Member States a 
degree of flexibility in one of the abovementioned manners. In concrete 
terms this means in particular that the main test applied in cases falling 
within the scope of the EU legislation concerned is whether the exercise of 
the discretion that may be left to the Member States is such as to ensure the 
effectiveness and the objectives of this legislation (as opposed to the test under 
the ‘Rewe-principles’ of equivalence and effectiveness). It is unfortunately 
not always clear whether or not a particular issue falls within the scope of 
EU legal acts such as the ones at issues in this study and which test is there-
fore to be applied. For instance, the Court has held that the Unfair Terms 
Directive regulates neither which court is to have territorial jurisdiction, nor 
the number of instances of jurisdiction.99 Both issues were therefore consid-
ered to fall within the Member States’ procedural autonomy and assessed 
under the EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness.100 Yet, while 
this same directive does not (expressly) regulate the question of own motion 
review either, in Océano Grupo this latter issue was assessed and decided in 
light of the objective of this directive and its particular provision at issue.101 
The Procurement Remedies Directives similarly do not expressly regulate in 
any way the standard of judicial review to be applied in cases brought under 
these directives. But in Hospital Ingenieure the Court nonetheless did not con-
sider this issue to fall within the Member States’ procedural autonomy. 
96 CoJ case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5. See further para. 26 above.
97 See section 2.2 above.
98 Cf. Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), pp. 216-217; Schebesta (2010), p. 856. See also Trstenjak & 
Beysen (2011), p. 103.
99 CoJ case C-413/12, ACICL, para. 28 and 30. See e.g. also CoJ case C-479/12, Gautzsch, 
para. 39-42. In this latter ruling it is noted that Community Designs Regulation 6/2002 
contains express rules neither on the burden of proof, nor on the production of evidence. 
That fi rst issue is then nonetheless considered to be regulated by EU law, so as to ensure 
that the objective of that regulation can be entailed, whereas the latter issue is left to be 
determined by national law, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
100 On these principles, see sections 2.1 (national procedural autonomy) and 2.2 (equivalence 
and effectiveness) above.
101 CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and C-244/98, Océano Grupo, para. 26. Note however that in 
some subsequent cases this same question is assessed under the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness. See further para. 167-168 above.
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Instead it formulated an answer on the basis of the spirit and objective of 
these directives.102
It is further true that, in cases such as the ones mentioned above, it some-
times seems to matter little which test is applied. The Court has for example 
come to the conclusion that, either way, EU law requires in principle full 
compensation of any damage caused as a consequence of an infringement 
of EU law.103 Yet in other cases the mere existence of a specific rule of EU law 
does appear to be of relevance. For instance, as was noted above, the Unfair 
Terms Directive expressly refers to national law where it stipulates that 
unfair terms in consumer contracts are not binding on the consumer. But, 
while acknowledging that the Member States consequently have a certain 
degree of autonomy in this respect, the Court has insisted all the same that 
any outcome must be such as to ensure the full effectiveness and achieve 
the objective of this rule of EU law.104 Furthermore in the aforementioned 
cases Océano Grupo and Hospital Ingenieure the Court drew rather far-going 
conclusions. In the former case it held that under the Unfair Terms Directive 
own motion review is in principle required, whereas in the latter it found 
that the judicial review exercised under the Procurement Remedies Direc-
tives cannot be limited to the question whether or not the contested decision 
is arbitrary. This suggests that the mere existence of specific EU legislation of 
the type at issue here can imply that a higher threshold to be met by national 
law is set, even where that legislation does not touch upon that particular 
issue expressly.
10.1.4. Summary
396. The ‘three-step-test’ established in Article 5 TEU regarding the exis-
tence and exercise of the EU’s powers to act, which requires the conferral of 
competences and therefore a sufficient legal basis, as well as compliance 
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, obviously constrains 
the EU legislature’s capacity to enact secondary law facilitating the private 
enforcement of EU law of the type at issue here. Due account is also to be 
taken of the fundamental rights provided for in the Charter when establish-
ing this secondary law. Having said that, there is no reason to be believe 
that, generally speaking, the need to respect these principles and these 
rights constitute an absolute bar for the EU legislature to act on private 
enforcement-related matters. More specifically, there appears to be broad 
agreement that Article 114 TFEU and, in certain cases, other specific articles 
such as Article 103 TFEU can in principle provide a sufficient legal basis. 
102 CoJ C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure, para. 57-64. See further para. 369 above.
103 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C271/91, Marshall, para. 26 (relating to Gender Equality Directive 
2006/54); CoJ case C-203/99, Veedfald, para. 25-28 (relating to Product Liability Directive 
85/374); CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 92-97 (relating to EU 
competition law, without any further specifi c rules of EU law being applicable).
104 CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 62 and 72.
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Indeed, this former article is the legal basis of most of the legal acts dis-
cussed in part B. The significance of the principles of subsidiarity and pro-
portionality, for their part, is for the present purposes more political than 
legal. And whereas compliance with the Charter arguably ought to be a par-
ticular point of attention, it allows for the restriction of the exercise of the 
rights laid down therein. Furthermore the principle of national procedural 
autonomy does not imply that the EU legislature cannot act on remedial and 
procedural matters relating to legal proceedings before the national courts. 
At most it can have a ‘residual’ role to play in situations where a particular 
subject-matter falls outside the scope of EU legislation at issue.
10.2. Political aspects and policy-related factors
The EU having, within certain limits, the legal capacity to take legislative 
action on the issues under consideration here is one (important) thing, as 
was discussed above. Quite another thing however is the extent to which 
there is also the required political will and there are deemed to be sufficient 
reasons in terms of policy to propose and adopt such legislation. Although 
these matters largely fall outside the scope of a legal study such as the pres-
ent one, they are nonetheless worth considering here. The relevant political 
aspects are therefore first briefly discussed below. Attention then turns to 
the three factors of a political and policy nature that can affect the chances of 
EU legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law being adopted.
10.2.1. Political aspects
397. Part B of this study makes clear that the prospect of adopting EU 
legislation of the type at issue here can be politically sensitive and that the 
process of establishing this legislation can (therefore) be challenging and 
cumbersome. Many of the Commission suggestions and proposals proved 
to be controversial. It took for example almost two decades and several revi-
sions of the Commission proposal to reach agreement on the Unfair Terms 
Directive.105 Furthermore, not only did it take nine years of discussions by 
the EU legislature for it to adopt the Commission’s proposal for the Product 
Liability Directive, it also required the insertion of various exceptions, limi-
tations and optional provisions.106 In the case of the Competition Damages 
Directive almost a decade filled with studies, official documents, discus-
sions and consultations elapsed between the publication of the Commis-
sion’s 2005 green paper and its adoption.107 And even then it seems ques-
tionable whether this directive would have been proposed and adopted in 
the absence of additional rulings by the Court (notably Pfleiderer) and the 
105 See para. 162 above.
106 See para. 174 above.
107 See in particular subsection 6.2.3 above.
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exclusion of controversial issues, such as collective redress, fault require-
ments and legal costs.108 The discussions related to a possible EU legislative 
initiative on collective redress provide yet another example of the contro-
versies that can arise in this regard.109 In the latter case these controversies 
were such that fears were expressed that the initiative had gone “lost in 
consultation”.110 In the end the Commission decided to limit itself, at least 
for the time being, to adopting a recommendation, rather than submitting a 
proposal for a legally binding act of secondary EU law.111
Arguably a further illustration of the sensitivity of EU legislative 
involvement with private enforcement-related matters are the efforts that 
the Commission typically makes to emphasise that national legal systems 
and traditions will continue to be respected as much as possible. In relation 
to the Procurement Remedies Directives the Commission held for instance 
that “[c]onsiderable flexibility is left for the Member States to implement the direc-
tive’s requirements in accordance with their particular approaches to administrative 
and judicial review”.112 And in its proposal for the Consumer Injunctions 
Directive it highlighted that “historical and legal traditions will be in no way 
compromised” and that “the proposed text in no way prejudices established reme-
dies at national level”.113 And when proposing the IPR Enforcement Directive 
the Commission declared that “[a]ccount must be taken of the legal traditions 
and situation of each Member State” and that the enforcement in question is to 
take place “within the existing national frameworks”.114
These findings seem to fit into a more general trend. Other commenta-
tors have noted that EU legislative measures of the type at issue here tend to 
be inherently “politically sensitive”115 and that their adoption can thus be “an 
extremely challenging process”.116 That is probably the case because national 
rules on remedies and (civil) procedure often reflect considerations that are 
fundamental to a Member State’s political organisation, social and economic 
structure, constitutional and social identity and/or its arrangements for 
wealth distribution. This has therefore been described as “a complex area of 
policy-driven rules, the application of which is irrevocably linked to legal cultures 
and judicial practices”.117 In this light it has been submitted that EU legislative 
108 See subsection 6.2.4 and para. 225 above.
109 See subsection 5.5.1 above.
110 Jeffries (2011), p. 1.
111 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See further para. 190-191 above.
112 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, p. 15. See 
further para. 77 above
113 Commission, Proposal for Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(95) 712, p. 8. 
See further para. 153 above.
114 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 15. See 
further para. 115 above.
115 Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 216. See e.g. also Adinolfi  (2012), p. 286.
116 Tulibacka (2009), p. 1527.
117 Ibid., p. 1533. In a similar sense, see Dougan (2011), p. 410.
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interference with remedies and procedures for the private enforcement of 
EU law is “more taboo” than with substantive law.118
398. That said, the above point should not be overstated either. For one 
thing, the mere fact that the EU legislation assessed in this study was in fact 
adopted demonstrates that one cannot speak of a taboo. For another thing, 
there can be no question that adopting secondary EU law on matters of sub-
stantive law can sometimes be highly controversial as well.119 EU legislation 
of the type at issue in this study certainly does not have a monopoly on 
controversy. Besides, and most importantly for the present purposes, this 
study suggests that adopting this latter type of EU legislation is not always 
particularly sensitive or difficult. It rather appears that the degree of contro-
versy that the various EU legal acts discussed in part B generate tends to 
vary considerably.
More specifically, it has been noted above that the Unfair Terms Direc-
tive, the Product Liability Directive, the Competition Damages Directive 
and a possible legislative initiative on collective redress all proved to be con-
troversial.120 However, although some discussions and controversies cer-
tainly emerged, particularly in the legal literature, the process leading to the 
adoption of the IPR Enforcement Directive has in contrast been on the whole 
relatively smooth and speedy.121 Arguably the main bone of contention dur-
ing the legislative process leading to the adoption of this latter directive, 
namely the possible inclusion of EU rules on criminal measures, was more-
over of a public enforcement nature, rather than that it concerned a private 
enforcement-related matter.122 In addition the IPR Enforcement Directive 
stands out for the rather rare example that it offers of a case where the EU 
legislature (and in particular the Member States represented in Council) 
enacted further-going harmonisation than the Commission had proposed. 
For the scope of this directive was extended so as to also cover infringe-
ments of intellectual property rights provided for by (‘purely’) national law 
and the general restriction to infringements committed for commercial pur-
118 Komninos (2008), p. 144 (n. 19) (although this author also acknowledges the gradual 
emergence at EU level of a “positive integration drive” in relation to rules on remedies and 
procedures; see pp. 142-144).
119 See e.g. the difficulties in establishing secondary EU law on patents, mentioned in 
para. 108 above. For another example, reference can be made to Services Directive 
2006/123, which has been described as “one of the most controversial and disputed pieces of 
European legislation in recent years”. See Flower (2007), p. 217.
120 Controversy is of course not easy to measure in a clear and objective manner. For the 
present purposes this is assessed based on the overall picture that emerges in light of 
especially the following elements: the duration of the legislative process and its prepara-
tory stages; the discussions by the EU legislature; the degree to which the Commission 
proposal underwent substantial changes in the course of that process; and the extent, 
content and tone of the public and academic debate relating to the acts in question.
121 See para. 111 above.
122 See para. 147 above.
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poses or causing significant harm that the Commission has proposed was 
deleted and instead limited to certain specific measures.123
Moreover neither was the Consumer Injunctions Directive overly con-
troversial.124 With respect to the Procurement Remedies Directives some 
controversy certainly arose,125 but also in this case the single most hotly 
debated issue concerned essentially rather a matter of public than of private 
enforcement, namely the powers for the Commission to intervene directly at 
national level.126 Neither did the legislative process leading to the revision 
of these directives in 2007 prove to be exceptionally problematic.127 Finally, 
despite the aforementioned controversies that it generated, it should not be 
forgotten that the legislative process leading to the adoption of the Competi-
tion Damages Directive was actually rather smooth and speedy.128 Once 
more the main bones of contention during this process were essentially pub-
lic enforcement-related matters, namely the extent to which evidence 
included in the file of a public enforcement authority should be shielded 
from disclosure and the effects of infringement decisions by those authori-
ties in private enforcement proceedings.129
399. The obvious next question is what explains these differences in terms 
of controversy between the various legal acts under consideration here. Sub-
ject to the proviso that there are clearly limits to the extent that the above-
mentioned directives and the fields of law at issue can be compared, the 
main point that emerges from the foregoing is that – contrary to what one 
might perhaps expect – the degree of controversy that a given private 
enforcement-related legislative proposal generates does not seem primarily 
related to the ‘intrusiveness’ (seen from the viewpoint of national law) of the 
measures it contains. On many accounts the IPR Enforcement Directive 
probably contains the most extensive EU legislative measures in this regard, 
yet this directive proved relatively uncontroversial during the law-making 
process. Something similar can be said of the Procurement Remedies Direc-
tives, which also touch upon a considerable number of remedial and proce-
dural matters that had hitherto mostly been left to the Member States. Still 
these directives appeared not to be excessively controversial. That is all the 
more noticeable given that the Procurement Remedies Directives were 
among the first self-standing EU legal acts of this type.130
123 See para. 140 above. See also subsection 9.1.1 above.
124 See para. 153 above.
125 See para. 72 above.
126 See para. 104 above.
127 See para. 75 above.
128 See para. 225 above.
129 See para. 235 and 243 above respectively.
130 See subsection 1.1.3 above.
p. 430 D. Broader aspects, perspectives and conclusions para. 401
This is not to suggest of course that the content of a private enforcement-
related act of secondary EU law is of no significance whatsoever in this 
respect. But what the foregoing does seem to indicate is that other factors 
can play a role that can be at least as important. These factors, it is submit-
ted, often relate more to the context of the initiative at issue than to its con-
tent. Three of the political and policy-related factors that, the findings of part 
of this study suggest, can affect the chances of EU legislation facilitating the 
private enforcement of EU law being adopted are identified and discussed 
in the following three subsections.
10.2.2. Overall enforcement framework
400. The first of these factors can be summarised as the ‘overall enforce-
ment framework’. This refers to the influence that considerations related to 
the interaction between the relevant public and private enforcement mecha-
nisms can have on discussions concerning the EU legislation at issue. 
Whereas it has been seen earlier that in legal terms these mechanisms most-
ly operate independently of each other,131 it appears that matters relating to 
public and private enforcement of EU law can nonetheless be linked in some 
respects. That can be explained as follows.
401. Consider first the fields where public enforcement generally plays a 
limited role, at least in as far as EU law is concerned. This is particularly the 
case in the fields of EU public procurement and intellectual property law.132 
In these two fields there is no obligation for the Member States to designate 
a public authority that is charged with enforcing the substantive rules in 
question and that is granted significant supervisory, investigatory and puni-
tive powers for that purpose. Although the Commission has in the past 
sought to obtain certain powers for itself to address infringements of EU 
public procurement law, neither is it foreseen that this institution fulfils such 
a public enforcement role at EU level.133 At the same time it is precisely in 
these two fields that relatively ambitious and detailed EU private enforce-
ment-related measures have been enacted, i.e. the Procurement Remedies 
Directives and the IPR Enforcement Directive.
As a matter of EU law public enforcement has furthermore historically 
played only a rather modest role in relation to the enforcement of EU con-
sumer protection law,134 while also in this field has a considerable body of 
secondary EU law on private enforcement been adopted, as the Consumer 
Injunctions Directive, the Unfair Terms Directive and the Product Liability 
Directive illustrate. Conversely, more recently the EU has considerably 
strengthened the public enforcement framework in this field, for instance 
131 See in particular subsection 2.4.3 above. See also subsection 9.2.4 above.
132 See subsections 3.4.2 and 4.4.2 above respectively.
133 See para. 111-112 above.
134 See subsection 5.5.3 above.
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through the adoption of the CPC Regulation.135 It has been observed that 
since the adoption of the CPC Regulation the public enforcement authorities 
of the Member States mostly prefer to cooperate between them, rather than 
to initiate legal proceedings under the Consumer Injunctions Directive as 
they can also be entitled to do.136 It is noticeable that over roughly same 
period of time the Commission has consistently decided against (substan-
tially) amending the said directives so as to improve the possibilities for 
private enforcement.137 Neither were any significant new legislative initia-
tives on this point developed.138
402. All this contrasts markedly with the developments with respect to the 
enforcement of EU competition law, where public enforcement plays a key 
role.139 Indeed, there is probably no other field of EU law where public 
enforcement mechanisms have been so well-established. There is certainly 
no other field where the Commission itself has such far-going powers to 
supervise and enforce compliance with the rules of EU law at issue vis-à-vis 
private parties. At the same time it has been seen that here it has been par-
ticularly difficult to enact private enforcement-related EU legislative mea-
sures. Although several factors play a role in this regard, there can be little 
doubt that concerns relating to the potential harmful effects of increased 
private enforcement on the existing public enforcement mechanisms fea-
tured prominently among them. Indeed, for some the very existence of a 
robust and effective public enforcement framework may perhaps not entire-
ly eliminate, but nonetheless significantly qualify and reduce the need for 
EU legislative measures facilitating private enforcement in this field.140 At 
the very least, the fact that such mechanisms exist may well limit the sense 
of urgency when considering the establishment of this kind of measures.
135 CPC Regulation 2006/2004. See further para. 196 above.
136 See Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 7. On the empowerment of public authorities to act under Consumer Injunctions 
Directive 2009/22, see further para. 170 above.
137 See para. 159, 170 and 201 above.
138 As discussed in subsections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 above, the EU has in recent years taken certain 
measures with respect to collective redress (notably Collective Redress Recommendation 
2013/396) and alternative dispute resolution (notably Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11) 
respectively. This illustrates that public enforcement is not the EU’s sole focus where 
infringements of EU consumer protection law are concerned. However it does not sub-
stantially affect the abovementioned observation that in recent years the EU legislature 
tends to place less emphasis on private enforcement in this fi eld. As regards collective 
redress, the said recommendation is not specifi cally concerned with infringements of EU 
consumer protection law, but rather with infringements of EU law generally. Moreover it 
is not legally binding. No EU legislation on this subject-matter has been adopted or even 
proposed to date. Furthermore alternative dispute resolution is by defi nition an alterna-
tive to, and not a type of, private enforcement (as defi ned in para. 22 above).
139 See subsection 6.4.2 above.
140 Cf. e.g. Wils (2003a), p. 473; Eilmansberger (2007), p. 478; Hjelmeng (2013), p. 1033.
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The fact that in 2014 the Competition Damages Directive was adopted 
does not imply that the abovementioned concerns no longer existed. Quite 
to the contrary, while it is evident that this directive contains a range of pri-
vate enforcement-facilitating measures, as was explained earlier, there is a 
good case to be made that the fact that this directive was in the end pro-
posed and adopted owes at least as much to a desire to protect public 
enforcement, particularly in light of the Court’s Pfleiderer case law, as it was 
driven by the ambition to facilitate private enforcement.141 As the Commis-
sion noted when submitting its proposal for this directive, “the EU right to 
compensation can sometimes be at odds with the effectiveness of public enforcement 
of the EU competition rules”.142 The protection of public enforcement was 
therefore elevated to an objective of this directive in its own right, existing 
on a par with – and in some respects taking precedence over – the original 
(sole) objective of the Commission’s initiative, namely to facilitate the bring-
ing of actions for damages by private parties for competition law infringe-
ments whereby the interaction between both types of enforcement was 
merely one point of attention among many others.143
403. It thus appears that the existence or absence of well-established and 
robust public enforcement mechanisms can be an important factor when 
determining whether EU law measures relating to private enforcement are 
enacted in a given field and if so, what type of measures are provided for. 
This works in two ways. On the one hand the absence of such public enforce-
ment mechanisms may reinforce the ‘demand’ for private enforcement and 
thus for secondary EU law of the type under consideration in this study. 
As such it can act as a facilitating factor. On the other hand, where public 
enforcement mechanisms of this kind are already ‘on offer’, there may not 
only be less ‘demand’ for private enforcement, but there can also be con-
cerns about the possible negative consequences of the latter on the former. 
These two latter elements can act as a barrier to the adoption of the said leg-
islation in terms of it coming into being as well as its objectives and content.
10.2.3. International dimension
404. A second factor that can affect the chances of secondary EU law facili-
tating private enforcement being adopted is what is referred to here as the 
‘international dimension’. At the heart of this argument lies the fact that both 
the Procurement Remedies Directives and the IPR Enforcement Directive, 
which, as was noted above, are noticeable for the degree of detail and ‘intru-
siveness’ in respect of matters of remedies and procedures for private 
enforcement purposes, should be understood against the background of two 
141 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer. See further subsection 6.2.4 above.
142 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 5.
143 See para. 223 and 226 above.
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international agreements concerning these two fields of law. These are the 
GPA (Agreement on Government Procurement) and the TRIPS (Trade-Relat-
ed aspects of Intellectual Property) Agreement, to which all Member States 
as well as the EU are a party.144 These two agreements are moreover both 
exceptional, in that they make provision for the private enforcement of the 
substantive rules at issue.145 The content of the said directives reflects to a 
high extent those of the international agreement to which they correspond, 
although the former are typically more detailed than the latter. This makes it 
tempting to conclude that the fact that the EU and the Member States were 
already bound by these international agreements is an important element 
explaining the adoption of these acts of secondary EU law.
Things are not as straightforward as that however. As regards the IPR 
Enforcement Directive there can be little doubt that the above logic has 
indeed been at work. As has been noted elsewhere, the TRIPS Agreement in 
effect “paved the way” for the EU harmonisation measures in question.146 The 
Commission itself spoke of a “TRIPS plus approach”.147 But the same cannot 
be said of the Procurement Remedies Directives. These latter directives were 
adopted in 1989 and 1992. Although negotiations had started as early as 
1986, the GPA was concluded only in 1994. Already the timing of events 
thus suggests that the influence of the latter on the former has probably been 
limited at best. This is confirmed by the legislative history of the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives, which reveals no indications that the (ongoing 
negotiations on) the GPA had a substantial influence on the coming into 
being and the content of these directives. In fact, it is more likely that con-
versely the GPA was modelled in part upon the Procurement Remedies 
Directives.148 For the EU can of course contribute to the ‘production’ of 
international law as much as it can be a ‘consumer’ thereof.
405. Yet that does not mean that the potential relevance of this ‘interna-
tional dimension’ in the present context is therefore limited to only the IPR 
Enforcement Directive. There are also other instances where this has proven 
to be a relevant factor. Influences stemming from international law appear 
to have been largely absent in relation to the Consumer Injunctions Direc-
tive, the Unfair Terms Directive and the Competition Damages Directive. 
But the situation is different where the Product Liability Directive is con-
cerned. In 1977 the Council of Europe established a Convention on product 
144 Regarding these two agreements, see further para. 79 and 118 above respectively.
145 These agreements are however in principle not directly effective in the EU legal order. As 
regards the GPA, see Anderson & Arrowsmith (2011), p. 32. As regards the TRIPS Agree-
ment, see CoJ case C-135/10, SCF, para. 46.
146 Reinbothe (2010), p. 5.
147 Commission, Press release on the proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, 
IP/03/144, p. 1.
148 Footer (1995), p. 88; Zhang (2011), p. 485.
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liability in regard to personal injury and death.149 The legislative history of 
this directive shows that this international agreement served as a valuable 
point of reference and offered some necessary common ground during the 
long and difficult negotiations at EU level.150
Similar influences can further be observed as regards other acts of sec-
ondary EU law than those discussed in part B of this study. A prominent 
example is the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive. This directive 
also contains a number of measures facilitating the private enforcement of 
the environmental rules in question, most notably with respect to the legal 
standing of the private parties concerned and legal costs.151 The provisions 
in question were introduced in order to give effect to the United Nation’s 
‘Århus Convention’ on access to information, public participation in deci-
sion-making and access to justice in environmental matters.152 Similarly, 
although it goes further in some respects, the Rail Passengers’ Rights Regu-
lation for instance expressly builds on the relevant international law instru-
ment.153
10.2.4. Temporal aspect
406. A third factor that can be of relevance in this regard concerns what 
could be called the ‘temporal aspect’. One could perhaps also speak of the 
‘political climate’ (or, if you will, the Zeitgeist). Either way this refers to the 
evolution over time of the mainly political, but to some extent also legal, con-
siderations that affect the scope for adopting EU legislation of the type at issue 
here. This aspect is inherently difficult to measure or pin down. There are 
nevertheless several indications that suggest that, put simply, it may well be 
that EU legislation that was adopted, say, two decades ago may not have been 
adopted today, or at least not in a similar form or under similar conditions.
149 Council of Europe, Convention on product liability in regard to personal injury and 
death, 27 January 1977. See also Whittaker (2005), pp. 433-435; Micklitz, Reich & Rott 
(2009), p. 220.
150 See e.g. Council, doc. 5555/80, pp. 4-5, 9 and 11; Council, doc. 7772/80, pp. 8-11 and 13; 
Council, doc. 9976/80, pp. 10-11 and 13-17; Council, doc. 4161/81, p. 4; Council, doc. 
7945/81, p. 6 and annex (p. 7). In a similar sense, see also Whittaker (2005), pp. 433-435; 
Micklitz, Reich & Rott (2009), p. 220.
151 Art. 11 Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92. See further para. 329 and 
343 above respectively.
152 See Decision 2005/370/EC on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of 
the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice in environmental matters, OJ 2005, L 124/1. The abovementioned provi-
sion was inserted into (the predecessor of) Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
2011/92 by Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public participation in respect of the 
drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment, OJ 2003, 
L 156/17. On this convention and its impact on EU law, see further Oliver (2013), p. 1423; 
Eliantonio (2014), p. 257.
153 Recital 6 Rail Passengers Rights’ Regulation 1371/2007. See the Convention concerning 
international carriage by rail (COFIT), 9 May 1980, concluded in the framework of the 
Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF).
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407. The first of the three such indications that stand out in this regard can 
be derived from the dates of adoption of the legal acts assessed in part B of this 
study. The Product Liability Directive was adopted in 1985, the two Procure-
ment Remedies Directives in 1989 and 1992, the Unfair Terms Directive in 
1993, the Consumer Injunctions Directive in 1998 (codified in 2009), while 
the IPR Enforcement Directive dates from 2004. It follows that of these six 
legal acts, all are a decade old and most are considerably older. Only one of 
the legal acts under consideration in this study is more recent, namely the 
Competition Damages Directive, which was agreed (and is expected to be 
adopted) in 2014. Also several other, comparable EU legal acts are of a 
respectable age. The 2006 Gender Equality Directive is for example a recast 
of directives that originally date from 1976 and 1980.154
A second indication emerges when the developments related to the 
Product Liability Directive are assessed in further detail. Despite the contro-
versy that it generated at the time, it was adopted (unanimously, as its legal 
basis then required155) in 1985. Over the years various shortcomings in the 
functioning of this directive have been identified.156 Yet over the same peri-
od of time the Commission has consistently decided against proposing to 
amend this directive.157 The references that it made in this connection to the 
abovementioned controversies and its stated fear to upset the existing ‘deli-
cate balance’ between the various interests at stake seem to suggest that the 
Commission believes that it may not again be possible to reach an agree-
ment. Indeed, if it were to propose an amendment it is not inconceivable 
that certain Member States would seek to use the opportunity to set a step 
back from a harmonisation perspective.158 Whatever the merit of the Com-
mission’s argument that it has not sufficiently been demonstrated that the 
aforementioned shortcomings constitute a problem from an internal market 
perspective, it seems questionable whether this directive would have been 
proposed and adopted in the first place had a similar standard been applied 
at that time. Indeed, this Commission position has been described elsewhere 
as “overly complacent”.159 As a consequence this directive has remained 
154 Gender Equality Directive 2006/54. See further para. 11 above.
155 See para. 382 above.
156 See para. 184 and 260 above.
157 Commission, Second report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2000) 893, p. 28; 
Commission, Third report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2006) 496, 
pp. 11-12; Commission, Fourth report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(2011) 
547, p. 4.
158 Cf. Council, Resolution on amendment of the liability for defective products directive, 
OJ 2002, C 26/2. Here it was in effect suggested to amend this directive, so as to allow for 
more scope for the application of national rules. Note that pursuant to Art. 17(2) TEU the 
Commission has the virtually exclusive right to propose secondary EU law, including 
amendments thereof, but that, once the Commission has made a proposal, the EU legisla-
ture is, within certain limits, at liberty to amend it.
159 Fairgrieve & Howells (2007), p. 978.
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essentially unaltered for an unusually long period of time, namely almost 
three decades.160
Third, and more generally, account can be taken of the more recent con-
sultations and other public statements regarding some of the directives and ini-
tiatives discussed in part B of this study. The responses generated suggest 
that various Member States may have become increasingly vocal in express-
ing hesitations as regards possible EU legislative intervention on the matters 
under consideration here.161 As was noted above, the fact that such objec-
tions are often formulated in legal terms (e.g. alleged non-respect for the 
principles of subsidiarity or national procedural autonomy) and that as such 
these arguments seem not always entirely convincing should not distract 
from the apparent underlying political uneasiness with the initiatives in 
question.162 More surprisingly perhaps, this development also seems to 
extend to the European Parliament. In the late 1970s and 1980s this institu-
tion called for a range of EU legislative measures harmonising national law 
on concerning consumers’ access to court, including measures on collective 
redress.163 In 2000 it still contemplated, in relation to the Product Liability 
Directive, addressing as a matter of EU law remedial and procedural issues 
such as burden of proof, limitation periods, non-material damage and quan-
tification of damages.164 All this contrasts with the seemingly more cautious 
positions that, at least in some cases, it has taken more recently. For instance, 
in 2008 it stated that “safeguarding effective enforcement of rights originating 
from [EU] legislation is principally an obligation of the Member States” and that 
“the [EU] is not competent to prescribe rules for national procedural law”.165 A 
year later it also took the view that rules on limitation periods and the allo-
cation of legal costs should in principle be left to be set by the Member 
States.166
408. This is by no means to suggest that, politically speaking, there is no 
longer scope for the EU to adopt or amend secondary law on private 
enforcement. For one thing, this would risk overlooking that also in the past 
not all relevant Commission initiatives actually led to EU legislation of this 
kind being adopted. The Commission’s draft directive on the liability of 
160 A limited amendment, which led to agricultural products being brought within the scope 
of this directive, was enacted in 1990 as a consequence of exceptional circumstances, 
namely the so-called ‘mad cow’ crisis. See further para. 184 above.
161 See para. 189 and 219 above.
162 See para. 389 and 393 above.
163 See e.g. the 1977 report and resolution by the European Parliament, cited in Commission, 
Memorandum on consumer redress, COM(84) 629, p. 7; European Parliament, Resolu-
tion on consumer redress, OJ 1987, C 99/203.
164 European Parliament, Resolution on the Commission green paper on liability for defec-
tive products, A5-0061/2000.
165 European Parliament, Resolution on the EU consumer policy strategy 2007-2013, P6_
TA(2008)0211, para. 34.
166 European Parliament, Resolution on the white paper on damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2009)0187, para. 19-20.
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suppliers of services, proposed in 1990, encountered for example so much 
resistance that it was withdrawn a few years later.167 Around the same time 
the Commission also unsuccessfully proposed EU rules establishing (no-
fault) civil liability in relation to waste.168 For another thing, it is evident that 
also in more recent times legislation of the type at issue here does get adopt-
ed. The 2007 amendment of the Procurement Remedies Directives offers a 
good example. This amendment involved the introduction of several new 
private enforcement-facilitating measures, most notably a new contractual 
remedy.169 Another evident example is the 2014 Competition Damage Direc-
tive. Besides, as was noted in the introduction to this study, also several 
other private enforcement-related measures have been proposed and adopt-
ed at EU level in recent years.170
What the foregoing does appear to indicate is that, generally speaking, 
the threshold for the EU act may well have been raised. Although all this is to 
a considerable extent a matter of political appreciation, it also has a legal 
side to it. The 2000 Tobacco Advertising judgment, discussed above, on the 
use of Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis can be seen as a turning point in this 
regard.171 This case did not concern private enforcement-related legislation 
as such. Nonetheless already the very fact that this challenge (and several 
other actions for annulment of EU legislation brought by Member States for 
alleged lack of a sufficient legal basis or infringements of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the same period172) was brought can be seen a symptom of 
the increasing uneasiness, referred to above. Moreover the resulting judg-
ment underlines that, despite its rather broad wording, there are limits to 
the extent to which Article 114 TFEU can be relied upon. This latter point – 
the first such finding in relation to this article – is of evident importance also 
in the present context, considering that almost all of the legislation at issue 
here is based on this article.173 Indeed, it appears that the EU legislature has 
taken good note of the message that the Court of Justice conveyed. Whereas 
justifications of this kind are only rather brief in the legal acts under consid-
eration that pre-date this judgment (such as the Procurement Remedies 
Directives and the Product Liability Directive), legal acts that post-date it 
167 Commission, Proposal for a services liability directive, COM(90) 482. See further subsec-
tion 5.2.3 above.
168 Commission, Proposal for a directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste, 
COM(89) 282; Commission, Proposal for a Council directive on the landfi ll of waste, 
COM(91) 102. This latter proposal was eventually adopted in 1999, but without the provi-
sion on liability referred to above. See Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfi ll of waste, OJ 
1999, L 182/1.
169 See para. 75 and subsection 3.2.3 above.
170 See para. 13 above.
171 CoJ case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco advertising). See further 
para. 382 above.
172 E.g. CoJ case C-84/94, UK v. Council; CoJ case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and 
Council; CoJ case C-217/04, UK v. Parliament and Council; CoJ case C-380/03, Germany v. 
Parliament and Council (Tobacco advertising II).
173 See para. 382 above.
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(such as the IPR Enforcement Directive and the Competition Damages 
Directive) extensively explains the required link between the harmonisation 
measures at hand and the internal market.174
409. At a more abstract level it appears that various phases can be dis-
cerned in the activities of the EU legislature relating to matters of remedies 
and procedures for the private enforcement of EU law in proceedings before 
the national courts.175 There is a first phase, running roughly up until the 
late 1980s, that is characterised by relative inactivity on the side of the EU 
legislature. The second phase, which runs from the late 1980s roughly until 
the early 2000s, marks the period where the EU is increasingly active in this 
respect. And subsequently there is a third phase, extending to the present, 
where EU legislative action of the type at issue here is certainly not per se 
excluded, but where its limits become more clearly visible. The parallel with the 
evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice on this very same subject-
matter is striking, be it that the phases in the activities of the EU legislature 
appear to trail those of its judiciary by a few years.176 In both cases this evo-
lution in EU activity can arguably be traced back to the same underlying 
broader developments. One can distinguish in particular: (i) an initial focus 
on the side of the EU on substantive matters and getting the European proj-
ect ‘up and running’ and EU law accepted at national level; (ii) a period of 
relative ‘euro-enthusiasm’ particularly in the context of the 1992 internal 
market project, accompanied by increased concerns about the effective 
implementation, application and enforcement of EU law at national level;177 
(iii) a period characterised by a more balanced and selective approach, 
reflecting the increased maturity of EU law and the EU as a political system, 
but also increasing concerns and resistance in some corners related to a per-
ception of ‘Brussels’ being overly intrusive.
10.2.5. Summary
410. EU legislative involvement with matters related to the remedies and 
procedures for the enforcement of EU law before the courts of the Member 
States can be politically sensitive. Many of the acts of secondary EU law at 
issue here were only proposed and adopted after a rather long and challeng-
174 See para. 383 above.
175 See also the overview set out in subsection 1.1.3 above.
176 See para. 37 above. As was explained there, the relevant case law has evolved over time. 
Three phases are typically distinguished, namely a prudent initial phase (up to the early 
1980s), a signifi cantly bolder and more ‘interventionist’ period (mid 1980s-early 1990s) 
and a phase characterised by a more balanced and selective approach (mid 1990s 
onwards).
177 Cf. e.g. Council, Resolution on the effective uniform application of Community law and 
on the penalties applicable for breaches of Community law in the internal market, OJ 
1995, C 188/1: “in the fi eld of the internal market the [EU] has moved from an intensively legis-
lative phase to a phase focusing on the effective operation of common rules”.
para. 411 Chapter 10. The how, when and why of EU private enforcement legislation p. 439
ing process of preparation and law-making. Yet that is not always the case. 
Although this undoubtedly plays a role, it appears that the degree of contro-
versy that a given proposal for this legislation generates is not primarily 
related to the ‘intrusiveness’ (seen from the point of view of the Member 
States) of the measures concerned. In many cases the political and policy 
context seems at least as important as the content. Although no absolute 
rules can be formulated in this respect, three factors can be identified that 
may affect the chances of EU legislation of the type at issue here being estab-
lished. The first factor is the ‘overall enforcement framework’ in the field of 
law at hand. It appears that the absence of robust and well-established pub-
lic enforcement mechanisms can facilitate the adoption of private enforce-
ment-related legislation. Conversely, the existence of such mechanisms need 
not constitute an absolute bar, but can be a complicating factor. Second, the 
‘international dimension’ can be of relevance, in that the existence of bind-
ing international agreements can offer a helpful point of reference and some 
necessary common ground for the negotiations at EU level and thus make it 
easier for agreement to be reached on a given legislative proposal. Finally, 
even if this is particularly difficult to quantify, there are indications that, 
over the past decades, the threshold for the adoption of legislation of the 
type at issue here has been raised. This latter point may well reflect a broad-
er trend.
10.3. The added-value of EU legislation on private enforcement
In the foregoing subsections it has been discussed which elements can drive, 
constrain and facilitate the adoption of the EU legislation under consider-
ation. In order to complement the picture that thus emerges, a further rele-
vant question is what, generally speaking, the ‘added-value’ is of adopting 
this legislation.178 Two points stand out in this connection. The first concerns 
the added-value as compared to leaving the matters in question to the judi-
ciary. The second relates to the relevance of other factors than remedial and 
procedural rules. These two points are subsequently discussed below.
10.3.1. Legislative vs. judicial action
411. The first point that could be seen as questioning the added-value of 
EU legislative action on the matters and of the type under consideration 
here is essentially founded on the fact that, as construed by the Court of 
Justice, the principles of equivalence and (especially) of effectiveness and 
effective judicial protection, as well as considerations related to the effective-
ness of EU law generally, can be powerful forces where the enforcement of this 
178 As this section is meant to complement the foregoing, the focus is not on the circum-
stances that may justify taking legislative action at EU level in an individual case, but 
rather on its possible ‘added-value’ considered at a more abstract level.
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law before the national courts is concerned. This has already been discussed 
in the foregoing.179 The Court has for instance ruled that in proceedings 
before the national courts there can be an obligation to ensure that interim 
relief is available,180 that actions for damages for infringements of EU law 
can be brought against both Member States and private parties,181 that 
national rules of evidence are applied in a particular manner182 and that 
unreasonable limitation periods set by national law are to be disapplied.183 
Taken together this constitutes a considerable body of ‘judge-made law on 
remedies’.184 It is moreover by no means excluded that (even) more far-
going requirements can be deduced from the abovementioned principles. It 
has for example been argued that on this basis duties to facilitate collective 
redress actions, enable the ordering of the disclosure of evidence or depart 
from certain evidential presumptions under national law can be con-
strued.185
This ‘judge-made law’ being already quite well-elaborated, and there 
arguably being scope for it being extended further, one might wonder to 
which extent there is still a need for ‘legislature-made law’ facilitating the 
private enforcement of EU law of the type under consideration here. Why 
not simply leave these matters to be dealt with by the courts of the Member 
States, which can refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice where 
required? Such an approach may seem all the more attractive given that, as 
has already been seen, the EU legislation in question anyway regularly 
leaves the Member States a significant degree of flexibility186 and that enact-
ing it can be a politically sensitive and cumbersome affair.187 Leaving the 
matters under consideration to be decided, as far as EU law is concerned, 
only on the basis of the aforementioned – broad – principles can also have 
the advantage of leaving the courts seised space for a case-by-case assess-
ment.
412. It is interesting to see how on this point a degree of ambiguity appears 
to exist on the side of the EU institutions concerned, and especially the Com-
mission. On the one hand, as has been seen in the foregoing, the latter tends 
to advocate the adoption of secondary EU law facilitating private enforce-
179 See sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5 above.
180 E.g. CoJ case C-213/89, Factortame, para. 21; CoJ case C-416/10, Križan, para. 107. See fur-
ther para. 58 above.
181 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich; CoJ case C-453/99, Courage. See fur-
ther para. 59 and 60 above respectively.
182  E.g. CoJ case C-228/98, Dounias, para. 71; CoJ case C-526/04, Laboratoires Boiron, para. 55. 
See further para. 38 above.
183 E.g. CoJ case C349/07, Sopropé, para. 44. CoJ case C-69/10, Samba Diouf, para. 66-67. See 
further para. 38 and 45 above.
184 Micklitz (2012, p. 366.
185 Temple Lang (2008), pp. 101 and 107. These views are based on a combined reading of the 
principles of effectiveness and sincere cooperation.
186 See in particular para. 394 above.
187 See subsection 10.2.1 above.
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ment. Its efforts in relation to consumer collective redress and in the field of 
competition law are but two recent examples thereof.188 On the other hand 
the Commission has also frequently stressed the potency of the abovemen-
tioned principles that are at the basis of the said judge-made law. It has 
sometimes done so to such an extent that it actually seems to matter little 
whether or not any such secondary EU law applies. For instance, in the field 
of public procurement law the Commission deduced from the principle of 
effectiveness a rule on legal standing that it believes should apply in cases 
not covered by the Procurement Remedies Directives, which is in effect pre-
cisely the same as the one laid down in these directives.189 And also for the 
Court of Justice it has sometimes seemed to make little difference in this 
respect whether these directives apply or whether the case is to be adjudi-
cated under the principle of effective judicial protection.190
The Commission has further suggested that pursuant to the principle of 
effectiveness an applicant cannot be required to prove the exact amount of 
damage suffered in competition cases.191 Yet it has nonetheless deemed it 
necessary to issue detailed (non-legally binding) guidance for the parties 
concerned and for the national courts as to how to quantify this damage and 
to include rules on this subject-matter in the Competition Damages Direc-
tive.192 Other provisions of this directive, especially those on the concept of 
‘full compensation’ and on legal standing, are expressly presented as mere 
‘reaffirmations’ of EU law as it already stood before its adoption.193 While 
these statements probably seek to facilitate the adoption of the directive by 
underlining that some of the rules provided for apply anyway, they also beg 
the question why, if that is indeed the case, it is necessary to include them. 
That applies not in the last place to the literal codification of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness that this directive also contains.194
188 See subsections 5.5.1 and 6.2.2 above respectively.
189 See Commission, Interpretative communication on the Community law applicable to 
contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement 
Directives, OJ 2006, C 179/2, para. 2.3.3. Cf. Dahlgaard Dingel (1999), p. 228. On these 
directives’ rules on legal standing, see para. 98 above. See also subsection 9.1.2 above.
190 Cf. CoJ case C-129/04, Espace Trianon, para. 20 (regarding Procurement Remedies Direc-
tive 89/665 and 92/12); CoJ joined cases C-145/08 and C-149/08, Club Hotel Loutraiki, 
para. 65-80 (regarding the principle of effective judicial protection).
191 Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 60.
192 Commission, Practical guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 and 102 TFEU, SWD(2013) 205; Art. 17 Competition Damages 
Directive. See further para. 231-232 above.
193 Recital 12 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 230 and 241 above respec-
tively. See also Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC anti-
trust rules, COM(2008) 165, p. 7.
194 Art. 3 Competition Damages Directive. Note that the Commission’s proposal on this 
point contained slightly divergent wording with respect to the principle of effectiveness. 
See Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 31 
(Art. 3).
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413. It should not to be overlooked however that legislation and the legis-
lature have several inherent advantages as compared to judge-made solutions 
and the courts respectively. The EU courts are neither formally charged, nor 
particularly well-placed to establish quasi-legislative measures.195 Obvi-
ously the courts can only act in response to a case having been brought 
before them. That implies that case-law driven solutions are by definition 
reactive and often also time-consuming, as well as casuistic. In addition 
such jurisprudential solutions in principle entail ‘negative integration’. That 
is to say, the Court of Justice is empowered to indicate how EU law should 
interpreted, thus stating expressly (in infringement proceedings) or by 
implication (in preliminary reference proceedings) which particular rules of 
national law are considered to be inconsistent with EU law and should thus 
be disapplied. But it has at best only limited scope to ‘positively’ indicate 
which rules or mechanisms should be applied instead.
The political difficulties that may arise in this regard notwithstanding, 
on most of these issues the EU legislature is in a considerably better posi-
tion. The latter can be proactive, set out a more detailed and structured 
approach and positively require certain measures to be taken at national 
level. Matters of remedies and procedures also often concern points of a 
technical nature, which are generally probably better dealt with by the leg-
islature. For the latter can benefit from the involvement of experts, consult 
stakeholders, issue studies and carry out impact assessments. Democratic 
legitimacy also mitigates in favour of having these matters primarily dealt 
with by the legislature.196 Some also believe that, as compared to the ‘judi-
cial law-making’ by the Court of Justice, involving the EU legislature might 
better ‘protect’ the interests of the Member States against too much EU 
‘intrusion’ with their domestic legal systems.197
414. The adoption of secondary EU law can furthermore contribute to legal 
certainty and the development of the law. Increasing legal certainty can in itself 
be of considerable importance. Concerns about legal uncertainty in the 
absence of EU legislation featured for example prominently in relation to the 
Competition Damages Directive.198 It can further be recalled that many have 
criticised the aforementioned ‘judge-made law of remedies’ for its unpre-
dictability.199 This unpredictability can evidently be reduced by enacting 
195 See further e.g. Snyder (1993), p. 50; Fernández Martín (1996), pp. 202-203 and 228; Jacobs 
& Deisenhofer (2003), p. 223; Nazzini (2012), p. 1001. See also para. 9 above.
196 Cf. Opinion AG Trstenjak case C-101/08, Audiolux, para. 108: “Rule-making generally invol-
ves a choice between different political and social interests which are represented by the instituti-
ons and bodies participating in the rule-making procedure. In addition to the relevant democratic 
legitimation, those bodies possess the necessary expertise to fulfi l the political responsibility con-
ferred on them”.
197 Lindholm (2007), p. 273.
198 See e.g. Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU 
antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 14 and 17.
199 See para. 29 above.
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secondary EU law. Besides, particularly through a dynamic interplay 
between the legislature and the judiciary, the law can further develop where 
secondary EU law applies. Regardless of whether it is fully ‘autonomous’ or 
concerns, in whole or in part, a codification of pre-existing case law, the 
adoption of secondary EU law typically leads to further interpretations 
thereof by the EU courts, as has been illustrated throughout this study. As a 
consequence the law evolves. This certainly occurs given the Court’s ten-
dency to sometimes interpret the EU legislation under consideration (and 
perhaps EU law generally) in a rather extensive manner. As was noted 
above, it has for instance derived certain requirements also in cases where 
they do not address a particular issue or where they expressly leave a mar-
gin of manoeuvre to the Member States.200 It follows that even where these 
acts are comparatively modest in the degree of harmonisation that they 
establish, their mere existence can be a ‘stepping stone’ for the Court to 
address certain issues as a matter of EU law.
Somewhat paradoxically perhaps, this interplay can thus reduce to some 
extent the abovementioned advantages that adopting EU legislation can 
have in terms of providing legal certainty and ‘protection’ against EU ‘intru-
sion’. While that is important to bear in mind, this seems neither entirely 
avoidable, nor peculiar to EU law however. In any case it would not seem to 
follow that it is therefore preferable not to adopt such secondary EU law in 
the first place. Such extensive interpretation by the Court of Justice may 
moreover often be as much due to the scope for interpretation that the legis-
lation in question leaves, as it is due to any ‘activism’ on the side of the 
Court, which is in principle bound to rule on the cases brought before it.201 
In other words, leaving certain issues unaddressed, or regulating them only 
in vague or general terms in secondary EU law, may increase the scope for 
manoeuvre not only of the Member States, as was noted earlier,202 but it also 
does so for the Court of Justice.
415. In sum, generally speaking, it cannot be maintained that EU legisla-
tive action of the sort at issue in this study does not provide any added-val-
ue as compared to leaving matters to the courts. The more important point 
that emerges on the basis of the foregoing is rather that there can be alterna-
tives to the ‘legislative route’ that takes central stage in this study. The Com-
mission and the EU legislature could thus decide (or in effect be forced to 
decide, e.g. in light of political objections to EU legislative action) to leave 
certain matters to be settled by the judiciary rather than to address them in 
EU legislation. Notwithstanding the aforementioned disadvantages of this 
judicial route, over time, effects that are at least to some extent similar to 
those of adopting secondary EU law may well emerge. The appeal of this 
200 See para. 395 above.
201 See para. 9 above.
202 See in particular para. 394 above.
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alternative route may increase in function of the (arguably increasing) diffi-
culties encountered when seeking to enact such law.203
The potential importance of this ‘judicial route’ – and especially the pre-
liminary reference procedure – is already evident from the fact that all the 
aforementioned landmark rulings with a particular importance from a pri-
vate enforcement perspective (i.e. Simmenthal, Factortame, Francovich, Cour-
age and Muñoz) concerned preliminary rulings relating to situations where 
no secondary EU law facilitating the private enforcement of EU law 
applied.204 Another illustration is the fact that to date no secondary EU law 
has been adopted to facilitate the bringing of actions for damages by private 
parties for infringements of EU law under the principle of Member State 
liability.205 In terms of nature, rationale and at least to some extent also con-
tent, this principle is closely related to the nascent principle of private party 
liability that is of particular relevance in the present context.206 Despite this 
absence, a range of EU law requirements with a considerable level of detail 
have nonetheless been developed in the Court’s case law.207 Granted, this 
may not lead to a situation that leaves nothing to be desired. Many private 
parties indeed still encounter difficulties when trying to obtain compensa-
tion in damages from Member States.208 But that is an unfair standard; nei-
ther does adopting secondary EU law tend to lead to optimal solutions in 
this respect.209 The absence of specific EU legislation facilitating private 
enforcement actions brought under the principle of Member State liability 
thus illustrates that taking legislative action is not necessarily the only way 
forward where the private enforcement of EU law is concerned.
The Commission moreover has the possibility to try to fasten and ‘steer’ 
jurisprudential developments by initiating infringement proceedings in 
selected cases.210 Rulings in cases concerning public enforcement-related 
matters, such as Greek Maize, demonstrate that this can be a manner to clari-
203 See subsections 10.2.1 and 10.2.4 above.
204 CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal; CoJ case C-213/89, Factortame; CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and 
C-9/90, Francovich; CoJ case C-453/99, Courage; CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz. See further 
sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 above.
205 On this principle, see para. 59 above. Note that Procurement Remedies Directive 89/665 
and 92/13 could be seen as codifi cations of this principle, particularly in light of CoJ case 
C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker, para. 87, discussed in para. 88 above (at least where their 
provisions on actions for damages are concerned). However these directives pre-date the 
abovementioned Francovich ruling that articulated the principle of Member State liability. 
It can therefore be ruled out that, when adopting these directives, the EU legislature 
aimed to codify the case law on this principle.
206 See subsection 2.5.3 above.
207 See para. 59 above.
208 See e.g. Van Dam (2006), p. 40; Lock (2012), p. 1675.
209 See e.g. subsection 7.1.1 above concerning the diffi culties that private parties that wish to 
bring actions for damages under the secondary EU law in question still tend to experi-
ence.
210 See subsection 2.4.1 above.
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fy the obligations upon the Member States in this respect.211 It is remarkable 
that in relation to the private enforcement-related matters at issue in this 
study infringement proceedings tend to play only a very limited role, if at 
all. Although in legal terms there are obvious limits to what can be achieved 
in this manner, this seems to be in large part the result of a policy choice. To 
give a concrete example, it would probably be difficult to establish through 
infringement proceedings that, as a matter of EU law, a finding of a competi-
tion law infringement by a national competition authority must necessarily 
have binding effect on a national court in a private enforcement case. For 
this to be achieved the adoption of secondary EU law seems required.212 
However, where the Commission finds that the laws of the certain Member 
States set the threshold for proving the extent of damages too high or pro-
vide for too limited disclosure possibilities, making it impossible or exces-
sively difficult for a private party to obtain full compensation for an 
infringement of EU law, there is legally speaking nothing preventing it from 
initiating infringements proceedings against those Member States. This 
could be done either instead of, or in parallel with, proposing secondary EU 
law. The general absence of infringement proceedings for private enforce-
ment-related matters suggests however that the Commission tends to prefer 
the ‘legislative route’.
10.3.2. Added-value: other relevant factors
416. The second set of considerations that could be seen as questioning the 
added-value of secondary EU law facilitating the private enforcement of EU 
law is more practical in nature. The central point here is that litigation pat-
terns typically depend on a broad range of factors, only a limited number of 
which can conceivably be addressed through adopting legislation. As has 
been seen in the foregoing chapters, this legislation at issue is typically con-
cerned with the applicable remedial and procedural rules in legal proceed-
ings for (alleged) infringements of EU law. But there can be little doubt that, 
when a private party must decide whether or not to initiate or pursue such 
proceedings, many other factors can play a role that may be at least as 
important as the content of those rules. In other words, there can be ‘unwrit-
ten obstacles’ to the success of private enforcement claims.213
As far back as in 1984 the Commission noted for instance the relevance 
of ”psychological barriers”.214 A more recent survey speaks in this connection 
of a “significant emotional component”.215 These findings typically relate to 
211 CoJ case 68/88, Commission v. Greece (Greek maize). See subsection 2.4.2 above.
212 Cf. Art. 9 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 243 above.
213 Cf. Heinemann (2011), p. 219.
214 Commission, Memorandum on consumer redress, COM(84) 629 fi nal, p. 6, where it is 
noted that consumers may be “overawed or intimidated by the atmosphere of the courthouse or 
the courtroom, by the formality of the proceedings and of the legal language and even by the jud-
ges’ and advocates’ robes”.
215 Eurobarometer, Consumer redress in the EU, August 2009, pp. 7 and 42.
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consumer disputes.216 Presumably factors of this kind tend to play less of a 
role where the private parties concerned are undertakings, i.e. parties that 
act in a professional capacity. But also for the latter parties other factors than 
strictly legal considerations can be of relevance. They may for example fear 
harming the commercial relationship with the opposing party or certain 
forms of retaliation. Such concerns particularly play a role in public procure-
ment cases, in light of some undertakings’ dependence on public contracts 
and fears of being ‘black-listed’.217 Yet they can also be relevant in other 
fields, such as in competition cases.218 Apart from that, both consumers and 
undertakings may simply prefer to spend their time, energy and resources 
on other things than litigation (opportunity costs; rational apathy).219
The awareness of the relevant rules of EU law and the rights that they 
may confer on private parties can be another important element, as has been 
frequently been noted in relation to various fields of law.220 This does not 
necessarily only concern (potential) private party-applicants. The training, 
expertise and attitudes of legal representatives, judges and potential infring-
ers, as well as the structure of the legal market, may all be relevant as well.221
It is moreover widely agreed that parties’ willingness to litigate tends to 
be influenced by social and cultural factors.222 The ‘claim-consciousness’ of 
private parties can thus differ significantly between Member States.223 Some 
speak therefore of differences in “procedural DNA”224 or the “procedural cul-
ture” that can differ.225 Even within one and the same Member State litiga-
tion habits can vary across various fields of law.226 Considerations of this 
216 See e.g. also Loos (2011), p. 491.
217 See para. 87 above.
218 See e.g. Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU 
antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, pp. 28-29. See also Basedow (2003), p. 37; Peysner (2006), 
p. 97; Eilmansberger (2007), p. 447; Milutinovic (2010), p. 125; Van den Bergh (2013), 
pp. 13-20.
219 See e.g. para. 87 and 188 above.
220 E.g. Commission, Green paper on public procurement in the EU, COM(96) 583, p. 17; 
Brown (1998), p. 93; Study Lovells (2003), p. x; Eurobarometer, Consumer redress in the 
EU, August 2009, pp. 9 and 39; Loos (2011), p. 490. See also CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and 
C-244/98, Océano Grupo, para. 26, discussed in para. 167 above, where consumers’ “igno-
rance of the law” was considered a relevant factor in concluding that in certain cases 
national courts must act of their own motion.
221 E.g. Jones (2003), p. 107; Kur (2004), pp. 825-826; Cafaggi & Micklitz (2009), pp. 426-427 
and 426; Loos (2011), p. 490.
222 E.g. Van Gerven (2003b), pp. 74 and 213; Dougan (2002), p. 157; Wolf (2003), p. 422; 
Arrowsmith (2005), pp. 1436-1437; Drake (2006), p. 862; Howells (2008), pp. 121 and 133. 
See also Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public pro-
curement, SEC(2006) 557, p. 16.
223 Study Lovells (2003), pp. ix and 23.
224 Fairgrieve & Lichère (2011), p. 194.
225 Opinion AG Geelhoed joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 31.
226 E.g. where one study (Study Lovells (2003)) singles out the UK as a particularly ‘claim-
conscious’ jurisdiction in relation to product liability, other reports (Wood Report (2004); 
Fairgrieve & Lichère (2011), p. 192) note that in the UK private parties are very hesitant in 
bringing claims for breaches of the public procurement rules.
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kind may also effect the extent to which the competent courts are inclined to 
make use of the procedural possibilities provided for, for instance to esti-
mate the harm caused by an infringement or to order the disclosure of evi-
dence.227
417. Taken together the above factors can be seen as putting in doubt the 
added-value of the EU legislation at issue, given that this legislation gener-
ally does not – and often cannot – address them. Yet again matters are not 
black and white. In particular, most of the abovementioned observations do 
not constitute absolute arguments against the adoption of EU legislation facil-
itating private enforcement of the type assessed in this study. The fact that 
psychological and emotional factors, commercial and pragmatic consider-
ations, as well as social and cultural attitudes play a role does not mean that 
therefore EU legislation has no role to play. Indeed, this could equally be 
seen precisely as a ground arguing in favour of enacting such legislation. 
For in this manner the factors that are capable of being influenced by legisla-
tion will be influenced to the extent possible. In addition most of the said 
factors are unlikely to be static. They can be expected to evolve over time, at 
least to some extent. There is no reason to presume that EU legislation could 
not play a role in that process. It would further appear that EU legislation of 
the type at issue here can in fact fulfil a particularly important function in 
raising awareness. Although it reportedly has not had a substantial effect in 
terms of increased litigation, the Product Liability Directive has for example 
been accredited with contributing towards “an increased awareness of and 
emphasis on product safety”.228 The introduction of the Procurement Remedies 
Directives has similarly been found to have contributed to improved aware-
ness on the side of aggrieved tenderers of their rights conferred by EU pub-
lic procurement law,229 just as the IPR Enforcement Directive has been said 
to have ‘sensitised’ courts and legal practitioners.230
Especially this ‘awareness-raising’ potential of EU legislation has not 
been lost on the Commission. It has repeatedly invoked it as an important 
argument in favour of adopting EU legislative measures of the type at issue 
here, inter alia in relation to the revision of the Procurement Remedies Direc-
tives.231 Another example is the Commission’s statement concerning its pro-
posal for the Competition Damages Directive that “[r]aising awareness is nec-
essary in order to ensure that victims of competition law infringements make use of 
their right to full compensation and, hence, contribute to achieving the purpose of 
227 Heinemann (2011), p. 219. As was noted in para. 231-233 above, national law does some-
times provide for possibilities of this sort, which tend however to be used only to a limit-
ed extent in practice.
228 Commission, First report on Product Liability Directive 85/374, COM(95) 617, p. 2. This 
conclusion is based on Study McKenna (1994).
229 Study Herbert Smith (1996), p. 21.
230 Geiger, Raynard & Rodà (2011), p. 546.
231 Commission, Impact assessment report on remedies in the fi eld of public procurement, 
SEC(2006) 557, p. 34.
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an effective private enforcement of competition law”.232 Earlier the Commission 
had held that, through its initiative in this field, private parties would also be 
“brought closer” to the EU competition rules233 and that codifying some of the 
relevant case law could lead to “greater awareness”.234 In fact, it may well be 
that even merely discussing possible legislative action can already have cer-
tain effects in practice. Over the past period damages litigation for infringe-
ments of competition law has on the whole gradually increased in the EU.235 
This has happened largely in parallel to the discussions on a possible EU 
legislative initiative in this field. In other words, this increase occurred 
before the Competition Damages Directive was adopted and transposed to 
national law. Although several factors are likely to have played a role in this 
connection,236 it appears that the years of discussions, studies, official docu-
ments, academic publications and consultations on a possible legislative ini-
tiative in this field helped to ‘sensitise’ the private parties concerned, their 
legal representatives and the national courts alike.237 It may furthermore well 
be that these discussions have also played a role in bringing about legislative 
change at the national level with respect to the private enforcement of com-
petition law.238 Also the national legislator may thus have been ‘sensitised’. 
Moreover, whatever its precise cause, this increased degree of litigation can 
have self-reinforcing effects, especially where it leads to additional, well-
published and broadly debated preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice.
418. Therefore again the main point is not that the abovementioned factors 
necessarily argue against the adoption of EU legislation facilitating the pri-
vate enforcement of EU law. The foregoing has rather served to underline 
that the remedial and procedural matters addressed in this legislation 
should not be assessed in isolation. It is submitted that, when considering 
the question whether or not to adopt or amend such EU legislation, or when 
assessing the effects in practice of EU legislative action or inaction in this 
respect, account ought to be taken of the broader context in which this legisla-
232 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 26. See e.g. also Commission, Staff working paper accompany-
ing the white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 
404, p. 98.
233 Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, p. 4.
234 Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the green paper on damages actions for 
breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, p. 7.
235 See in particular para. 223-224 above.
236 The CoJ’s Courage case law has e.g. undoubtedly been another relevant factor. See further 
para. 213-215 above.
237 See e.g. Kammin & Becker (2013), p. 61.
238 See e.g. Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU 
antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 17 (see also its pp. 74-75). Here it is noted that several 
Member States have adopted or amended their legislation, or are considering doing so, 
so as to facilitate the bringing of actions for damages for breaches of the competition 
rules.
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tion operates or is to operate. This argues for instance against an approach 
whereby the need for EU legislative action is principally determined in light 
of the number of cases brought in a given field of law. Not only would few 
consider litigation to be an end in itself,239 too many factors would also seem 
to be at work for this to be an adequate measure.
10.3.3. Summary
419. The Court of Justice has, on the basis of primary EU law, over the 
years established a rather elaborate body of case law relating to the enforce-
ment of EU law by private parties at national level. Litigation patterns more-
over tend to be determined not only by the applicable remedial and proce-
dural rules, but also by a range of other factors. The latter include, as the 
case may be, psychological and emotional factors, commercial and prag-
matic considerations, social and cultural attitudes towards litigation, as well 
as awareness (or the absence thereof) of the relevant rules. Neither of these 
two observations implies that adopting EU legislation facilitating the pri-
vate enforcement of EU law has no added-value. And yet these observations 
do provide useful reminders that the value of this legislation should not be 
overstated either. In particular, the existence of the said case law highlights 
that adopting legislation is not necessarily the only way forward. Prelimi-
nary references and targeted infringement proceedings might lead to out-
comes that are at least in part comparable to those that result from the adop-
tion of secondary EU law. The inherent limits and disadvantages of case 
law-driven solutions notwithstanding, this ‘judicial route’ may appear more 
attractive in function of the difficulties experienced in relation to the ‘legisla-
tive route’. Quite apart from that, the relevance of the abovementioned other 
factors underlines that any such enforcement-related legislation should not 
be considered in isolation. Rather account should be taken of the broader 
environment in which this legislation operates or is to operate.
10.4. Coherence and fragmentation
This final section of chapter 10 takes as its point of departure that, in light of 
the relevant legal, political and policy considerations, the adoption of EU 
legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law is seen as both fea-
sible and necessary. On that basis the question is essentially addressed how 
to legislate in such a case. It is first shown that the legislation analysed in the 
foregoing chapters can lead concerns in terms of coherence and fragmenta-
tion, when considered from the perspective of both EU law (first subsection) 
and national law (second subsection). The third subsection then considers to 
which extent there is scope for a more coherent approach at EU level.
239 Cf. Cafaggi & Micklitz (2009), p. 443.
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10.4.1. Coherence and fragmentation at EU level
420. Overlooking the foregoing it seems fair to say that the EU legislation 
considered in this study leaves much to be desired in terms of internal coher-
ence. On the whole neither in this legislation itself, nor in the preparatory 
and explanatory documents relating thereto can indications be found that 
these legal acts are underpinned by an approach that seeks to address the 
remedial and procedural matters in question in a coherent and consistent 
manner. These acts and documents have instead been mostly tailored to the 
perceived needs and specifics of the sector at issue. Little account is taken of 
the state of play in other fields of EU law, let alone that much consideration 
seems to be given to the possible future development of EU law concerning 
private enforcement seen in its entirety.
For instance, hardly any attention appears to have been paid to ensuring 
a coherent and consistent approach regarding EU rules on actions for dam-
ages, even if this remedy takes an important place in most directives under 
consideration and similar concerns often arise in the different fields of law 
at issue.240 There can of course be good reasons for addressing certain par-
ticular concerns in a particular manner. But it is difficult to see why one 
should not at least try to depart from a common position, for example on 
points such as the applicable causality requirements and the quantification 
and the qualification of the harm caused.241 The relevant differences not-
withstanding, it has similarly already been seen above that in respect of the 
contractual remedies there does appear to be scope for solutions ensuring a 
greater degree of internal coherence of the rules of EU law at issue.242 It is 
also not immediately evident why, where provision is made in secondary 
law EU for recurring penalty payments or for publicity measures, the mea-
sures in question tend to be drafted every time in a different manner.243 The 
rules on the inter partes disclosure of evidence set out in the Competition 
Damages Directive are in a sense a positive exception, as they are expressly 
inspired on the corresponding arrangement of the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive.244 This would however seem to make it all the more regrettable that 
these provisions have been drafted and structured in a slightly different 
manner.245
In this light it is unsurprising that many commentators have cast a harsh 
verdict on the EU’s legislative involvement with the remedies and proce-
dures applicable in proceedings before the national courts generally and 
with issues such as non-contractual liability (tort) and contract law specifi-
240 See section 7.1 above.
241 See subsections 7.1.3, 7.1.4 and 7.2.5 above respectively.
242 See subsection 8.1.1 above.
243 See subsections 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 above respectively.
244 See Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, 
p. 14.
245 Cf. Art. 6 and 7(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/18; Art. 5 Competition Damages 
Directive. See further subsection 8.2.2 above.
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cally. The relevant bodies of EU law have been criticised for their “piecemeal 
nature”,246 their “ad hoc” character247 and the “compartmentalisation”.248 EU 
law relating to non-contractual liability has been called a “rather ramshackle 
creation”,249 while in this connection it has also been held that it is “hard to 
identify any consistency of approach at all”.250 EU law on consumer contracts 
has similarly been described as “wildly unsystematic”.251 It has rightfully 
been observed that when addressing these matters the EU legislature seems 
mostly interested in solving certain particular problems, rather than in 
securing legal integrity or doctrinal coherence.252
421. An obvious but therefore no less relevant point to make in this con-
nection is that each of the legal acts and initiatives assessed in part B of this 
study relates to one particular sector of economic activity regulated by EU 
law. The Procurement Remedies Directives are limited to the enforcement of 
the EU rules in the field of public procurement, the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive is primarily linked to EU legislation in the field of intellectual property, 
etc. In fact, hardly ever is an entire sector or field of law covered.253 The two 
aforementioned directives may be comparatively ambitious in as far as their 
scope is concerned, but they do not provide ‘full’ coverage of the substan-
tive rules of EU law at issue even at sectoral level. The Procurement Reme-
dies Directives do not apply to infringements of the Defence Procurement 
Directive for instance. The latter instead contains a set of private enforce-
ment-related rules of its own.254 This thus adds to the differentiation that 
already results from the fact that the EU legislature found it necessary to 
adopt not one but two Procurement Remedies Directives, which once again 
slightly differ between them. As to the IPR Enforcement Directive, the Com-
mission decided to lay down a separate set of rules on civil redress in its 
proposal for a trade secrets directive, rather than to amend the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive.255 Besides already at present certain private enforcement-
related provisions concerning intellectual property law infringements can 
be found in other legal acts than the IPR Enforcement Directive, for example 
in the Infosoc Directive.256 The Competition Damages Directive’s scope may 
246 Van Gerven (1995), p. 525
247 Dougan (2004), p. 15
248 Milutinovic (2010), p. 341.
249 Kellner (2009), p. 151.
250 Oliphant (2008), p. 271 (regarding the qualifi cation and quantifi cation of damages).
251 Weatherill (2012), p. 1280.
252 Collins (2011), p. 453. See e.g. also Curtin (1993), p. 17.
253 As regards the scope of the EU legislation at issue more generally, see subsection 9.1.1 
above.
254 Art. 55-64 Defence Procurement Directive 2009/81. See further para. 94 above.
255 Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, COM(2013) 813, pp. 19-24 (Art. 5-14). 
See further para. 140 above. Unlike IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, this proposal 
includes e.g. rules on limitation periods, whereas it does not foresee rules on the disclo-
sure of evidence.
256 Art. 8 Infosoc Directive 2001/29. See further para. 117 above.
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be relatively broad in that it covers in principle all infringements of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, yet its scope is narrow in the sense that, in terms of sub-
stantive remedies provided for, it concentrates on actions for damages.
It follows that none of these directives regulate private enforcement-
related matters in an entire field of EU law in a more or less complete man-
ner, let alone that they cover several or even all fields covered by substantive 
EU law. This is evidently a difference with many national legal systems. 
Particularly in Member States with a civil law (as opposed to common law) 
system, rules on remedies and procedures typically apply much more 
broadly, i.e. regardless of which types of substantive rules are infringed.257
422. The resulting ‘compartmentalisation’ is in part inherent in the manner 
in which competences have been vested in the EU. As was noted earlier, pur-
suant to the principle of conferral the EU cannot legislate as it sees fit.258 The 
EU Treaties mostly confer powers on a sector-specific basis, notably with a 
view to addressing issues with a transnational dimension. Also Article 114 
TFEU does not vest in the EU a general power to regulate the internal mar-
ket.259 That being so, it can hardly come as a surprise that secondary EU law 
is mostly sector-specific. That applies for the substantive rules in question 
and, by extension, also for the rules on remedies and procedures that seek to 
facilitate the enforcement of those substantive rules by private parties before 
the national courts. Admittedly this need not lead, in and of itself, to inco-
herence and inconsistencies in the wider body of EU law. The reality is how-
ever that this is typically the result of such a ‘stand-alone’ approach. That 
tends to be the case already where the private enforcement-related rules 
relate to the same sector, as is illustrated by the generally limited, but none-
theless noticeable differences between the Defence Procurement Directive 
and the Procurement Remedies Directives, or between the proposal for a 
trade secrets directives and the IPR Enforcement Directive. It certainly 
applies where entirely different sectors are concerned. Indeed, diversity of 
legal bases may result in equally fragmented mind-sets among administra-
tors, decision-makers and stakeholders.260
One could well imagine establishing an underlying programme or 
framework of some sort, in light of which the EU’s private enforcement-
related legislation could then be drafted, regardless of the sector or subsec-
tor concerned.261 It could set out certain guiding principles, standardised 
approaches, rules on uniform terminology, etc. Generally speaking, neither 
the need for tailor-made solutions in certain cases, nor constraints related 
to the legal basis of a particular proposed act need to stand in the way of 
257 On the impact on national level, see further subsection 10.4.2 below.
258 See para. 381 above.
259 See para. 382 above. See also para. 430 below.
260 Dawson & Muir (2014), p. 222.
261 Cf. European Parliament, Council and Commission, Interinstitutional agreement on bet-
ter law-making, OJ 2003, C 321/1.
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such an approach. In that sense more can, and indeed should, be expected 
from the Commission and the EU legislature.262 Yet there are also reasons for 
not being overly optimistic in this regard. The everyday reality of Brussels-
based law-making is likely to continue to lead to situations where issues 
related to internal coherence and consistency play (at best) only a second-
ary role, whether or not a ‘horizontal’ programme or framework of some 
kind exists. When discussing a draft legal act that is only concerned with, 
say, private enforcement in the field of competition law, the parties involved 
(not only the EU institutions concerned, but also experts, academics, pri-
vate sector stakeholders, etc.) may well have other concerns than ensuring 
consistency with the EU rules that already apply for instance in the field of 
intellectual property law. Account should further be taken of the political 
sensitivity of many of the matters under consideration.263 Things tend to be 
complicated further by the need to reconcile different legal cultures, men-
talities and linguistic issues in the process of EU law-making.264 All this may 
well necessitate innovative rather than standardised solutions for a draft 
act to be adopted or even proposed. This almost inevitably comes at the 
expense of well-intended and in themselves laudable ambitions in terms of 
coherence and consistency.
423. Another – more fundamental – point to be made in this connection is 
that the current sector-specific approach also implies a differentiation in 
enforcement possibilities within the broader category of rights of private par-
ties vested in EU law. While the EU legislation and initiatives at issue in this 
study typically seek to make it easier for these parties to enforce their rights 
based on substantive EU law on public procurement, intellectual property, 
consumer protection and competition law, in many other instances where 
EU law grants rights to private parties no comparable legislation exists. 
Here the issue of coherence thus does not relate so much to the differences 
between various legal acts at issue, but rather to the difference that exists 
between the fields of law where such acts have been adopted on the one 
hand and the fields where that is not the case on the other hand.
Not without reason has the appropriateness of the resulting sector-spe-
cific privileging of certain fields of EU law, and the rights derived therefrom, 
over others been questioned.265 Such an approach can raise issues of fairness 
and equal treatment. To illustrate this point, it is evident that, further to the 
Court’s ruling in Courage, the Commission and subsequently the EU legisla-
ture have sought to ensure, by proposing and adopting the Competition 
Damages Directive, that a private party affected by a competition law 
infringement can receive full compensation.266 But it is considerably less evi-
262 Cf. Art. 7 TFEU. See also Van Gerven (2008a), p. 42.
263 See subsection 10.2.1 above.
264 Cf. Van Gerven (2008a), p. 43.
265 E.g. Wolf (2003), pp. 422-423; Van Dam (2006), p. 345; Reich (2007), p. 738.
266 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage. See in particular subsections 6.2.2, 6.2.3, and 6.3.1 above.
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dent why no such ‘legislative follow-up’ has been given to the Court’s find-
ing in Muñoz that private parties should be able to bring civil proceedings to 
address infringements of certain agricultural rules.267 Similarly the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives seek to facilitate the private enforcement of the 
Substantive Public Directives, which give expression to the EU Treaties’ 
‘fundamental freedoms’ (namely the freedoms of establishment and to pro-
vide services).268 Yet one could wonder why no such measures exist for 
example in respect of the rights that private parties can derive from the Ser-
vices Directive, which was also adopted on the basis of these provisions.269
424. Once more the point here is not that there cannot be good grounds for 
differentiating between the enforcement possibilities that exist with respect 
to various substantive rules of EU law or in particular situations.270 It may 
well be that one sector is considered to be of greater economic importance 
than another, that certain rules are singled out as a political priority, that the 
available enforcement difficulties encountered by private parties differ, etc. 
Likewise there can also be reasons for such differentiation between the vari-
ous substantive rules that apply within a particular field of law.271 The main 
point here is rather that the question whether or not there are such grounds 
does not seem to receive much attention, if at all, when EU legislation of the 
type at issue in this study is being prepared, discussed and adopted. In par-
ticular, it is often far from clear on the basis of which criteria these choices are 
made, or indeed whether the question on which basis certain particular 
domains are singled out has been asked at all. It may only be human that 
individual observers sometimes seem to assume rather easily that their own 
field of specialisation is exceptional and worthy of special treatment.272 It is 
remarkable however how little attention is generally paid at institutional 
level to the question whether and why a particular field of EU law requires 
special legislative measures so as to facilitate private enforcement.
In relation to the Competition Damages Directive some attention has 
been given to this issue, presumably in response to earlier critical comments 
by stakeholders.273 That is to say, in 2008 the Commission argued that the 
fact that similar private enforcement-related problems might exist in other 
fields is, in and by itself, not a reason for the EU not to act in this particular 
field. This seems a valid point to make. But it is submitted that it would 
have been considerably more convincing had the following statements 
about competition cases being “unusually difficult”, given their “particular 
267 CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz. See further para. 61 above.
268 See para. 70 above.
269 Services Directive 2006/123.
270 Cf. also the discussion of certain ‘sector-specifi c’ measures on the closure of evidence in 
subsection 8.2.2 above.
271 Cf. e.g. Hüschelrath & Peyer (2013), p. 585.
272 E.g. Milutinovic (2010), pp. 330-331.
273 See para. 219 above. See e.g. also European Parliament, Resolution on the white paper on 
damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2009)0187, para. 3 and 5.
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complexity” and the “particularly high” and “unevenly distributed” evidential 
burden been properly explained and substantiated.274 At least some of these 
submissions may well be less self-evident than seems to be presumed. Com-
petition cases can undoubtedly be complicated. But are they inherently 
more complex than other forms of commercial litigation, especially consid-
ering that in some (‘follow-on’) competition cases applicants can build on 
the findings of unusually powerful public enforcement authorities? It has 
already been seen in the foregoing that low levels of damages litigation and 
the problems typically cited in this connection (high costs, lengthy proceed-
ings, difficulties in meeting the standard of proof, difficulties in quantifying 
the harm, etc.) are by no means unique to competition cases.275 In 2013 the 
Commission also highlighted another element, namely that in the amount of 
uncompensated harm caused by competition law infringements would be 
“particularly big”.276 That might be true. But again this statement seems 
largely speculative. Not only is the estimate of the harm caused by the 
infringements at issue a very rough approximation,277 there are also no indi-
cations whatsoever that a quantitative comparison has been made.
10.4.2. Coherence and fragmentation at national level
425. Even if they take a somewhat different form, it is important to note 
that concerns related to coherence and fragmentation emerge not only at 
EU, but also at national level. A particular concern is that EU legislative mea-
sures of the type at issue in this study can lead to fragmentation, i.e. a lessen-
ing of the internal coherence, of the respective domestic legal systems of the 
Member States. Adopting specific remedial and procedural provisions for, 
say, the enforcement of right based on the EU public procurement rules can 
cause a degree of disruption of the national legal systems, in as much as 
these provisions of EU law do not cover rights based on ‘purely’ national 
procurement law (i.e. rules of national law other than those transposing a 
directive). As is perhaps to be expected, concerns along these lines have reg-
ularly been expressed especially by the Member States in relation to the EU 
legislation discussed above, either with respect to an intended EU legislative 
274 Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 95-96.
275 See subsection 7.1.1 above.
276 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 18 (n. 42).
277 Cf. ibid., p. 22, where it is observed that “the absence of reliable empirical data makes precise 
quantifi cation impossible”, but that “there is general agreement that the infringements of compe-
tition law cause substantial harm”. The subsequent estimates give a somewhat more con-
crete indication, but the ranges remain very wide (between € 5,7 and € 23,3 billion a year 
EU wide) and the costs cited do not coincide with the size of the uncompensated harm as 
a consequence of the infringements that the proposal seek to address. A comparison with 
other fi elds of law is entirely absent.
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initiative generally or a particular provision of a proposal.278 Yet it is notice-
able that, especially in more recent years, also the European Parliament has 
highlighted them.279 This concern has also been widely acknowledged in the 
legal literature.280
This fragmenting effect at national level – the ‘dark side of EU harmoni-
sation’, as it has been called281 – may not be unique to EU legislation of the 
type at issue here. Yet this concern arguably features more prominently in 
the present context for two reasons. First, the matters concerned, i.e. reme-
dies and procedures applicable in private enforcement proceedings, have 
traditionally been mostly left to be regulated by the domestic legal systems 
of the Member States.282 This means that, as far as EU law is concerned, 
these legal systems have on the whole been able to retain a considerable 
degree of internal coherence, certainly as compared to many matters of sub-
stantive law. Second, at least in most Member States with a civil law tradi-
tion, the national bodies of law regulating these matters of remedies and 
procedures (e.g. regarding legal standing, damages claims or legal costs) 
have typically been designed to apply across the board, i.e. regardless of the 
nature or origin of the rule of substantive law at issue. The EU’s sector-spe-
cific manner of legislating tends to necessitate a deviation from this point of 
departure. This effect is of aggravated by the fact that, as was pointed out in 
the previous subsection, the EU rules in question tend to differ between 
them.
426. This fragmenting effect can be looked upon in different manners. One 
view is to see it simply as an unfortunate but necessary evil, resulting from 
the supranational structure of the EU and the position of EU law in relation 
to national law.283 There is certainly some truth in this. Generally speaking, 
the manner in which powers have been conferred to the EU makes it impos-
sible to cover all situations, i.e. including situations without an internal mar-
ket relevance or another cross-border dimension, in a single act of secondary 
EU law and thus to ensure coherence across the board.284 It naturally follows 
278 See e.g. para. 98 (concerning the possibility under Procurement Remedies Directives 
89/665 and 92/13 to designate several, separate review bodies), para. 116 (concerning the 
legislative initiative leading to IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48), para. 177 (concern-
ing a provision on compensation of non-material damages under Product Liability Direc-
tive 85/374), para. 189 (concerning a possible legislative initiative on collective redress) 
and para. 219 (concerning the legislative initiative leading to the Competition Damages 
Directive) above.
279 E.g. European Parliament, Resolution on the white paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2009)0187, para. 5; European Parliament, Resolution on 
towards a coherent European approach to collective redress, P7_TA(2012)0021, para. 15.
280 E.g. Van Gerven (1995), p. 700; Cornish et al. (2003), p. 448; Dougan (2011), p. 416; Weath-
erill (2012), p. 1315.
281 Van Gerven (2003a), p. 401.
282 See section 2.1 above.
283 Komninos (2008), p. 181.
284 See also subsection 10.4.3 below.
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that national rules tend to be harmonised on a selective basis, which neces-
sarily implies that other national rules can remain unaffected. A degree of 
fragmentation at national level may therefore indeed be a necessary and 
often unavoidable evil.
However it is submitted that this is not – or, at least, this should not be –
the last word to be said on the matter. In particular, it would be incorrect 
to perceive the abovementioned concerns about fragmentation at national 
level as being mainly a matter of national legislative design and elegance. 
For it can have significant ‘real-world’ consequences. To start with, it is not 
to be forgotten that substantive EU law mostly applies in ‘translated’ form 
at national level, i.e. through – and therefore as an integral part of – the 
domestic legal systems of the Member States.285 Furthermore the bodies of 
national rules that are affected by this EU legislation are often the result of 
centuries of legal evolution and, more importantly, may well reflect in prin-
ciple legitimate political, social and cultural preferences.286 In accordance 
with these preferences, most of these rules perform moreover a useful func-
tion.287 Although this does not constitute an absolute bar to EU legislative 
action, all this is already reason not to set these rules aside too easily. Indeed, 
while it may be true that procedural idiosyncrasy, unlike national costume 
or regional cuisine, is not to be nurtured for its own sake,288 neither is this 
merely a question of easily ‘transferable technology’.289 There is a balance to 
be struck.
That applies all the more so given that also in this context EU legislative 
interference tends to imply preferential treatment in terms of enforcement 
possibilities of certain fields of law and of certain rights over others.290 The 
rights, the enforcement of which the EU legislation at issue seeks to facili-
tate, are after all mostly rights conferred by substantive EU law.291 The result 
of EU legislative action facilitating private enforcement can therefore be 
more favourable treatment in terms of enforcement of certain rights vested 
in EU law, as compared to rights vested in ‘purely’ national law. There is 
however no reason to assume that the former, simply by virtue of being EU 
rights, are of greater importance than the latter.292 It is not evident that a 
private party seeking to enforce a right vested in for instance EU consumer 
protection law ought to be treated more favourably than the party that seeks 
285 Cf. Prechal (2005), pp. 178-179.
286 Cf. Storme (1994), p. 38; Van Gerven (2008b), p. 409; Storskrubb (2008), p. 21; Dougan 
(2011), p. 410.
287 Cf. CoJ case C-413/12, ACICL, para. 38: “[national] procedural rules relating to the structure 
of internal legal remedies and the number of instances of jurisdiction pursue a general interest in 
the sound administration of justice and foreseeability”. In a similar sense, see Dougan (2004), 
p. 28; Prechal (2005), p. 173.
288 Storskrubb (2008), p. 13 (citing English case law).
289 Harlow (2000), pp. 80-83.
290 See also para. 423 above.
291 See subsection 9.1.1 above.
292 Cf. Opinion AG Jacobs joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 27.
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to enforce such a right vested in ‘purely’ national consumer protection law. 
Also in this context issues of fairness and equal treatment can thus arise. 
Indeed, in its 2010 DEB ruling concerning national rules on legal aid the 
Court of Justice held that applicants relying on EU law should not be 
favoured over other applicants.293
427. A final point to note in this connection is the ‘spill-over’ effect that EU 
legislation harmonising national law on remedies and procedures can have. 
This refers to the phenomenon that pursuant to the adoption of this legisla-
tion (or case law of the Court of Justice294) Member States regularly decide 
to apply more broadly the requirements set out in that legislation. For 
instance, the Procurement Remedies Directives only covers the substantive 
EU public procurement rules.295 Nonetheless, when transposing these direc-
tives, many Member States decided to apply the same remedial and proce-
dural rules to infringements of ‘purely’ national substantive public procure-
ment rules.296 Such a spill-over effect has also been observed to occur with 
respect to the Consumer Injunctions Directive297 and the Product Liability 
Directive.298 Of course, as a matter of EU law, these Member States are not 
legally obliged to take such steps. Strictly speaking this is no more than ‘vol-
untary harmonisation’. But the fact that the Member States still regularly do 
so underlines the sincerity of the abovementioned concerns regarding the 
fragmentation of their respective national legal systems, as this is often the 
only manner to retain a degree of internal coherence and ensure equal treat-
ment. Moreover this spill-over effect can also lead to question as regards the 
practical effects of the principle of conferral, which is of fundamental impor-
tance in the EU legal order.299
428. In many respects the conclusion to be drawn concerning matters of 
coherence and fragmentation considered from the perspective of national 
law is therefore comparable to the one set out in the previous subsection that 
concentrated on the EU perspective. That is to say, in legal terms none of the 
foregoing constitutes an absolute bar to the adoption of EU legislation facil-
293 CoJ case C-279/09, DEB, para. 56.
294 See Hartmann (2012), p. 620, where it is noted that several Member States ‘implemented’ 
the principle of Member State liability also for purely domestic situations pursuant to CoJ 
joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich. On this ruling and the said principle, see 
further para. 59 above.
295 See para. 94 above.
296 Commission, Report on the impact and effectiveness of EU public procurement legisla-
tion, SEC(2011) 853, p. 67.
297 Study University of Bielefeld (2008), p. 610.
298 Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000), p. 648. For another example, outside the scope of 
part B, see the (proposed) application of the provisions of Mediation Directive 2008/52 
not only in cross-border, but also in ‘purely’ national disputes under Netherlands and 
Italian law. See European Parliament Policy Department (2011), p. 67; Davies & Szyszc-
zak (2011), p. 702.
299 See para. 381 above.
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itating the private enforcement of EU law. There may moreover well be val-
id and convincing policy reasons for taking such legislative action at EU 
level. It is submitted however that, although this may be the outcome, con-
cerns related to fragmentation at national level should not be simply shrug 
off a priori as an unfortunate but necessary evil. For the reasons set above 
the possible consequences for the national legal systems merit being given 
appropriate weight in the EU decision-making process. This is a matter of 
good law-making as well as respect for the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.300
10.4.3. Towards a more coherent approach?
429. In light of the foregoing, it is understandable that calls for a more coher-
ent EU legislative approach have often been made.301 It should be acknowl-
edged that more recently there have been some (modest) signs of a ‘de-com-
partmentalisation’, or at least certain attempts thereto. As was noted above, 
despite the regrettable differences between both regimes, the Competition 
Damages Directive at least acknowledges the existence of, and seeks to build 
on, the arrangement in the IPR Enforcement Directive on the inter partes dis-
closure of evidence.302 At an earlier stage, when this competition law initia-
tive was still expected to include rules on collective redress, account was 
also taken of the approach involving ‘qualified entities’, as set out in the 
Consumer Injunctions Directive.303 This collective redress aspect has since 
developed from a ‘competition-only’ into a broader initiative, covering also 
consumer protection law as well as other infringements of EU law.304 The 
Commission explained this decision to opt for a broader approach with ref-
erence to the fact that competition law is not the only field where infringe-
ments may lead to ‘scattered’ damages, as well as the wish to avoid the 
unnecessary fragmentation of the civil laws of the Member States.305
And also elsewhere in EU law attention for ensuring a more coherent 
and consistent approach appears to be increasing. Ambitions in this regard 
were expressed for instance in relation to the EU rules on passengers’ 
300 In a similar sense, see Opinion AG Jacobs joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van 
Schijndel, para. 27; De Búrca (1997), p. 45; Van Gerven (2008a), p. 43; Milutinovic (2010), 
p. 328.
301 E.g. Van Gerven (2004a), pp. 527-532; Koziol & Schutze (2008a), p. 608; Lukas (2008), 
p. 102; Storskrubb (2008), p. 305; Kellner (2009), p. 152; Zippro (2009a), p. 220; Tulibacka 
(2009), p. 1557.
302 See subsection 8.2.2 above.
303 Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 19. See Art. 3 Consumer Injunctions 
Directive 2009/22, discussed in para. 154 above.
304 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See further subsection 5.5.1 above.
305 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 55.
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rights, including the enforcement thereof.306 A legislative proposal aimed at 
improving the consistency of existing EU legislation in the field of civil pro-
cedural law was announced in 2010.307 In the field of contract law a number 
of further initiatives were also taken to this aim.308 These include involving 
academia so as to establish a ‘common frame of reference’.309 In due time 
this academic work may contribute to the creation of more extensive and 
more coherent EU legislation on the aforementioned issues,310 although 
for now that seems still a rather distant and uncertain prospect.311 The said 
initiatives also include legislative proposals, most notably for a consumer 
rights directive and for a regulation on a European sales law.312 Without 
going into detail here, it can however be noted that these proposals have 
been received rather critically.313 Whereas the proposal for a regulation on 
a European sales law is currently still pending, the Consumer Rights Direc-
tive has been adopted in 2011.314 In the course of the legislative process sub-
stantial amendments to the Commission’s proposal were made, including a 
significant reduction of its scope. Many find the end result disappointing.315 
Indeed, the fate of this directive has led to the observation that “there are 
limits to what is politically palatable in the name of ‘coherence’”.316
It thus seems that a coherent approach is often more easily called for and 
dreamt up in the abstract than brought into EU legislative practice.317
306 Commission, White paper on a roadmap on a single European transport area, COM(2011) 
144, p. 23.
307 Commission, Communication on delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for 
Europe’s, COM(2010) 171, p. 23. In Commission, Work programme 2012 (Annex), 
COM(2011) 777, p. 32, this initiative was announced for 2014, but it does no re-appear in 
subsequent work programmes.
308 See e.g. Commission, Green paper on policy options towards a European contract law for 
consumers and businesses, COM(2010) 348.
309 Von Bar & Clive (2010). For a discussion and further references, see e.g. Hondius (2011), 
p. 531. For other academic contributions, see e.g. Lando & Beale (2000); Lando et al. 
(2003); Hartkamp et al. (2011). More specifi cally on the topic of the law of non-contractual 
liability (tort), see also Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche (2000); Van Dam (2006); Koziol & 
Schulze (2008b). See also the work of the European Group on tort law, available via 
wwww.egtl.org.
310 Some of the academic work referred to above is at times referred to in opinions of certain 
AG’s. See further Basedow (2010a), p. 465 (n. 103); Gutman (2011), p. 748.
311 Cf. Commission Decision 2010/233/EU setting up the expert group on a common frame 
of reference in the area of European contract law, OJ 2010, L 105/109; Study Expert group 
on European contract law (2011).
312 Commission, Proposal for Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83, COM(2008) 614; Com-
mission, Proposal for a regulation on a common European sales law, COM(2011) 635.
313 On the proposed directive, see e.g. Micklitz & Reich (2009), p. 471; Ackermann (2010), 
p. 587; Hondius (2010), p. 103. In relation to the proposed regulation, see e.g. Lando 
(2011), p. 717; Samoy, Dang Vu & Jansen (2011), p 855; Heideman (2012), p. 119.
314 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83.
315 E.g. Stuyck (2012), p. 69.
316 Weatherill (2012), pp. 1311.
317 See further e.g. Weitenberg (2008), p. 309; Basedow (2010a), p. 443.
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430. A similar conclusion is likely to emerge when considerably more ambi-
tious legislative arrangements are considered, which would cut across various 
sectors and regulate national remedial and procedural rules for the enforce-
ment of EU law before national courts in a more coherent manner. Leaving 
political, policy and practical issues aside for a moment, as the law stands 
the main legal constraint seems, once more, the requirement of a sufficient 
legal basis.318 It has for example been suggested that the EU might take leg-
islative action to address differences between national laws on remedies and 
procedures in a more general manner under Article 114 TFEU. To this effect 
it has been submitted that “the harmonisation of procedural rules [is] a sine qua 
non for market integration” and that “the Member States of the European Union, 
having created an internal market, are obliged to correct […] unwanted effects 
which stem from procedural differences”.319 Others argue that “[i]f a market is to 
flourish, disputes arising out of business conducted in the market must be resolved 
consistently with one another, and that requires more than uniform substantive law. 
Distortion is bound to occur if the mode of litigation, with all that that implies by 
way of procedural techniques and by way of their implications for costs, delays, 
appeals, enforcement of judgments and so on, varies substantially from one place to 
another”.320
Claims of this type may not be untrue. Yet it is another matter whether 
that suffices for the present purposes, particularly in light of their level of 
abstraction. It has already been noted above that the use of a legal basis can 
only be determined in light of the aim and the content of a concrete intended 
legislative measure and that Article 114 TFEU does not grant the EU a gen-
eral power to regulate the internal market.321 A real, appreciable effect of the 
identified disparities on the internal market is required. It seems question-
able whether broad claims such as the ones set out above can be sufficiently 
substantiated so as to withstand scrutiny by the Court of Justice if and when 
challenged. In practice it would generally seem difficult to meet the required 
standard where the intended legislative measures relate to matters of reme-
dies and procedures to be applied across the board. The Court of Justice has 
for instance held that the possibility that undertakings would hesitate to sell 
goods in another Member State because they are subject to different proce-
dural rules “is too uncertain and indirect for that national provision to be regarded 
318 Apart from the articles discussed above, Art. 352 TFEU could also be considered here. 
This article provides a legal basis where EU action is necessary to attain one of the objec-
tives set out in the EU Treaties. However this provision has important limitations of its 
own. Most notably it is residual in nature, as it can only be applied “if the [EU] Treaties 
have not provided the necessary powers”, and it requires that the Council acts unanimously 
in adopting the proposed legislative measure.
319 Storskrubb (2008), pp. 78-79. In a similar sense, see e.g. Van den Bossche (2003), pp. 52-54.
320 Jolowicz (1994), p. xiii. See also Storme (1994), pp. 43-53.
321 See para. 382 above.
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as liable to hinder trade between Member States”.322 This case did not concern 
the use of Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis, but it would still seem to illus-
trate the mostly indirect or subsidiary effects that national rules on remedies 
and procedures have. Adopting private enforcement-related legislation 
based on this article seems difficult to conceive without making the argu-
ment that the intended EU legislative action is required in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of certain specific substantive rules of EU (or national) law.323 
Enforcement rules thus mostly ‘follow’ the substantial rules to which they 
relate.324
431. It is further important not to misunderstand the meaning of issues of 
uniformity that can arise in the present context. It is true that the Court of 
Justice has held the uniform application of EU law to be a fundamental 
requirement of the EU legal order.325 However it has also ruled that the exis-
tence of certain differences between jurisdictions is inevitable where nation-
al law is relied upon for certain remedial and procedural matters (which 
continues to be the ‘default’ position under EU law326) or where the har-
monisation at EU level in this respect is limited (which is mostly the case 
here327).328 The fundamental requirement of uniform application therefore 
not necessarily involves (fully) uniform enforcement at national level.329 In 
relation to (private) enforcement-related matters a certain degree of diver-
sity can, and often must, be accepted. As Advocate General Reischl observed 
in 1980, the fact that “the legal position of the individual may […] differ in the 
various Member States is simply a consequence of the implementation of [EU] law 
by the Member States, which is accepted by the [EU] legal system”.330 There can 
be no doubt that EU law has since further evolved. But as a general rule it 
would seem to be no less true today.331
322 Cf. CoJ case C-412/97, ED, para. 11. See e.g. also CoJ case 811/79, Ariete, para. 16. See also 
Dougan (2004), pp. 23 and 100; Van Dam (2006), pp. 133-138; Study Cauffman, Faure & 
Hartlief (2009), p. 308.
323 Cf. Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU anti-
trust rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 41. Here it is said that “[e]ffective redress, fair competition and 
the proper functioning of the internal market would […] require comparable exposure to damages 
claims, which can be brought about only by similar procedural rules governing actions for dama-
ges”. This also seems a rather broad and abstract claim, even if here it evidently relates 
only to national rules relating to EU (and in some cases national) competition law.
324 Cf. CoJ case C-60/03, Wolff and Müller, para. 36-37.
325 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen, para. 26.
326 See section 2.2 above.
327 See subsection 10.1.3 vabove.
328 E.g. CoJ joined cases 205/82 to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor, par. 21; CoJ case C-570/08, 
Simvoulio, para. 37.
329 Cf. Micklitz (2012), p. 395.
330 Opinion AG Reischl case 61/79, Denkavit, p. 1233.
331 Cf. Opinion AG Jacobs joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 45.
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It has also been observed that the Court of Justice does not regard uni-
formity as an all-embracing principle which does not allow for any national 
differences. Advocate General Van Gerven (writing extra-judicially) noted 
that “the requirement of universal application is fundamental, but does not override 
other principles, such as, in particular, the principle of the Member States’ compe-
tence in ‘procedural’ matters”.332 More specifically in relation to EU legislative 
measures, he added that: “[w]ithin the EU, uniformity of laws, or even far-reach-
ing harmonisation, must not be an objective in itself, as it is not of itself a higher 
good than diversity. The diversity between the legal families within the EU is so 
huge (not only with regard to content but also, and even more so, with regard to 
style and mentalities), and the task to achieve unity so daunting and time and 
resources-consuming, that unification and harmonisation should occur only when 
there is a good justification for it”.333 It has also been noted in this respect that 
the degree of EU involvement with substantive law can vary significantly 
from one field to another. This, in turn, might well be seen as a reason for 
“selectively matching the required level of remedial-procedural harmonisation to the 
actual degree of substantive approximation achieved within any given policy area”.334
A certain degree of increased uniformity may therefore well be the con-
sequence of the adoption of EU legislation of the type assessed in this study, 
but it is not its (primary) purpose.335 Some may see the resulting state of affairs 
as objectionable, whereas others may deem it entirely appropriate. The key 
point here is however that this is principally looked upon in a ‘neutral’ man-
ner as a matter of EU law in the sense that, in and by itself, a quest for uni-
formity cannot be a basis for the EU to act in this regard. For that to be the 
case a sufficient legal basis in the EU Treaties is required. Indeed, whereas 
increased uniformity across the EU may be likely to be beneficial for the 
enforcement of rights vested in EU law by private parties, it cannot readily 
be assumed that, conversely, a degree of diversity in the applicable national 
rules as such leads to weak private enforcement.336
432. Finally, there is the question whether Article 81 TFEU concerning 
judicial cooperation in civil matters could lead to a different assessment. It 
has already been seen that questions relating to this article have occasion-
ally been voiced in relation to the EU legislation at issue.337 Moreover over 
the past decade or so, an increasing body of secondary EU law has been 
adopted on the basis of this article. This latter legislation is mostly of an 
‘international private law-type’, but it also goes further by addressing vari-
ous specific procedural issues.338 Of particular relevance here is that Article 
332 Van Gerven (2000), p. 505. See also Dougan (2002), p. 162, where it is held that uniformity 
is neither a general principle nor a primary goal of the EU legal order.
333 Van Gerven (2008b), p. 409.
334 Dougan (2002), p. 162. See also Dougan (2004).
335 Cf. Prechal (2005), p. 178.
336 Cf. Milutinovic (2010), p. 97.
337 See para. 384 above.
338 See para. 14 above.
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81 TFEU allows, among other things, for the adoption of EU legislative mea-
sures aimed at ensuring “effective access to justice” and at “the elimination of 
obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting 
the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States”.339 
Both ‘access to justice’ and the ‘proper functioning of civil proceedings’ are 
– or at least can be – rather broad concepts. This suggests that a range of leg-
islative private enforcement-related measures could conceivably be adopted 
under these banners.340 This legal basis moreover inherently deals with pro-
cedural issues. It is therefore not ‘subsidiary’ in nature. Indeed, it can be said 
that, more generally, developments in relation to the EU’s ‘area of freedom, 
security and justice’ mean that it “reaches beyond economic integration and dis-
connects individually enforceable rights from the market logic”.341 In short, Article 
81 TFEU undeniable has potential as a possible legal basis for broader EU 
legislative measures on many of the issues under consideration here.342
Yet as it stands this provision contains also several important limita-
tions. It includes an internal market requirement of its own, which is however 
formulated somewhat loosely as compared both to its formulation as it 
stood before the Treaty of Lisbon and to Article 114 TFEU.343 More important 
therefore seems the requirement that the measures to be adopted on this 
basis must concern matters having cross-border implications.344 This require-
ment relating to cross-border situations has been particularly contentious in 
the past years. The Commission has sought to interpret it in an extensive 
manner.345 However especially the Council has consistently rejected any 
interpretation other than that this requirement excludes situations internal 
to a Member State from the scope of the intended EU legal act.346 A further 
limitation is that the measures adopted under Article 81 TFEU must be lim-
339 Art. 81(2) TFEU, points (e) and (f) respectively. Note that the above reference to effective 
access to justice was only introduced recently, through the Treaty of Lisbon.
340 In a similar sense, see Lindholm (2011), p. 470. Legal Aid Directive 2003/8 has e.g. been 
adopted on the basis of (what is now) Article 81(2)(f) TFEU.
341 Micklitz (2012), p. 370 (in relation to the CoJ case law on citizenship).
342 Cf. Tulibacka (2009), p. 1561; Dougan (2011), pp. 436-437; Kuipers (2011), p. 545; Leskinen 
(2011), p. 114; Van Schagen (2012), p. 37.
343 Art. 81(2) TFEU. Here it is stated here that the measures in question shall be adopted 
“particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”. The use of the 
word “particularly” suggests that this is not necessarily the case. Before the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it read “in so far as necessary” for the proper functioning of 
the internal market. On this requirement and its relation to Art. 114 TFEU, see further 
Bariatti (2011), pp. 23-25; Stuyck (2011), pp. 527-528.
344  Art. 81(1) TFEU.
345  Most notably in its 2005 proposal for Small Claims Regulation 861/2007 the Commission 
argued that “procedural law by its nature may have cross-border implications” and that “[a] 
measure which is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market has necessarily cross-
border implications”. On this reading the ‘internal market requirement’ and the ‘cross-bor-
der requirement’ would thus basically coincide. See Commission, Proposal for Small 
Claims Regulation 861/2007, COM(2005) 87, p. 6.
346 See further e.g. Storskrubb (2008), pp. 42, 173-174, 185, 206-207 and 220-221; Stuyck 
(2009), p. 67; Tulibacka (2009), pp. 1562-1563; Bariatti (2011), pp. 29-30.
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ited to cooperation in civil matters. Rules regarding proceedings under 
administrative law – which can be of relevance for instance in relation to 
infringements of EU public procurement or consumer protection law347 – 
are thus excluded. Where it refers to civil procedure, it also seems doubtful 
that in this context the term ‘procedure’ is to be interpreted in an equally 
broad manner as the term ‘procedural’ when used in relation to the princi-
ple of national procedural autonomy.348 Finally, certain Member States ‘opted 
out’ from this part of the EU Treaties, meaning that they are not (necessarily) 
bound by any of the measures adopted on this basis.349
All in all it thus appears that, despite its apparent potential and the 
scope for possible future developments in this domain, as it stands Article 
81 TFEU does not allow either for an approach whereby all aforementioned 
concerns related to fragmentation and coherence emerging in a private 
enforcement context are a thing of the past.
10.4.4. Summary
433. The EU legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law con-
sidered in this study leads to concerns of coherence and fragmentation of 
various kinds. Seen from the perspective of EU law, these concerns come in 
two forms. First, there is the issue of consistency between the various EU 
legal acts in terms of underlying principles, conceptual approach and draft-
ing. Even if the EU’s typical sector-based approach and the realities of day-
to-day Brussels law-making may not make this easy, more can and should 
be expected in this regard from the Commission and the EU legislature. Sec-
ond, there is the question why certain fields of law are singled out for spe-
cial treatment in the form of the adoption of private enforcement-facilitating 
EU legislation, while others are not. It is suggested that, contrary to what is 
the case at present, the choices made in this respect should be made explicit 
and be properly explained. That applies all the more so because EU har-
monisation measures of the type at issue here tend to lead to a loss of inter-
nal coherence for the domestic legal systems of the Member States. The 
affected national rules often not only reflect legitimate preferences and serve 
a valuable function, but are also meant to apply across the board, i.e. irre-
spective of the nature or origin of the provision of substantive law that the 
applicant invokes. While none of this needs to prevent the EU legislature 
from acting on private enforcement-related matters, it is submitted that 
these considerations nonetheless merit being given appropriate weight. At 
the same time, as the law stands, the manner in which powers have been 
conferred on the EU would appear to make the adoption of EU legislation 
that applies itself across the board to all sorts of infringements highly unlike-
ly, if not impossible. Potential legal bases, such as Article 114 TFEU on the 
347 See in particular subsection 9.2.1 above.
348 See para. 32 above.
349 Namely Denmark, Ireland and the UK. See Protocols No 21 and 22 to the EU Treaties.
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internal market and Article 81 TFEU on judicial cooperation in civil matters, 
may have been drafted in a relatively broad terms, they nonetheless have 
certain important limits. In that sense a certain degree of incoherence and 
fragmentation seems unavoidable in connection to the establishment of EU 
legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law.
In the introduction to this study it was explained that one of the objectives is 
to come to a profound understanding of EU legislation facilitating the pri-
vate enforcement of EU law of the type under consideration here. To this 
end the present penultimate chapter seeks to ‘take a step back’ and assess 
the concept of private enforcement generally and EU legislation thereon 
specifically at a more fundamental level. It does so from two different 
angles. The first section below focuses on considerations related to effective-
ness. While it has already been seen that ensuring effectiveness is an impor-
tant ‘driver’ behind the EU legislation at issue, it is shown below that the 
concept of effectiveness in EU law is neither unambiguous nor unproblem-
atic for the present purposes. The second section of this chapter subsequent-
ly asses this legislation from the perspective of the ‘horizontalisation’ of the 
enforcement of EU law. There it is explained what is meant by this term and 
what its implications are, particularly at the practical level and in as far as 
the various relevant fundamental rights protected in the EU legal order are 
concerned.
 11.1. The effectiveness perspective
Considerations related to effectiveness lay in many ways at the heart of the 
issues discussed in the foregoing chapters. It is explained below that in this 
context a distinction can be made between two different ‘expressions’ of the 
principle of effectiveness as it exists in EU law. They often coincide and rein-
force each other, but that is not always the case. It is further demonstrated 
that tensions, if not outright conflicts, can and do exist between these two 
forms of effectiveness where the private enforcement of EU law is con-
cerned. On that basis, three additional remarks are made.
 11.1.1. Two expressions of effectiveness
434. In the foregoing many references have been made to considerations of 
effectiveness. Most notably considerations of this kind have been identified as 
central elements in justifying the EU legislation considered in part B of this 
study.1 This is consistent with the crucial role that effectiveness-related 
1 See in particular para. 383 above.
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considerations tend to play in underpinning the key legal doctrines of EU 
law regarding the enforcement of EU law at national level. The clearest 
example may be the principle of effectiveness, as articulated in the Rewe case 
law, pursuant to which, as regards matters falling within their procedural 
autonomy, Member States may not make it impossible or excessively diffi-
cult for private parties to exercise their rights conferred by EU law.2 Effec-
tiveness is obviously also a consideration that is central to the principle of 
effective judicial protection, laid down in Article 47 Charter.3 Consider-
ations of effectiveness moreover underpin landmark rulings concerning 
matters of public and private enforcement before the courts of the Member 
States, such as Greek Maize (as regards penalties for infringements of EU 
law), Simmenthal (as regards the setting aside of national law that infringes 
EU law), Francovich (as regards the principle of Member State liability for 
infringements of EU law) and Courage and Muñoz (as regards the liability of 
private party for infringements of EU law).4
435. There can therefore be little doubt as to the crucial importance of con-
siderations of effectiveness when discussing the topic of private enforce-
ment of EU law. Yet it is all very well to speak of ‘effectiveness’ generally, 
but this is of limited importance if one does not answer the question effec-
tiveness of what precisely.
The case law of the Court of Justice in this respect has been said to be 
“strewn with intermittent and inconsistent references to ‘effectiveness’, ‘effective 
protection’ and ‘effective judicial protection’”.5 Others have criticized the Court 
for its “almost chronic inability to adhere to any consistent legal terminology” 
whether matters of effectiveness are concerned.6 Largely as a consequence 
the concept of ‘effectiveness’ in EU law has been described as “multifunc-
tional and double-edged” and “a handy device for best result instrumentalism”,7 as 
a “moving target”8 and as “a kind of jack-in-the-box instrument”.9 This suggests 
that in this context the concept of ‘effectiveness’ can be as hard to capture 
as it can be of crucial importance. For the present purposes it is nonetheless 
necessary to make a distinction in relation to the broader concept of effec-
2 See subsection 2.2.2 above.
3 See section 2.3 above.
4 CoJ case 68/88, Commission v. Greece (Greek maize); CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal; CoJ 
joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich; CoJ case C-453/99, Courage; CoJ case 
C-253/00, Muñoz. See further subsections 2.4.2, 5.2.2 and 2.5.3 above.
5 Drake (2006), pp. 843-844.
6 Oliver (2011), p. 2038.
7 Ross (2006), pp. 480 and 486.
8 Lindholm (2007), p. 297.
9 Micklitz (2012), p. 398.
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tiveness, as it manifests itself in EU law. That distinction boils down to the 
following.10
On the one hand there are the situations where the (subjective) right of a 
private party, conferred by EU law, is the main interest that is being protect-
ed. This notion of effectiveness underlies, inherently, the principle of effec-
tive judicial protection, laid down in Article 47 Charter. It also largely cor-
responds with the principle of effectiveness, as developed in the 
aforementioned Rewe case law.11 On the other hand there are situations 
where the emphasis is on the protection of the interests associated with the 
effective application and enforcement of (objective) EU law per se. This 
expression of effectiveness was particularly clearly articulated in Simmen-
thal, where the Court of Justice insisted on the need to ensure that rules of 
EU law have “full force and effect”.12 In this ruling it emphasised the ‘consti-
tutional’ character of these considerations by noting the importance of safe-
guarding the effectiveness of the obligations of the Member States under the 
EU Treaties, so as not to ”imperil the very foundations of the [EU]”.13 Similarly 
in Courage it was made clear that considerations of this kind can also be 
essential in relation to specific policy objectives that the rules of EU law at 
issue seek to achieve, in casu the full effectiveness of the EU competition 
rules.14
436. Before discussing the significance of drawing the above distinction in 
the following, two preliminary remarks should be made. To begin with, 
making a distinction such as the one referred to above inevitably involves a 
degree of simplification. In practice things are not always as clear-cut. This is 
at least in part due to the manner in which the Court of Justice tends to 
employ the concept of effectiveness; as was noted above, many have found 
clarity and consistency to be lacking. To give a concrete example, under the 
‘Rewe-principle’ of effectiveness the protection of rights that private parties 
derive from EU law not always takes centre stage. This principle occasion-
ally ‘transforms’ into a requirement not to make the application and enforce-
10 Comparable distinctions have been made elsewhere. See e.g. Snyder (1993), p. 46 (who 
speaks of a ‘bottom up’ perspective providing judicial protection for the individual and a 
‘top down’ perspective performing an essentially political function of social control); Pre-
chal (2005), p. 304 (referring to ‘the need for effective judicial protection’ and ‘the desire 
to give full effect to EU rules’); Nebbia (2008), pp. 28-34 (distinguishing between ‘effec-
tive judicial protection’ and ‘effective enforcement’); Dougan (2011), p. 427 and 431 (dis-
tinguishing between ‘the principle of effectiveness in its narrow Rewe/Comet sense’ and 
‘independent manifestations of some broader concept of effectiveness’, complemented 
by the principle of effective judicial protection as a ‘distinct EU rights in and of itself’); 
Bobek (2012), p. 316 (referring to the ‘protection of an individual’ as compared to the 
‘protection of all individuals within the EU’).
11 On the relationship between these two principles, see further para. 44 above.
12 CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal, para. 22.
13 Ibid., para. 17-20.
14 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 25.
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ment of EU law per se impossible or excessively difficult.15 And while in 
Simmenthal the emphasis was placed on the abovementioned ‘constitutional’ 
considerations related to the effectiveness of EU law per se, this line of argu-
mentation was nonetheless blended in that case with a rights-based narra-
tive. For in that case the Court also noted that national courts must “protect 
rights which the latter confers on individuals”.16 More generally it should not be 
forgotten that the distinction between the individual and the general interest 
that underlies the abovementioned distinction is not a matter of black and 
white, but rather one of degree. For every legal rule and its correct applica-
tion in an individual case can be considered to be in the general interest.17 
Conversely objective law will generally serve to give effect to the subjective 
entitlements of the parties concerned.18
That leads to the second remark. The two forms of effectiveness identi-
fied above are generally understood in the case law of the Court of Justice as 
vectors pointing in the same direction. In other words, these two expres-
sions of effectiveness and the interests that underlie them often coincide. The 
Court’s ruling in Francovich offers perhaps the best illustration. In that case 
it was held that the “full effectiveness of [EU] rules would be impaired and the 
protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened” if private parties 
were unable to obtain compensation in cases of infringements of EU law 
attributable to Member States.19 Both the effective protection of the (subjec-
tive) rights of private parties and the effectiveness of (objective) EU law per 
se were thus seen as arguing in favour of acknowledging the existence of a 
principle of Member State liability. A similar logic is apparent for instance in 
Courage concerning the liability of private parties for breaches of EU law.20 
As construed by the Court of Justice, these two expressions of effectiveness 
are generally used in a “two-fold sense”.21 Put differently, they are of a “dual 
15 Cf. e.g. CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 17 and 19; CoJ case 
C-443/03, Leffl er, para. 49-52 and 65. See also CoJ case C-226/99, Siples, para. 17-20. By 
contrast, e.g. in CoJ case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, para. 27, both issues were kept express-
ly separate. For a view insisting on keeping the test applied under the ‘Rewe-principle’ of 
effectiveness restricted to the enforcement of rights, rather than the enforcement of EU 
law per se, see Opinion AG Bot case C-455/06, Heemskerk, para. 121-130. Note that some 
argue that the ‘Rewe-principle’ of effectiveness is, or should be, primarily concerned with 
the enforcement of (objective) EU law per se. See Dougan (2011), p. 425; Prechal & Wid-
dershoven (2011), p. 31; Parret (2012), p. 159. It is however submitted that, as the law 
stands, this view seems diffi cult to maintain in light of the CoJ’s case law, discussed in 
subsection 2.2.2 above.
16 CoJ case 106/77, Simmenthal, para. 21. See further para. 57 above.
17 Prechal (2005), p. 119.
18 Cf. e.g. Opinion AG Tesauro joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, 
para. 32, where it is observed that the central value articulated in the Francovich ruling on 
Member State liability is the effectiveness of EU law “and hence” complete judicial protec-
tion.
19 CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, para. 33.
20 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 25. See further para. 60 above.
21 Steiner (1995), p. 57.
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nature”.22 As construed by the Court, the underlying concerns are thus inti-
mately linked and in effect mostly treated as two sides of the same coin.23
11.1.2. From dual nature to dual vigilance
437. The two expressions of effectiveness identified above may not only 
coincide, but often actually reinforce each other. That is already evident from 
the relevant case law. Let us return for instance to the aforementioned Cour-
age ruling. Here the Court found not only that the full effectiveness of the 
rule of EU competition law at issue would be put at risk if it were not open 
for a private party to claim damages for loss caused by the infringement of 
that rule. It also highlighted that the existence of such a right for private par-
ties would “strengthen the working” of that rule and would “discourage 
infringements” thereof, thus making a “significant contribution to the mainte-
nance of effective competition” in the EU.24 As has been noted with reference 
to Courage, “[w]hile pursuing his private interest, a plaintiff in such proceedings 
contributes at the same time to the protection of the public interest”.25 Compara-
ble considerations are apparent in Muñoz, which was concerned with the 
enforcement of EU rules that set quality standards and encouraged fair com-
petition in the agricultural field. There the Court held that civil proceedings 
to enforce the rights that can be derived from those rules “strengthens [their] 
practical working” and, as a supplement to the existing public enforcement 
mechanisms, “helps to discourage practices […] which distort competition”.26
These cases thus echo the ‘dual vigilance’27 logic that was already 
apparent in the Court’s 1963 ruling in Van Gend en Loos. As was noted at the 
outset of this study, in this latter case the Court held that “[t]he vigilance of 
individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in 
addition to the supervision entrusted […] to the diligence of the Commission and 
the Member States”.28 The thought that the general and the individual inter-
est can coincide and that moreover legal actions brought by private parties 
in their individual interest can also contribute to reaching certain policy 
objectives in the general interest – as a matter of the ‘dual vigilance’29 exer-
cised by those parties as well as the competent public enforcement authori-
ties – has thus been crucial in underpinning the principle of direct effect and 
the private enforcement model that emerged on its basis.30
22 Prechal (1998), p. 706.
23 Prechal (2005), pp. 132 and 215.
24 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 25-27.
25 EFTA Court case E-14/11, Schenker, para. 132.
26 CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz, para. 31. See further para. 61 above.
27 Cf. Weatherill (2000), p. 92; Tridimas (2006), p. 546.
28 CoJ case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, p. 13. See para. 1 above
29 Weatherill (2000), p. 92; Tridimas (2006), p. 546
30 See subsection 1.1.1 above.
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438. It has already been seen that considerations related to effectiveness 
generally constitute a key underlying objective of the EU legislation assessed 
in part B of this study.31 When assessed more in detail, it appears that this 
typically constitutes a mix of considerations related to ensuring the effective-
ness of EU law per se on the one hand and the effective protection of the 
rights of private parties on the other hand. Where the emphasis is placed 
precisely can vary somewhat per directive concerned, but a common theme 
is always the ‘dual vigilance’ philosophy referred to above.
Of the legal acts under consideration the Procurement Remedies Direc-
tives are probably most outspoken in their desire to strengthen the compli-
ance with – and thus the effectiveness of – the relevant rules of substantive 
EU law. In its proposal for the first of these two directives the Commission 
stated that the underlying aim was “to ensure that the rules of public contracts 
are correctly applied”.32 This objective is also reflected in these directives’ 
recitals.33 It has subsequently been echoed in the Court’s case law, where 
the objective of these directives has been held to be “to guarantee the existence 
of effective remedies for infringements of [EU] law in the field of public procurement 
or of the national rules implementing that law, so as to ensure the effective applica-
tion of the [Substantive Procurement Directives]”.34 The Consumer Injunctions 
Directive is also rather explicit in this respect, in particular where it is stated 
in the recitals that its aims to address concerns that “the effectiveness of nation-
al measures transposing the [substantive consumer protection directives concerned] 
[…] may be thwarted”.35 Indeed, it is noticeable that neither the Procurement 
Remedies Directives nor the Consumer Injunctions Directive even addresses 
the issue of ‘rights’ of private parties expressly. They refer instead to 
infringements of the relevant substantive law generally.36 By contrast espe-
cially the IPR Enforcement Directive places more emphasis on the protection 
of the rights of the private parties concerned. It aims to ensure a high level 
of protection for holders of intellectual property rights.37 Yet also this direc-
tive makes it clear that this objective should be understood in light of the 
necessity “to ensure that the substantive law on intellectual property […] is 
applied effectively”.38
31 See in particular para. 383 above.
32 Commission, Amended proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, COM(88) 
733, p. 10. See further para. 72 above.
33 See in particular recital 2 Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
34 CoJ case C-406/08, Uniplex, para. 26. See further para. 74 above.
35 Recital 4 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further para. 155 above.
36 See para. 338 above.
37 See in particular recital 10 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also CoJ case 
C-406/09, Realchemie, para. 49. See further para. 113 above.
38 Recital 3 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also para. 110 above.
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The Competition Damages Directive further illustrates how, over time, 
the emphasis can sometimes shift somewhat from one expression of effec-
tiveness to the other.39 In relation to this initiative the emphasis was initially 
largely on the ‘general interest’ function (deterrence, punishment) of dam-
ages claims that is associated with ensuring the effectiveness of the relevant 
EU rules per se. It was only subsequently that the ‘private interest’ function 
(compensation for loss and damage suffered by private parties) associated 
with the effective enforcement of rights of private parties conferred by those 
EU rules was articulated more forcefully.40 All the same there can be no 
doubt that it is essentially the thought that the combining of both functions 
and the mutually reinforcing effect that can then emerge that underpins this 
initiative. As the Commission noted in its proposal for this directive, “if the 
likelihood increases that infringers of Articles 101 and 102 [TFEU] have to bear the 
costs of their infringement, this will not only shift the costs away from the victims 
of the illegal behaviour, but will also be an incentive for better compliance with the 
EU competition rules”.41 Against that background the proposal “seeks to ensure 
the effective enforcement of the EU competition rules by […] ensuring that victims 
of the EU competition rules can obtain full compensation for the harm they 
suffered”.42
439. Traces of the duality referred to above can also be detected in several 
specific provisions of the EU legislation at issue. It is evident that many of 
those provisions serve, first and foremost, to facilitate the enforcement of 
the rights of the private parties concerned. These parties are for example the 
prime beneficiaries of the EU rules at issue on obtaining compensation in 
damages or injunctive relief.43 Yet the ‘general interest function’ of private 
enforcement actions also comes to light here. Take again the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive. This directive stipulates that the remedies and procedures 
provided for therein must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.44 This 
is a phrase that is normally used in relation to the penalties for which the 
Member States must make provision as a matter of public enforcement of 
EU law.45 Especially dissuasiveness – to which also the Procurement Rem-
39 It appears that there has been a (somewhat) comparable ‘shift’ where Procurement Rem-
edies Directives 89/665 and 92/13 are concerned, in the sense that in this connection the 
objective of effective judicial of the private parties concerned has recently been given 
increased attention. See in particular recital 81 Concessions Awards Directive 2014/23, 
where it is explained that the scope of the Procurement Remedies Directives must be 
extended so as to cover also infringements of that directive, with reference to the need “to 
ensure adequate judicial protection of candidates and tenderers in the concession award procedu-
res, as well as to make effective the enforcement of this Directive”. On this amendment, see fur-
ther para. 76 above.
40 See in particular para. 217 above.
41 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 4.
42 Ibid., pp. 2-3. See also recitals 3 and 4 Competition Damages Directive.
43 See sections 7.1 and 7.2 above respectively.
44 Art. 3(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 144 above.
45 See subsection 2.4.2 above.
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edies Directives refer46 – is something that is generally of little direct interest 
for a private party seeking to enforce its rights. It rather points to a desire 
for prevention, so as to ensure that the infringement will not occur again.47 
As such it is closely related to the interests associated with the effective 
enforcement of EU law per se. Something similar can be said of the publicity 
measures provided for in the IPR Enforcement Directive and in certain con-
sumer protection directives, including the Consumer Injunctions Directive, 
which serves the dual purpose of informing the public at large and deterring 
infringers.48 Deterrence is also closely related to the interests associated with 
the effective enforcement of EU law per se.49 Another illustration is the Com-
mission’s express ambition to ensure that the Procurement Remedies Direc-
tives’ provisions on damages serve as a “genuine incentive to compliance”.50
The Court of Justice has further noted for instance that the injunctions 
and the contractual remedy provided for in the Unfair Terms Directive also 
serve purposes of deterrence and dissuasion.51 And also elsewhere in EU 
law the Court regularly emphasises the deterrent effect of the civil law rem-
edies, notably those set out in the Gender Equality Directive.52 Similarly in 
relation to the Consumer Injunctions Directive the Commission has referred 
to injunctions as a “tool for policing market” and as a “governance tool [which] 
can be used as a deterrent”.53 A further illustration is the regular use of the term 
‘penalty’ in connection to the remedies set out in the EU legislation at issue 
in this study. This term is normally associated with general interests related 
to punishment and deterrence, and thus ensuring the effectiveness of the 
EU law per se, rather than the enforcement of a right of a private party.54 The 
Commission has called the contractual remedy set out in the Unfair Terms 
Directive a “civil penalty”.55 The Court of Justice has similarly referred
46 See Art. 2(1)(c) and (5) Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13. This provisions offers the pos-
sibility, as an alternative for the setting aside of a decision taken in breach of the applica-
ble procurement rules, to pay a particular sum set at a level high enough to ‘dissuade’ the 
contracting authority from committing or persisting in an infringement. See further 
para. 82 above.
47 Cf. Prechal (1997), p. 10.
48 Art. 15 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48; Art. 2(1)(b) Consumer Injunctions Directive 
2009/22. See also Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29; Art. 5(4) Mis-
leading Advertising Directive 2006/114. See further subsection 8.2.4 above.
49 Cf. Hodges (2011), p. 438.
50 Commission, Proposal for Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, COM(90) 297, pp. 12-13.
51 As regards the said injunctions, see CoJ case C-372/99, Commission v. Italy, para. 15; CoJ 
case C-472/10, Invitel, para. 37; CoJ case C-470/12, Pohotovost, para. 44. As regards the 
said contractual remedy, see CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 69.
52 Art. 18 Gender Equality Directive 2006/54. See e.g. CoJ case 14/83, Von Colson, para. 23; 
CoJ case C-177/88, Dekker, para. 23-26; CoJ case C-54/07, Feryn, para. 38-39. See e.g. CoJ 
case C-174/12, Hirmann, para. 43.
53 Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 7.
54 Cf. the third of the three ‘Engel-criteria’, referred to in para. 471 below. Cf. e.g. Opinion 
AG Sharpston case C-174/12, Hirmann, para. 47.
55 Commission, Report on Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, COM(2000) 248, p. 19.
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to the remedies set out in the Procurement Remedies Directives as pen-
alties.56 More specifically in relation to the contractual remedy of ineffec-
tiveness set out in these latter directives provision is made for ‘alternative 
penalties’.57 This term not only suggests a penalising element where this 
provision itself is concerned, the word ‘alternative’ also implies that the EU 
legislature saw this contractual remedy itself as a sort of penalty. Tellingly, in 
its proposal the Commission spoke in this connection of “sanctions intended 
not to leave unpunished the conclusion of a contract”.58 The term ‘penalties’ is 
also used in relation to provisions on civil liability in some other provisions 
of secondary EU law.59
 440. The quest for effectiveness that underpins not only the relevant case 
law, but also the EU legislation at issue thus generally encompasses a desire 
to ensure the effective protection of rights of private parties vested in EU 
law and the effectiveness of EU law per se. The underlying idea is that these 
two expressions of effectiveness may not only coincide, but will normally 
also reinforce each other. Accordingly ensuring that a private party can 
effectively enforce its rights vested in EU law before a national court contrib-
utes not only to safeguarding the effective judicial protection of the private 
party concerned, but it also serves to ensure that EU law is effectively 
applied and enforced at national level. This insight in effect appears to con-
stitute the very essence of the concept of private enforcement as it exists in the 
EU legal order.60
Although this study has not sought to quantify this, there seems gener-
ally little reason to doubt that the overall effect on both the individual inter-
est of the private parties concerned and the general interest is often positive. 
In itself, the idea of private parties pursuing their own interests and, in so 
doing, also furthering the general interest is obviously attractive. It is more-
over by no means unique to the present context. Adam Smith observed in 
1776 that “every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the 
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the pub-
56 CoJ case C-315/01, GAT, para. 55.
57 Art. 2e(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further para. 92 
above.
58 Commission, Proposal for Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66, 
COM(2006) 195, p. 18 (Art. 2f(4)).
59 See e.g. Art. 39 Directive 2005/60/EC on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial system 
for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing, OJ 2005, L 309/15.
60 There is also a semantic side to this discussion. It has been argued that the term ‘private 
enforcement’ is semantically biased towards the idea of ensuring compliance with EU 
law per se, while terms such as ‘claims for damages’ or ‘effective protection’ connote more 
strongly with the idea of compensating a victim of a wrong and safeguarding his subjec-
tive rights. See Nebbia (2008), p. 24. See also Ottervanger (2014), pp. 18-19. Whereas this 
latter statement is undoubtedly correct, it is submitted that, in EU law generally, there is 
however not necessarily such a bias where the term ‘private enforcement’ is concerned. 
For this term leaves open the key question, namely what is being ‘privately enforced’: EU 
law per se or the rights that private parties derive therefrom?
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lic interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. […] [H]e intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote 
an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society 
that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of 
the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it”.61 The adop-
tion of EU legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law should 
perhaps be seen an instance where this famous ‘invisible hand’ becomes 
visible to some extent and is given a bit of guidance.
11.1.3. Tensions and potential conflicts
441. On the basis of the foregoing one might be tempted to conclude that 
the individual and the general interests at stake when enforcing EU law 
before the national courts make a ‘perfect match’. But situations can and do 
arise where the said interests underlying these two expressions of effective-
ness collide rather than collude, or where there is at least a certain tension 
between them. Given the centrality of both expressions of effectiveness in 
private enforcement-related matters, this can lead to pressing questions of 
various sorts. That is illustrated by the following four examples.
442. First, such tensions and potential conflicts can emerge in relation to 
the question of how to deal with leniency applicants in relation to the pri-
vate enforcement of EU competition law. The difficulties that can arise 
in this connection have already been discussed rather extensively in the 
foregoing, particularly where the possible disclosure of leniency applica-
tions and other relevant evidence in the file of a competition authority is 
concerned.62 Suffice to note therefore that, seen from the perspective of an 
injured private party wishing to claim compensation, the disclosure of such 
documents could be highly beneficial, whereas too permissive disclosure 
rules are widely seen as putting at risk the effectiveness of the leniency pro-
grammes as a public enforcement instrument. As the Commission observed, 
“the EU right to compensation can sometimes be at odds with the effectiveness of 
public enforcement of the EU competition rules”.63 After considerable debate, 
the EU legislature eventually cut the knot by opting for absolute protection 
from disclosure for certain documents (the ‘black list’), temporal protection 
until the public enforcement proceedings are terminated for a larger cat-
egory of documents (the ‘grey list’) and in principle disclosability for all 
other documents in a competition authority’s file.64 As was explained above, 
while there would appear to be good grounds to argue that in this man-
61 Adam Smith, cited in Cambell & Skinner (1976), p. 456.
62 See in particular subsections 6.2.4 and 6.3.3 above.
63 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 5.
64 Art. 5 and 6 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 234-235 above.
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ner a reasonable and tenable balance has been struck between the inher-
ently conflicting interests at stake, some scope for discussion remains.65
A related issue arising is whether successful leniency applicants should 
be granted a ‘rebate’ on any damage claim brought against them. This was 
one of the options outlined in the Commission’s 2005 green paper on actions 
for damages for competition law infringements.66 This would clearly make 
the leniency programmes more attractive. But this would also be evidently 
at odds with the ambition to ensure full compensation for private parties 
that suffered harm as a consequence of such infringements. This option was 
therefore not retained in the subsequent white paper, which instead focused 
on a less far-going option, namely limiting the civil liability of successful 
leniency applicants to claims brought by their direct and indirect purchas-
ers.67 This means that, in cartel cases, the undertakings in question would 
not be jointly and severally liable for the entire damage caused. On the one 
hand such a rule makes it more difficult, but certainly not impossible for an 
injured party to obtain full compensation. On the other hand, in the absence 
of such a rule, these undertakings would be the most likely of all co-infring-
ing undertakings to be addressed by a damages claim for the entire damage, 
which was seen as a threat to the attractiveness of the leniency programmes 
and a form of “undue exposure to damages claims”.68 For that reason this sug-
gestion made its way into the Commission’s proposal and subsequently also 
the Competition Damages Directive itself.69 Illustrative of the effort to 
strike a balance between the various interests at stake is the addition of a 
rule pursuant to which the above limitation of joint and several liability 
does not apply where full compensation cannot be obtained from the co-
infringing undertakings that did not obtain leniency.
443. Second, the distinction between the two expressions of effectiveness 
referred to above can have a bearing on discussions on how to assess the 
issue of punitive damages, i.e. damages awards that go beyond mere compen-
sation of the harm suffered with a view to punishing and deterring infring-
ers. Seen from an individual rights perspective there appears to be no justi-
fication for making provision for this type of damages. Full compensation of 
the loss or damage caused by the infringement is the general rule; no less, 
65 See para. 236 above.
66 Commission, Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672, p. 10. For a discussion of those options, see Milutinovic (2010), pp. 274-
278.
67 Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165, p. 10. See further Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the 
white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, 
pp. 81-89.
68 See Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, 
p. 16; recital 28 Competition Damages Directive.
69 Art. 11(3) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 238 above.
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but also not more.70 But these aims of punishment and deterrence associated 
with punitive damages fit in well with a perspective whereby the main con-
cern is the effectiveness of EU law per se. Which of these two perspectives is 
applied determines to a large extent the views on the appropriateness or 
desirability of punitive damages as a matter of EU law. Where the view is 
taken that compensation is not a sanction71 and that deterrence and punish-
ment is a task better left to public enforcement,72 it logically follows that 
there is no place for punitive damages. However on the alternative view, 
whereby the effectiveness of EU law per se takes centre stage, there is a ‘defi-
cit’ if damages are regarded as purely compensatory73 and the idea of limit-
ing damages to compensation of the harm suffered can be dismissed as 
“formal(istic)” and something that is to be abolished.74 The tension between 
these two fundamentally differing views lies at the heart of the discussions 
referred to above on whether or not punitive damages are an appropriate 
private enforcement instrument to be provided for in secondary EU law.75
444. Third, take the topic of out-of-court settlements, reached either after a 
form of alternative dispute resolution or simply through negotiations 
between the parties concerned. At first sight it might appear that reaching 
such a settlement – as opposed to litigating a case until a final judgment is 
rendered – is both attractive for the private parties concerned and in the 
general interest. Both interests are after all generally served where disputes 
are terminated faster and with lower legal and administrative costs, as will 
typically be the case where disputes are settled. Several directives consid-
ered in part B therefore contain provisions that aim to facilitate pre-trial con-
tacts between the parties to the dispute and to otherwise encourage out-of-
court settlements between them.76 It has already been noted however that 
these kinds of provisions can also have disadvantages, especially for the 
(potential) applicants.77 One could think of delays and the associated risk of 
limitation periods expiring. In these cases the general interest may thus 
argue in favour of encouraging settlements, while the individual interests of 
the private parties concerned can point in a different direction. The latter 
interests can be safeguarded to some extent by taking specific legislative 
measures, such as the suspension of limitation periods for the duration of 
the settlement attempt. But this is unlikely to address all possible disadvan-
tages, for instance in terms of additional costs and complexities or other 
negative consequences of the said delays.
70 See subsection 7.1.5 above.
71 Van Gerven (2000), p. 530.
72 Wils (2009), p. 22.
73 Komninos (2008), p. 211.
74 Milutinovic (2010), p. 221.
75 See subsection 7.1.6 above.
76 See subsection 9.2.2 above.
77 See para. 366 above.
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Where out-of-court settlements as such are concerned (as opposed to the 
rules encouraging them, referred to above), the situation can moreover be 
largely reverse. That is to say, then settling the dispute may be advantageous 
for the private parties concerned, while from the perspective of the effective-
ness of EU law per se there may also be some notable disadvantages.78 Set-
tlements tend after all to be primarily based on considerations of conve-
nience and not, or at least not necessarily, on considerations of legality or 
effectiveness of the law.79 The private parties concerned typically simply 
seek to obtain the best possible deal. This means that there can be a real risk 
that they will settle a dispute in a manner that is not compatible with, for 
example, the applicable EU rules on public procurement or competition.80 
The foregoing evidently applies when the settlement is negotiated directly 
between the parties concerned, but it can also apply when it comes about 
after alternative dispute resolution. It is notable in this connection that 
‘alternative dispute resolvers’ are not necessarily obliged to apply the law 
when solving the dispute at hand.81 And when they do, it is not evident 
that they are always best placed to do so. For even where the amounts at 
issue may be small, the legal questions raised can be complex, while the 
option of referring preliminary questions to the Court of Justice to obtain 
guidance and ensure the uniform interpretation of EU law is in principle not 
available in those cases.82 Settlements are further rarely published. They 
therefore do not contribute to the clarification and development of the law 
in the same manner as court judgments do.83 Neither are they likely to have 
a (general) deterrent effect on infringers in such a case.
445. Finally, addressing the issue of collective redress can also involve ten-
sions and trade-offs between the two aforementioned expressions of effec-
tiveness and the interests that underlie them.84 Take the Commission’s Col-
lective Redress Recommendation, adopted in 2013.85 The stated main aim of 
this initiative is ensuring private parties’ access to court and the effective 
78 For a more detailed assessment from an economic perspective and for further references, 
see Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), pp. 138-150.
79 Cf. Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 196 (see also p. 221).
80 See para. 102 and 248 above respectively. See also Hondius (2009), p. 242. Cf. also point 28 
Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396, discussed in para. 190 above, which calls 
for verifi cation by a court of the legality of the binding outcome of a collective settlement.
81 Wagner (2014), p. 177 (concerning Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11, discussed in 
para. 194 above).
82  Ibid., pp. 178-179. See further para. 22 above.
83 Cf. Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 196. See also para. 414 above.
84 Various proposals have been made in the legal literature with a view to fi nding the cor-
rect balance in this connection. See e.g. Cafaggi & Micklitz (2009), p. 444 (opt-in for pri-
vate applicants and opt-out for public applicants); Micklitz, Reich & Rott (2009), p. 361 
(opt-in for small claims, opt-out for bigger ones).
85 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See further section 5.5.1 above.
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enforcement of their rights vested in EU law.86 This thus suggests an 
approach concentrating on the enforcement of the right of the private parties 
concerned. However at the same time many of the arguments that have 
been put forward in this connection to justify the possible introduction of 
special rules on collective redress are of a ‘general interest nature’. They 
relate for instance to contributing to the overall level of enforcement, the 
aggregate loss that ‘scattered’ damages can cause to society, procedural effi-
ciency and the risk of abuse.87 Indeed, the Commission’s remark in 2011 that 
“careful consideration must be given as to whether and in which area an EU initia-
tive would bring added value for improving the enforcement of EU law” suggests 
that it found ensuring the effectiveness of EU law per se at least equally 
important as the protection of rights of private parties.88
Once more the aforementioned distinction can have important conse-
quences. Arguably only where ‘scattered’ damages are at stake (i.e. a situa-
tion where many parties each individually suffered relatively low amounts 
of damage resulting from the same or similar unlawful behaviour) can an 
enforcement of rights rationale convincingly be invoked for justifying the 
introduction of special rules on collective redress. In other cases of mass 
damages, i.e. where the damage suffered does result from the same or simi-
lar unlawful behaviour but where the damage of each individual party con-
cerned is nonetheless significant, these parties normally have, each individ-
ually, a sufficient incentive to take legal action. The Commission’s Collective 
Redress Recommendation is however not limited to such cases of ‘scattered’ 
damages.89 In the said other cases rules on collective redress are first and 
foremost about ensuring efficient administration of justice.90 This can of 
course also be a perfectly legitimate reason to enact legislation. However 
then it seems confusing or even misleading to justify suggestions to this 
effect in terms of access to justice and the enforcement of rights. This is of 
particular importance, given that identifying the objective at stake can be 
86 See e.g. recital 10 and point 1 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See e.g. also 
Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective redress, 
SEC(2011) 173, p. 7; Commission, Communication towards a European horizontal frame-
work for collective redress, COM(2013) 401, p. 2.
87 See e.g. Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective 
redress, SEC(2011) 173, pp. 3 and 9; Commission, Communication towards a European 
horizontal framework for collective redress, COM(2013) 401, pp. 7 and 9.
88 Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective redress, 
SEC(2011) 173, p. 5.
89 See the defi nition of ‘mass harm situation’ in point 3 Collective Redress Recommendation 
2013/396. The Commission specifi cally referred to ‘scattered low-value damage’ in its 
earlier work on collective redress in a competition law context. However also in that case 
the argumentation brought forward seemed to blur points related to individual rights 
(access to court, right to compensation) and the effective enforcement of EU law per se 
(procedural economy, undesirability of illegal gains remaining in the hands of the 
infringer). See Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on dam-
ages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 15-16.
90 Cf. Stadler (2009), p. 307; Cupa (2012), p. 511.
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crucial when assessing whether the EU has the required legal basis to act 
and if so, whether the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are 
complied with.91
The same tension can come to light in relation to a specific collective 
redress-related issue, namely whether an ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ approach is 
preferable.92 It is common ground that most private parties do not make the 
effort to opt-in to a collective redress scheme even where it is available.93 
Seen from a perspective that is primarily concerned with the enforcement 
of rights, this need not be overly problematic.94 After all the principle of 
party autonomy implies that parties can also decide not to initiate legal pro-
ceedings, for example because they consider that the amounts at stake are 
not worth even the modest effort of opting-in. In such cases these parties’ 
‘rational apathy’ can seem very rational indeed.95 As the Court of Justice 
held in another context, the effective protection of rights vested in EU law 
may find its limits in the “total inertia” of the private party concerned.96 But 
legislative intervention may then still be required to safeguard the effective-
ness of EU law per se. Scattered or not, collectively the negative effects of the 
infringements can still be very significant. Seen from this latter perspective 
the limited appeal of opt-in collective redress schemes may therefore well be 
seen as problematic and thus a reason to introduce opt-out mechanisms.97 
On that view an express opt-in requirement would “hamper the effectiveness 
91 Cf. e.g. points e) and f) of Art. 81(2) TFEU, discussed in para. 432 above. On issues of legal 
basis and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, see subsections 10.1.1 and 
10.1.2 above respectively. E.g. where the effective enforcement of EU law per se is identi-
fi ed as the main objective at stake, then one might argue in favour of establishing or rein-
forcing public enforcement mechanisms. In a sense, public enforcement is after all the 
ultimate form of collective redress. Public enforcement might then well be seen as prefer-
able to, and more proportionate than, meddling with the basic principles of the legal 
systems of the Member States (with respect to legal standing, the role of the courts, party 
autonomy, etc.) to facilitate collective redress in an attempt to achieve a result that seems 
inherently diffi cult to reach via civil law means. Cf. e.g. Frese (2011), p. 410.
92 In short, an ‘opt-in’ system implies that any party allegedly having suffered damage 
must explicitly indicate that it wishes to participate in the collective redress procedure, 
whereas under an ‘opt-out’ system consent is assumed and the party concerned has 
instead the opportunity to expressly indicate that it does not want to participate.
93 Study Civic Consulting (2008a), p. 9; Nazzini (2009), pp. 426-427; Miller (2009), p. 280; 
Tzakas (2011), p. 1136-1137; Buccirossi & Carpagnano (2013), p. 5; Van den Bergh (2013), 
p. 23; Jones (2014), p. 301.
94 In particular not where legal aid, specifi c small claim procedures and/or alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms are available where necessary. It is submitted that the ques-
tions addressed above should be seen in the context on other measures of this kind that 
may serve to address similar shortcomings.
95 Cf. Eurobarometer, Consumer redress in the EU, August 2009, p. 12, where it is found 
that the majority of consumers prefer their small claims to be fully handled by a con-
sumer organisation or a public enforcement authority. Collective alternative dispute res-
olution emerges as the second-best option. Only where higher value claims are at stake 
do consumers generally favour collective redress proper.
96 CoJ case C-40/08, Asturcom, para. 47.
97 Nazzini (2009), pp. 426-428; Andreangeli (2012), p. 529.
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and deterrent effect”98 of the collective redress scheme and has been said to be 
“excessive and formalistic”.99 And also the loss of influence of the individual 
parties concerned on the course of the litigation or the undermining of these 
parties’ right to be heard under an opt-out collective redress scheme will 
then not be seen as much of a concern.100 Yet what is excess and formal-
ism to some, are to others constitutionally protected fundamental rights and 
reasons to reject opt-out schemes.101 The latter occurred in Germany and 
Sweden.102
11.1.4. Three final remarks
446. By means of a first final remark it is probably no exaggeration to say 
that in many respects the above discussions go to the very heart of EU law. 
Few will dispute that the finding in Van Gend en Loos in 1963 that EU law can 
confer rights directly upon private parties, enforceable before their national 
courts, laid the basis for “one of the great achievements of EU law”.103 In the 
words of Advocate General Jacobs (writing extra-judicially), this “has clearly 
proved fundamental in creating the EU legal order and, indeed, in transforming the 
[EU Treaties] from a classical instrument of international law into (or towards) the 
constitution of a quasi-federal organism”.104 Since then both the EU judiciary 
and the EU legislature have been rather “generous” in conferring rights to 
private parties.105 Indeed, it has been held that the “language of rights perme-
ated every aspect of EU law”.106
This does not mean however that an ‘individual rights perspective’ nec-
essarily prevails. The above remark by Advocate General Jacobs was fol-
lowed by the observation that “the Court’s approach, historically at any rate, has 
not been to promote the rights of individuals for their own sake or as a matter of 
ideology; its approach has essentially been pragmatic and the recognition of indi-
vidual rights has almost been instrumental, being seen as necessary to ensure the 
effectiveness of the legal order”.107 In a similar vein, it has been held elsewhere 
that “the case law suggests that the principle of full effectiveness of [EU] law is a 
98 Cf. Tzakas (2011), p. 1136.
99 Ibid., p. 1137. See also Tzakas (2014), p. 236.
100 Stadler (2009), pp. 315 and 317.
101 See e.g. European Parliament, Study on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 65, 
where it is argued that a (‘pure’) opt-out system is incompatible with the fundamental 
right to a fair trial guaranteed under Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 47 Charter, discussed in sec-
tion 2.3 above.
102 Stadler (2009), p. 317.
103 Reich (2010), p. 118. For a critique (but not a denial of the importance of this fi nding), see 
e.g. Lindholm (2007), p. 256.
104 Jacobs (2004b), p. 307. This statement was made in relation to direct effect, of which the 
conferment of rights upon private parties is a consequence (see p. 306). In a similar sense, 
see e.g. Weatherill (2000), p. 99-101; Drake (2005), p. 329.
105 Eilmansberger (2004), p. 1205.
106 Wakefi eld (2009),  p. 410.
107 Jacobs (2004), p. 308.
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leading theme in the conferral on individuals of a right to damages for breach of 
[EU] law”.108 Although there is certainly no consensus on this point,109 many 
understand the Court’s ‘language of rights’ primarily in such an ‘instrumen-
talist’ manner, meaning that the rights of private parties vested in EU law 
are, at least in part, instruments to help achieving the underlying objective 
of ensuring the effectiveness of EU law per se.110 Put differently, in this latter 
view the ‘ethos of individual rights’ in EU law is little more than an “inevi-
table by-product” of the underlying quest to ensure the application and 
enforcement of EU law at the national level.111 It then follows that, on this 
view, the private parties in question could and should be seen, first and fore-
most, as ‘private policemen’, ‘private attorneys general’ or ‘law enforcers 
acting in the public interest’.112 Contrary to what the Court’s ‘language of 
rights’ might suggest at first sight, this reading would thus imply that the 
latter considerations take precedence in case of a conflict.
447. The second remark concerns the question what the position of the Court 
of Justice would be if and when it must choose between the rights of private 
parties vested in EU law and the effectiveness of this law per se. This has 
been described earlier as “the real hard case”, whereby it is “not easy to predict 
what the choice of the Court will be”.113 Indeed, the existence of the diverging 
views outlined above can be seen as testimony to the ambiguity of the case 
law available to date and moreover the aforementioned tendency of the 
Court of Justice to underline the symmetry and the synergy between both 
interests at stake rather than to make an explicit choice between them. It 
consequently remains disputed whether, put simply, EU law serves indi-
vidual rights, or these rights serve EU law.114 While acknowledging the 
resulting uncertainty and the fact that this question is particularly hard to 
answer in the abstract, it is submitted here that a purely ‘instrumentalist’ 
view, whereby the interests associated with the enforcement of EU law per se 
would eventually take precedence where a choice is unavoidable, is unlikely 
to be upheld.
108 Nazzini (2009), p. 405. See also Nazzini (2011), p. 131.
109 While recognising the importance that the CoJ often attaches to safeguarding the effec-
tiveness of EU law per se, some consider that at least in certain cases “the response of the 
Court suggests rather unambiguously that priority should be given to effective judicial protecti-
on”. See Nebbia (2008), p. 33. In a similar sense, see also e.g. Leczykiewicz (2010a), p. 282; 
Dougan (2011), pp. 425 and 431. For yet another approach, see e.g. Becker (2007), 
pp. 1051-1056.
110 E.g. Prechal (2005), p. 111: “it is more often the case that full application of [EU] law provisions 
as such is what matters, as opposed to the protection of any specifi c rights”. In a similar sense, 
see e.g. Caranta 1995), p. 725; Kilpatrick (2000), p. 2; Geursen (2009), p. 136; Dougan 
(2011), p. 425; Micklitz (2011), p. 563.
111 Dougan (2004), p. 76.
112 See Drake (2006), p. 843; Kilpatrick (2000), p. 2; Gyselen (2001), p. 144 respectively.
113 Prechal (1997), p. 13.
114 Cf. Milutinovic (2010), p. 89.
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This follows, in the first place, from a further assessment of the origin 
and purpose of the Court’s frequent insistence on safeguarding the effec-
tiveness of EU law per se. Court of Justice Judge Pescatore noted in this 
respect (writing extra-judicially) that “[e]ffectiveness is the very soul of legal 
rules”. He explained this as follows: “the purpose of any legal rule [...] is to 
achieve some practical aim and it would be running counter to its essential purpose 
if one handled it in such a way as to render it practically meaningless”.115 This 
highlights that any such reference to effectiveness is, at least in its origin, an 
application of an interpretative technique.116 This implies that the effectiveness 
of EU law is not an end in itself; the end in question depends on the content 
of the rule of EU law at issue. It is rather a means to an end, namely ensuring 
that that rule is meaningful in practice.117 Against this background, it should 
come as no surprise that Advocate General Jacobs found on another occa-
sion that “the proper application of the law does not necessarily mean that there 
cannot be any limits on its application [but that] the interest in full application may 
need to be balanced against other considerations, such as legal certainty, sound 
administration of justice and the orderly and proper conduct of proceedings”.118 As 
Judge Pescatore reminded us, the rule at issue should not be meaningless – 
but this is not quite the same as saying that it can never yield, to some 
extent, to another interest that is considered to be of fundamental impor-
tance.119 Particularly if we add to this the abovementioned consistent 
emphasis placed by the Court of Justice on the conferral and effective pro-
tection of rights of private parties vested in EU law, including the rise to 
prominence of the principle of effective judicial protection,120 the conclusion 
seems justified that a purely ‘instrumentalist’ interpretation is not (or, per-
haps, no longer121) likely to be upheld.122 In other words, as the law stands 
115 Pescatore (1983), p. 177.
116 Tridimas (2006), p. 419. In a similar sense, see Jacobs (2004), p. 315; Prechal (2005), p. 219; 
Ross (2006), p. 497.
117 Van den Bogaert (2002), p. 136. See also Leczykiewicz (2010a), p. 274; Temple Lang (2008), 
p. 95. For a good example of the application of this interpretative technique, see CoJ case 
C-105/03, Pupino, para. 38 and 42.
118 Opinion AG Jacobs joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 31. See also 
Jacobs (1997), pp. 26-27.
119 Cf. e.g. Opinion AG Léger case C-66/95, Sutton, para. 71: “Thus, national rules clearly may 
not be applied in such a way as to wholly negate the exercise of a right based on [EU] law”.
120 On this principle, see further section 2.3 above. Broadly speaking, this rise went hand-in-
hand with the expansion of EU competences beyond purely economic issues covering 
also matters such as social policy and consumer protection, as well as the creation of the 
concept of EU citizenship, which the CoJ has referred to as “destined to be the fundamental 
status of nationals of the Member States”. See CoJ case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, para 31. Cf. Dou-
gan (2004), pp. 75-82.
121 Note that the above citation by AG Jacobs referring to the CoJ’s ‘instrumentalist’ 
approach was accompanied by the words “historically at any rate”.
122 As a subsidiary point, it can also be noted that EU law allows for other means to protect 
the EU’s interest, most notably through infringement proceedings ex Art. 258 TFEU (and, 
in competition cases, also public enforcement exercised by the Commission). See Opinion 
AG Jacobs joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 26.
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at present there seems to be no reason to presume a priori that the effective-
ness of EU law per se must and will always prevail over the rights of private 
parties, should a conflict emerge. 
It appears that, rather than establishing a clear hierarchy, the Court of 
Justice may well insist on balancing these two fundamental interests on a 
case-by-case basis. This was after all the essence of its approach in the afore-
mentioned Pfleiderer case law.123 There the Court had an opportunity to pri-
oritise the interest related to the effective public enforcement of EU competi-
tion law (no access to leniency documents) over the interest related to the 
right to obtain full compensation of the private parties concerned (full and 
unconditional access to these documents), or vice versa. However it did not 
do so. It instead insisted on a case-by-case balancing of the interests at stake, 
without establishing a clear hierarchy between them. This case law more-
over does not stand on its own. The Court seems inclined to follow a compa-
rable approach, emphasising the need to find a balanced solution, also in 
other cases where it is confronted with (potentially) conflicting principles 
and interests of a fundamental nature. One example is the Van Schijndel case 
law, where the Court allowed in essence for a balancing of the interests of 
EU law and the protection of rights vested therein on the one hand and the 
basic principles of the legal systems of the Member States on the other 
hand.124 The Court typically also insists on a balancing approach in cases 
where various fundamental rights of private parties are in conflict with each 
other, as was the case in Promusicae.125 And it again did so in Smidberger, 
where the EU law provisions on the free movement of goods conflicted with 
the freedoms of expression and of assembly of certain private parties.126 A 
further illustration is the Atlanta case law on the possibilities for national 
courts to grant interim relief with respect to the application of secondary EU 
law whose validity is in doubt.127 In this context the Court of Justice has 
made the balancing between the interests of the EU related to ensuring the 
full effect of EU law on the one hand and the interests of the private parties 
at issue on the other hand an important condition.
It is of course true that the situations and the interests at stake in each of 
the abovementioned cases all differ to a greater or lesser extent. Still it is 
suggested that the positions are sufficiently comparable so as to be able to 
consider that also in the present context, as a general rule, the interests 
involved are essentially ‘too fundamental’ to be forced in a hierarchical rela-
tionship.128 If this view is correct, this approach should arguably be seen as 
123 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer. See further para. 221 above.
124 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 19. See further para. 39 
above.
125 CoJ case C-275/06, Promusicae, para. 68. See further para. 124 above. See e.g. also CoJ case 
C-461/10, Bonnier, para. 56-60; CoJ case C-283/11, Sky Österreich, para. 59-60.
126 CoJ case C-112/00, Smidberger, para. 81. See e.g. also CoJ case C-438/05, Viking Line, 
para. 79.
127 CoJ case C-465/93, Atlanta, para. 42-44 and 50. See further para. 58 above.
128 Cf. Reich (2010), pp. 140-141.
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a consequence of the increased maturity of EU law over time.129 Now that 
EU law is established more firmly than in the early decades of the process of 
European integration, there may be less of a need to ‘instrumentalise’ con-
cepts such as rights of private parties to ensure its effectiveness. It can then 
also more easily ‘afford’ giving way to other legitimate interests where 
appropriate, such as these very same rights.130
 448. The third and last remark relates to the implications of the foregoing 
specifically for the EU legislature. The institutions involved in the EU’s law-
making process do not necessarily need to follow the same approach as the 
Court of Justice with respect to the issues discussed above. Indeed, the bal-
ancing and prioritising of the various interests at stake in a particular situa-
tion is the very essence of law-making (which in itself may be an additional 
argument why the Court could be expected to take a nuanced approach). 
Generally speaking, there is no rule of law that precludes the EU legislature 
from letting prevail what it sees as the general interest over the interests of 
certain private parties when regulating a particular situation, or vice versa. 
Of course in so doing the EU legislature must respect certain boundaries. 
These come in the form of procedure (e.g. consulting widely, stating 
reasons)131 as well as substance (e.g. proportionality, fundamental rights).132 
Procedural requirements by definition do not amount to an absolute bar 
however. Moreover, where issues of substance are concerned, the EU legis-
lature tends to enjoy broad discretion when making political, economic and 
social choices and complex assessments.133 Subject to certain conditions, this 
may also involve restricting the exercise of fundamental rights of certain 
private parties.134 The EU legislature therefore generally has not unrestrict-
ed, but nonetheless considerable freedom to legislate in a manner that it 
deems appropriate on the abovementioned matters involving tensions and 
conflicts between the two expressions of effectiveness that are of particular 
importance here. In other words, this is to a considerable extent a matter of 
policy choices.
Crucially the discussion in the foregoing subsections has highlighted the 
importance, when making these policy choices, of clearly identifying the 
objectives that the EU legislative initiative in question seeks to achieve and 
the effect that this has on establishing the approach to be followed. In par-
ticular, it has been illustrated how one’s views on the objective that is pri-
marily to be achieved determines to a high extent the answer to questions 
such as: whether and if so, to what extent and in what manner, leniency 
129 For a detailed overview and discussion of the relevant developments over time, see Eil-
mansberger (2004), pp. 1201-1231. Cf. Tridimas (2001), p. 77.
130 Cf. Prechal (1998), p. 686; Bengoetxea (2008), p. 22.
131 See e.g. Art. 11(3) and 296 TFEU.
132 See subsection 9.2.2 above.
133 Cf. para. 389-390 above.
134 See para. 391 above.
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applicants are to be shielded from private enforcement litigation; punitive 
damages are desirable or objectionable as a private enforcement instrument; 
out-of-court settlements between the private parties to an EU law-related 
dispute are to be encouraged or a reason for concern; and whether and if so, 
in which form collective redress mechanisms are to be provided for. These 
are issues that are of obvious importance when discussing EU legislation 
facilitating the private enforcement of EU law.
11.1.5. Summary
449. Considerations of effectiveness are at the heart of most of the EU leg-
islation relating to private enforcement analysed in this study. A distinction 
can be made between two expressions of the broader concept of effective-
ness as it exists in EU law, namely one centred on the effective protection of 
the (subjective) rights of private parties and another one that focuses on the 
effective enforcement of (objective) EU law per se. Generally speaking, these 
two expressions tend not only to coincide, but also to reinforce each other. 
The resulting ‘dual vigilance’ logic lies at the heart of the concept of private 
enforcement. Yet in certain situations there can be tension, if not an outright 
conflict, between these two expressions and the interests that underlie them. 
These situations include discussions on the relationship between private 
enforcement and leniency programmes, punitive damages, out-of-court 
settlements and collective redress. The resulting question whether the inter-
est associated with a private party enforcing its individual right or the inter-
est associated with the effective enforcement of EU law per se should prevail 
is as fundamental as the said interests themselves. It appears that the Court 
of Justice, if and when confronted with this question, may well insist on the 
balancing of these interests, rather than establishing a clear hierarchy 
between them. Within certain boundaries (procedural requirements, propor-
tionality, fundamental rights), the EU legislature is free to make its own 
policy choices in this respect. This can generally entail letting one interest 
prevail over the other. Yet it can still be of considerable importance in a law-
making context to clearly identify which interest is being prioritised. For 
while these interests may often coincide, the choices made, the arguments 
underpinning them and the scope for the EU to act may well differ signifi-
cantly depending on whether one seeks primarily to facilitate the enforce-
ment of the rights of private parties vested in EU law or rather the enforce-
ment of EU law per se.
11.2. The horizontalisation perspective
 At the outset of this study it was recalled how the Court of Justice has made 
it clear that the EU legal order is essentially triangular in nature, meaning 
that EU law is not exclusively a matter between the Member States and the 
EU institutions, but that it can grant private parties a legal position of their 
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own right and that, driven by considerations of effectiveness, this has led to 
the creation and elaboration of a private enforcement model.135 In this sec-
tion the emphasis is on another aspect of this model. It builds on the point 
that over the years it has become clear that private parties can invoke their 
rights vested in EU law not only in ‘vertical’ legal relationships, i.e. vis-à-vis 
the Member States and the EU institutions, but also in ‘horizontal’ legal rela-
tionships, i.e. vis-à-vis other private parties. The present section thus looks at 
private enforcement from a ‘horizontalisation’ perspective. Below the main 
aspects of this development are first sketched in relation to EU law gener-
ally and the private enforcement of this law specifically. Attention then turns 
to the most important implications in terms of enforcement, costs, fears of a 
‘litigation culture’ and situations where diffuse interests are at stake. Then 
the three main categories of hybrid enforcement are outlined, followed by 
an assessment of the fundamental rights-related implications.
11.2.1. The horizontalisation of EU law and its enforcement
450. A first issue to be elaborated on when discussing the ‘horizontalisa-
tion’ of EU law is whether the provisions of EU law in question are capable 
of having horizontal direct effect, i.e. whether they can be relied upon directly 
in legal proceedings between two private parties. As was noted earlier, in 
this respect a distinction must be made between various instruments of EU 
law.136 On the one hand provisions of the EU Treaties, regulations and deci-
sions that are sufficiently clear and unconditional can be directly effective in 
horizontal legal relationships, whereas on the other hand the Court of Jus-
tice has consistently refused to construe directives as being capable of having 
such effect. In the case of directives, transposition by the Member States into 
national law is required before the rules in question can have direct legal 
effects between private parties. This latter limitation is obviously an impor-
tant one in the present context. For one thing, the substantive EU law to 
which the legal acts discussed in part B of this study relate have often been 
laid down in directives. That is the case for substantive EU public procure-
ment law, EU consumer protection law and in part also substantive EU intel-
lectual property law.137 By contrast another part of substantive EU intellec-
tual property law has partially been laid down in regulations, whereas 
substantive EU competition law is founded in the EU Treaties, i.e. Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU.138 For another thing, all private enforcement facilitating 
legal acts at issue in this study are themselves directives. Transposition into 
135 See subsection 1.1.1 above.
136 See para. 5 above.
137 See para. 69 (concerning public procurement law), 108 (concerning intellectual property 
law) and 151 (concerning consumer protection law) above.
138 See para. 108 (concerning intellectual property law) and 200-201 (concerning competition 
law) above.
para. 451 Chapter 11. Two perspectives on private enforcement p. 489
national law by the Member States is thus required for them to have effect in 
disputes between two private parties.
At the same time the practical implications of this lack of horizontal 
direct effect of directives should probably not be overstated either. Although 
there is certainly scope for improvement, especially in terms of the speed 
with which transposition takes place, in the majority of cases Member States 
do transpose directives in a timely and adequate manner.139 The private par-
ties concerned can therefore normally invoke their rights vested in EU law 
also vis-à-vis other private parties, on the basis of the national laws transpos-
ing the directives in question. Moreover, even where transposition is late or 
inadequate, pursuant to the EU law principle of consistent interpretation 
national law must be interpreted in so far as possible in light of the wording 
and the purpose of the directives at issue.140 In this manner a directive can 
thus still have important ‘indirect’ effects also in legal relationships between 
private parties.141 Finally, in certain cases directives give expression to a gen-
eral principle of EU law. Where national law is incompatible with that prin-
ciple, it may still need to be disapplied also in disputes between two private 
parties.142 Some understand this to boil down to all but the same thing as 
granting horizontal direct effect to directives.143 
451. A second important issue is whether the provisions of EU law in ques-
tion actually confer rights on which a private party can rely vis-à-vis another 
private party. As was explained earlier, the issues of direct effect and confer-
ral of rights may often coincide, but they are not identical.144 Whether a pro-
vision confers right on a given private party depends on its content. When 
the content of an EU law provision is such as to confer rights, and how that 
is to be determined, is regrettably not always entirely clear.145 This does not 
appear to be overly problematic for the present purposes however. As has 
also already been seen, the substantive EU law the private enforcement of 
which the legal acts under consideration seek to facilitate generally confer 
rights on which private parties can rely, also against other private parties.146 
139 Cf. Commission, 30th Annual report on applying EU law (2012), COM(2013) 726, pp. 2-4.
140 See para. 5 above.
141 In addition a private party that suffers damage as a consequence of a lack of timely and 
adequate transposition of a directive can seek to obtain compensation from the Member 
State in question under the principle of Member State liability, discussed in para. 59 
above.
142 See e.g. CoJ case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, para. 50-51. For a case where the CoJ expressly 
refused to apply similar reasoning, see CoJ case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, 
para. 41-47.
143 E.g. Thüsing & Horler (2010), p. 1161. For a more nuanced analysis, see Peers (2010), 
p. 849. On the possible horizontal direct effects of general principles of EU law more gen-
erally, see further e.g. Groussot & Lindgard (2008), p. 173; De Mol (2010), p. 293; Hart-
kamp (2010), p. 250; Azoulai (2012), p. 215.
144 See para. 31 above.
145 See para. 21 above.
146 See in particular para. 338 above.
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Indeed, if that were otherwise, there would be little point in adopting these 
acts in the first place. And also more generally EU law, as construed by the 
Court of Justice, tends to be rather ‘generous’ in conferring rights on private 
parties.147
This ‘generosity’ at times also extends to the related issue of the identifi-
cation of the addressee of a particular provision of EU law. This determines 
who is bound by the obligation in question and consequently against whom 
the rights that private parties may be able to derive from that provision can 
be invoked. The most notable example is probably Article 157 TFEU relating 
to gender equality, in relation to which the Court of Justice has held that “the 
fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member 
States does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any indi-
vidual who has an interest in the performance of the duties thus laid down”.148 It 
added that the provision concerned applies not only to the action of public 
authorities, but also to agreements between private parties.149 Although the 
case law is still evolving, the EU Treaties’ provisions on the fundamental 
freedoms150 are subject to a certain degree of ‘horizontalisation’ as well. It 
has become clear that, even if they are formally addressed only to the Mem-
ber States, in certain situations private parties can rely on the rights that they 
derive from these provisions against parties that may be functionally rather 
closely related to the State, but that are nevertheless not themselves public 
authorities.151
452. Although there are various conditions and limitations, it has thus 
gradually become clear that private parties can in many instances invoke 
rights vested in EU law vis-à-vis other private parties. One can therefore 
speak of a perhaps not universal and unrestricted, but nonetheless clearly 
apparent development towards the ‘horizontalisation’ of substantive EU law. 
In many ways the development of the concept of private enforcement of that 
law, both in the enforcement-related case law discussed in part A of this 
study and in the EU legislation on private enforcement discussed in part B, 
is an expression and extension of this development. Where substantive law is 
increasingly ‘horizontalised’, attention logically also turns to the remedies 
and procedures that seek to make the enforcement of the rights in question 
a realistic possibility. This is well illustrated by the aforementioned provi-
sion on gender equality, which was first substantially ‘horizontalised’, what 
in turn led to EU involvement – by its judiciary as well as by its legislature 
147 See para. 338 and 446 above.
148 CoJ case 43/75, Defrenne, para. 31.
149 Ibid., para. 39.
150 Art. 34, 45, 49 and 56 TFEU.
151 See e.g. CoJ case C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 33; CoJ case C-171/11, Fra.bo. See further 
Van den Bogaert (2002), p. 123; Krenn (2012), p. 177; Van Harten & Nauta (2013), p. 677; 
Verbruggen (2014), p. 201. As follows from this case law and as is discussed in these con-
tributions, as it stands, not all freedoms are treated in the same manner however.
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– with the rules of national law relating to the enforcement of this provi-
sion.152
Accordingly it has been observed that a ruling such as Muñoz – where 
the Court of Justice held that national law cannot preclude the private par-
ties concerned from relying, in a horizontal relationship, on the rules laid 
down in two EU regulations on common quality standards for certain agri-
cultural products153 – “transposes the principle of horizontal direct effect to the 
procedural and remedial plain”.154 Put differently, this case clarifies the practi-
cal consequences of that principle.155 Similar observations have been made 
in a competition law context in relation to the Court’s rulings in BRT and 
Courage.156 The (nascent) principle of private party liability articulated in 
those cases can thus be seen as the corollary of the principle of direct effect 
and the granting of rights by EU law directly to private parties, which 
underlines once more that the legal order established under the EU Treaties 
is in many respects truly triangular in nature.157
Some caution is admittedly in place when drawing conclusions on the 
basis of the above case law. In Muñoz the rights in question derived from 
regulations. Similarly in Courage, where the same principle of private party 
liability for infringements of EU law was articulated, they derived from the 
EU Treaties, i.e. Article 101 TFEU. It therefore does not necessarily follow 
that this principle can also be applied to directives, which, as was recalled 
above, have no horizontal direct effect.158 There seems no reason however to 
presume that in principle the same logic could not be applied to provisions 
of national law transposing a directive.159 That is certainly the presumption 
underlying the EU legislation at issue in this study. After all, as was also 
noted above, in many instances this legislation seeks to facilitate the enforce-
ment of rights vested in EU law taking the form directives. It may therefore 
be presumed that the said principle can apply in all situations where provi-
sions of EU law that confer rights on private parties are allegedly 
infringed.160
152 Resulting in what is now Gender Equality Directive 2006/54. See e.g. CoJ case 43/75, 
Defrenne, para. 40; CoJ case 14/83, Van Colson, para. 23-28.
153 CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz. See further para. 61 above.
154 Tridimas (2006), p. 546.
155 Biondi (2003), p. 1243.
156 CoJ case 127/73, BRT; CoJ case C-453/99, Courage. See further para. 199 (concerning BRT) 
and para. 60 and 213 (concerning Courage) above. See Milutinovic (2014), p. 346.
157 Cf. Kelliher (2008), p. 7.
158 Tridimas (2006), p. 546.
159 Cf. Prechal (1997), p. 5; Betlem (2003), pp. 215-216.
160 In a similar sense, see e.g. Dougan (2004), p. 386; Drake (2006), pp. 858 and 861; Van Dam 
(2006), p. 345; Komninos (2008), pp. 176-179; Milutinovic (2010), p. 76. Cf. Ward (1998), 
p. 70. See also Opinion AG Geelhoed case C-253/00, Muñoz, para. 2-3. Tridimas (2006), 
p. 547, appears however to take the view that the scope of application of this principle is 
limited to the internal market.
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453. More specifically, there can be little doubt that also the secondary EU 
law considered in part B of this study focuses primarily on the ‘horizon-
talised’ private enforcement of EU law. The legal acts assessed generally set 
out rules on remedies and procedures which can be relied upon by a private 
party in cases of alleged infringements of EU substantive law by another 
private party. In a typical case the infringements to be addressed in acts such 
as the IPR Enforcement Directive, the Consumer Injunctions Directive the 
Product Liability Directive and the Competition Damages Directive are 
committed by private parties.
There is one notable exception however. The Procurement Remedies 
Directives are typically concerned with private enforcement actions to be 
brought against (quasi-)public bodies and not against other private par-
ties.161 This exception serves to underline that the EU legislation facilitating 
private enforcement at issue may have mostly been designed to apply to 
disputes between two private parties, it does not necessarily remain limited 
to such situations. Put differently, this legislation can give effect not only to 
the principle of private party liability for infringements of EU law, but also 
that of public party (i.e. Member State) liability for such infringements.162 It 
may in effect well be the other way round. Van Gend en Loos, where the 
Court of Justice laid the foundations for the private enforcement model, con-
cerned a case brought by a private party against a public body.163 Since then 
the Court’s enforcement-related case law has evolved by first articulating 
the principle of Member State liability and only subsequently that of private 
party liability. Likewise, where secondary EU law on this subject-matter is 
concerned, it would seem that in some respects the Procurement Remedies 
Directives ‘led the way’ and subsequently ‘spilled-over’ from the vertical to 
the horizontal domain.
This distinction between vertical and horizontal situations is further-
more far from absolute. Private undertakings can in certain situations be 
bound by rules of substantive EU public procurement law as well, which 
implies that the Procurement Remedies Directives can also apply to disputes 
between two private parties.164 Indeed, in some legal systems procurement 
law is in any case treated as a matter of civil law, given that the bodies in 
question act in a private rather than a public capacity in as far as they pro-
cure goods or services on the market.165 Conversely it is not excluded that 
legal proceedings are brought under the IPR Enforcement Directive against 
a public body. After all public bodies can at times also infringe intellectual 
property rights. The same applies for the Competition Damages Directive, 
considering that public bodies can sometimes also be subject to (and there-
161 See in particular para. 69 above.
162 See also section 2.5 above.
163 CoJ case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, p. 1. See further para. 1 above. The public body in ques-
tion was the Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration.
164 See para. 78 above.
165 See para. 78 above.
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fore be infringers of) the substantive EU competition rules to which this 
directive relates.166 Indeed, these latter two directives could theoretically 
even apply to disputes between two public bodies, given that the latter can 
also be applicants in the cases covered by them.167
454. Especially the IPR Enforcement Directive takes this ‘horizontalisation’ 
again one step further in some respects. Under this directive certain third 
parties (i.e. private parties who are not themselves accused of having 
infringed any intellectual property right) can be required to disclose infor-
mation on the origin and distribution network used for an alleged infringe-
ment of the relevant rules of EU law.168 Covered by this provision are most 
notably intermediaries whose services were used by the alleged infringer. In 
addition this directive allows for injunctions being imposed on these third 
party-intermediaries.169 In practice these obligations tend to play a particu-
larly important role in the online sphere, for instance with respect to internet 
service providers. Bringing these third parties within the directive’s scope 
has been justified essentially on the basis of their central role as ‘gatekeep-
ers’ and the relevant information and means to act that they often possess. 
This is also one of the directive’s most controversial aspects however. This 
has been called the ‘privatisation’ of enforcement, forcing these third parties 
to act as a sort of ‘internet police’.170
The Court of Justice has highlighted certain limitations that are to be 
respected in connection to the abovementioned provisions of the IPR 
Enforcement Directive. These limitations relate in particular to the funda-
mental rights that may be at stake. Depending on the case at hand it con-
cerns not the only fundamental rights of the persons that make use of the 
services provided by these intermediaries, such the right to protection of 
personal data and the freedom to receive and impart information, but also 
the freedom to conduct a business of the intermediaries themselves.171 It is 
noticeable however that the Court has so far not expressed any principled 
objections against the involvement of these third parties as such. Quite to 
the contrary, it has interpreted the provision of the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive on these injunctions extensively, by allowing this remedy to relate not 
only to past, but also to possible future infringements.172 In relation to cer-
tain (on-line) copyrights infringements it has expressly held that “intermedi-
aries are, in many cases, best placed to bring such infringing activities to an end”.173
166 See para. 199 above.
167 Cf. e.g. recital 12 Competition Damages Directive.
168 Art. 8 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 122 above.
169 Art. 9(1)(a) and 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also Art. 8(3) Infosoc Directive 
2001/29. See further para. 126 and 130 above.
170 See para. 124 above.
171 E.g. CoJ case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended, para. 46-52.
172 E.g. CoJ case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, para. 128-134. See further para. 131 above.
173 CoJ case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien, para. 27 (relating to the injunctions referred to in 
Art. 8 Infosoc Directive 2001/29).
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It is true that the abovementioned remedies that are available with 
respect to third parties under the IPR Enforcement Directive are rather lim-
ited in several respects. In terms of personal scope they remain limited to 
certain categories of third parties. In terms of substance they only concern 
the disclosure of information and the issuing of injunctions. The information 
to be disclosed is moreover specified in a rather narrow manner. The very 
existence of these provisions nonetheless illustrates how far the ‘horizon-
talisation’ of the enforcement of EU law can extend. And it is not inconceiv-
able that this approach will be taken a step further in due time. Although 
there appear to be at present no specific plans to this effect, one could think 
of making other remedies, such as actions for damages, available also with 
respect to certain third parties implicated in infringements of EU law.174 
Apart from that this tendency to involve third parties in private enforce-
ment proceedings already appears to be spreading to other sectors. Most 
notably also the Competition Damages Directive foresees the possibility of 
third parties being ordered to disclose evidence that may be of relevance in 
private enforcement proceedings.175 Unlike under the IPR Enforcement 
Directive, this regime covers in principle all third parties that may have rel-
evant evidence that lies within their control. Neither the evidence in ques-
tion nor the third parties concerned are circumscribed in any detail, mean-
ing that these parties are in fact treated hardly any differently than 
defendants.176
11.2.2. Private enforcement implications
 455. What does the foregoing mean in practical terms? When considering 
the implications of this ‘horizontalisation’ in terms of private enforcement, 
it is once more important to distinguish between the two different expres-
sions of effectiveness identified in the foregoing.177  In the first place, seen 
from an individual rights perspective, the implications seem quite straightfor-
ward. Generally speaking, the more the enforcement of EU law is ‘horizon-
talised’, the better the possibilities for private parties to enforce the rights 
that they derive from that law. ‘Horizontalised’ EU law may occasionally 
offer these parties an entirely new legal venue, as was the case for the pri-
vate parties affected by the (alleged) infringement of the EU competition 
and agricultural rules at issue in Courage and Muñoz respectively.178 More 
174 Cf. Commission, Responses to the public consultation on the civil enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, July 2013, p. 17.
175 Art. 5 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 234 above.
176 Only in the context of the proportionality assessment referred to in Art. 5(3) Competition 
Damages Directive is (limited) attention paid to the specifi c attention paid to the interests 
of third parties. There it is stipulated that the factors relating the scope and costs of the 
requested disclosure, as well as the protection of confi dential information, apply “especi-
ally for any third parties concerned”.
177 See in particular subsection 11.1.1 above.
178 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage; CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz. See further para. 60-61 above.
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often the improvement of the enforcement possibilities of the private parties 
concerned are however more gradual, for instance by clarifying specific 
matters such as the terms under which they are to be given access to evi-
dence or can claim damages.179
The requirements in this respect that flow from secondary EU law can 
be rather modest in terms of the level of detail that they provide or the stan-
dard that they establish,180 but it can nonetheless safely be assumed that no 
single Member State already complied with all remedial and procedural 
requirements discussed in the foregoing chapters before they were imposed 
on them by the EU legal acts under consideration. In most cases the Member 
States have thus been obliged to amend their respective national laws, at 
least to some extent. Overall the position of private parties wishing to bring 
a private enforcement claim has improved as a consequence. From this per-
spective the practical implications resulting from the EU legislative action at 
issue are thus generally to be assessed positively.
456. But there is also another side to this coin. The case law and the legisla-
tive measures discussed above typically enlighten the burden on the (poten-
tial) applicant in private enforcement proceedings. It is primarily this private 
party that benefits from the availability under EU law of remedies, such as 
actions for damages, contractual remedies, interim relief, the disclosure of 
evidence and recurring penalty payments.181 The EU law provisions on pro-
cedural issues such as legal standing, forum, limitation periods and judicial 
review have mostly also been established with the interests of the applicants 
in mind.182 Although, legally speaking, these provisions can affect all parties 
to the dispute, in practice they primarily benefit the applicants.183 This raises 
the question of the position of the (potential) defendant in the disputes cov-
ered by the EU legislation at issue.
On the one hand it cannot be said that improving the legal position of 
the applicant in a horizontal context necessarily means that the defendant’s 
position deteriorates in a manner that is to be deemed unfair or legally prob-
lematic. It is hard to see which legitimate reasons a defendant could invoke 
for arguing that he is unduly affected by EU legislative measures that seek 
for instance to safeguard and improve an applicant’s access to court so as to 
179 See subsections 8.2.2 and section 7.1.1 above respectively.
180 See in particular para. 394 above.
181 See sections 7.1 and 7.3 and subsections 8.2.1 and 8.2.3 above respectively.
182 See subsections 8.2.2, 8.2.3, 8.2.5 and 8.2.7 above respectively.
183 One of the few examples of a procedural provision that mitigates mostly in favour of the 
defendant is the rule on (very) short limitation periods for bringing actions under the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. It is noticeable that this rule has thus 
been laid down in the only acts under consideration that are not primarily concerned 
with enforcement in horizontal legal relationships, but where the typical defendant is a 
(semi-)public body. By contrast, e.g. under Art. 10 Competition Damages Directive, 
which regulates disputes between private parties, the rules on limitation periods mainly 
seeks to safeguard the interests of the applicants. See further section 9.1.3 above.
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allow this party to obtain a fair, timely and legally enforceable ruling on the 
lawfulness of certain behaviour on the side of the defendant. Indeed, that 
can also be in the interest of the latter. In that sense there is no ‘one-to-one’ 
relationship between an improvement of the position of the applicant and a 
deterioration of that of the defendant. On the other hand it is striking how-
ever that in the present context at best very limited attention tends to be 
paid to the position of the latter. That applies all the more so because, at the 
stage when the relevant measures are applied for, it often still remains to be 
determined whether an infringement of EU law has actually been commit-
ted. In other words, at that stage one can often only speak of an alleged 
infringement of EU law. In a vertical context such a generally rather one-
sided focus on improving the position of the applicant might normally not 
be much of a concern. In that case it may even be said to be perverse to pay 
too much attention to the position of the defendant, i.e. the State or one of its 
entities, as the latter is generally not considered to be in need of any special 
protection.184 But this is considerably less evident in horizontal legal relation-
ships, which disputes between two private parties that are as a general rule 
presumed to be equals.185 Even when leaving the possible fundamental 
rights-related implications aside for now (which are discussed separately 
below186), the question can arise why certain measures are not made avail-
able to the defendant as well.
Take the IPR Enforcement Directive. Its provisions facilitate the enforce-
ment of the various rights enjoyed by private parties that in relation to their 
intellectual property, whereas a party that wishes to challenge the existence 
or validity of such an intellectual property right cannot benefit from those 
provisions.187 Furthermore, although both parties to the dispute may be able 
to rely on this directive’s provision on the disclosure of evidence, the word-
ing of its provisions on the preservation of evidence and on obtaining informa-
tion from certain third parties seems to suggest that these measures are only 
available to the private party-applicant.188 Yet also a private party-defendant 
may wish to make use of those measures so as to demonstrate that no intel-
lectual property right has been infringed or that it was not involved in any 
such infringement. Turning to the Competition Damages Directive, this 
legal act regulates the effects of decisions by national competition authori-
ties (and of the courts reviewing those decisions) in private enforcement 
proceedings only where it concerns findings of an infringement.189 Although 
under EU law these authorities cannot establish that no infringement 
occurred, they may still find that there are no grounds for action on their 
184 Cf. Himsworth (1997), p. 310; Dougan (2004), pp. 13-14.
185 Cf. Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 205.
186 See in particular para. 468 below.
187 CoJ case C-180/11, Bericap, para. 77. See also CoJ case C-435/12, ACI Adam, para. 62.
188 Art. 6-8 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsection 6.2.1 above.
189 Art. 9 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 243 above.
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part.190 Or a review court might annul a decision by these authorities find-
ing an infringement. A defendant in a private enforcement case may well 
wish to rely on decisions of this type. But this directive leaves their legal 
effects entirely unaddressed. Comparable questions can arise in relation to 
certain rules on the allocation of legal costs, particularly if they were to 
amount to one-way fee shifting.191
 457. In the second place, an assessment of the implications is altogether 
rather different if we consider them from the perspective of ensuring the 
effectiveness of EU law per se.192 Then the main consequence in practical terms 
of private parties being facilitated in bringing their actions for infringements 
of EU law before national courts is that this helps drawing private resources 
into the overall ‘enforcement mix’.193 Private parties that consider that they 
have a reasonable prospect of obtaining for instance an injunction or a dam-
ages award for infringements of EU law before their national courts can be 
expected to more closely monitor the behaviour of their (commercial) coun-
terparts and initiate legal proceedings where they deem this necessary. This 
in turn should act as an incentive for the parties that are subject to these 
rules to improve compliance and avoid infringements. It has already been 
seen that this ‘dual vigilance’ logic was an important consideration when 
adopting the legislation assessed in part B.194 The resulting beneficial effect 
in terms of overall compliance and enforcement can be particularly impor-
tant, given that the resources available for public enforcement (where such 
mechanisms exist in the first place) are often limited, certainly in times of 
budgetary constraints.195 But it would be wrong to see this as only a matter 
of financial means. In many cases private parties also possess considerable 
expertise and inside-knowledge of the practical workings of a given sector, 
which is certainly not always the case for public enforcement authorities. 
The latter may moreover not wish to pursue certain infringements, in light 
of their policy of prioritisation or under political influence. Constraints of 
this kind will normally not apply to private parties affected by infringe-
ments of EU law.
190 Art. 5 Competition Regulation 1/2003. See e.g. CoJ case C-375/09, Tele 2 Polska, 
para. 19-30.
191 See subsection 8.2.5 above.
192 See further Benedict (1995), p. 250; Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 191; Jones (2004), p. 21; 
Hodges (2006), p. 1395; Eilmansberger (2007), p. 443; Wils (2009), p. 6; Milutinovic (2010), 
pp. 17 and 352; Peyer (2011), p. 635; Canenbley & Steinvorth (2011), p. 321; Lock (2012), 
p. 1675; Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 295; Möschel (2013), pp. 4-6; Van den Bergh (2013), 
pp. 13-20.
193 Jones (2004), p. 21.
194 See in particular para. 383 and 438 above.
195 Cf. Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 11. See e.g. also Heads of the Euro-
pean competition authorities, Resolution on competition authorities in the EU: the con-
tinued need for effective institutions, 16 November 2010.
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458. Seen from this latter perspective, a private enforcement model also 
has certain important limitations however. First and foremost, the (potential) 
private party-applicants inevitably act primarily in accordance with what 
they see as their own interest. These private parties decide for themselves 
if, when and how they wish to initiate legal proceedings. As the Court of 
Justice put it, “in a civil suit, it is for the parties to take the initiative”, which 
“reflects fundamental conceptions prevailing in most Member States as to the rela-
tions between the State and the individual”.196 Indeed, notwithstanding certain 
differences and exceptions, national law on civil procedure has tradition-
ally been based on the concept of party autonomy, which is reflected inter 
alia in the principle of judicial passivity.197 This also implies that no party 
can be forced to initiate litigation when it does not want to do so.198 Pri-
vate parties will typically base their decisions in this regard on a cost/ben-
efit analysis that takes account only of their own individual interests. No 
account is normally taken of broader considerations in the general interest, 
such as the overall benefits in terms of effective enforcement of the law or 
the optimal level of enforcement. In a competition case private enforcement 
can consequently easily lead to a focus on protecting the competitor, rather 
than competition as such.199 This distinction is perhaps less clearly visible, 
but nonetheless not fundamentally different in the other fields of law under 
consideration.
The investigative and evidence-gathering powers of private parties are nor-
mally also rather limited.200 As discussed above, especially the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive and the Competition Damages Directive seek to address this 
issue by setting out specific disclosure regimes.201 Yet there are still clear 
limits to the extent to which private parties are, and can be, granted such 
powers. That is the case essentially for the simple reason that they are pri-
vate parties, which implies that granting them too far-going powers inevita-
bly raises concerns in terms of risk of abuse, fairness and equality of arms.202 
These powers are therefore subject to a whole set of safeguards, including 
judicial oversight.203 This latter safeguard implies that the powers in ques-
tion are in fact attributed mainly to the national courts, rather than to the 
private parties concerned. In any case these powers tend to be more modest 
196 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 21. See e.g. also Opinion AG 
Geelhoed joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 31.
197 Ebers (2010), p. 826. See also Opinion AG Jacobs joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, 
Van Schijndel, para. 33-37.
198 Cf. Jacobs & Deisenhofer (2003), p. 191.
199 Cf. Hjelmeng (2013), pp. 1024 and 1032.
200 Cf. e.g. Whish (1994), p. 4; Wils (2003a), p. 480; Jones (2004), p. 17; Frese (2011), p. 410; 
Canenbley & Steinvorth (2011), p. 321.
201 See in particular subsection 8.2.2 above. Another example is the ex parte search order pro-
cedure, provided for in Art. 7 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 121 
and 456 above and para. 471 below.
202 See para. 458 above and para. 468 below.
203 See para. 316 above.
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than the powers attributed to the competent public enforcement authorities, 
even if the powers of the latter can differ significantly across the various 
field of law at issue.204
The above can obviously limit the effectiveness and deterrent effect of 
possible private enforcement actions – and therefore the effectiveness of a 
model that relies on ‘regulation through litigation’ as such.205
11.2.3. Costs, litigation culture and diffuse interests
459. It was noted above that one of the attractions of facilitating private 
enforcement can be its role in increasing overall levels of enforcement, in 
light of the often limited resources of the relevant public enforcement 
authorities. It would be a mistake however to think that private enforcement 
actions of the type at issue do not also entail certain costs.206
The most visible costs relate directly to the litigation resulting from the 
legal claims the enforcement of which the legislation assessed in this study 
seeks to facilitate. This involves expenditure on the side of the national 
courts before which the proceedings are brought, as well as legal costs for 
the parties to the dispute.207 But there can also be other costs that are some-
times less immediately apparent, such as costs related to ‘over-deterrence’. 
Facilitating private enforcement actions may lead to a risk that potential 
defendants adapt their behaviour not so much because there is a clear cut 
case of them infringing EU law, but rather simply out of fear of being sued. 
A private party could for example decide not to bring an innovative product 
on the market for that reason. There can thus be a ‘chilling effect’. A related 
matter is the possibility of strategic litigation and the harassment of inno-
cent parties, known as ‘nuisance cases’. For even when a legal action is 
unlikely to be successful, the mere fact that it is brought can be problematic 
for the defendant, for example due to the legal costs and other resources that 
the latter must spend on its defence or the reputational damage that may 
result from the mere fact that a case has been brought against it.
All this may lead to costs not only for the (potential) defendants in a 
private enforcement action, but also for society as a whole.208 These negative 
effects are to some extent an inevitable by-product of any legal system that 
aims to offer effective judicial protection to private parties and to punish 
204 An obvious example of public enforcement authorities possessing far-going powers in 
this respect are competition authorities (see subsection 6.4.2 above). The powers of the 
competent authorities in fi elds such as public procurement law and consumer protection 
law are, certainly in as far as EU law is concerned, signifi cantly more limited, but also in 
these cases they go beyond the investigative and evidence-gathering powers of private 
parties (see subsections 3.4.2 and 5.5.3 above respectively).
205 Cf. Hodges (2006), p. 1394.
206 See further e.g. Wils (2003a), pp. 479 and 484; Kur (2004), p. 829; Hodges (2006), p. 1395; 
Eilmansberger (2007), p. 459; Milutinovic (2010), pp. 16-17; Peyer (2011), pp. 635-641.
207 As regards the latter, see also subsection 8.2.5 above.
208 Cf. European Parliament, Study on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 41.
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and deter infringers. But that should not distract from the fact that the more 
these latter objectives are pursued through particular legislative measures 
such as the ones at issue in this study, the bigger these risks generally 
become.
460. That brings us to the fears of a creating or encouraging what is often 
called a ‘litigation culture’. Concerns of this type have been expressed regu-
larly in connection to private enforcement-related EU legislation, whether in 
the form of fears of ‘cowboy tenderers’ bringing ‘nuisance cases’ under the 
Procurement Remedies Directives,209 a perceived risk of the Product Liabil-
ity Directive leading to excessive litigation210 or more general concerns 
about creating or encouraging such a culture through an EU initiative on 
collective redress or the private enforcement of EU competition law.211 Ref-
erence is often made in this connection to the situation in the United 
States.212
The term ‘litigation culture’ refers, broadly speaking, to a situation 
where litigation between private parties takes place to a degree that is con-
sidered to be undesirable, harmful or even abusive.213 Understood in this 
manner there are obviously few people who will argue in favour of creating 
or encouraging such a culture. This presumes that a clear dividing line can 
be drawn between an ‘excessive’ and a ‘healthy’ degree of litigation. Making 
such a distinction may be far from easy in practice however. Views on where 
this line is to be drawn tend to depend not only on whether or not the party 
concerned is likely to an applicant or a defendant in private enforcement 
proceedings, it also typically involves a value judgment of sorts. It may well 
vary for instance on whether the enforcement of EU law per se or safeguard-
ing the rights of private parties is seen as the principal objective. In any case 
it is not difficult to spot the inherent tension between the ambition to see 
more private enforcement claims being brought and the desire to avoid a 
litigation culture. Indeed, the EU might not be able to have the cake and eat 
it too.214
209 See para. 72 and 75 above.
210 See para. 174 and 179 above.
211 See para. 189 and 219 above respectively. See e.g. also Hodges (2006), p. 1398.
212 Cf. e.g. Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective 
redress, SEC(2011) 173, p. 9; European Parliament, Resolution on towards a coherent 
European approach to collective redress, P7_TA(2012)0021, p. 2; Commission, Communi-
cation towards a European horizontal framework for collective redress, COM(2013) 401, 
p. 3.
213 Commission, Communication towards a European horizontal framework for collective 
redress, COM(2013) 401, p. 7: “Litigation can be considered abusive when it is intentionally 
targeted against law-abiding businesses in order to cause reputational damage or to infl ict an 
undue fi nancial burden on them”. See also e.g. Garben (2013), pp. 42-43.
214 Cf. Keyte (2014), p. 203.
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Having said that, there are good reasons to believe that, as matters stand 
at present, there is generally little risk of establishing such a litigation cul-
ture. To begin with, the impact of the relevant EU legislation in practice 
should probably generally not be overstated.215 And even apart from that it 
is broadly agreed that the – presumed216 – private enforcement-related 
excesses in the United States can mainly be explained by the availability of 
what the Commission has called a “toxic cocktail”217 of rules on issues such 
as class action, punitive (treble) damages, intrusive pre-trial discovery and 
legal costs (contingency fees).218 On none of these issues there are currently 
similar rules in place in the EU legal system, let alone that such rules would 
apply in combination.219 It can further be noted that the said fears tend to 
arise especially in connection to the facilitation of actions for damages under 
EU law. However, despite the more recent increase observed in several 
fields, precisely these types of private enforcement actions remain for now 
typically rather scarce in practice, even where EU legislative action has been 
taken.220 The Commission thus may well be correct in its assessment that, at 
present, undercompensation is generally more of a concern in the EU than 
possible overcompensation.221
Besides, if required, the EU legislature has several instruments at its dis-
posal to help avoid creating situations that are deemed harmful and unde-
sirable.222 The Product Liability Directive offers one example in this regard, 
where it sets a financial threshold of € 500 for damages awards.223 This 
threshold has been expressly designed to “avoid litigation in an excessive num-
ber of cases”.224 Even if this could conceivably be seen as objectionable espe-
cially from the perspective of a private party’s right to full compensation, 
the Court of Justice has so far not expressed any principled objections in this 
215 See subsection 10.4.2 above.
216 Whether or not this perception actually rests on a realistic understanding of the US sys-
tem is another matter. Micklitz (2011), p. 114, notes in relation collective redress that 
observations made in this regard tend to be based on the unquestioned assumption that 
the situations in the EU and the US are comparable and on rather superfi cial knowledge 
of the situation in the US. In a similar sense, see e.g. also Lande (2010), p. 11; Gavil (2014), 
p. 12.
217 Commission, Questions and answers regarding the green paper on consumer collective 
redress, MEMO/08/741, p. 4.
218 E.g. Commission, Green paper on consumer collective redress, COM(2008) 794, pp. 12-14; 
European Parliament, Study on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 11; recital 15 
Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See e.g. also Hodges (2011), pp. 438-439; 
Van den Bergh (2013), p. 13.
219 See subsections 5.5.1, 7.1.6, 8.2.2 and 8.2.5 above respectively.
220 See in particular para. 259 above.
221 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 18.
222 More generally, in a different context the CoJ has made it clear that EU law cannot be 
relied upon for abusive or fraudulent ends. See e.g. CoJ case C-153/13, SICES, para. 29-34; 
CoJ joined cases C-58/13 and C-59/13, Torresi, para. 42-46.
223 Art. 9 Product Liability Directive 85/375. See further para. 179 above.
224 Recital 9 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
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regard.225 Another possible instrument is the regulation of legal costs, and in 
particular rules on their allocation between the parties to the dispute. Espe-
cially the ‘loser pays’ principle can and does act as a threshold against 
unmeritorious claims and excessive litigation.226 A further example can be 
found in the IPR Enforcement Directive, which requires in general terms 
that safeguards against abuse are provided for.227 The proposed trade secrets 
directive takes this one step further by providing for a rule to address 
“intimidating or harassing” litigation.228 More limited but not dissimilarly, the 
Commission had proposed providing for penalties for cases of abuse relat-
ing to the rules on the disclosure of evidence laid down in the Competition 
Damages Directive, a suggestion that was however not retained by the EU 
legislature.229
461. Finally, it has been seen in the foregoing that the concept of a ‘right’ is 
an indispensable element for a private enforcement model to function, as it 
essentially links the relevant objective law to the subjective entitlement of a 
given private party.230 However the interests that substantive EU law seeks 
to protect can sometimes be ‘diffuse’ in nature and therefore hard to capture 
in terms of individual rights that private parties can derive from EU law.231 
One could think of EU environmental law, where legal protection “generally 
serves not only the individual interest of claimants, but also, or even exclusively, the 
public”.232 In those cases it may not always be evident that a private party-
applicant has the required standing to initiate legal proceedings when it 
believes that an infringement occurred.233 In other words, the issue here is 
not so much that the private parties concerned might be discouraged from 
bringing a legal action in light of potential drawbacks such as costs or other 
risks involved, but rather that there might be no such parties that are in a 
position to bring an action in the first place.234 Where they cannot, the pri-
vate parties’ vigilance will be of no relevance in terms of private enforce-
ment.
225 CoJ case C-52/00, Commission v. France, para. 29-32; CoJ case C-154/00, Commission v. 
Greece, para. 29-32.
226 See para. 329 above.
227 Art. 3(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 144 above. See also subsec-
tion 9.2.5 above.
228 Commission, Proposal for a trade secrets directive, COM(2013) 813, pp. 19-20 (Art. 6(2)).
229 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 35 
(Art. 8(1)(d)).
230 See in particular para. 338 and 451 above.
231 Even if there are certain similarities, this situation where the interests at stake are ‘diffuse’ 
is to be distinguished from the situation where substantive EU law grants ‘individualis-
able’ rights to private parties, but where these parties may not be inclined to enforce them 
for other reasons, such as the low monetary value of the issue at stake. The latter situation 
is discussed in the context of collective redress. See further subsection 5.5.1 above.
232 Opinion AG Kokott case C-260/11, Edwards, para. 40.
233 On legal standing, see also subsection 9.1.2 above.
234 Cf. Eliantonio (2014), pp. 259-260.
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This particularity can be addressed, at least to some extent, by granting 
legal standing to certain third parties, such as non-governmental organisa-
tions that invoke the public rather than a strictly individual interest. As the 
Court of Justice noted in an environmental case, this can be seen as appro-
priate precisely because the rules of substantive EU law in question mostly 
address the public interest and not merely the protection of the interests of 
individual private parties as such.235 Yet even where those organisations are 
entitled to initiate legal proceedings, and valuable as such actions may be, 
this still means that the group of potential applicants is significantly reduced 
as compared to a situation where in principle any interested private party 
affected by an infringement of EU law can bring a case. Indeed, it is debat-
able whether such ‘general interest litigation’ amounts to private enforce-
ment at all.236 It is at least not private enforcement in a ‘pure’ sense, given 
that the category of potential applicants is, by definition, limited to parties 
that seek to defend the public (or at least not only a strictly individual) inter-
est. Certain private enforcement remedies, such as actions for damages, 
moreover seem less suitable in these cases. For where ‘diffuse’ interests are 
at stake, the damage caused by an infringement may not be ‘individualis-
able’ either.
A private enforcement model therefore generally does not seem particu-
larly well suited for these situations.237 Indeed, the EU legislature appears 
to be of the view that persons invoking a general or public interest (as tax-
payers) can be prevented from relying on the remedies and procedural pro-
visions set out in the Procurement Remedies Directives.238 In such cases 
public enforcement may well be a more appropriate and effective means of 
enforcement. It is probably no coincidence that the Environmental Liabil-
ity Directive does not provide for ‘classical’ liability in damages,239 nor that 
it was precisely in this field that criminal sanctions were (controversially) 
introduced as a matter of EU law.240 This points seems to be further under-
scored by the fact that alleged violations of EU environmental law top the 
list of fields about which private parties complain to the Commission, with 
235 CoJ case C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, para. 46.
236  See para. 22 above for the defi nition of the term ‘private enforcement’ for the purposes of 
this study. The above arguably constitutes a form of ‘hybrid’ enforcement, as discussed in 
subsection 11.2.4 below. The legal systems of several Member States provide for certain 
forms of ‘public interest litigation’, whereby legal actions are brought by entities seeking 
to protect fragmented, diffuse or collective interests. See further e.g. Jacobs & Deisen-
hofer (2003), p. 192; Wilsher (2006), p. 34; Eliantonio (2014), pp. 260-261.
237 See further Weatherill (2000), p. 87; Micklitz (2011), p. 568.
238 Note that Cf. recital 122 New Public Sector Directive 2014/24; recital 128 New Utilities 
Procurement Directive 2014/25.
239 Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35. See also Art. 11 Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive 2011/92, pursuant to which private parties are to be given access to 
review procedures for challenging the legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to 
public participation under that directive. However this latter directive does not, in prin-
ciple, confer a right to compensation in damages. See CoJ case C-420/11, Leth, para. 46-47.
240 See CoJ case C-176/03, Commission v. Council.
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a view to the latter exercising its public enforcement powers under the EU 
Treaties.241
11.2.4. Hybrid enforcement
462. The relationship between public and private enforcement has already 
been touched upon several times in the foregoing. There it has been made 
clear not only that both forms of enforcement can be complementary, but 
also that the existence of public enforcement mechanisms can influence the 
establishment of the private enforcement-related EU legislation assessed in 
this study.242 At the same time public and private enforcement are largely 
unconnected in legal-procedural terms.243 Certain ‘hybrid’ forms of enforce-
ment, which mix elements of both enforcement mechanisms, have nonethe-
less emerged in the EU legislation at hand, in Commission proposals and in 
the legal literature related thereto.244 The following three main categories 
can be distinguished in this respect.
463. The first category concerns the granting of certain quasi-public powers 
to private parties. An example is the ex parte search order procedure found in 
the IPR Enforcement Directive.245 Under this (optional) provision certain 
investigatory powers – notably to enter premises for the description or 
physical seizure of infringing goods, materials used for their production or 
documents relating thereto – can be granted to a private party, which this 
party can exercise in relation to another private party that allegedly 
infringed its intellectual property rights. It has been pointed out in the legal 
literature that this entails a remarkable measure of ‘privatisation’.246 Indeed, 
many Member States consider that this measure is more common in the con-
text of criminal proceedings than for civil ones and therefore did not make 
use of this option offered under the directive.247
Another example is Article 27(4) ACTA. It will be recalled that ACTA is 
the international treaty that aimed to step up the fight against infringements 
of intellectual property rights worldwide, which the EU signed but eventu-
241 See Commission, 30th Annual report on applying EU law (2012), COM(2013) 726, p. 6. Cf. 
Rawlings (2000), p. 278. On these infringement proceedings, see further subsection 2.4.1 
above.
242 See in particular subsection 10.2.2 above.
243 See also subsection 2.4.3 above.
244 The term ‘hybrid enforcement’ is used (only in relation to the ‘qualifi ed entity’ approach, 
discussed below) by Culpa (2012), p. 528, with reference to Basedow (2010b), p. 16. See 
also Collins (2011), p. 460; Hodges (2011), p. 440.
245 Art. 7 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 121 above. See also para. 471 
below.
246 Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin (2010), pp. 89-90 (regarding the English law equivalent of this 
procedure).
247 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 9.
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ally did not ratify.248 The said provision essentially foresees the possibility of 
a court ordering an internet service provider to disclose, to the rightholders, 
information to identify the alleged infringer that uses the provider’s servic-
es. This would arguably have entailed a further step in the abovementioned 
process of ‘horizontalisation’. For, even if the Member States are in not nec-
essarily precluded from providing for a possibility of disclosing this informa-
tion in the context of legal proceedings between private parties under 
national law,249 EU law itself currently foresees such disclosure only to pub-
lic authorities.250
464. The second category of hybrid enforcement relates to the involvement 
of (quasi-)public authorities in civil proceedings. This involvement can for 
instance take the form of the Commission being involved in proceedings 
before national courts. Proposals to this effect were made at the time of the 
adoption of the two Procurement Remedies Directives in 1989 and 1992. 
There the Commission – unsuccessfully – suggested it being granted the 
power to intervene directly by submitting amicus curiae observations in 
national legal proceedings or by suspending on-going contract award proce-
dures.251 Years later a somewhat comparable arrangement did find its way 
into the Competition Regulation however. It entitles both the Commission 
and national competition authorities to submit, either upon request or on 
their own initiative, amicus curiae observations in legal proceedings before 
national courts. The Commission may do so whenever it considers that the 
coherent application of EU competition law so requires.252
Over and above this possibility, more recently the Competition Dam-
ages Directive set a few further steps in this direction. Under this direc-
tive the Commission or national competition authorities can intervene in 
pending private enforcement proceedings by submitting observations on 
the proportionality of a disclosure request concerning evidence included in 
the authority’s file and by providing assistance on the determination of the 
quantum of damages.253 It is noticeable that neither of these two provisions 
was included in the Commission’s proposal. Interesting and comparatively 
innovative as these provisions may be, it remains for now to be seen what 
their effect will be in practice. This will largely depend on the authorities 
concerned, as in both cases they are entitled, but not obliged to do so (in the 
248 See para. 118 above.
249 See CoJ case C-275/06, Promusicae, para. 58-69. See further para. 124 above.
250 Art. 15(2) E-Commerce Directive 2000/31.
251 See para. 104 above.
252 Art. 15 Competition Regulation 1/2003. See further para. 203 above.
253 Art. 6(11) and 17(3) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 235 and 231 above 
respectively. Reference can further be made to the provisions on the effects of decisions 
by national competition authorities (and the courts reviewing these decisions) in private 
enforcement proceedings. See Art. 9 Competition Damages Directive, discussed in 
para. 243 above.
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latter case subject to a request of the court seised).254 More radical sugges-
tions made in the legal literature were not taken over in this directive, such 
as to provide for the possibility of national competition authorities (or other 
public bodies) themselves bringing actions for damages before a national 
court in the general interest, so as to obtain compensation for the harm suf-
fered by all consumers or by society as a whole.255
A somewhat distinct form of hybrid enforcement that also falls in this 
second category is litigation brought by ‘qualified entities’ under the Con-
sumer Injunctions Directive.256 This directive foresees certain private par-
ties, notably consumer associations, being allowed to initiate legal proceed-
ings with a view to bringing an infringement of EU consumer protection law 
to an end.257 Strictly speaking, these parties do not exercise public powers.258 
Yet they still can be said to act in a quasi-public – or at least not in a fully 
‘private’ – capacity. After all these qualified entities take legal action not in 
their own interest, but in the interest of all consumers collectively.259 They 
moreover do so pursuant to some form of ex ante designation or approval by 
the Member State concerned, while in some jurisdictions these associations 
are also (co-)financed by public means.260 After having initially contemplat-
ed following a similar approach with respect to collective redress for compe-
tition law infringements,261 this has since become an important element of 
the Commission’s more widely applicable Collective Redress Recommenda-
tion.262
254 Where assistance on the quantifi cation of the harm is concerned, the European Parlia-
ment had (unsuccessfully) argued for such an obligation. See European Parliament, 
Report on the proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, A7-0089/2014, p. 29 (Art. 
16).
255  E.g. Milutinovic (2010), p. 135; Tzakas (2011), p. 1150. The suggestions described here are 
to be distinguished from the situation where a public authority claims compensation for 
injury that it suffered itself as a consequence of an infringement of EU law. In this latter 
case, the authority acts in a private capacity and will thus essentially be in the same posi-
tion as any private party. Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-199/11, Otis. The actions referred to above 
would be similar to parents patriae actions now in several national jurisdictions, such as in 
France. See Komninos (2008), p. xv.
256 Art. 3 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further para. 154 above.
257 Another possibility under this directive is that certain public authorities (e.g. an ombuds-
man or a consumer protection authority) initiate the legal proceedings referred to here. In 
those cases this ‘hybrid’ approach falls in the fi rst category, discussed above.
258 Cf. CoJ 1 case C-167/00, Henkel, para. 30.
259 See also para. 461 above with respect to actions by third parties where ‘diffuse’ interests 
are at stake.
260 See e.g. Rott (2001), pp. 418 (regarding Germany) and 430 (regarding England). In Italy 
provision is made for consumer associations being (co-)fi nanced by the proceeds of fi nes 
imposed by the national competition authority. See Komninos (2008), p. 237.
261 See para. 218 and 220 above.
262 Points 4 and 6 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See further para. 190 
above.
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465. The third and last category of hybrid enforcement is essentially the 
mirror image of the previous one. Instead of introducing a quasi-public or 
public element in civil litigation, it concerns the introduction of a ‘private’ 
element in public enforcement proceedings. Most notably in its 2006 proposal 
on criminal measures for infringements of intellectual property rights, 
which did not get adopted for reasons largely unrelated to this particular 
aspect of the proposal, the Commission suggested allowing rightholders to 
form ‘joint investigation teams’ with the competent national public enforce-
ment authorities.263 The involvement of the latter prevents this from being a 
proper ‘privatisation’ of typically public prerogatives. All the same, granting 
private parties such a formal and active role in criminal investigations 
would still have been a remarkable development. Elsewhere in EU law the 
term ‘joint investigation teams’ refers only to the cooperation between vari-
ous public authorities.264 This proposal would also have implied a significant 
step beyond the already existing cooperation arrangements between the pri-
vate and public parties concerned as regards intellectual property-related 
customs matters, where private parties can (only) request the competent 
public authorities to take action.265
Other suggestions, made in the legal literature (typically relating to 
competition law infringements), seek to integrate damages claims in public 
enforcement proceedings.266 This could involve private parties intervening 
in these proceedings, whereby they would be allowed to bring actions for 
damages in their own name. This connects with the possibility under the 
national laws of some Member States that allow private parties to benefit 
from the efforts made by the competent public enforcement authorities, for 
instance in criminal proceedings.267 Alternatively it has been suggested that 
(part of) the proceeds of the fines imposed by the public authorities could be 
used to compensate the private parties that suffered harm as a consequence 
of the established infringement or that the granting of leniency would be 
made subject to compensation having been paid. Once more the 2014 Com-
petition Damages Directive sets a step in this direction, as it provides that 
competition authorities may consider any compensation payments made as 
part of consensual settlements as a mitigating factor when setting the fines 
for the infringements at issue.268 But again this step is a rather modest one, 
in that this concerns merely a (seemingly already existing) possibility and not 
263 Commission, Proposal for a directive on criminal measures for the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, COM(2006) 168, p. 11 (Art. 7). See further para. 147 above.
264 See Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA on joint investigation teams, OJ 2002, L 162/1. 
See also Art. 88(2)(b) TFEU.
265 See in particular Customs Enforcement Regulation 608/2013, discussed in para. 117 above.
266 E.g. Van Gerven (2003b), p. 77; Wolf (2003), p. 423; Canenbley & Steinvorth (2011), 
pp. 324-326; Heinemann (2011), p. 225. These suggestions sometimes draw on the possi-
bilities that exist in some national jurisdictions (e.g. in Germany) to integrate damages 
claims in criminal proceedings.
267 See e.g. Hodges (2013), p. 80.
268 Art. 18(4) Competition Damages Directive. See para. 245 above.
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an obligation on those authorities. Also this provision did not feature in this 
Commission’s proposal for this directive.
466. The above legislative provisions, proposals and academic suggestions 
have in common that they seek, in one way or another, to bridge the divide 
between public and private enforcement. They illustrate that hybrid solu-
tions of various kinds are conceivable – and have to some extent also actu-
ally been enacted in EU law – to address specific enforcement-related con-
cerns touched upon in the foregoing. On an optimistic reading, this indicates 
that (also) in procedural terms the division between these two forms of 
enforcement need not be absolute. With some creativity, optimal use can be 
made of the relative advantages that the public and private parties involved 
may offer in terms of enforcement of EU law and the rights that can be 
derived from that law. Through hybrid enforcement mechanisms of the type 
discussed above it may thus be possible to optimise the aforementioned 
‘enforcement mix’.
A less optimistic reading is also possible however. To begin with, it is 
clear that comparatively few of the hybrid enforcement arrangements out-
lined in the foregoing paragraphs are current law or even stand a reason-
able chance of becoming law. And where this is otherwise, the provisions in 
question tend to be formulated in a rather non-committal manner. Particu-
larly the measures of the first category referred to above (i.e. granting quasi-
public powers to private parties) seem to generate resistance, as the contro-
versy related to ACTA illustrates.269 Moreover some of those suggestions 
can be understood not so much as creative solutions, but rather as testimony 
to the inherent limitations of a private enforcement model. For instance, if 
in respect of actions for damages the intervention by a public enforcement 
authority is structurally required for such actions to be dealt with success-
fully by national courts, this would seem to highlight the difficulties associ-
ated with these actions as much as it highlights their potential for private 
enforcement purposes.270 Involving public enforcement authorities in pri-
vate enforcement proceedings or conversely involving private parties in 
public enforcement proceedings may anyway not be a feasible option in 
many other fields than competition law, for the simple reason that no com-
parable public enforcement mechanisms exist. It further appears that also 
an approach relying on qualified entities has its shortcomings, for instance 
in terms of incentives and capacity to act, funding, possible principal/agent 
problems and the distribution of damages awards.271 The more such short-
269 See para. 118 above. See also subsections 9.2.5 and 9.2.6 below for an assessment of this 
type of measures from a fundamental rights perspective.
270 On these diffi culties, see also subsection 7.1.1 above.
271 See para. 159 above. See e.g. also Hodges (2006), p. 1388 and 1391; Leskinen (2011), p. 90; 
European Parliament, Study on collective redress in antitrust, June 2012, p. 40; Commis-
sion, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 635, p. 6. Cf. 
CoJ case C-413/12, ACICL, para. 37.
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comings are addressed through increased public involvement with these 
entities (in terms of funding, oversight, etc.), the more the question can arise 
what the added-value is as compared to (‘traditional’) public enforcement.
In addition, seen from the perspective of the public enforcement author-
ities concerned, one of the key features of a private enforcement model is 
that it can complement public enforcement, and as such enlighten the burden 
on, and to some extent perhaps even replace, the competent public enforce-
ment authorities in a given field. Blurring both forms of enforcement may 
well be seen as being at odds with that philosophy. To give a concrete exam-
ple, there may well be better ways to contribute to the effective enforcement 
of the law than using the public enforcement authorities’ scarce resources to 
quantify the harm suffered by a private party or to otherwise be involved in 
private enforcement litigation.272 Indeed, the Commission stated in relation 
to its aforementioned possibility to make amicus curiae interventions in 
national legal proceedings that it has “no intention to serve the private interests 
of the parties involved in the case pending before the national court”.273 In other 
words, even if it had the necessary resources,274 this public authority does 
not wish to “transform into an investigator for the benefit of national litigation at 
the request of national courts”.275 Accordingly the Commission had thus far 
used this possibility rather sparingly, seemingly to the disappointment of 
certain stakeholders.276 This hesitance probably lies behind the fact that it 
was not the Commission that proposed the abovementioned provisions on 
possible interventions by competition authorities in private enforcement 
proceedings, just as it is reflected in the care that has been taken to empha-
size in those provisions that the authorities concerned cannot be obliged to 
provide assistance. Indeed, even the mere possibility of having to disclose 
evidence in their files was seen as too much of a burden on these authorities, 
which can therefore be required only as a last resort.277
It therefore appears that, while there is evidently nothing against seek-
ing to optimise the interaction between public and private enforcement also 
in procedural terms and some creativity and innovation may well be called 
for, there are principal as well as practical limits to what can be sensibly 
achieved by blurring the distinction between the two.
11.2.5. Fundamental rights (1): horizontal effects and ‘civil’ rights
 467. The ‘horizontalisation’ of the enforcement of EU law also raises issues 
with a fundamental rights dimension. As a first and general issue, there is 
the question whether the rights set out in the Charter can have horizontal 
272 Cf. Study CEPS, Erasmus University Rotterdam & LUISS (2007), pp. 200-201.
273 Commission, Cooperation notice, OJ 2004, C 101/54, para. 19.
274 Which the Commission considers it has not, as reported in Hodges (2013), p. 73.
275 Statement by Commission offi cials, reported in Komninos (2003), p. xxx.
276 Commission, Report on Competition Regulation 1/2003, COM(2009) 206, pp. 8-9.
277 Art. 6(10) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 235 above.
p. 510 D. Broader aspects, perspectives and conclusions para. 467
direct effect, i.e. be invoked directly in legal relationships between private 
parties. On this issue the case law is still evolving.278 Some caution is there-
fore required. That said, the Charter is expressly addressed only to the insti-
tutions and other bodies of the EU, as well as to the Member States when 
they are implementing EU law.279 It is moreover stipulated that the Charter 
does not extend the field of application of EU law, nor establish new powers 
or tasks for the EU.280 Many commentators take the view that to consider 
that the provisions of the Charter are directly effective in horizontal relation-
ships would in effect bypass these important delimitations and that there-
fore such effect should be considered excluded.281
Yet the foregoing does not mean, in any case, that the Charter is not of 
relevance in the horizontal legal relationships under consideration here. For 
one thing, where there is some form of involvement by public or quasi-pub-
lic bodies, this can still be reason to apply the Charter directly to the case at 
hand. There may thus be some margin of interpretation when determining 
what constitutes precisely a ‘horizontal’ relationship.282 For another thing, 
and more importantly for the present purposes, it is clear that the funda-
mental rights set out in the Charter can have indirect effects in such relation-
ships.283 In this regard the Court of Justice has held that “the Member States 
must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with [EU] law, 
but also make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of an instrument of second-
ary legislation which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by 
the [EU] legal order or with the other general principles of [EU] law”.284 It has 
further ruled that “under a general principle of interpretation, a [EU] measure 
must be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity and 
in conformity with primary law as a whole and, in particular, with the provisions of 
the Charter”.285 Thus, as a particular form of the general EU law principle of 
278 See e.g. CoJ case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, para. 40-48.
279 Art. 51(1) Charter. On the meaning of this term ‘implementing’ EU law, see para. 43 
above.
280 Art. 51(2) Charter.
281 See e.g. Opinion AG Trstenjak case C-282/10, Dominguez, para. 80-83, and the references 
made there. See also Craig (2010), pp. 206-207; Leczykiewicz (2010b), p. 332; Ladenburger 
(2012), p. 35. Inclined to the same view, but somewhat more hesitant are Rosas & Arman-
ti (2010), pp. 160-162. As regards the formal addressees of provisions of EU law, see how-
ever also CoJ case 43/75, Defrenne, para. 31, discussed in para. 451 above. Furthermore an 
open question remains to what extent the fundamental rights, in their capacity as general 
principles of EU law (see para. 42 above), could in some cases be applied in horizontal 
situations. On the horizontal direct effect of those principles, see para. 450 above. On 
these issues, also Nauta (2012), p. 19; Leczykiewicz (2013), p. 479.
282 For a range of such conceivable situations, see Rosas & Armanti (2010), pp. 160-162; Lad-
enburger (2012), pp. 35-37. See also Craig (2010), pp. 207-208.
283 Cf. Craig (2010), pp. 209-210; Ladenburger (2012), p. 16.
284  CoJ joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., para. 77-78. See e.g. also CoJ case 
C-275/06, Promusicae, para. 68; CoJ case C-277/11, M.M., para. 93; CoJ joined cases 
C-356/11 and C-357/11, Maahanmuuttovirasto, para. 78.
285 CoJ case C-579/12 RX-II, Strack, para. 40. See e.g. also CoJ case C-400/10 PPU, McB., 
para. 52 and 60; CoJ case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron, para. 30.
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consistent interpretation,286 where relevant, provisions of both secondary 
EU law and national law implementing that law may need to be interpreted 
in a ‘Charter-consistent’ manner. Accordingly the case law of the Court of 
Justice offers several examples of instances where such provisions were 
interpreted in light of the principle of effective judicial protection, set out in 
Article 47 Charter.287 Considering the importance of this principle in the 
present context, there may well be considerable scope to interpret the EU 
legislation at issue here in light of especially (but certainly not exclusively) 
this Charter provision.288 It would appear however that also in this case the 
principle of consistent interpretation is limited, in that it cannot lead to an 
interpretation contra legem.289
468. In litigation between two private parties involving matters of EU law 
the Charter can also be of importance in other, more specific manners. Seen 
from the perspective of the State, the primary objective of the relevant (typi-
cally civil law) proceedings is to settle the dispute at hand in a fair manner, 
whereby the State and particularly the national courts normally remain neu-
tral and passive.290 Accordingly in terms of fundamental rights the focus is 
on ensuring that everyone can have a fair and public hearing within a rea-
sonable time by an independent and impartial court, as is guaranteed under 
Article 47 Charter.291 This involves among other things respect for the prin-
ciple of equality of arms, which requires a fair balance between the parties, 
and the right to adversarial proceedings, which requires that all parties have 
knowledge of and can comment on all evidence adduced and observations 
filed.292 This in turn brings us back to a point made earlier, namely that the 
EU legislation at issue tends to focus rather unilaterally on improving the 
position of the applicant, while little attention appears generally to be paid 
to that of the defendant.293
This can be illustrated with reference to the IPR Enforcement Directive’s 
regime on the disclosure of certain information held by third parties.294 
Judging by its wording, it appears that only applicants – and not also defen-
dants – are able to rely on the provision in question. If that reading is correct, 
286 See para. 5 above.
287 E.g. CoJ case C-459/99, MRAX, para. 101-102; CoJ case C-50/00 P, UPA, para. 42; CoJ case 
C-506/04, Wilson, para. 45; CoJ case C-268/06, Impact, para. 54; CoJ case C-240/09, Lesoo-
chranárske zoskupenie, para. 51; CoJ case C-300/11, ZZ, para. 50-51.
288 See e.g. para. 343 above on the interpretation of some of the provisions on legal standing 
laid down in this legislation.
289 See e.g. CoJ case C-583/11 P, Inuit, para. 97.
290 Cf. e.g. Cadiet (2005), pp. 57-58. On the passive role of courts in civil proceedings and the 
own motion application of EU law, see also subsection 9.2.4 above.
291 On Art. 47 Charter generally, see para. 43 above. As was noted there, different from Art. 
6(1) ECHR, Art. 47 Charter applies to proceedings that are civil as well as administrative 
in nature.
292 See para. 47 above. Cf. Hodges (2006), pp. 1400-1401.
293 See para. 456 above.
294 Art. 8 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 122 and 456 above.
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it would contrast markedly with the Competition Damages Directive’s dis-
closure regime, which is expressly also available to defendants.295 As the 
Commission noted in this latter context, in private enforcement proceedings 
the defendant may also need to have access to evidence in so far as the bur-
den of proof falls on him.296 The Competition Damages Directive explains 
the choice to make the disclosure measures available also to defendants in 
terms of equality of arms.297 Furthermore the possibility under the IPR 
Enforcement Directive to order measures to preserve evidence may not only 
lead to questions from the perspective of equality of arms, but also from that 
of the right to adversarial proceedings.298 For not only does this possibility 
appear to be available to the applicant only, these measures can also be 
ordered without the defendant having been heard. Again this stands in clear 
contrast with the more recent Competition Damages Directive, which 
expressly requires the party concerned to be heard before it can be ordered 
to disclose evidence under this directive.299 It has further already been seen 
that these measures can also affect third parties, which can lead to additional 
fundamental rights-related questions, for instance as regards the protection 
of privacy and personal data, the freedom of expression and information, as 
well as the freedom to conduct a business.300
469. Does this mean that the aforementioned fundamental rights are, or 
will be, infringed in the cases referred to above, particularly where the said 
provisions of the IPR Enforcement Directive are concerned? It is submitted 
that, generally speaking, this is probably not the case. It has already been 
noted earlier that the fundamental rights of the type at issue here are not 
unfettered prerogatives.301 The Court of Justice has repeatedly held that they 
may need to be balanced against the other fundamental rights that can be at 
issue in particular case.302 The Charter expressly allows the restriction of the 
exercise of these rights in the general interest and to protect the rights of 
other parties.303 In this connection it must be acknowledged that the EU 
legislation under consideration, including the IPR Enforcement Directive, 
provides for several limitations and safeguards. This latter directive stipu-
lates for example that any measure granted must be fair, equitable and pro-
295 Art. 5 Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 234 above.
296 Cf. Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 13.
297 Recital 14 Competition Damages Directive.
298 Art. 7 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 121 above.
299 Art. 5(7) Competition Damages Directive. See further para. 256 above.
300 Art. 7, 8, 11, and 16 Charter respectively. See in particular para. 124 and 131 above.
301 E.g. CoJ case C-418/11, Texdata, para. 84. See further para. 391 above.
302 E.g. CoJ case C-275/06, Promusicae, para. 68. See further para. 124 above. See e.g. also CoJ 
case C-461/10, Bonnier, para. 56-60; CoJ case C-283/11, Sky Österreich, para. 59-60. In 
addition to the abovementioned fundamental rights, in specifi c cases other fundamental 
rights can also be of relevance, such as those relating to the protection of intellectual 
property (Art. 17(2) Charter) and consumer protection (Art. 38 Charter).
303 Art. 52(1) Charter. See also para. 391 above.
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portionate.304 It also contains more specific requirements concerning the 
conditions applicable to the disclosure of evidence and other relevant 
information,305 as well as the specific substantive and procedural safeguards 
attached to the abovementioned possibility of granting preservation mea-
sures without hearing the opposing party.306 Added to the fact that, first, 
these provisions of EU law are to be interpreted in a ‘Charter-consistent’ 
manner where necessary, second, further safeguards may apply as a matter 
of national law and, third, the fairness of the proceedings as a whole is what 
matters in this regard, there appears to be generally little reason to believe 
that the aforementioned EU legislative measures as such necessarily involve 
the infringement of the said fundamental rights. Although some scope for 
debate remains, there appear to be good grounds for coming to a similar 
conclusion with respect to the absolute bar to the disclosure (and use) of 
certain pieces of evidence that the Competition Damages Directive estab-
lishes.307
Yet it is evident that in this respect a certain tension can nonetheless exist. 
Ensuring the fundamental right to a fair trial generally and to equality of 
arms and adversarial proceedings specifically may well need to be a point of 
special attention in relation to the type of private enforcement-facilitating 
measures referred to above. That applies to the EU legislature at the stage of 
the adoption of such measures, as well as to the national legislatures when 
transposing them into national law and the national courts when they are 
being called upon to apply and interpret these measures in individual cas-
es.308 Particularly if the remedial and procedural rights of private party-
applicants in horizontal legal contexts were to be further reinforced, there 
might well be a point where the above assessment leads to a different con-
clusion. In other words, the balance to be struck can be a delicate one and a 
degree of caution on this point is therefore called for.
11.2.6. Fundamental rights (2): ‘criminal’ rights
470. Fundamental rights can also come into play in another manner in the 
present context. Put crudely, fundamental rights are rights of defence 
enjoyed by private parties in respect of public authorities.309 These rights are 
of particular relevance in the context of criminal proceedings. In those cases 
the private parties concerned may benefit for instance from the presumption 
of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur), the 
principle of legality and the principle that one cannot be punished twice for 
304 Art. 3(1) and (2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 144 above. See also 
subsection 9.2.5 above.
305 Art. 7 and 8 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See in particular para. 316 above.
306 Art. 7(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 121 above.
307 Art. 6(6) and 7(1) Competition Damages Directive. See further 236 above.
308 Cf. e.g. CoJ case 125/79, Denilauler, para. 13 and 15; CoJ case C-450/06, Varec, para. 44-55.
309 Opinion AG Trstenjak case C-101/08, Audiolux, para. 77.
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the same offence (ne bis in idem).310 These rights function, as it were, as a 
counterbalance to the powers vested in the competent public enforcement 
authorities to detect, punish and deter infringements in the general inter-
est.311 Whether or not proceedings are criminal in nature is for the present 
purposes to be determined on the substance. Decisive are the three so-called 
‘Engel-criteria’, namely: (i) the classification of the measure under national 
law; (ii) the nature of the offence; and (iii) the nature and severity of the pos-
sible penalty.312
The foregoing implies that the abovementioned fundamental rights can 
inter alia be invoked in proceedings for the imposition of fines under compe-
tition law also where those proceedings are nominally a matter of adminis-
trative law, as is typically the case in the EU.313 In contrast these rights do not 
apply in legal relationships between private parties in proceedings that are 
truly civil in nature, which is also determined on the  substance.314 That 
means that these rights may generally be of no importance in the context of 
‘horizontalised’ enforcement, i.e. in disputes between two private parties. 
But this distinction between typical criminal (i.e. vertical) and typical civil 
(i.e. horizontal) cases sometimes becomes blurred as a consequence of the 
legislative measures discussed in this study. That means in turn that it is not 
excluded that the abovementioned ‘criminal’ fundamental rights might also 
come into play in the present context of ‘horizontalised’ enforcement. This 
can be illustrated through the following three examples.
471. First, consider once again the ex parte search order procedure, set out in 
the IPR Enforcement Directive.315 This (optional) provision creates the pos-
sibility of a private party whose intellectual property rights have allegedly 
310 Art. 48-50 Charter. More specifi cally, under the Charter the ‘triggers’ for the application 
of the above rights are the existence of a ‘charge’ (Art. 48), ‘criminal offences and penal-
ties’ (Art. 49) and ‘criminal proceedings’ (Art. 50). Under Art. 6(2) and (3) ECHR the exis-
tence of a ‘criminal charge’ is the (corresponding) central element. Other examples are 
full jurisdiction of the competent courts, the proportionality of sanctions and retro-appli-
cation of the more lenient penalty. See e.g. CoJ case C-386/10 P, Chalkor, para. 53-67; CoJ 
case C-17/10, Toshiba, para. 64. See further Zippro (2009b), pp. 450-459.
311 Concerning the Commission’s powers in relation to infringements of EU competition 
law, see e.g. CoJ joined cases 100/80 to 103/80, Musique Diffusion Française, para. 105-106; 
GC case T-13/03, Nintendo, para. 73; CoJ case C-429/07, Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst v. 
X, para. 36-37.
312 See e.g. ECtHR case 5100/71, Engel v. Netherlands, para. 82; ECtHR case 73053/01, Jussila 
v. Finland, para. 30-31. These criteria have since been applied by the EU courts. See e.g. 
CoJ case C-489/10, Bonda, para. 37; CoJ case C-617/10, Åklagaren, para. 35.
313 E.g. CoJ case C-301/04 P, SGL Carbon, para. 42; CoJ case C-352/09 P, ThyssenKrupp, 
para. 80; CoJ case C-17/10, Toshiba, para. 94. On the public enforcement of EU competi-
tion law, see further subsection 6.4.2 above.
314 E.g. ECtHR case 6232/73, Köning v. Germany, para. 88-90; ECtHR case 21522/93, Georgia-
dis v. Greece, para. 34. On the non-applicability, as a general rule, of the privilege against 
self-incrimination in civil proceedings concerning EU competition law, see also CoJ case 
C-60/92, Otto v. Postbank, para. 11-17.
315 Art. 7 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/28. See further para. 121 and 463 above.
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been infringed entering certain premises for the description or physical sei-
zure of infringing goods, materials used for their production or documents 
relating thereto. With respect to the similar procedure foreseen under Eng-
lish law, on which this directive’s regime was inspired, the national courts 
initially took the view that the privilege against self-incrimination could be 
invoked. This view was only reversed after it had been ensured that any 
statement obtained from the defendant in this manner cannot be used in 
criminal proceedings.316 Furthermore it is true that, as part of this proce-
dure, a court must first decide whether or not to grant this order. This thus 
ensures a degree of objective control and constitutes an important safe-
guard. Nonetheless, as has been pointed out in the legal literature, the fact 
remains that, where the execution of this order is concerned, it allows a par-
ticular private party that can arguably least be expected to preserve a mea-
sure of objectivity and sense of proportion acting in a manner that may 
amount to a direct infraction of personal liberties of the private party that is 
subject to the search.317
This is by no means merely an academic discussion. In 1989 the Court of 
Human Rights highlighted certain concerns with respect to the said proce-
dure, as provided for under English law.318 In the case at hand no breach of 
the right to a private and family life was found,319 it being noted that the 
order in question was a necessary step in the effective pursuit by private 
parties of their intellectual property rights and that the scope of that order 
was limited so as to keep its impact within reasonable bounds.320 Yet the 
Court of Human Rights also held that such an order is “capable of producing 
damaging and irreversible damage” for the private party-defendant and that it 
is “essential that this measure should be accompanied by adequate and effective 
safeguards against arbitrary interference and abuse”.321 Along similar lines many 
Member States associate this ex parte search order more with criminal pro-
ceedings than with civil ones and therefore chose not to transpose it to 
national law.322 Comparable concerns come to light in the more recent Pat-
ent Court Agreement, which contains a procedure that is largely similar to 
the one of the IPR Enforcement Directive.323 There is however an important 
316 Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin (2010), pp. 92-93.
317 Ibid., pp. 89-90 (regarding the English law equivalent of this procedure).
318 On the ECtHR, see also para. 42 above.
319 Art. 8 ECHR. Cf. Art. 7 Charter.
320 ECtHR case 10461/83, Chappell v. UK, para. 59-60. These limitations related to the dura-
tion of order, the times at which and the number of persons by whom the applicant’s 
search could be effected, and the purposes for which any materials seised could be used. 
Reference is further made to the undertakings given by the applicants or their solicitors 
and the remedies available to the defendant. See also para. 61 of this judgment on the role 
of the solicitor under English law as an offi cer to the court.
321 Ibid., para. 57.
322 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 9.
323 On this agreement and its relationship to IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, see further 
para. 108 above.
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difference. Pursuant to this agreement the order to inspect certain premises 
can only be executed by a person appointed by the court, whereas the appli-
cant is in fact expressly barred from being present during the search.324
All this shows that, while a procedure of this kind is not per se problem-
atic from a fundamental rights perspective, it can certainly lead to some con-
cerns in this respect, sometimes requiring certain particular safeguards to 
address them.
472. Second, comparable questions can emerge in connection to the afore-
mentioned measures on the disclosure of evidence.325 In a competition law 
context the Commission has held that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of unfavourable evidence 
in private enforcement proceedings.326 Advocate General Jääskinen simi-
larly held in his opinion in Donau Chemie that this privilege “does not apply in 
private law contexts”.327 While as a general rule these statements are undoubt-
edly correct, in light of the foregoing they may nonetheless require a degree 
of nuance.328 This is again illustrated by the more cautious line in this 
respect that was taken by the drafters of the Patent Court Agreement. This 
agreement provides expressly that a court order to disclose evidence may 
not result in an obligation of self-incrimination.329 A similar concern is 
echoed in the IPR Enforcement Directive’s provision on the ‘right of infor-
mation’, pursuant to which infringers and third parties can be required to 
disclose certain information. There it is said that this right is without preju-
dice to other statutory provisions that “afford an opportunity for refusing to 
provide information which would force the person [concerned] to admit to his/her 
own participation or that of his/her close relatives in an infringement”.330
473. A third and final example concerns the possibility of awarding puni-
tive damages, which EU law does not foresee at present, but which has 
repeatedly been debated.331 By definition punitive damages seek to penal-
ise. Pursuant to the aforementioned ‘Engel-criteria’ the existence of a puni-
tive element is an important aspect in determining whether, in substance, 
the proceedings are criminal in nature and hence whether the aforemen-
tioned fundamental rights can be relied upon.332 Accordingly it is at least 
324 Cf. e.g. Art. 60(3) and (4) Patent Court Agreement. The applicant can only be represented 
by an independent legal practitioner.
325 See subsection 8.2.2 above.
326 Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, p. 37.
327 Opinion AG Jääskinen case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, para. 56.
328 Note that, unlike its AG, the CoJ left this issue untouched in its ruling in Donau Chemie. 
See CoJ case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, discussed in para. 222 above.
329 Art. 59(1) Patent Court Agreement. On this agreement, see further para. 108 above.
330 Art. 8(3)(d) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further para. 122 above.
331 See in particular subsection 7.1.5 above. On punitive damages, see also para. 443 above.
332 See para. 470 above.
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conceivable that in civil proceedings involving punitive damages the defen-
dant must be deemed to be entitled to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination or the principle of ne bis in idem.333 Opinions differ especially 
on the possible application of this latter principle in such cases.334 Also this 
is by no means merely an academic discussion. Whether or not this principle 
of ne bis in idem applies can be of considerable practical importance, given 
the possible concurrent imposition of fines and award of punitive damages 
for the same anti-competitive behaviour.335 As was the case with ex parte 
search orders mentioned earlier this question has already been subject to 
debates and litigation especially in England,336 whereas for now it largely 
remains an open question how the Court of Justice would address it.337
474. In light of the foregoing the conclusion here is not unlike the one 
drawn in the previous subsection on ‘civil’ fundamental rights. That is to 
say, there seems no reason to believe that the EU legislative measures dis-
cussed here are such that the fundamental rights at issue have been or will 
be infringed. With the possible exception of punitive damages, for which EU 
law however makes at present no provision, these measures are unlikely to 
insert a ‘criminal’ element in ‘horizontalised’ enforcement proceedings to 
such an extent that, as a counterbalance, fundamental rights such as the pre-
sumption of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination and the ne 
bis in idem principle ought to be available to a defendant. Yet it would seem 
that this nonetheless remains an important point of attention when discuss-
ing EU legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law. Generally 
speaking, the more a ‘dual vigilance’ logic translates into particular powers 
or prerogatives being granted to a private party-applicant, the less ‘civil’ 
in substance the proceedings are and the more likely it becomes that these 
‘criminal’ fundamental rights can be relied upon. Put differently, one cannot 
equip a private party with the powers to act as a ‘private policeman’ or ‘pri-
vate attorney general’ without equipping the party that may be subject to 
333 Cf. Zippro (2009b), p. 450. Specifi cally in relation to penalties and the privilege against 
self-incrimination, see CoJ case C-60/92, Otto v. Postbank, para. 16.
334 Cf. e.g. Milutinovic (2010), p. 131 (who argues that punitive damages do not breach the 
said principle); Wils (2009), p. 22 (who argues essentially the contrary).
335 Note that, even where it can be assumed that this principle applies, its application may 
not always be straightforward. In particular, only in retrospect can it be said with cer-
tainty that both types of punishment were imposed in a concrete case. At the time of a 
punitive damages award, public enforcement proceedings may still be pending or not 
even been initiated, or vice versa. Cf. Zippro (2009b), pp. 457-458.
336 For a discussion, see e.g. Frese (2011), pp. 425-426.
337 It may however be possible to derive some indications from GC case T-59/02, Archer 
Daniels Midlands, para. 349-351 (where it was held that there is no need to take account of 
punitive damages paid in non-Member State jurisdiction when setting fi nes in competi-
tion cases) and CoJ case C-301/04 P, SGL Carbon, para. 32-34 (where it was found that the 
ne bis in idem principle is not applicable in relation to competition fi nes imposed by a non-
Member State).
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the exercise of these powers with the fundamental right safeguards that 
would have been available to the latter had he been prosecuted by a ‘real’ 
policeman or attorney general.
11.2.7. Summary
475. Over the past decades it has become clear that substantive EU law can 
play an important role in legal relationships between private parties. This 
‘horizontalisation’ of EU law also extends to the enforcement of that law. 
Much of the EU legislation at issue in this study reflects and reinforces this 
development. In practical terms this generally means that it becomes easier 
for private party-applicants to enforce their rights vested in EU law vis-à-vis 
other private parties. Limited attention tends to be paid however to the pri-
vate parties that are defendants in these private enforcement proceedings. 
This development also contributes to the effective enforcement of EU law 
per se, particularly by drawing private resources into the ‘enforcement mix’, 
thus complementing public enforcement. Yet the private parties concerned 
mostly take legal action only if and to the extent that they consider this to be 
in their own individual interest. Private enforcement is moreover not cost-
free. It might involve less expenditure on public enforcement, but it entails 
costs directly related to the resulting litigation (expenditure on courts, legal 
costs for the parties) as well as possibly also costs associated with ‘over-
facilitation’ (over-deterrence, chilling effects, nuisance cases). At the same 
time, while regularly raised in this connection, the risk of creating a ‘litiga-
tion culture’ seems generally limited.
Three main forms of hybrid enforcement, whereby elements of public 
and private enforcement are combined in the same legal proceedings, are 
conceivable, namely: (i) granting certain typically ‘public’ powers to pri-
vate parties (e.g. to obtain evidence); (ii) involving public or quasi-public 
authorities in civil proceedings (e.g. to advise the court or to bring actions 
in the general interest); and (iii) introducing a ‘private’ element in public 
proceedings (e.g. so as to rule on damages claims). These measures, which 
have so far only to a limited extent been enacted in EU law, generally seek to 
optimise the abovementioned ‘enforcement mix’. While this can be helpful, 
all in all, there nonetheless seems a lot to be said for keeping both forms of 
enforcement mostly separate in procedural terms. That applies all the more 
so if account is taken of the fundamental rights issues that can arise in a 
‘horizontalised’ enforcement context. For the more the distinction between 
public and private enforcement is blurred, particularly by granting private 
parties additional powers so as to reinforce the dual vigilance logic underly-
ing the EU legislation at issue, the bigger the risk that typical ‘civil’ rights, 
such as the equality of arms, will be infringed and the greater the probability 
that typical ‘criminal’ rights, such as the privilege against self-incrimination 
and the ne bis in idem principle, will need to be made available to the oppos-
ing private party.
This final chapter summarises this study’s main findings, brings together 
the most important general lines running through the foregoing and draws 
conclusions. It concentrates on the two aspects of the main research question 
identified in chapter 1, namely what EU legislation facilitating the private 
enforcement of EU law entails, particularly in terms of remedies and proce-
dural provisions and how it should be understood more generally, notably 
as regards its typical characteristics, its underlying objectives as well as the 
advantages and drawbacks of and the limits to the choices made by the EU 
legislature in this connection. To that end, this chapter consists of three 
parts. In the first section below a number of general remarks are made with 
respect to the EU’s legislative activities relating to private enforcement. The 
second section then focuses on the remedies and procedural provisions pro-
vided for private enforcement purposes as a matter of EU law. The last sec-
tion outlines the main findings with respect to the nature, limits and effects 
of private enforcement generally and EU legislative action in this regard in 
particular. It also includes a discussion of what an EU policy on this subject-
matter could look like.
12.1. Private enforcement between interference and autonomy
A central theme in this section is the tension that can exist between, put sim-
ply, EU ‘interference’ and the Member States’ ‘autonomy’ in relation to the 
(possible) adoption of EU legislation facilitating the private enforcement of 
EU law. This is of course a common theme in almost all instances where 
secondary EU law is being established. However it is arguably of particular 
importance in the present context, especially given that the remedial and 
procedural issues under consideration have traditionally largely been left to 
be regulated by the Member States. In the first subsection below the relative 
value of the said ‘autonomy’ as well as the possibility for the EU to act on 
these matters are highlighted. The second subsection then explains, con-
versely, that there are nonetheless limits to the EU’s scope to act, while the 
Member States tend to retain considerable ‘residual’ autonomy in private 
enforcement-related matters. The further consequences of this tension are 
also discussed.
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12.1.1. The scope for enacting EU legislation on private enforcement
476. In the foregoing chapters it has been seen how, over the past decades, 
the EU legislature has enacted a range of legislative measures that facilitate the 
private enforcement of EU law, i.e. the bringing of legal actions by private 
parties before the courts of the Member States with a view to enforcing their 
rights derived from the rules of substantive EU law at issue. These mea-
sures can touch upon issues of civil as well as administrative law, substance 
as well as procedure, and remedies as well as procedures. This study has 
concentrated on seven acts of secondary EU law that provide, to varying 
degrees and in different manners, for measures of this kind, i.e.: the two 
Procurement Remedies Directives, dating from 1989 and 1992 and revised 
in 2007;1 the 2004 IPR Enforcement Directive;2 the Consumer Injunctions 
Directive, which was adopted in 1998 and codified in 2009;3 the 1993 Unfair 
Terms Directive;4 the Product Liability Directive, which dates from 1985;5 
and the Competition Damages Directive that was agreed (and is expected to 
be adopted) in 2014.6 Several other private enforcement-related provisions 
and developments have also been assessed, most notably the provision of 
primary EU law on anti-competitive agreements being automatically void7 
and the Commission’s 2013 Collective Redress Recommendation.8
477. It is evident that EU legislative measures of this kind affect national 
rules on remedies and procedures applicable in private enforcement pro-
ceedings. As the Court of Justice has consistently held ever since its 1976 
judgment in Rewe, pursuant to the principle of national procedural autonomy 
it is as a general rule for the Member States to set these rules.9 They have 
considerable discretion in this regard, although they remain bound to 
respect EU law, in particular the principles of equivalence and effective-
ness.10 The very existence of the abovementioned EU legislation already 
indicates however that this principle should not be misunderstood as consti-
tuting an absolute bar for the EU to act on these matters. As the Court 
already held in Rewe, this principle only applies in the absence of EU rules. 
As it later clarified, rules on remedies and procedures applicable in private 
enforcement proceedings are not “within some sort of domain reserved for the 
1 Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13, discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 
above.
2 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 above.
3 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, discussed in section 5.2 above.
4 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13, discussed in section 5.3 above.
5 Product Liability Directive 85/374, discussed in section 5.4 above.
6 Competition Damages Directive, discussed in section 6.3 above.
7 Art. 101(2) TFEU, discussed in subsection 6.1.3 above.
8 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396, discussed in subsection 5.5.1 above.
9 CoJ case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5. See further section 2.1 above.
10 On these two principles, see further section 2.2 above.
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Member States”.11 Quite to the contrary, it was held that the EU is “certainly 
competent to harmonise national rules on those matters” in so far as the EU Trea-
ties provide for a sufficient legal basis.12 It follows that in fact the key ques-
tion is not one of autonomy of the Member States. This is approaching the 
matter from the wrong angle. As is generally the case where possible acts of 
secondary EU law are concerned, the key issue is rather whether or not the 
EU is competent to act. Where the EU legislature has not (yet) acted, it is for 
the Member States to take all necessary measures to enable the private par-
ties concerned to effectively exercise their rights based on EU law.13
In the present context the significance of the principle of national proce-
dural autonomy is therefore threefold. First, it highlights the importance of 
the question whether and if so, to which extent the EU is competent to act on 
private enforcement-related matters. Second, where EU legislation of the 
type at issue in this study has been adopted, this principle can continue to 
be of relevance for issues falling outside the scope of that legislation. In those 
cases there is after all still an absence of EU rules. Third, it can also serve a 
function that is not strictly legal. In particular, this principle can function as 
a means to signal political unease or opposition, rather than a proper legal con-
cern, in relation to an intended private enforcement-related EU legislative 
initiative. As such it serves as a reminder that it is one thing for the EU to be 
competent to act on certain private enforcement-related matters, but that it 
can be quite another thing to determine whether it is also seen as appropri-
ate or desirable for the EU to actually exercise those competences. Indeed, as 
is further discussed below, EU legislative involvement with the matters at 
issue here can be a sensitive affair.
478. Legally speaking, the key question is therefore, first and foremost, 
that of the EU’s competence to adopt secondary law facilitating the private 
enforcement of EU law. In this respect it is to be noted that Article 114 TFEU 
on harmonisation for the establishment and the functioning of the EU’s 
internal market constitutes the legal basis for virtually all abovementioned 
EU legal acts.14 There has been comparatively little debate on this point at 
the time of adoption of these acts. Neither have there to date been any legal 
challenges. Although this might certainly be taken as an indication to that 
effect, in and by itself, this does not allow for the conclusion that the EU is 
competent to enact legislation of this type on the basis of this article. An 
express ruling by the Court of Justice would be required for drawing any 
definitive conclusions. Moreover, where possible future EU legislative mea-
sures of this type are concerned, it will always need to be assessed whether 
the legal basis that this article offers suffices in light of the aim and the con-
tent of the particular measure in question. In specific cases there may fur-
11 CoJ Opinion 1/94, WTO, para. 104.
12 Ibid.
13 Cf. Art. 4(3) and 19(1) TEU.
14 See subsection 10.1.1 above.
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thermore also be other, more specific legal bases available. Article 103 TFEU 
is one example thereof in as far as EU legislative measure that give effect to 
substantive EU competition law are concerned. Indeed, this article would 
seem the most logical legal basis for secondary EU law on the private 
enforcement of EU competition law, even if, perhaps somewhat less self-
evidently, the Competition Damages Directive has been adopted on a dual 
legal basis, i.e. Articles 103 as well as 114 TFEU.15 Consequently, the above 
qualifications notwithstanding, it appears that Article 114 TFEU is not only 
a commonly used legal basis for EU legislation facilitating the private 
enforcement of EU law, but also that, to the extent that this can be said in the 
abstract, there also seems little reason to doubt that it can legitimately be 
used for those purposes.
12.1.2. The limits to the EU’s scope to act and its consequences
479. The foregoing evidently does not mean that there are no limits to the 
EU’s scope to act in relation to private enforcement. In particular, Article 114 
TFEU does not empower the EU to generally regulate the internal market. 
This implies that the EU can act on this basis only if and to the extent that 
that is demonstrably required for internal market purposes, in accordance 
with the conditions set out in this article. Generally speaking, these condi-
tions can be expected to be met where the EU legislative measures in ques-
tion are necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of certain internal 
market-related rules of substantive EU law. Indeed, that is precisely what 
the abovementioned EU legislation essentially seeks to achieve; each of 
those directives is primarily concerned with harmonising the provisions of 
national law so as to facilitate the enforcement of the rights that private par-
ties derive from the rules of substantive EU law in question, i.e. on public 
procurement, intellectual property, consumer protection and competition 
law, which are all closely connected to the EU’s internal market, with a view 
to improving overall levels of compliance and enforcement of those rules.16
Yet these limits inherent in Article 114 TFEU complicate, and may in 
practice even preclude, the possibility of adopting EU legislation that is of 
broader application, i.e. covering the enforcement of all substantive rules of 
EU law or even all legal proceedings before the national courts generally. 
That applies all the more so when account is taken of the additional con-
straints on the EU’s legislative activities resulting from the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality.17 It would seem that, as the law stands, neither 
does any other Treaty provision constitute a sufficient legal basis for the 
adoption of EU legislation of the type referred to above that can apply across 
the board. Article 81 TFEU on judicial cooperation in civil matters undeni-
ably appears to have some potential to serve as such, as it empowers the EU 
15 See subsection 6.3.1 above.
16 See subsections 10.1.1 and 11.1.2 above.
17 Art. 5(3) and (4) TEU. See further subsection 10.1.2 above.
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to take measures to ensure ‘effective access to justice’ and to eliminate 
‘obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings’.18 Yet this provision 
has certain important limits of its own. Most notably, not only does it also 
require a link with the internal market (although arguably a looser one than 
under Article 114 TFEU), any EU action on this basis is also to remain limit-
ed to “civil matters having cross-border implications”.
For the foreseeable future the issues under consideration in this study 
are therefore likely to continue to be regulated on a sector-specific basis. On 
the one hand this should not prevent, it is submitted, the Commission and 
the EU legislature from improving the internal coherence and consistency of 
the legislation that they propose and adopt to this effect respectively. This 
study has shown that more can, and indeed should, be expected in this 
regard.19 On the other hand this implies that a degree of fragmentation of 
the legal systems of the Member States may prove unavoidable.20 For where 
the EU legislative interference relates only to certain situations but not to 
others (e.g. addressing infringements of the EU rules on public procure-
ment, but not those of ‘purely’ national rules in this domain or of substan-
tive rules in other fields), the effects in the domestic legal sphere are neces-
sarily uneven. At the same time that does not mean that this possible 
‘fragmenting’ effect should not be given serious consideration when adopt-
ing EU legislation of the type at issue in this study. That is the case not only 
because many of the affected national rules tend to fulfil a useful and legiti-
mate function, but also because those rules tend to apply across the board, 
i.e. regardless of the sector or the origin of the rights concerned. Careful 
consideration and a degree of constraint on the side of the EU legislature 
would therefore seem to be in place.
480. The EU legislature may thus have considerable scope to adopt legisla-
tion of the type under consideration and it may already have exercised these 
competences on several occasions, but this should not distract from the fact 
that many remedial and national rules applicable in private enforcement 
proceedings are still determined by ‘purely’ national law (i.e. national law 
other than that transposing a directive). This is a point that risks being over-
looked in a study such as this one, which concentrates on EU legislative 
action in this domain. In other words, the seven abovementioned legal acts 
may imply increased EU involvement with private enforcement proceed-
ings, a point that is further underlined by the fact that comparable acts 
apply in certain other fields of EU law.21 However, for the time being as well 
as for the foreseeable future, this development remains not only gradual and 
18 See subsection 10.4.3 above.
19 See subsection 10.4.1 above.
20 See subsections 10.4.2 and 10.4.3 above.
21 E.g. Gender Equality Directive 2006/54.
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far from linear,22 but in many respects also incomplete. This results in particu-
lar from the following four considerations.
In the first place, many other sectors governed by substantive EU law 
than the ones assessed in this study remain mostly or entirely unaffected by 
EU legislation of the type at issue here. In the second place, even if this leg-
islation touches upon a considerable number of important remedial and 
procedural matters, it certainly does not regulate all matters that can be of 
relevance in private enforcement proceedings. There are many other impor-
tant issues that often remain unaddressed, such as the applicable rules of 
evidence, including on the burden of proof, and the standard of judicial 
review to be exercised by the national courts.23 In third place, the EU 
involvement also tends to be uneven in the sense that, taken together, said 
acts may address many private enforcement-related issues, but not all acts 
touch upon all matters discussed here. In fact, far from it. Just to give one 
example, while only the IPR Enforcement Directive deals with the allocation 
of legal costs between the parties,24 this is also one of the few acts under 
consideration that does not contain rules on limitation periods.25 Finally, the 
level of detail provided for in the provisions of this EU legislation is often 
rather limited. With respect to damages claims the Procurement Remedies 
Directives stipulate for instance little more than that it must be possible to 
award damages to injured private parties.26 The Unfair Terms Directive sim-
ilarly only provides for the bear minimum where it lays down a contractual 
remedy, while expressly referring to national law in this connection.27
Consequently, without putting into question the (potential) importance 
of any of these legal acts and the provisions laid down therein individually, 
let alone the abovementioned development more generally, it remains 
important to see these measures in their proper perspective. The EU’s 
involvement may be considered remarkable especially as compared to the 
general rule that remedial and procedural matters relating to legal proceed-
ings for the private enforcement of EU law at national level are in principle 
left to be regulated by the Member States. But as it stands there is no ques-
tion of something resembling an EU code of civil (or administrative) pro-
ceedings being established. In other words, there is still a considerable 
degree of ‘residual’ autonomy to be exercised by the Member States in this 
regard.
22 See subsection 10.2.4 above.
23 See subsection 9.1.4 and 9.2.3 above respectively.
24 Art. 14 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsection 8.2.5 above.
25 See subsection 9.1.3 above.
26 Art. 2(1)(c) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665; Art. 2(1)(d) Utilities Remedies 
Directive 92/13. See further subsection 3.2.2 above.
27 Art. 6(1) Product Liability Directivce 93/13. See further subsection 5.3.1 above.
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481. That leads to a last general remark, which relates to the degree of con-
troversy generated by EU legislative action related to private enforcement. 
This study indicates that on the one hand, contrary to what is sometimes 
presumed, there is no reason to believe that such EU involvement is gener-
ally and necessarily controversial.28 The relatively smooth adoption of the 
IPR Enforcement Directive, which contains some of the most far-going pri-
vate enforcement-related measures available to date, is a case in point. Here 
a number of contextual factors (upcoming EU enlargement, absence of ade-
quate public enforcement, existence of the TRIPS Agreement) appear to 
have carried at least as much weight during the law-making process as the 
content of the proposal as such.29 On the other hand this study has also 
found that EU involvement with private enforcement-related issues can 
indeed be a sensitive matter. As is discussed in further detail in the follow-
ing two sections, that is the case most notably where national rules on non-
contractual liability (tort), contract law, penalty payments, legal costs and 
legal standing are affected. The fact that, as was noted above, not few of the 
provisions of EU law under consideration are broadly – not to say vaguely 
or ambiguously – worded is at least in part a result of this sensitivity. Leav-
ing a degree of flexibility or ambiguity allows political compromises to be 
made. This can at times be the only manner in which agreement can be 
reached at EU level on a legislative proposal.
All the same this given can have important consequences also beyond the 
sphere of political compromises made in the context of the decision-making 
process. These consequences need not be negative. In particular, it tends to 
leave the Member States a margin of manoeuvre when transposing the pro-
visions at issue into national law, as is required considering that all of the 
abovementioned acts are directives. This facilitates the embedment of those 
provisions in the domestic legal systems in which they are to function. This 
therefore limits the aforementioned ‘fragmenting’ effect. That sometimes 
occurs to the point that no transposition at all is needed, because a nation-
al legal system is already compliant.30 And even broadly or ambiguously 
worded provisions can have an important impact in practice. Among other 
things they can help to make all parties concerned (private parties affected 
by infringements, possible infringers, legal practitioners, judges) aware of 
the rights and enforcement possibilities that may exist as a matter of EU law. 
Largely independent of their content the EU rules at issue tend to fulfil an 
important ‘awareness-raising’ function.31 Awareness is obviously a necessary 
precondition for the rights derived from EU law to be of relevance in practice.
28 See subsection 10.2.1 above.
29 See subsections 10.2.2 and 10.2.3 above.
30 E.g. with respect to Art. 14 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48 on legal costs. See further 
subsection 4.2.5 above. As regards the Member States’ scope not to transpose directives 
when they deem their domestic legal system to be already compliant, see e.g. CoJ case 
C-151/12, Commission v. Spain, para. 26-28.
31 See further subsection 10.4.2 above.
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Having said that, enacting broadly worded provisions of EU law and 
leaving flexibility to the Member States in this respect can also come at a 
‘price’. For the private parties concerned it can result in legal uncertainty and 
a degree of unequal treatment. Seen from the perspective of the EU, the 
main disadvantage is the continuing differences between the laws of the 
Member States and the related risk of the objectives of the harmonisation 
aimed for not being achieved. But also for the Member States there can be 
such a price. In particular, there can be a certain loss of control and risk of 
unanticipated consequences when this EU legislation is applied and inter-
preted after its adoption. Over time this uncertainty and ambiguity is likely 
to lead to preliminary questions being referred to the Court of Justice. The 
wording of the rules of EU law in question providing only limited guidance, 
the Court (which is in principle bound to answer such questions) tends to 
attach particular weight to the objectives of the legislation at issue. This can 
in turn sometimes lead to expansive and unexpected interpretations. One 
example is the Océano Grupo case law, pursuant to which the national courts 
seised under the Unfair Terms Directive must in principle raise the unfair-
ness of a terms in a ‘standard’ consumer contract, and consequently the 
related contractual remedy, of their own motion.32 Another example is the 
finding that the Procurement Remedies Directives preclude judicial review 
exercised by the national courts being limited to a test of arbitrariness.33 The 
present EU legislation can thus play an important role as a ‘stepping stone’ 
for Court rulings, even – or perhaps: particularly – in connection to matters 
that are not expressly or extensively addressed in this legislation.
12.2. Remedies and procedures for private enforcement purposes
This second section looks more in detail at what the EU legislation at issue 
might entail in terms of the instruments that it offers to private parties for 
pursuing private enforcement actions. To this end the three ‘main’ (substan-
tive) private enforcement remedies laid down in this legislation – i.e. actions 
for damages, actions for injunctions and contractual remedies – are first sub-
sequently discussed. Attention then turns to the ‘other’ remedies, which are 
not necessarily any less important. However these latter remedies are gener-
ally less widely provided for, they tend to be concerned with certain more 
specific issues and they are mostly not ‘self-standing’ but instead dependent 
on a ‘main’ claim of some sort being brought as well. Attention is also brief-
ly paid to the remedies that remain unregulated in the EU legislation at 
issue. At the end of this section the findings with respect to the most impor-
tant provisions of a procedural nature that are set out in that legislation are 
outlined.
32 CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and C-244/98, Océano Grupo, para. 22-29. See further subsec-
tions 5.3.2 and 9.2.4 above.
33 CoJ C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure, para. 57-64. See further subsection 9.2.3 above.
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12.2.1. Actions for damages
482. For some the term ‘private enforcement’ typically connotes private 
parties bringing actions for damages before the courts of the Member States 
for infringements of EU law. Where competition law infringements are con-
cerned this seems to hold true for the Commission, given that it decided to 
concentrate the Competition Damages Directive exclusively on this substan-
tive remedy.34 While acknowledging that other remedies can be of relevance 
too, in its slipstream most attention in academic publications on private 
enforcement tends to go this remedy, certainly in a competition law context. 
It further appears to hold true in a sense for the Court of Justice. While this 
latter institution is evidently constrained by the cases brought before it, it is 
nonetheless noticeable that for instance both in its competition law-related 
case law (Courage, Manfredi, Pfleiderer35) and in its case law concerning 
infringements of EU law committed by the Member States (Francovich, Bras-
serie du Pêcheur36) the emphasis tends to be on compensation in damages. To 
a considerable extent the same applies for the EU legislature, given that, 
besides their central place in the Competition Damages Directive, actions for 
damages are also especially an important remedy under the Procurement 
Remedies Directives, the IPR Enforcement Directive and the Product Liabil-
ity Directive.
Generally speaking, the above directives aim to ensure that private par-
ties that suffered loss or damage as a consequence of an infringement of EU 
law can obtain compensation, which in turn is expected to contribute to 
strengthening compliance with the substantive rules at issue. At the more 
detailed level there are several thorny issues however. Causality generally 
leads to few structural difficulties.37 In contrast fault is certainly one of 
them.38 The approaches found in the abovementioned legislation in this 
regard range from the ‘strict’ (no-fault) liability provided for in the Product 
Liability Directive39 to the IPR Enforcement Directive that requires that the 
infringer acted “knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know”.40 Matters are 
complicated further when account is taken of the case law of the Court of 
Justice on matters of fault. Most notably the Court has interpreted the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives’ silence in this regard as implying that no 
fault requirement can be applied.41 It is cannot be excluded that the Court 
would come to a similar conclusion with respect to the Competition Dam-
34 See subsection 6.3.2 above.
35 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage; CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi; CoJ case 
C-360/09, Pfl eiderer. See further subsections 2.5.2, 6.1.3 and 6.3.1 above.
36 CoJ joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich; CoJ joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, 
Brasserie du Pêcheur. See further subsection 2.5.1 above.
37 See subsection 7.1.3 above.
38 See subsection 7.1.2 above.
39 Art. 4 Product Liability Directive 85/374. See further subsection 5.4.1 above.
40 Art. 13(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsection 4.2.4 above.
41 CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz, para. 30-45.
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ages Directive. After all, despite earlier suggestions to this effect,42 this direc-
tive does not expressly address the issue of fault. That will however largely 
depend on the importance that the Court attaches to the relevant statements 
in the directive’s recitals.43 More generally, while the reasons for these differ-
ing approaches are not always clear and while a no-fault approach can have 
considerable disruptive effects at national level, it also appears that in prac-
tice the approach chosen as a matter of EU law has at most only a limited 
effect on the degree of successful damages litigation.
Quantifying the harm suffered tends to be an important practical bottle-
neck for successfully bringing damages claims.44 The Commission therefore 
proposed EU rules on this subject-matter on several occasions. The EU leg-
islature mostly rejected these proposals however. Yet the more recent adop-
tion of the Competition Damages Directive, which contains several limited 
but nonetheless noteworthy provisions on quantification, illustrates that this 
is not always the case. It appears that especially rules that are not overly 
rigid but instead allow the court seised a degree of flexibility, for instance to 
estimate the extent of the harm caused, can be both acceptable to the EU 
legislature and helpful in practice. It has on the whole proven less difficult 
to adopt common rules on the qualification of damages, i.e. specifying the 
heads of damages to be compensated. Here the EU’s involvement is typi-
cally more substantial than where matters of quantification are concerned.45 
Certainly when read together with the relevant case law (referred to below), 
these rules indicate that a general rule of EU law is emerging according to 
which – subject to possible deviations or precisions in the legislation at hand 
– any harm caused by infringements of EU law must be compensated in full. 
That means that costs and lost profits, as well as interest and non-material 
damage, must normally be compensable. While extensively debated, the 
award of punitive damages is currently not foreseen as a matter of EU law 
however.46 Neither are they at present considered to be precluded as a mat-
ter of EU, although more recently there appears to be a growing trend 
towards their prohibition.
483. When considered more generally one of the main findings of this 
study is that harmonising national laws relating to actions for damages for 
private enforcement purposes is often a problematic affair, with in many 
cases disappointing results in practice.47 To begin with, agreeing at EU level on 
the rules to be provided for is often difficult. EU interference with issues of 
non-contractual liability (tort) remains a sensitive matter. This can translate 
42 See in particular Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC anti-
trust rules, COM(2008) 165, pp. 6-7.
43 Recital 11 Competition Damages Directive.
44 See subsection 7.1.4 above.
45 See subsection 7.1.5 above.
46 See subsection 7.1.6 above.
47 See in particular subsection 7.1.1 above.
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into the relevant provisions of EU law being worded in a broad and mini-
malistic manner (e.g. the Procurement Remedies Directives’ damages 
regime generally48), the Member States being left several options (e.g. the 
IPR Enforcement Directive’s rules on setting damages49), the inclusion of 
express references to national law (e.g. the Product Liability’s provision on 
non-material damage50) or EU law simply not addressing certain issues (e.g. 
the issue of fault under the Competition Damages Directive). The ‘net har-
monising effect’ of these provisions is therefore often rather limited indeed. 
Furthermore in all fields of law at issue here where legislative measures of 
this kind have been taken, private parties often continue to be hesitant to 
initiate damages claims. This is in part due to (anticipated) difficulties asso-
ciated with these claims, such as lengthy proceedings, high legal costs and 
problems in demonstrating and quantifying the harm suffered. But even 
apart from that it appears that these parties might prefer spending their 
resources on more forward-looking activities, rather than seeking to obtain 
ex post compensation. Other considerations can also play a role in specific 
cases, such as the fear of ‘biting the hand that feeds you’ in procurement 
cases, the difficulty of identifying infringers in intellectual property cases or 
the ‘rational apathy’ where the harm suffered is modest for individual con-
sumers.
All this thus puts in perspective the well-known finding that, especially 
in light of the low number of successful claims, there is “astonishing diversity 
and total underdevelopment” as regards actions for damages for infringements 
of EU competition law.51 To the extent that the number of cases successfully 
brought is to be considered an appropriate indicator in the first place (which 
seems debatable, considering that many disputes appear to be settled and 
that litigation would not appear to be an end in itself), the Commission had 
already concluded three decades earlier that “[s]cant use has yet been made of 
the possibility of actions for damages for breaches of the [EU] competition rules”.52 
More importantly, the situation appears to be largely similar in many other 
fields of EU law. For instance, although the degree of litigation seems to 
have increased somewhat since then, after the Procurement Remedies Direc-
tives’ regime had been in force for several years it was reported that “no 
more than a handful” of damages cases had been brought EU-wide.53 Like-
wise, roughly a decade after its adoption, a study found that “almost no cases 
have been reported” under the Product Liability Directive.54 And in 2010 the 
Commission observed in relation to the IPR Enforcement Directive that in 
intellectual property cases damages awards “are not requested […] as a matter 
48 Art. 2(1)(c) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665; Art. 2(1)(d) Utilities Remedies 
Directive 92/13. See further subsection 3.2.2 above.
49 Art. 13(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsection 4.2.4 above.
50 Art. 9 Product Liability Directive 85/374. See further subsection 5.4.1 above.
51 Study Ashurst (2004), p. 1.
52 Commission, Thirteenth report on competition policy, 1984, p. 136.
53 Study Herbert Smith (1996), p. 18.
54 Study McKenna (1994), p. 45.
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of course”.55 This limited degree of damages litigation for (alleged) infringe-
ments of EU law in these other fields is all the more remarkable, given that 
there the EU legislature enacted specific measures meant to facilitate the 
bringing of this kind of private enforcement actions years, if not decades, 
ago.
484. There are reasons to doubt whether the Commission and the EU leg-
islature are willing and able to alter this situation by substantially ‘beefing 
up’ EU law on this point. These doubts seem to result as least as much from 
political constraints as from strictly legal considerations. The Product Liabil-
ity Directive has for example been left substantially unaltered for almost 
three decades, despite there being broad agreement that this directive has 
done relatively little to alleviate the burden on private parties wishing to 
obtain compensation in damages.56 The Commission similarly seems hesi-
tant to propose amending the IPR Enforcement Directive’s damages 
regime.57 But probably the best illustration is the 2007 revision of the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives.58 In that context the problems encountered 
by private parties having suffered harm as a consequence of infringements 
of EU public procurement law were expressly acknowledged. However the 
Commission – and with it the EU legislature – saw this as a reason to intro-
duce another remedy (namely a contractual remedy, discussed below) rath-
er than to attempt to improve and further elaborate these directives’ rules on 
damages claims. This evidently contrasts with the extensive efforts that 
especially the Commission made over the past decade to come to EU legisla-
tion that gives effect to the right to compensation in damages for competi-
tion law infringements, which eventually led to the adoption of the Compe-
tition Damages Directive.59 And on many points (also) this latter directive is 
only limitedly prescriptive. Moreover the fact that it was eventually pro-
posed and adopted is arguably more due to a desire to protect the existing 
public enforcement mechanism (particularly ‘leniency’ programmes) than to 
a broadly shared ambition to facilitate the private enforcement of EU com-
petition law.60
It may therefore well be that some of the most noticeable legal develop-
ments with respect to actions for damages in a private enforcement context 
are still to come from Luxembourg rather than from Brussels. For instance, 
as was noted above, the Court of Justice has held that the absence of an 
express fault requirement in the Procurement Remedies Directives implies 
that the application of such a requirement under national law is precluded.61 
55 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 21.
56 See subsection 5.4.2 above.
57 See subsection 4.1.2 above.
58 See subsection 3.1.3 above.
59 See subsection 6.2.3 above.
60 CoJ case C-360/09, Pfl eiderer. See subsection 6.3.4 above.
61 CoJ case C-314/09, Stadt Graz, para. 30-45. See further subsections 3.2.2 and 7.1.2 above.
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As a consequence liability under these directives is probably more ‘strict’ 
even than under the no-fault Product Liability Directive. For the latter con-
tains a range of exonerating circumstances and other moderating provisions 
on which a defendant can seek to rely, which are evidently entirely absent in 
the former.62 There is also case law suggesting that, unless expressly pro-
vided otherwise, non-material damage is also to be compensated, and 
indeed that the harm caused must be compensated in full, including costs, 
lost profits and interests.63 In this connection the scope for dynamic inter-
play between the EU’s judiciary and its legislature is not to be overlooked. 
As was noted earlier, almost irrespective of their content the above direc-
tives can fulfil a function in terms of ‘awareness-raising’ and as a ‘stepping 
stone’. Put crudely, for it to be able to issue rulings the Court of Justice needs 
cases to be brought before it and EU law to interpret. On both accounts these 
directives can play an important role, notwithstanding their often modestly 
prescriptive rules on actions for damages (perhaps to the contrary). And the 
Court’s rulings can in turn also lead to further legislative developments. 
That is illustrated by the Competition Damages Directive, which in many 
respects codifies and builds on the earlier Courage case law.64
12.2.2. Actions for injunctions
485. The story of the second main remedy discussed above, i.e. actions for 
injunctions, is altogether rather different. This remedy is a common one 
especially in the field of EU consumer protection law. Not only the Con-
sumer Injunctions Directive, but also several other directives, including the 
Unfair Terms Directive, contain provisions in this regard.65 This remedy fur-
ther plays an important role under the IPR Enforcement Directive66 and, be 
it perhaps to a lesser extent, the Procurement Remedies Directives.67 In EU 
legislative terms this remedy is therefore by and large as widely provided 
for as actions for damages. Together with actions for damages it is also one 
of the two key remedies addressed in the Commission’s Collective Redress 
Recommendation.68
62 E.g. Art. 7 and 16(1) Product Liability Directive 85/374. See further subsection 5.4.2 
above.
63 E.g. CoJ case C271/91, Marshall, para. 26; CoJ case C-203/99, Veedfald, para. 25-28; CoJ 
case C-168/00, Leitner, para. 21-23; CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, 
para. 92-97. See further subsection 7.1.4 above.
64 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage. See further subsections 2.5.2 and 6.1.3 above.
65 Art. 2(1)(a) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22; Art. 7(1) Unfair Terms Directive 
93/13. See further subsections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 above respectively.
66 Art. 9(1) and 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsections 4.2.2 and 
4.2.3 above respectively.
67 Art. 2(1)(b) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further subsection 
3.2.1 above.
68 See in particular section IV Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See further 
subsection 5.5.1 above.
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And yet injunctive relief arguably still remains an undervalued possible 
course of action in the present context. This remedy tends to receive only 
limited attention both in the private enforcement-related legal literature and 
in the case law of the Court of Justice. More than a decade after Courage it 
still remains to be clarified if the reasoning set out in that case can also be 
extended to other remedies than actions for damages, particularly with 
respect to actions for injunctions.69 As compared to the academic and insti-
tutional attention and follow-up given to Courage, the Court’s ruling in 
Muñoz – based on similar reasoning but relating to the civil law consequenc-
es of EU law infringements generally – almost went unnoticed.70 This rem-
edy is also notably absent from the Competition Damages Directive. The 
reasons for the exclusion of this remedy from this latter directive are far 
from evident and have regrettably not been properly explained to date.
486. This study suggests that injunctive relief can in fact be an important 
remedy in private enforcement proceedings, including in competition cases.
In particular, it appears that, although this will obviously depend on the 
circumstances of the case at hand, private parties confronted with EU law 
infringements are often most interested in a ‘quick fix’, i.e. (relatively) 
uncomplicated, speedy and not overly costly proceedings that serve to 
determine whether or not the relevant rules of substantive EU law have 
been infringed and that oblige the defendant to stop acting in that manner 
in case of an affirmative answer. To a considerable extent, actions for injunc-
tions can satisfy this need.
With respect to the EU legislation under consideration, two factors stand 
out in this regard, namely the (likely) absence, as a matter of EU law, of a 
requirement to demonstrate, in order for injunctive relief to be granted, first, 
that the defendant was at fault when committing the infringement and, sec-
ond, that the infringement caused (sufficiently quantified) harm to the appli-
cant.71 As a consequence, even if there can be significant differences between 
the legal systems of the Member States, the proceedings concerned are typ-
ically less complex, faster and less costly, at least as compared to actions 
for damages. That applies all the more so because, as is further discussed 
below, unlike actions for damages, injunctions can often be granted as inter-
im relief. Indeed, the abovementioned directives regularly expressly require 
certain forms of injunctive relief to be made available by means of interim 
measures.72 The provisions of EU law in question often also leave a degree of 
flexibility to the Member States and by extension the national courts seised. 
69 Cf. Opinion AG Jacobs joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOB 
Bundesverband, par. 105.
70 CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz. See subsection 2.5.2 above. For a broader assessment of Cou-
rage and Muñoz, see subsection 2.5.3 above.
71 See subsection 7.2.2 above.
72 E.g. Art. 9(1)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48; Art. 2(1)(a) Consumer Injunctions 
Directive 2009/22.
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That can allow the latter to issue orders tailored to the specifics of the case 
at hand.
Taken together the above probably goes a long way in explaining the 
relative success in practice of injunctive relief as a private enforcement rem-
edy, despite this remedy often receiving only a limited degree of broader 
attention.73 It is mostly positively assessed in consumer cases for instance. 
And in relation to infringements of intellectual property law stakeholders 
have even identified this as the “main enforcement remedy”.74 There further 
appears to be considerable ‘demand’ for providing for the possibility of 
granting injunctive relief in competition cases.75 The forward-looking (rela-
tively) ‘quick fix’ that injunctive relief can offer may thus for many private 
parties be more attractive than the inherently backward-looking remedy of 
compensation for past harm.76 It is submitted that this remedy therefore 
deserves being taken seriously and to be made available and facilitated 
more broadly where relevant, as a possible manner for private parties to 
address infringements of EU law before their national courts.
487. The foregoing does not mean however that EU law on injunctive relief 
as it stands does not leave room for improvement. Two points are to be not-
ed in particular. In the first place, the provisions in question are arguably too 
unclear and too lenient in some respects. Most notably the EU legal acts under 
consideration do not stipulate expressly that no requirements of fault or 
harm can apply for injunctive relief to be granted.77 This means that there 
remains scope for debate – and for deviating approaches at national level – 
on these two important points. The possibility offered by both the Procure-
ment Remedies Directives and the IPR Enforcement Directive to allow in 
certain cases a defendant to ‘buy off’ an injunction that might otherwise 
have been granted can also be seen as an example of too far-going flexibili-
ty.78 These provisions essentially allow injunctive relief to be ‘transformed’ 
into compensatory relief, thus denying the applicant the possibility to obtain 
the former where required.
In the second place, it appears that this remedy generally functions in an 
unsatisfactory manner where cross-border infringements are at stake.79 The 
Consumer Injunctions Directive, which specifically seeks to address these 
73 See subsection 7.2.2 above.
74 Commission, Staff working document accompanying the report on IPR Enforcement 
Directive 2004/48, SEC(2010) 1589, p. 14 (regarding preliminary injunctions).
75 See subsection 7.2.3 above.
76 Cf. CoJ case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo, para. 43, where it is held that, in certain cases, the 
purely compensatory nature of a damages award might mean that the protection con-
ferred on the private party concerned is incomplete and insuffi cient.
77 For two exceptions, see Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29; Art. 
5(3) Misleading Advertising Directive 2006/114.
78 Art. 12 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48; Art. 2(1)(c) and 2(5) Utilities Remedies Direc-
tive 92/13.
79 See subsection 7.2.3 above.
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kinds of infringements, is a case in point. It has largely failed to do so, con-
sidering that the system it established to this effect has been used only very 
sporadically. Similar shortcomings have been observed in connection to 
the IPR Enforcement Directive. These difficulties are probably not peculiar 
to this specific remedy however. It would appear that they mainly come to 
light here mainly because injunctive relief is otherwise relatively frequently 
applied for and granted. The Commission may therefore well be correct 
in treating this concern as an expression of more general difficulties con-
nected to cross-border litigation relating to infringements of EU law. None-
theless it remains to be seen whether the improvements that may result from 
measures of broader application, such as the Brussels I and the Rome II 
Regulations,80 will lead to significant improvements in this respect. Addi-
tional measures might be called for.
12.2.3. Contractual remedies
488. Contractual remedies, i.e. actions intended to make good infringements 
of EU law by seeking to nullify or to otherwise make ineffective contractual 
arrangements entered into in relation to those infringements, can be found 
in three fields of EU law selected for the purposes of this study. Article 
101(2) TFEU stipulates that contracts that are contrary to the prohibition of 
anti-competitive behaviour, notably cartels, are ‘automatically void’.81 Pur-
suant to the Unfair Terms Directive consumers are ‘not bound’ by unfair 
terms in standard consumer contracts.82 The Procurement Remedies Direc-
tives stipulate that contracts concluded pursuant to certain infringements of 
the EU public procurement rules are to be considered ‘ineffective’.83
489. This remedy can play an important role where the EU law infringe-
ments to be addressed have a contractual dimension of some sort.84 The 
precise nature of this dimension can differ. In competition cases the conclu-
sion of the contract as such essentially constitutes the infringement of EU 
law. By contrast in public procurement cases the conclusion of the contract 
is ‘merely’ a consequence of an infringement committed at an earlier stage, 
namely during the preceding contract award procedure. And under the 
Unfair Terms Directive it is the inclusion of a particular term that can have 
implications for the contract in question. Despite these differences, this rem-
edy thus seeks to prevent private parties from being confronted with a fait 
accompli when they try to address an infringement of EU law in the form of a 
concluded contract. In the absence of this remedy being expressly provided 
80 Brussels I Regulation 44/2001; Rome II Regulation 864/2007.
81 See subsection 6.1.3 above.
82 Art. 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See further subsection 5.3.1 above.
83 Art. 2d(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further subsection 
3.2.3 above.
84 See subsection 8.1.1 above.
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for as a matter of EU law, primary EU law may – arguably – still require the 
contract to be terminated in certain cases.85 Considerably uncertainty exists 
in this regard however. It would moreover seem that in those cases the out-
come is likely to depend to a high extent on the circumstances of the case at 
hand and the applicable provisions of national law.
It follows from the foregoing that this remedy is more selective in nature 
than the other two ‘main’ (substantive) remedies discussed earlier. After all 
by no means all infringements of EU law typically have a contractual dimen-
sion of the type referred to here. The IPR Enforcement Directive does not 
provide for this remedy for instance. Neither does EU law expressly provide 
for a contractual remedy in relation to abuses of a dominant position within 
the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. This selectiveness is further illustrated by 
the fact that the contractual remedy set out in the Procurement Remedies 
Directives is available only with respect to what are considered to be the 
most serious infringements of substantive EU public procurement law. The 
possible contractual consequences of other infringements remain unad-
dressed in these directives. This appears to imply that, as a matter of EU law, 
in the latter case the contracts in question can remain effective.
490. The fact that each of the three abovementioned provisions uses a dif-
ferent term (‘automatically void’, ‘not bound’, ‘ineffective’) further suggests 
a lack of coherence at EU level where this remedy is provided for. That applies 
all the more so because other consumer protection directives than the Unfair 
Terms Directive use yet again different terms.86 This is not merely a matter 
of terminology. There are notable differences as regards the legal effects that 
result from this remedy being awarded. The Court of Justice has for instance 
long held that the effects under Article 101(2) TFEU are absolute (i.e. vis-à-vis 
all contracting parties as well as third parties) and that they apply ex tunc 
(i.e. retroactively).87 By contrast the wording of the Unfair Terms Directive 
makes it clear that here the effects are relative (i.e. they only affect certain 
parties),88 while the Procurement Remedies Directives expressly allow for 
this remedy having only ex nunc effects (i.e. only for future purposes).89 The 
effects of this remedy being invoked on the remaining, ‘non-infringing’ pro-
visions of the contracts in question can vary too. Competition law is largely 
‘neutral’ on this point, as it leaves questions of severability in principle to 
85 See subsection 8.1.3 above.
86 E.g. Art. 3(2), (5) and (6) Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44 speaks of contracts being 
‘rescinded’. Elsewhere, reference is made to the possibility of ‘withdrawal’ from a contract, 
whereby this term is moreover used in different legal acts with two apparently distinct 
meanings (cf. e.g. Art. 4(5) and (6) Package Travel Directive 90/314 and Art. 9 Consumer 
Rights Directive 2011/83).
87 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 57.
88 Art. 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13 provides that the unfair contract term shall not be 
binding “on the consumer”.
89 Art. 2d(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. Although in that case 
provision must be made for the ‘alternative penalties’ set out in Art. 2e of these directives.
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national law.90 The Unfair Term Directive’s approach can be described as 
one of ‘restraint’, in that it seeks to leave the other provisions of the con-
tract unaffected as much as possible.91 Although this remains to be clarified, 
under the Procurement Remedies Directives there would generally seem to 
be little scope for severance, this thus being more of an ‘all-or-nothing’ issue. 
For in procurement cases the entire contract will normally result from the 
earlier infringement of EU law during the contract award procedure.
These differences are to some extent understandable, given that the 
objectives of the above three contractual remedies, and the contexts in which 
they operate, differ. A one-size-fits-all approach on the matters discussed 
above is therefore not always in place. Absolute effects seem for example 
entirely appropriate for breaches of the relevant competition rules. But that 
is certainly not the case for breaches of the rules on unfair terms in consum-
er contracts, as the latter are meant only to protect the interests of the con-
sumer concerned. The distinct approaches as regards the ‘non-infringing’ 
provisions seem understandable as well, in light of the different nature of 
the contractual dimension at issue, as explained above. But this explains by 
no means all these differences. On many other points the manner in which 
this remedy has been elaborated appears to be driven primarily by other 
considerations. Even allowing for the required relative effect, the Unfair 
Terms Directive could set out the effects more specifically as a matter of EU 
law. From a legal perspective it is also far from evident why, while Article 
101(2) TFEU stipulates that anti-competitive contracts are ‘automatically 
void’, in the Procurement Remedies Directives the legally much less distinct 
term ‘ineffectiveness’ is used. Under these latter directives the contract in 
question must moreover first be ‘considered’ ineffective, implying that here 
there are no ‘automatic’ effects.92
491. That leads to the last point to be made in this connection. If, as was 
noted above, EU legislative interference with matters of non-contractual 
liability (tort) tends to be sensitive, this surely also holds true, and perhaps 
even more so, where contract law is concerned. Contract law has tradition-
ally been left to be regulated by the Member States. Even the Court of Justice 
can seem hesitant to venture too deeply into this domain.93 This tension 
between the EU wishing to take certain legislative measures to facilitate pri-
vate enforcement and the Member States wishing to avoid too much EU 
involvement goes a long way in explaining why this remedy has been regu-
lated in such a rather incoherent and unspecific manner, as was already 
touched upon above. Indeed, the legislative history of the Unfair Terms 
Directive and the Procurement Remedies Directives show that the legally 
rather indistinct terms ‘not bound’ and ‘ineffective’ were introduced at the 
90 E.g. CoJ case 56/65, Société Technique Minière, p. 250.
91 E.g. CoJ case C-453/10, Pereniová, para. 31-35.
92 Cf. recital 13 Procurement Remedies Amending Directive 2007/66.
93 Cf. e.g. CoJ case C-159/00, Sapod, para. 52.
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behest of the EU legislature. The Commission had proposed using more spe-
cific wording (namely ‘void’ and ‘invalid’ respectively). Different from what 
the Commission had proposed these two directives now also expressly refer 
to national law for the precise legal consequences of this remedy.94 The com-
plex system of possible ‘alternative penalties’ and judicial discretion for 
which the Procurement Remedies Directives provide in this regard is also 
testimony to the compromises that sometimes need to be struck when enact-
ing secondary EU law of the type at issue here.95
It is therefore unsurprising that the laws of the Member States provide 
for a range of legal concepts when transposing the terms ‘not bound’ and 
‘ineffectiveness’, such as non-existence, revocability, voidability and unen-
forceability. As was noted earlier, this flexibility can help to ensure an opti-
mal ‘fit’ with the domestic legal systems in which these provisions of EU 
law are to be embedded. However, when taken too far, as is arguably the 
case here, it can also put at risk the very harmonised and effective enforce-
ment possibilities that the EU legislative measures in question seek to 
achieve. This very same tension is also reflected in the case law of the Court 
of Justice. For example, while acknowledging that under the Unfair Terms 
Directive the Member States have “a certain degree of autonomy” to define the 
applicable legal arrangements, it has also insisted on ensuring the full effec-
tiveness of the objectives of this provision of EU law.96 Although more fac-
tors are likely to play a role in this respect, this ambiguity may well be an 
important element in explaining why these contractual remedies are not 
always assessed positively in practice.
12.2.4. Interim relief, disclosure measures and penalty payments
492. Turning to the other remedies found in the EU legislation assessed in 
this study, a first remedy is interim relief.97 As the Court of Justice has held, 
this remedy serves in essence “to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to 
be given on the existence of the rights claimed under [EU] law”.98 Without interim 
relief being available, pending a definitive ruling in the dispute at hand, the 
situation ‘on the ground’ may well evolve in such a manner that this latter 
ruling becomes devoid of practical effects. One could think of a public con-
tract that is awarded and executed while the contract award decision is still 
being contested in court. As the Court of Justice observed, in these cases the 
granting of interim measures can prevent a lacuna in the legal protection of 
the private parties concerned from occurring.99 Although there can be sig-
94 Art. 6(1) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13; Art. 2d(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 
89/665 and 92/13.
95 Art. 2d(3) and Art. 2e Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further 
subsection 3.2.3 above.
96 CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 62 and 72.
97 See subsection 8.2.1 above.
98 CoJ case C-416/10, Križan, para. 107.
99 CoJ Order case C-278/13 P(R), Pilkington, para. 36.
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nificant differences between the laws of the Member States, proceedings for 
interim measures are therefore typically (relatively) uncomplicated and 
speedy. The resulting measures however only apply provisionally; as the 
Court has also held, they do not finally determine the legal situation in the 
dispute at hand.100 The latter can only be done through legal proceedings on 
the merits of the case.
Therefore the availability of this remedy under the EU legislation at 
issue in this study principally depends on whether the typical disputes in 
question are deemed to require judicial intervention on short notice. At one end 
of the spectre are the Procurement Remedies Directives, where interim mea-
sures take an important place.101 As the above example relating to the award 
and execution of a public contract illustrates, disputes arising in that context 
often need to be addressed quickly.102 At the other end of the spectre are the 
Product Liability Directive and the Competition Damages Directive. These 
latter two directives do not provide for this remedy at all, because in terms 
of substantive remedies they are exclusively concerned with actions for 
damages and those actions are generally not seen as urgent.103 Somewhere 
in between these two extremes lies the IPR Enforcement Directive, which 
requires interim relief to be made available for two specific purposes, name-
ly to prevent imminent infringements from occurring and to preserve rele-
vant evidence.104 The consumer protection directives at issue here, in turn, 
take a somewhat different route. They tend to leave it principally to the 
Member States to ensure speedy legal proceedings, whether or not they are 
interlocutory in nature.105
The above directives mostly establish a link between the possibility of 
granting interim relief and injunctive relief of some sort. Generally speaking,
interim measures lend themselves well to bringing an (alleged) infringement 
to a (provisional) halt and/or to prevent damage from occurring. It is notice-
able however that the EU legislation under consideration here generally 
only provides for limited details on the functioning of these proceedings. 
Only the Procurement Remedies Directives are to some extent an exception, 
as they go some way in specifying what these interim measures are to entail. 
These directives refer to the suspension of the contract award procedure 
100 CoJ case C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker, para. 61.
101 Art. 2(1)(a) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further subsection 
3.2.1 above.
102 Cf. Art. 1(1) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13, according to which one 
of the key objectives of these directives is to ensure that decisions taken in relation to 
contract award procedures can be reviewed “as rapidly as possible”.
103 Cf. e.g. CoJ joined cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen, para. 29; 
CoJ Order case C-278/13 P(R), Pilkington, para. 50.
104 Art. 7(1) and Art. 9(1)(a) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsections 4.2.1 
and 4.2.2 above.
105 Art. 2(1)(a) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further subsection 5.2.1 above. 
See e.g. also Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29; Art. 5(3) Mislead-
ing Advertising Directive 2006/114.
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or of the implementation of a decision taken by the contracting authority 
concerned. They are also alone in expressly allowing for the balancing of the 
various interests at stake by the competent national court (even if such an 
exercise often takes place in this connection more generally).106 The Court of 
Justice has further held that the Procurement Remedies Directives preclude 
making the filing of an application for interim measures dependent on a 
requirement that proceedings on the merits must first have been brought, 
even where the latter is mere a formality.107 As regards this latter point, the 
situation seems largely similar under the IPR Enforcement Directive. There 
it is stated that the said provisional measures to preserve evidence are to be 
made available even before the commencement of proceedings on the merits 
of the case.108
493. Another relevant remedy is concerned with measures on the disclosure 
of evidence and other relevant information.109 Over and above the ‘general’ 
EU law requirements that can be derived from the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness,110 there are two EU legal acts that provide for this remedy, 
namely the IPR Enforcement Directive and the Competition Damages Direc-
tive.111 Both regimes essentially aim to ensure that in the private enforce-
ment proceedings concerned applicants, and where relevant also defen-
dants, can obtain access to evidence that is in the possession or that lies 
within the control of either the opposing party in the dispute at hand or a 
third party. They also seek to ensure that this evidence is being preserved, 
either by means of a court order to this effect (IPR Enforcement Directive) or 
by means of sanctions in case of relevant evidence being destroyed (Compe-
tition Damages Directive). The disclosure possibilities offered under the IPR 
Enforcement Directive are assessed mostly favourably. Many also agree that 
measures were called for in relation to competition law infringements. 
According to the Commission the national laws pre-dating the Competition 
Damages Directive not only varied considerably, but could also mean that 
there is “no effective access to effective evidence”.112
This study has nonetheless shown that the following two issues of 
broader relevance tend to arise in this connection. In the first place, this is an 
example of a situation where in relation to the EU’s legislative intervention 
several questions of coherence and fragmentation come to light. Even if the 
Competition Damages Directive has been inspired on the IPR Enforcement 
106 Art. 2(5) Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665; Art. 2(4) Utilities Remedies Directive 
92/13.
107 CoJ case C-214/00, Commission v. Spain, para. 99-100.
108 Art. 7(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
109 See subsection 8.2.2 above.
110 E.g. CoJ case C-526/04, Laboratoires Boiron, para. 55. See further section 2.2 above.
111 Art. 6-8 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48; Art. 5-7 Competition Damages Directive. See 
further subsections 4.2.1 and 6.3.3 above respectively.
112 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 19 (regarding competition cases).
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Directive, there are certain differences between both disclosure regimes. 
Some of these differences are understandable, such as the special rules on 
the disclosure of evidence included in the files of public enforcement author-
ities that the former directive provides for. These rules are to a high extent 
specific to the manner in which competition law is being enforced in the EU, 
namely through strong public enforcement and with heavy reliance on ‘leni-
ency’ programmes. Other differences between these two regimes are more 
difficult to understand and are to be regretted however. This includes the 
manner in which the requests for disclosure must be specified and the for-
mulation of the standard to be met before disclosure can be ordered. A fur-
ther – and more fundamental – question is why these two fields of law have 
been singled out for EU legislative action, while no such action has been 
taken in other fields. This decision implies that the enforcement possibilities 
of the private parties concerned by (alleged) infringements of EU intellec-
tual property and competition law are increased, while those of private par-
ties affected by infringements of other rules of EU law, or of ‘purely’ nation-
al law, remain unaltered. This also implies that there is a fragmenting effect 
on the national legal systems concerned, as the latter tend to address matters 
of disclosure across the board (i.e. regardless of the field of law at issue). It 
would seem that, on balance, there are grounds for arguing that the con-
cealed and professional manner in which intellectual property and competi-
tion law infringements tend to be committed sets these two fields of law 
apart, at least when compared to typical infringements of public procure-
ment and consumer protection law. Whether or not these differences are 
such that the aforementioned consequences are to be taken for granted 
remains however a matter for (political) debate.113
The second issue is the risk of conflicting interests and abuse. Fears of this 
kind have been expressed in relation to the disclosure regimes foreseen in 
both the IPR Enforcement Directive and the Competition Damages Direc-
tive, for instance concerning the possible high costs of complying with these 
disclosure orders, the possibility of confidential information or personal 
data being disclosed and abuse through overly broad ‘fishing expeditions’. 
A balance is therefore to be struck between the legitimate interests of the 
applicants, the defendants and the third parties that may be involved. At a 
more abstract level, this also concerns a balancing between the interests 
served by private enforcement of EU law generally and the risk associated 
with a ‘litigation culture’. Against this background several safeguards have 
been provided for in the two abovementioned directives. They include: the 
requirement of a court order, thus ensuring judicial oversight; the obligation 
to first present reasonably available evidence supporting the claims in ques-
tion (‘fact pleading’); a requirement to delineate the disclosure orders in a 
113 Doubts on these points were expressed e.g. in the context of the consultations relating to 
the Competition Damages Directive, discussed in subsection 6.2.3 above. On issues of 
coherence and fragmentation at national level more generally, see also subsection 10.4.2 
above.
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specific, narrow and proportionate manner, especially under the Competi-
tion Damages Directive; and rules on the protection of confidential informa-
tion. That being so, it would appear that these directives strike a reasonable 
balance, although the effects in practice may depend in part on the precise 
manner in which the above rules are transposed and applied at national 
level. Especially the possible involvement of third parties seems to require 
particular attention in this regard.
494. The Consumer Injunctions Directive describes a recurring penalty pay-
ment as “an order against the losing defendant for payments into the public purse 
or to any beneficiary designated in or under national legislation, in the event of 
failure to comply with the decision within a time limit specified by the courts or the 
administrative authorities, of a fixed amount for each day’s delay or any other 
amount provided for in national legislation, with a view to ensuring compliance 
with the decisions”.114 It follows that this remedy serves to ensure that, once a 
national court has issued a ruling in a private enforcement case, the defen-
dant takes the necessary measures to comply with that ruling.115 It does so 
by imposing a financial penalty, often on a recurring basis, for instance per 
day that the non-compliance persists after a certain date. The aim is thus, in 
the words of the Court of Justice, to place the defendant under “economic 
pressure which induces it to put an end to the breach established”.116 No payment 
will be due if timely compliance is ensured. This remedy can thus be espe-
cially useful in situations where there is reason to doubt the defendants’ 
commitment to comply with a court’s ruling in private enforcement pro-
ceedings.
Apart from the Consumer Injunctions Directive, of the legal acts under 
consideration only the IPR Enforcement Directive also provides for this rem-
edy however.117 That leads to the question what explains its rather limited 
availability for private enforcement purposes. Two points stand out in this 
regard. In the first place, the two abovementioned directives make this rem-
edy available specifically in relation to the injunctive relief that may be grant-
ed under the legislation at hand. Much like interim measures, this remedy is 
thus not available in relation to actions for damages. This explains why it 
has not been laid down in acts such as the Product Liability Directive and 
the Competition Damages Directive, which concentrate exclusively on com-
pensation in damages. In the second place, it appears that this is another 
subject-matter where EU legislative intervention tends to be seen as particu-
larly sensitive. This is likely to be connected to the differences between the 
national laws in this respect. While some national legal systems are entirely 
unfamiliar with this remedy, where they do, differences exist as to whether 
114 Art. 2(1)(c) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further subsection 5.2.1 above.
115 See subsection 8.2.3 above.
116 CoJ case C-177/04, Commission v. France, para. 91 (concerning Article 260(2) TFEU).
117 Art. 9(1)(a) and Art. 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsections 4.2.2 
and 4.2.3 above.
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any such penalty payments are due to the State or rather to the private par-
ty-applicant concerned. Therefore, at the insistence of the Member States 
represented in Council, the abovementioned reference to this remedy in the 
Consumer Injunctions Directive is preceded by the phrase “in so far as the 
legal system of the Member State concerned so permits”. The IPR Enforcement 
Directive similarly contains phrases qualifying the Member States’ obliga-
tions in this respect, i.e. “where appropriate” and “where provided for under 
national law”.118 Both directives further leave it open who is the beneficiary 
of the payment. The fact that the Procurement Remedies Directives do not 
provide for this remedy, but instead – more generally – require Member 
States to ensure that decisions are effectively enforced should probably also 
be seen in light of this sensitivity.119 It also indicates that there are also other 
manners to seek to ensure compliance with judgments issued in private 
enforcement proceedings.
12.2.5. Publicity measures, legal costs and ‘unregulated’ remedies
495. Another remedy that is provided for in only some of the acts of sec-
ondary EU law under consideration in this study is the possibility for the 
court seised to order publicity measures. The IPR Enforcement Directive 
speaks of “appropriate measures for the dissemination of information concern-
ing the decision, including displaying the decision and publishing it in full or in 
part”.120 This directive adds that, on an optional basis, Member States may 
also make provision for the ordering of “additional publicity measures which 
are appropriate to the particular circumstances, including prominent advertising”. 
These measures are to be imposed at the request of the applicant and imple-
mented at the expense of the infringer. The Consumer Injunction Directive 
and certain other consumer protection directives contain a largely similar 
remedy, which is to be ordered “where appropriate”.121
This remedy serves a dual purpose, namely deterring infringers and 
contributing to the awareness of the public at large.122 It can therefore be 
expected to be normally most effective where the general public is directly 
affected by the infringements of EU law at issue and where the infringing 
party is sensitive to the reputational damage that may result from the publi-
cation. This explains its inclusion in the abovementioned directives, just as it 
probably explains its absence in acts such as the Procurement Remedies 
Directives. It might also mean that, although it has not been included in the 
118 This latter phrase has been included in Art. 11 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48 (on 
‘permanent’ injunctions), but not in its Art. 9(1)(a) (on interlocutory injunctions).
119 Art. 2(8) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See further subsection 
3.3.3 above.
120 Art. 15 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsection 4.2.5 above.
121 Art. 2(1)(b) Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further subsection 5.2.1 above. 
See e.g. also Art. 11(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29; Art. 5(4) Mislead-
ing Advertising Directive 2006/114.
122 Recital 12 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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Competition Damages Directive, at least in certain competition cases this 
remedy might well be of relevance. Having said that, where EU law makes 
this remedy available it mostly appears to play only a modest role in prac-
tice. The often rather non-committal manner in which it has been set out 
may be part of the explanation for this. However a more important consid-
eration appears to be that this remedy anyway tends to generate only limit-
ed interest on the side of the private parties that are being confronted with 
an infringement of EU law. Given its dual purpose (i.e. deterring and raising 
awareness), it is arguably more suitable as a public enforcement instru-
ment.123
496. Although both are evidently concerned with different subject-matters, 
there is a remarkable degree of similarity between the EU law measures on 
the disclosure of evidence discussed above and those on legal costs.124 And 
both issues are of considerable practical importance to private parties that 
may wish to initiate private enforcement proceedings, especially (but not 
exclusively) actions for damages. Both issues were singled out for EU legis-
lative action in particular in relation to infringements of EU intellectual 
property and competition law. But in the end no binding measures were 
provided in the Competition Damages Directive.125 Of the EU legislation 
under consideration only the IPR Enforcement Directive contains therefore 
measures on legal costs. This latter directive provides that “reasonable and 
proportionate legal costs and other expenses incurred by the successful party shall, 
as a general rule, be borne by the unsuccessful party, unless equity does not allow 
this”.126 That implies that the infringer must generally bear all the financial 
consequences of its conduct.127 Exceptional as it may be,128 this provision 
has been drafted in a very broad manner, to the extent that most Member 
States did not even consider it necessary to amend their pre-existing rules to 
comply with it. Although it cannot be excluded that the Court of Justice will 
develop more ambitious requirements on the basis of this provision, it is 
123 Cf. e.g. Art. 30 Competition Regulation 1/2003.
124 See subsection 8.2.5 above.
125 For earlier discussions on this subject-matter, see in particular Commission, Green paper 
on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672, p. 9; Commis-
sion, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 
165, pp. 9-10; Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the white paper on dam-
ages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404, pp. 74-75.
126 Art. 14 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsection 4.2.5 above. See also 
the ‘general rules’ set out in Art. 3(1) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, discussed in 
subsection 4.3.2 above, pursuant to which the measures, procedures and remedies for the 
enforcement of the intellectual rights covered by this directive may not be “unnecessarily 
complicated or costly”.
127 CoJ case C-406/09, Realchemie, para. 49.
128 For another (scarce) example of EU involvement in this domain, see Art. 11(4) Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92. Cf. CoJ case C-260/11, Edwards, 
para. 40-48; CoJ case C-427/07, Commission v. Ireland, para. 92-94; CoJ case C-530/11, 
Commission v. UK, para. 33-72.
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therefore unsurprising that its introduction so far seems to have done little 
to alleviate stakeholders’ concerns related to the legal costs involved in 
bringing private enforcement actions for infringements of EU intellectual 
property law. Comparably, also the Commission’s (non-legally binding) 
Collective Redress Recommendation leaves the Member States a large mar-
gin of manoeuvre when setting rules on legal costs.129
The result is therefore somewhat of a paradox. On the one hand the 
importance of legal costs for the private enforcement of EU law is generally 
not in doubt. On the other hand as it stands this subject-matter is hardly 
addressed in a meaningful manner in EU law. This state of affairs can prob-
ably be explained in particular by two considerations. First, many consider 
that EU ‘interference’ in this domain is undesirable. There appears to be a 
general preference for leaving this subject-matter to be regulated by the 
Member States, as a matter of subsidiarity and so as to avoid fragmentation 
at national level. Second, as was the case in relation to the aforementioned 
disclosure measures, the fear of creating or encouraging a ‘litigation culture’ 
is frequently voiced in this connection. That applies especially where a pos-
sible rule of EU law would entail a deviation from the generally accepted 
‘loser pays’ principle. In this light it is probably no coincidence that the 
abovementioned rule of the IPR Enforcement Directive, which is broadly 
consistent with this principle, did get adopted, whereas the Commission’s 
earlier suggestion to include a rule on legal costs in the Competition Dam-
ages Directive, which could have implied a deviation from this principle, 
received considerable criticism and was eventually dropped.
This would seem to make it unlikely that the EU will take private 
enforcement-related legislative measures on legal costs in the foreseeable 
future. That applies all the more so because not only the Member States rep-
resented in Council tend to be of the above view, as is perhaps to be expect-
ed, but also its co-legislator, i.e. the European Parliament. The watering 
down of the IPR Enforcement Directive’s rule on legal costs largely occurred 
at the insistence of the two EU co-legislators. And in 2012 the European Par-
liament declared that “Member States are to determine their own rules on the 
allocation of [legal] costs”, while also insisting that “there can be no action with-
out financial risk”.130 Still it is uncertain whether this means that this matter 
is therefore to be considered ‘settled’ at EU level. Not only do rules on legal 
costs remain of considerable practical importance in this context, there can 
also be a tension between the two abovementioned considerations. For now 
it remains an open question what carries more weight for the EU legislature, 
its opposition against EU legislative involvement with rules of legal costs 
129 Points 13 and 30 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396. See further subsection 
5.5.1 above.
130 European Parliament, Resolution on towards a coherent European approach to collective 
redress, P7_TA(2012)0021, para. 20. See also European Parliament, Resolution on the 
white paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2009)0187, 
para. 20.
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(which implies that no EU legislative measures are to be taken) or its desire 
to ensure that the applicable rules are such as to avoid creating or encourag-
ing a litigation culture (which could imply that certain measures are to be 
taken, e.g. prohibiting contingency fees as a matter of EU law).
497. Finally, it is not to be forgotten that the overview of the remedies dis-
cussed above is certainly not exhaustive. Although this can vary significant-
ly, the national laws of the Member States regularly provide for other reme-
dies, which remain unregulated as a matter of secondary EU law, but which 
can nonetheless also be of importance for the purposes of the private 
enforcement of EU law.131 One could think in particular of actions for declar-
atory relief, actions based on unjust enrichment and actions for restitution. 
Especially this latter remedy can be relevant here, not in the last place 
because on this point there is already a well-established body of case law 
concerning ‘vertical’ situations, pursuant to which private parties can claim 
the repayment of charges levied contrary to EU law by the Member States’ 
authorities.132 In its ‘pure’ form restitution can involve an action for the 
repayment of sums paid from one private party to another as a consequence 
of an infringement of EU law. As such an action for restitution could serve as 
a ‘follow-up’ to a successful contractual remedy. Actions for ‘restitutionary 
damages’ can also be used to reclaim the gains made by the infringer, rather 
than – as is the case with the ‘classical’ actions for damages discussed above 
– for compensating the harm caused by the infringement. The above reme-
dies could therefore conceivable play a role in the EU’s broader approach on 
private enforcement.
Noting the existence and the private enforcement potential of these 
‘unregulated’ remedies is not only of relevance with a view to possible 
future legislative action at EU level in this regard. These remedies can also 
be of relevance in other ways. In particular, it may not always be easy to 
clearly distinguish those remedies from the ones that are at present already 
regulated by the EU legislation assessed in this study. That is illustrated by 
the fact that under the IPR Enforcement Directive’s regime on actions for 
damages account can be taken of the ‘unfair profits’ made by the infringer. 
This appears to point to a restitution-related element, even though the direc-
tive’s overall emphasis remains on the compensatory function of damages 
awards.133 Likewise views can differ as to whether and if so, in which cases 
actions for restitution brought under national law qualify as ‘actions for 
damages’ within the meaning of the Competition Damages Directive. This is 
of practical relevance, as it determines whether or not this directive’s rules 
on matters such as the non-disclosure of certain evidence apply to the legal 
131 See subsection 8.2.6 above.
132 E.g. CoJ case 199/82, San Giorgio, para. 12; CoJ case C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World, 
para. 93.
133 Art. 13(1)(a) and (2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also its recital 26.
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proceedings in question.134 Finally, the concept of unjust enrichment can 
lead to particular complexities of its own, mainly because it can be a double-
edged sword. That is to say, it may serve as a ground for reclaiming pay-
ments made to a party that infringed EU law, but it can also be an argument 
for rejecting such claims for restitution where it would lead to the overcom-
pensation of the private party-applicant.
12.2.6. Legal standing, limitation periods and rules of evidence
498. One of the most important procedural issues touched upon in the 
foregoing is that of legal standing (locus standi), i.e. the rules that determine 
which parties are entitled to initiate private enforcement proceedings.135 In 
many respects the EU’s involvement with this issue echoes the more general 
tendencies touched upon earlier. On the one hand for private enforcement to 
be a realistic option for private parties affected by infringement of certain 
rules of substantive EU law it is evidently of crucial importance to ensure 
that these parties are not precluded from bringing a case. All EU legal acts 
under consideration in this study therefore contain rules on legal standing. 
The IPR Enforcement Directive specifies for example which four categories 
of parties should in principle be allowed to bring a case.136 It is even one of 
the main aims of the Consumer Injunctions Directive to specify which enti-
ties are entitled to act upon (alleged) infringements of the relevant EU con-
sumer protection rules.137 One might thus be inclined to conclude that EU 
law typically regulates this subject-matter to a high extent.
On the other hand the provisions of EU law in question have often been 
drafted in such a manner that the Member States did not need to take any 
action to comply with them. Indeed, in relation to the Procurement Reme-
dies Directives’ rule on legal standing the EU legislature expressly stated 
that it wished not to “jeopardise” the logic of the existing legal systems of the 
Member States.138 Mostly at the insistence of the Member States, almost all 
provisions in question contain express references to national law. These ref-
erences are sometimes limited to the applicable detailed rules, as is the case 
under the Procurement Remedies Directives. But in other instances they 
appear to relate to the more fundamental question which parties are entitled 
to initiate private enforcement proceedings in the first place. For example, 
three of the four categories of potential applicants specified in the IPR 
Enforcement Directive only have legal standing “in so far as permitted by and 
in accordance with the rules of the applicable law”. The degree of harmonisation 
provided for is thus often more limited than what might appear at first 
134 See in particular Art. 2, 4(4) and 6 Competition Damages Directive.
135 See subsection 9.1.2 above.
136 Art. 4 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See further subsection 4.3.1 above.
137 Art. 4 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further subsection 5.2.2 above.
138 Council, doc. 7834/89 ADD 1, p. 7.
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sight. The relevant provisions of EU law tend to confirm the pre-existing 
rules of national law as much as they may lead to these rules being altered.
It would seem therefore that this is another situation where the dynamic 
interplay between the EU legislature and the EU judiciary might be of par-
ticular importance. For the Court of Justice may well derive from the above 
provisions more ambitious requirements as a matter of EU law. With respect 
to the Procurement Remedies Directives the Court has already signalled 
that, while the inclusion of an express reference to national law may allow 
the Member States a certain margin of manoeuvre, the exercise thereof 
should not come at the expense of the effectiveness of these directives.139 
Conversely, the Competition Damages Directive, where an express reference 
to national law is notably absent in relation to the issue of legal standing, is 
an example of a case where the EU legislature codified and built on earlier 
case law.140 More generally, even if much remains to be clarified, when seen 
in light of the Court’s other case law on legal standing-related issues141 as 
well as the need for an interpretation that is consistent with the fundamental 
right to an effective remedy guaranteed under the Charter,142 the Court may 
well be inclined to interpret the above provisions rather extensively, without 
however creating an actio popularis.
499. Another procedural issue of particular importance in a private 
enforcement context is that of limitation periods, which determine before 
which date an aggrieved private party must initiate legal proceedings to 
address an infringement of EU law should it wish to do so.143 Rules of this 
kind serve to ensure legal certainty, particularly for possible defendants and 
affected third parties, while at the same time their length and application in 
specific cases should not be such as to deprive the private parties concerned 
from a reasonable opportunity to bring a private enforcement action. Espe-
cially the Procurement Remedies Directives, the Product Liability Directive 
and the Competition Damages Directive contain relatively detailed rules in 
this regard.144 When considered together, it appears that the EU legislature 
tends not to rely on a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach where limitation periods 
are concerned. Instead the balance between the various interests at stake is 
139 CoJ case C-410/01, Fritsch, para. 28-34.
140 See in particular Art. 1(1) and 2(1) and recital 12 Competition Damages Directive. Cf. CoJ 
case C-453/99, Courage, para. 24; CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, 
para. 59 and 61. See further subsection 6.3.5 above.
141 See e.g. CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz, para. 32; CoJ case C-174/02, Streekgewest Westelijk 
Noord-Brabant, para. 18-20; CoJ case C-132/05, Commission v. Germany (Parmesan cheese), 
para. 68-71; CoJ case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, para. 51.
142 Art. 47 Charter. See further section 2.3 and subsection 11.2.5 above.
143 See subsection 9.1.3 above.
144 Art. 2c and Art. 2f(1) and (2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13; Art. 10 
and 11 Product Liability Directive 85/374; Art. 10 Competition Damages Directive. IPR 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48 addresses this issue only in very general manner (see its 
Art. 3(1)). See further subsections 3.3.2, 5.4.2, 6.3.5 and 4.3.2 above respectively.
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often struck in a slightly different manner, in light of the specific objectives 
that the directives in question seek to achieve and the particularities of the 
field of law at issue.
The rules on limitation periods set out in the three abovementioned 
directives accordingly each have certain specific characteristics. First, 
although this depends on the form of relief sought, the Procurement Reme-
dies Directives provide for limitation periods that are generally very short 
(as little as 10 days). This is consistent with these directives’ aim to ensure 
that the judicial review is not only effective, but also, and in particular, rap-
id. Second, the time periods set out in the Product Liability Directive pri-
marily serve as a sort of temporal ‘counterbalance’ against the ‘strict’ liabil-
ity provided for in this directive. This directive therefore not only provides 
for a relatively short limitation period, but it also lays down an additional 
period after which all relevant rights are extinguished in any case. Third, the 
Competition Damages Directive’s rules on limitation periods stand out for 
being particularly ‘claimant-friendly’. These rules seek to ensure that any 
limitation period has a considerable length (five years), while allowing – dif-
ferent from the Product Liability Directive for instance – the Member States 
to set longer periods. These rules also determine, in manner that is rather 
‘generous’ to (potential) applicants, the moment at which the limitation 
period begins to run and that these periods are to be suspended until after 
the completion of any relevant public enforcement investigations and pro-
ceedings.
500. Turning to rules of evidence, the main conclusion to be drawn here is 
that the EU legislation assessed in this study only sporadically specifies 
which party has the burden of proof in private enforcement proceedings 
and how the available evidence is to be assessed.145 For the most part it 
seems to be simply presumed that, in accordance with the relevant national 
law, it is for the applicant to substantiate its claims and for the national court 
seised to assess the evidence brought before it. It is true that the Product 
Liability Directive specifies what applicants and defendants must demon-
strate for liability to be incurred and for the latter to be able to rely on the 
defences set out in this directive (e.g. the ‘development risk defence’).146 
However the point here seems more one of making clear that the said liabil-
ity is ‘strict’ and that the said defences are available, rather than one of 
addressing the burden of proof proper. The same essentially applies with 
respect to the Competition Regulation, which stipulates that it is for the 
applicant to prove that an infringement occurred, while the defendant must 
prove that the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU have been met if it wishes 
to rely on this provision by means of a defence.147
145 See subsection 9.1.4 above.
146 Art. 4 and 7 Product Liability Directive 85/374. See subsections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 above 
respectively.
147 Art. 2 Competition Regulation 1/2003. See further subsection 6.1.3 above.
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Even if the Commission eventually did not pursue its earlier suggestion 
to provide for a rebuttable presumption of fault in competition cases,148 the 
Competition Damages Directive is still comparatively ambitious where 
rules of evidence are concerned. Most notably it regulates the effects (as 
either irrefutable or prima facie evidence) in private enforcement proceedings 
of infringement decisions taken by public enforcement authorities, it 
includes particular rules of evidence regarding cases where the harm may 
have been ‘passed-on’ and it provides for a rebuttable presumption that cer-
tain infringements caused harm.149 While these rules go further than the 
ones set out in the other EU legislation at here, elsewhere in EU law compa-
rable rules of evidence can be found, particularly rebuttable presumptions 
and reversals of the burden of proof.150 Seen in this broader perspective, the 
said rules on the effects of infringement decisions appear to be the most 
innovative (and perhaps therefore also the most controversial).
12.2.7. Forum, rules facilitating settlements and judicial review
501. This study indicates that, at least as far as the EU legislation assessed 
is concerned, detailed EU rules on forum are rather unusual.151 In fact, hard-
ly any such rules are provided for regarding situations where the private 
enforcement claims in question are presumed to be brought before a civil 
court, as is the case under the Product Liability Directive, the IPR Enforce-
ment Directive and the Competition Damages Directive (although the refer-
ence in this latter directive to Article 267 TFEU on the preliminary reference 
procedure implies that indirectly certain requirements apply152). The situa-
tion is more heterogeneous however under the Procurement Remedies 
Directives and consumer protection directives such as the Consumer Injunc-
tions Directive and the Unfair Terms Directive.153 Probably in light of the 
differences existing at national level, these latter directives leave the Mem-
ber States the choice whether to designate a judicial or a non-judicial body to 
rule on the claims brought on the basis of these acts. These judicial bodies 
can be either civil or administrative courts. In those cases again no further 
requirements have been specified. But this can be different where these bod-
148 See in particular Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC anti-
trust rules, COM(2008) 165, pp. 6-7.
149 Art. 9, 12-15 and 16 Competition Damages Directive respectively. See further subsection 
6.3.5, 6.3.4 and 6.3.2 above respectively.
150 See e.g. Art. 6(1) and (2) Electronic Signatures Directive 1999/93; Art. 8 Racial Equality 
Directive 2000/43; Art. 5(3) and (4) Air Passengers’ Rights Regulation 261/2004; Art. 19 
Gender Equality Directive 2006/54; Art. 6(9) Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83; Art. 
20(3) Public Limited Liabilities Companies Directive 2012/30.
151 See subsection 9.2.1 above.
152 Art. 4(9) Competition Damages Directive. See further subsection 6.3.5 above.
153 Art. 2(9) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13; Art. 2(1) Consumer Injunc-
tions Directive 2009/22; Art. 7(2) Unfair Terms Directive 93/13. See further subsections 
3.3.3, 5.2.2 and 5.3.2 respectively.
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ies are non-judicial in character (e.g. an administrative appeal board or an 
ombudsman). As especially the Procurement Remedies Directives illustrate, 
then additional and rather detailed requirements can apply, which essen-
tially aim to ensure that the review exercised is independent and impar-
tial.154 These requirements include rules on the composition of the review 
bodies concerned, the parties’ right to be heard, decisions being reasoned 
and in writing, as well as the possibility of making preliminary references. 
It thus appears that, where rules of forum are concerned, a considerable 
degree of ‘residual’ procedural autonomy often remains for the Member 
States. As the Court of Justice has consistently held ever since Rewe, in the 
absence of specific EU rules, it is in principle for each Member State to des-
ignate the courts having jurisdiction to rule on private enforcement actions 
and to specify the detailed rules that apply in this respect.155 The findings of 
this study suggest that secondary EU law on private enforcement mostly 
leaves this general rule unaffected, particularly where the Member States 
designate bodies that are judicial in character. Put simply, the EU legislature 
appears to trust that the – civil or administrative – courts of the Member 
States will do their work in an independent, impartial and fair manner. It 
tends to be less inclined to do so however where the task of ruling on the 
private enforcement actions in question is attributed to administrative 
authorities or other non-judicial bodies.
502. The EU legislation under consideration aims to encourage the out-of-
court settlement of disputes involving alleged infringements of EU law essen-
tially in two distinct manners.156 As a first possible manner, rules on ‘pre-
trial contacts’ do so by obliging potential applicants to first contact the 
alleged infringers before initiating legal proceedings. Rules of this kind are 
typically found in the acts that expressly allow for review by administrative 
courts, notably the Consumer Injunctions Directive and the Procurement 
Remedies Directives.157 A second possible manner is the provision of rules 
on alternative dispute resolution, which in contrast presume that the parties 
concerned are unable to resolve the dispute between them and therefore 
foresee the involvement of (non-judicial) outside entities of some sort. Leav-
ing aside the Procurement Remedies Directives’ aforementioned broadly 
formulated rules on forum (which could entail arbitration) and the ‘concili-
ation mechanism’ for which one of these directives provided until the 2007 
revision of these directives,158 it has been seen that the EU legislation at issue 
154 See e.g. also Art. 11(1) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29; Art. 5(1) Mislead-
ing Advertising Directive 2006/114.
155 CoJ case 33/76, Rewe, para. 5.
156 See subsection 9.2.2 above.
157 Art. 1(4) and (5) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13; Art. 5 Consumer 
Injunctions Directive 2009/22. See further subsections 3.3.3 and 5.2.2 above respectively. 
See e.g. also Art. 11(1) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29.
158 Art. 9-11 Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13, as it stood before the 2007 amendment. See 
further subsection 3.4.1 above.
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does not set out rules on alternative dispute resolution as such. The focus is 
squarely on facilitating judicial redress. Yet the Competition Damages Direc-
tive nonetheless includes certain rules that expressly seek to encourage 
attempts at settling disputes out-of-court, especially by specifying the effects 
thereof on legal proceedings brought under this directive (suspension of 
limitation periods and possibly also of legal proceedings; reduction of 
claims for compensation and contribution).159 This illustrates that the EU 
legislature does not see judicial redress and alternative dispute resolution as 
being entirely unrelated. It also illustrates, more generally, that interest at 
EU level in alternative dispute resolution appears to be increasing, as also 
the adoption in 2013 of the Consumer ADR Directive illustrates.160
Two additional points merit being noticed here. In the first place, the 
abovementioned provisions of EU law are characterised by their optional 
nature. The said rules on pre-trial contacts can be binding on the parties con-
cerned, but under the directives concerned they are mere options available 
to the Member States. The reverse is true for the abovementioned rules on 
alternative dispute resolution. These latter rules are binding on the Member 
States, but they are optional for the parties concerned, in the sense that nei-
ther the Competition Damages Directive nor the Consumer ADR Directive 
obliges private party-applicants to have recourse to alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanisms. In the second place, there is generally little doubt that 
out-of-court settlements can have certain advantages, notably in terms of 
lower costs and the informality and speed of the proceedings. This is thus 
potentially an interesting manner to resolve disputes involving infringe-
ments of EU law. Yet there can also be certain disadvantages, especially for 
(potential) applicants. In as far as possible delays and the associated risks 
during attempts to reach a settlement are concerned, such as the expiry of 
limitation periods, the above directives mostly address these disadvantages. 
However the EU legislature seems to take a narrower view than the EU judi-
ciary on this point, given that the latter also tends to take account of possible 
additional costs and practical complications for the private parties con-
cerned.161 Another, more general potential disadvantage that tends to 
receive only limited attention is how to safeguard the general interest associ-
ated with issues such as the legality of any settlement reached between the 
parties and the lack of transparency of settlements.162
503. As a last point, two procedural issues that both relate to the judicial 
review to be exercised by national courts seised in private enforcement pro-
ceedings are to be considered, i.e. the standard of judicial review and the 
question whether those courts are required to raise certain points of EU law 
159 Art. 18-19 Competition Damages Directive. See further subsection 6.3.5 above.
160 Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11. See further subsection 5.5.2 above.
161 CoJ case C-63/01, Evans, para. 44-58; CoJ joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Alassini, 
para. 52-66.
162 See subsection 11.1.3 above.
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of their own motion (ex officio). Both issues have in common that none of the 
legal acts assessed in this study addresses them expressly. Yet in both 
instances certain requirements have been developed in the case law. In par-
ticular, as regards the standard of judicial review, the Court has held that it is 
not compatible with the objective of the Procurement Remedies Directives if 
the test to be applied is whether or not the defendant acted in an arbitrary 
manner.163 For now it remains to be clarified however what standard is then 
required under these directives and whether this ruling can be applied more 
broadly. There is other case law suggesting that EU law generally (especially 
the principle of effectiveness) does not require ‘full’ judicial review, i.e. the 
empowerment of the court to substitute its own assessment for that of the 
defendant.164 Consequently the required standard arguably lies somewhere 
in between a test of arbitrariness and full review. Yet it cannot be excluded 
that a higher standard applies in cases brought under secondary EU law of 
the type at issue in this study, as compared to cases where no such legisla-
tion applies and that therefore fall squarely within the procedural autonomy 
of the Member States.
At least as many questions can arise with respect to EU law require-
ments regarding the possible own motion review by a national court in private 
enforcement litigation.165 Such an obligation implies a deviation from the 
predominantly passive role of those courts, particularly in legal proceed-
ings between private parties, under the domestic laws of the Member States, 
which the Court of Justice has accepted as a general rule.166 In a remarkable 
line of case law the Court has however also clarified that under the Unfair 
Terms Directive an obligation of own motion review exists in principle, in 
light of the often weak position of consumers and the nature and impor-
tance of the public interest underlying consumer protection in the EU legal 
order.167 The Court has further held that in competition cases a similar obli-
gation can exist, at least where the possible annulment of arbitration awards 
is concerned, whereby the importance of the EU rules in question has again 
been highlighted, without however making it clear precisely in which situ-
ations and on which grounds such an obligation exists in this field of law.168 
By contrast in relation to the Procurement Remedies Directives the Court 
has left this question primarily to be determined by national law, while not-
163 CoJ C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure, para. 57-64. See subsection 9.2.3 above.
164 CoJ case C-120/97, Upjohn, para. 30-37.
165 See subsection 9.2.4 above.
166 E.g. CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 21; CoJ joined cases 
C-222/05 and C-225/05, Van der Weerd, para. 28.
167 See in particular CoJ joined cases C-240/98 and C-244/98, Océano Grupo, para. 22-29. See 
further subsection 5.3.2 above.
168 See CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 13-14 and 22; CoJ case 
C-126/97, Eco Swiss, para. 36-41; CoJ joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, 
para. 31; CoJ case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands, para. 49. See further subsection 6.1.1 
above.
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ing at the same time that these directives can preclude own motion review.169 
The overall picture that thus emerges is therefore far from clear. Further clar-
ification remains to be awaited. Nonetheless it would appear that the nature 
or importance of the rules of substantive EU law at stake in the above-
mentioned cases is not the decisive element in explaining these differing 
outcomes. The crucial issue seems rather a desire on the side of the Court 
to ensure the effective protection of the rights that the private parties con-
cerned derive from EU law. While in some cases this consideration can argue 
in favour of own motion review, in other instances it can argue against it.
12.3. Public and private perspectives on private enforcement
In many respects a central theme running through the two preceding sec-
tions has been, as was noted earlier, the tension between EU ‘interference’ 
and the Member States’ ‘autonomy’ where the possible adoption of EU leg-
islation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law is concerned. This last 
section has a somewhat different central theme, namely the distinction and 
interaction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ in private enforcement-related 
matters. A question that is of particular importance in this connection is 
whether and if so, to which extent private enforcement can and should be 
understood as an enforcement instrument in the general interest. The 
answer to this question also has a bearing on the assessment of the inherent 
limitations and points of attention that arise in connection with the EU’s 
private enforcement model and, by extension, the EU legislation assessed in 
this study. Finally, the question arises as to the need for, and the content of, 
a more elaborated EU policy regarding its law-making related to private 
enforcement. Building on the findings set out in the preceding chapters, 
these issues are subsequently discussed in the three subsections below.
12.3.1. Private enforcement as a complementary enforcement instrument
504. This study has shown that the relationship between public and pri-
vate enforcement is both an important and a complex issue. Just as the 
enforcement of the rights that private parties derive from EU law normally 
takes place before the national courts, public enforcement also mostly takes 
place at national level.170 The Commission itself is only exceptionally empow-
ered to address (alleged) infringements of rules of substantive EU law by 
private parties, notably in the field of EU competition law.171 Consequently, 
where the compliance with EU law by private parties is concerned, the 
responsibility for ensuring public enforcement normally lies with the Mem-
ber States. EU law typically requires the Member States to provide, as a min-
169 CoJ case C-315/01, GAT, para. 46-55. See further subsection 3.2.2 above.
170 See in particular subsections 1.1.1 and 2.4.2 above.
171 See subsections 2.4.2 and 6.4.2 above.
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imum, for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for such 
infringements of EU law. They can also be required to designate public 
enforcement authorities that exercise certain powers to investigate, termi-
nate and/or punish infringements. The extent of these requirements and 
these powers tends to differ significantly between the various fields of EU 
law however.
505. When considering these public enforcement-related obligations under 
EU law and the EU legislation facilitating the private enforcement of EU law 
discussed in the foregoing in their totality the starting point is that these are 
to a high extent two largely unrelated matters. These two sets of obligations 
exist for the most part independently from each other. For instance, a Mem-
ber State will generally not be deemed to have fulfilled its duties under EU 
law to ensure public enforcement of the substantive rules in question merely 
because it has permitted or facilitated private enforcement.172 Similarly, 
whereas for an assessment under the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion regard can be had to the entirety of the remedies available to the private 
party concerned in a given legal system, the availability or absence of cer-
tain public enforcement mechanisms does not appear to be a relevant factor 
in this respect however.173 And while private parties can seek to ‘trigger’ 
public enforcement proceedings by filing complaints, that does not mean 
that they become a party to the legal proceedings to which their complaint 
may (or may not) lead.174
It is true that especially in the field of EU competition law there is a 
degree of interaction. The Competition Regulation foresees the possibility of 
amicus curiae interventions by the competent public enforcement authorities, 
including the Commission, in private enforcement proceedings.175 The 
Competition Damages Directive further provides for the possibility of such 
interventions specifically in relation to requests for the disclosure of evi-
dence included in the their files and the quantification of damages.176 This 
directive also regulates the effects of findings of infringements in public 
enforcement proceedings, the suspension of limitation periods until after 
the termination of public enforcement proceedings as well as the possibility 
for the public enforcement authorities concerned, when determining the 
appropriate penalty for an infringement, to take account of compensation 
paid to injured private parties pursuant to an out-of-court settlement.177 But 
these are on the whole rather limited exceptions. That is already illustrated 
by the optional nature of most of the abovementioned rules set out in the 
172 See subsection 2.4.3 above.
173 See further subsection 2.3.1 above.
174 See subsection 2.4.1 and 6.4.2 above.
175 Art. 15 Competition Regulation 1/2003. See further subsection 6.1.3 above.
176 Art. 6(11) and 16(3) Competition Damages Directive. See further subsections 6.3.3 and 
6.3.2 above respectively.
177 Art. 9, 10(5) and 18(4) Competition Damages Directive. See further subsection 6.3.5 
above.
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Competition Damages Directive. It is further illustrated by the fact that no 
comparable rules exist (and to some extent cannot even exist, in the absence 
of any significant public enforcement obligations under EU law) in other 
fields of EU law. It is noticeable that both in the field of EU competition law 
and in the other fields of law under consideration several suggestions and 
proposals to connect both enforcement mechanisms more closely were not 
taken over by the EU legislature.178 In procedural terms public and private 
enforcement therefore remain for the most part two separate worlds.
506. Having said that, in several other respects public and private enforce-
ment ought not to be considered entirely in isolation from each other. When 
assessed at a more general level, the most evident link between the two is 
that both forms of enforcement can help increase overall levels of enforce-
ment of, and eventually compliance with, EU law. Private enforcement is 
frequently seen as a means to complement (or supplement) public enforce-
ment. In its proposal for the Competition Damages Directive the Commis-
sion stated for example that “[t]he overall enforcement of the EU competition 
rules is best guaranteed through complementary public and private enforcement”.179 
Here both forms of enforcement were thus seen as “complementary tools serv-
ing the objective of an effective enforcement of the EU competition rules”.180 The 
Collective Redress Recommendation similarly declares that “[i]t is a core task 
of public enforcement to prevent and punish the violations of rights granted under 
[EU] law. The possibility for private persons to pursue claims based on violations of 
such rights supplements public enforcement”.181 The European Parliament is 
essentially of the same view. It has for example held that “bringing private 
actions for damages should complement and support, but not replace, the enforce-
ment of competition law by the competition authorities”.182
Broadly speaking, this view rests on the idea that private enforcement 
can help to draw important resources into the overall ‘enforcement mix’. 
That can be all the more important given that the resources of the competent 
public enforcement authorities tend to be limited. This is not only a matter 
of the human and financial resources. Private parties can also have specific 
expertise and inside knowledge of the practical workings of a particular sec-
tor, which might make it easier for them to detect and pursue infringements 
of EU law that it is for public enforcement authorities. This insight is more-
over by no means a recent one. The possible beneficial effects in terms of 
increasing the overall enforcement capacity that might result from the “vigi-
178 See subsection 11.2.4 above.
179 Commission, Proposal for Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 3.
180 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 12.
181 Recital 2 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
182 European Parliament, Resolution on the white paper on damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2009)0187, recital H. See e.g. also European Parliament, 
Resolution on towards a coherent European approach to collective redress, P7_
TA(2012)0021, recital I.
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lance of individuals” played an important role already in the Court of Justice’s 
1963 landmark judgment in Van Gend en Loos, which articulated the princi-
ple of direct effect that is a necessary prerequisite for a private enforcement 
model to function.183 Similarly, as the Commission already observed three 
decades ago, damages awards to injured private parties “would render [EU] 
law more effective” and might therefore have to be facilitated.184 More recent-
ly the same thought has been echoed in rulings such as Courage and Muñoz, 
where the Court stressed the beneficial effects of private parties being able 
to address other private parties’ (alleged) infringements of EU law in terms 
of strengthening the working of the substantive rules of EU law in question 
and discouraging infringements of those rules.185
507. Although the degree to which this has been articulated differs some-
what per legal act at issue, there can be no doubt that the EU legislation 
under consideration in this study builds on this insight. The Procurement 
Remedies Directives for instance ultimately aim “to ensure that the rules of 
public contracts are correctly applied”.186 The Consumer Injunctions Directive 
similarly seeks to prevent the effectiveness of substantive EU consumer pro-
tection law from being “thwarted”.187 Although this ‘general interest func-
tion’ of private enforcement litigation is less clearly expressed in the IPR 
Enforcement Directive, this directive too should be understood against the 
background of a desire “to ensure that the substantive law on intellectual prop-
erty […] is applied effectively”.188 Likewise by increasing the likelihood that 
infringers of the EU competition rules have to bear the costs of their infringe-
ment, the Competition Damages Directive aims inter alia to act as “an incen-
tive for better compliance”.189 Also the private enforcement-facilitating mea-
sures introduced by this latter directive should thus be seen in light of the 
desire to further the full effectiveness and practical effects of the substantive 
EU competition law at issue.190
This ‘general interest function’ of private enforcement is also echoed in 
several of the individual remedial and procedural provisions that have been 
included in the EU legislation at issue. One example is the reference in the 
IPR Enforcement Directive to the measures, procedures and remedies set 
out therein being “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.191 As was noted 
183 CoJ case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos. See further subsection 1.1.1 above.
184 Commission, Thirteenth report on competition policy, 1984, p. 136.
185 CoJ case C-453/99, Courage, para. 25-27; CoJ case C-253/00, Muñoz, para. 31. See further 
subsections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 above.
186 Commission, Amended proposal for Public Sector Remedies Directive 89/665, COM(88) 
733, p. 10. Cf. recital 2 Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13. See e.g. also 
CoJ case C-406/08, Uniplex, para. 26.
187 Recital 4 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
188 Recital 3 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
189 Commission, Proposal for the Competition Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404, p. 4.
190 Recital 3 Competition Damages Directive.
191 Art. 3(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
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above, this is what EU law normally requires with respect to the penalties to 
be provided for by national law as a matter of public enforcement. The 
Court of Justice has further clarified that the provisions on injunctions and 
the contractual remedy provided for in the Unfair Terms Directive serve a 
purpose in terms of deterrence and dissuasion.192 Along similar lines the 
Commission has noted that the injunctive relief available under the Con-
sumer Injunctions Directive can be a “successful tool for policing markets” and 
a “governance tool [which] can be used as a deterrent”.193 Other illustrations are 
the Procurement Remedies Directives’ provisions on ‘alternative penal-
ties’194 and the publicity measures for which the IPR Enforcement and the 
Consumer Injunctions Directive provide, which serve both as a ‘supplemen-
tary deterrent’ and to inform the public at large.195
508. The underlying idea is thus essentially to co-opt and ‘instrumentalise’ 
interested private parties so as to encourage them to play their role as “the 
‘real guardians’ of the legal integrity of [EU] law”.196 On this view private 
enforcement involves private parties as “law enforcers acting in the public 
interest, rather than as holders of subjective rights”, as a Commission official 
argued in 2001 in a competition law context.197 Others speak of these parties 
functioning as ‘private policemen’198 or ‘private attorneys general’.199 
Although this study has not sought to quantify this effect, there seems little 
reason to doubt that the vigilance of interested private parties can make an 
important contribution to improving overall levels of enforcement of and 
compliance with the rules of EU law. In all likelihood that applies even more 
so where legislation of the type at issue in this study is in place. Nonetheless 
this study also indicates that the above view on private enforcement is 
incomplete, in light of the following considerations.
509. To begin with, considering private enforcement primarily as a com-
plement to public enforcement seems to presuppose that public enforcement 
mechanisms are in place. In some fields this certainly is the case. Especially 
in relation to EU competition law infringements robust and well-entrenched 
public enforcement mechanisms exist both at EU and at national level.200 
192 Cf. CoJ case C-372/99, Commission v. Italy, para. 15; CoJ case C-618/10, Banco Español de 
Crédito, para. 69.
193 Commission, Second report on Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22, COM(2012) 
635, p. 7.
194 Art. 2e(2) Procurement Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13.
195 Art. 15 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48; Art. 2(1)(b) Consumer Injunctions Directive 
2009/22. See further subsection 8.2.4 above.
196 Weiler (1991), pp. 2413-2414.
197 Gyselen (2001), pp. 144-145 (this author was at the time head of unit in the Commission’s 
Directorate General for Competition; this paper was however written at a personal title).
198 E.g. Drake (2006), p. 843.
199 E.g. Kilpatrick (2000), p. 2.
200 See subsection 6.4.2 above.
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But in many other fields of law public enforcement plays at best only a lim-
ited role as a matter of EU law. These latter fields include EU public procure-
ment and intellectual property law.201 It is noticeable that precisely in these 
two fields some of the most elaborated EU legal acts facilitating private 
enforcement have been enacted, i.e. the Procurement Remedies Directives 
and the IPR Enforcement Directive respectively. Initially the same held true 
where the EU’s law-making activities in the field of consumer protection 
law are concerned. The EU’s involvement with public enforcement in this 
field has historically been limited,202 while several private enforcement-
related acts were adopted (Consumer Injunctions Directive, Unfair Terms 
Directive, Product Liability Directive). More recently attention has focused 
on strengthening public enforcement, which appears to have come at the 
expense of the EU’s long-standing ambition to facilitate private enforce-
ment.
All this suggests that seeing the relationship between public and private 
enforcement merely in complementary terms risks overlooking that – as 
matter of policy rather than in strictly legal terms – there can be what rather 
appears to be a substitution effect.203 That is to say, at least some private 
enforcement-related EU legislation appears to have been established at EU 
level not so much to as complement, but rather as a substitute for weak or 
even almost entirely absent public enforcement mechanisms under EU law. 
Put differently, the absence of robust and well-entrenched public enforce-
ment mechanisms as a matter of EU law in a given field may well be an 
important factor in determining the ‘demand’ for private enforcement-relat-
ed EU legislation of the type at issue in this study. The considerable difficul-
ties encountered in establishing a directive on the private enforcement of EU 
competition law seem to confirm this. Many of the concerns expressed in 
connection to this initiative relate to the negative effects that it might have 
on the public enforcement already ‘supplied’ in this field. The existence of 
the latter can thus not only lessen ‘demand’, but it might in effect also act as 
a barrier for the adoption of private enforcement-related measures. It is 
noticeable in this regard that this competition law initiative has transformed 
over time from one that wholeheartedly sought to encourage private 
enforcement in this domain, to one that is as much driven by a desire to 
shield the existing public enforcement structures from the (potential) nega-
tive effects of increased private enforcement.204
510. A second and more fundamental point is that seeing private enforce-
ment principally as a complement to public enforcement and considering 
private parties essentially as law enforcers in the general interest places the 
emphasis squarely on ensuring the effectiveness of EU law per se. This large-
201 See subsections 3.4.2 and 6.4.2 above respectively.
202 See subsection 5.5.3 above.
203 See subsection 10.2.2 above.
204 See subsection 6.3.1 above.
para. 510 Chapter 12. Summary and conclusions p. 559
ly neglects that ensuring the effective enforcement of the rights that private 
parties may derive from this law can be an objective in its own right. There 
is no reason to presume that this latter objective is of secondary importance 
in the EU legal order.205 As Advocate General Jääskinen observed, appli-
cants in private enforcement proceedings are essentially simply seeking 
legal protection in relation to a private law claim rather than that they are 
enforcing a public policy.206 It can be noted in this connection that, although 
the Court may at times have seemed ambiguous on this point, it has held 
that the purpose of the EU law principle of Member State liability is not 
punishment or deterrence, but rather ensuring that the parties having suf-
fered damage are compensated.207 The situation is unlikely to be fundamen-
tally different where the principle of private party liability, which underlies 
the concept of private enforcement, is concerned, in light of the parallelism 
between that these two principles.208 An overly one-sided emphasis on the 
‘general interest function’ of damages claims (and by extension private 
enforcement actions generally) would moreover seem to sit uncomfortably 
with the predominant views that the rules of national law of this kind aim to 
punish and deter at most as a secondary objective, if at all.209
If anything, this argues for not distinguishing too rigidly between the 
objectives of ensuring the effectiveness of EU law per se and the effective 
enforcement of the rights that private parties derive from that law. They are 
intertwined. This distinction also matters little in practice where the two 
underlying interests (i.e. the general interest and the individual interests of 
the private parties concerned) coincide, as is often the case. A private party 
that is affected by an infringement of, say, the EU public procurement rules 
may find it entirely in its own individual interest to initiate legal proceed-
ings so as to have a discriminatory provision struck out from the tender 
documents, a contract award procedure annulled or damages awarded. At 
the same time the bringing of private enforcement actions of this kind – or 
the mere fact that there is a realistic risk of such actions being brought – can 
be an incentive for the parties that are subject to these rules to ensure com-
pliance, which is evidently in the general interest. Indeed, the thought that 
both objectives can be reached at the same time, and that there can moreover 
be mutual beneficial effects, lies at the very heart of the private enforcement 
model generally and the EU legislation assessed in this study specifically. 
Concentrating only on the ‘general interest function’ risks overlooking the 
duality that is central to the concept of private enforcement as it exists in the 
EU legal order.
205 See subsection 11.1.4 above.
206 Opinion AG Jääskinen case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, para. 48.
207 CoJ case C-470/03, AGM-COS.MET, para. 88.
208 See in particular subsections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 above.
209 See subsection 7.1.6 above.
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The rationale underpinning the said legislation may thus be a desire to 
improve the effectiveness of the (objective) EU law at issue, as was noted 
above, but at the same time the legal acts in question also aim to help the 
private parties concerned to enforce their (subjective) rights derived from 
that law.210 Those parties are obviously the prime beneficiaries for instance 
of the “high, equivalent and homogeneous level of protection” that the IPR 
Enforcement Directive aims to establish.211 The Unfair Terms Directive seeks 
among other things “to safeguard the citizen in his role as consumer”,212 just as 
the Product Liability Directive makes it clear that “injured person[s] should be 
able to claim full compensation”.213 The Competition Damages Directive like-
wise also aims to ensure that the “Union right to compensation” can be exer-
cised effectively, in accordance with the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion.214 While again this study did not seek to quantify this effect, it can 
safely be assumed that these parties’ possibilities to enforce their rights 
derived from EU law have generally improved as a consequence of the 
introduction of the specific EU rules on remedies and procedures discussed 
in the foregoing.
511. Lastly, besides for a proper understanding of the concept of private 
enforcement as such, the above distinction between ensuring the effective-
ness of EU law per se and ensuring the effective enforcement of the rights 
that private parties derive from this law can also be of importance in the 
present context for other reasons. In particular, the two interests involved 
may at times collide rather than collude, or at least there can be a certain ten-
sion between them. This can for instance occur in relation to issues such as 
whether and to which extent infringers that applied for ‘leniency’ for com-
petition law infringements should be protected from being held liable in 
private enforcement cases, whether punitive damages are required or to be 
rejected at EU level, whether out-of-court settlements should be encouraged 
or treated with some caution and whether collective redress mechanisms 
ought to be provided for as a matter of EU law and if so, in which cases and 
in what form.215 As the Commission once put it, there can be an “[inevitable] 
trade-off between justice […] and efficiency”.216
It is submitted that, generally speaking, in situations of this kind the 
Court of Justice is likely to insist on both interests being balanced rather than 
placing them in a hierarchical relationship.217 It would appear that both are 
in principle equally fundamental in the EU’s legal order. In and by itself that 
210 See subsection 11.2.2 above.
211 Recital 10 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48.
212 Recital 6 Unfair Terms Directive 93/13.
213 Recital 5 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
214 Recitals 3 and 4 Competition Damages Directive. See also its Art. 1(1).
215 See subsection 11.1.3 above.
216 Commission, Staff working paper accompanying the green paper on damages actions for 
breach of EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, pp. 49-50.
217 See subsection 11.1.4 above.
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does not necessarily mean that the EU legislature is barred from prioritising 
one interest over the other when it acts in this respect. If and when it does 
so, it must however respect certain boundaries, notably in terms of proce-
dural requirements, proportionality and fundamental rights.218 The afore-
mentioned distinction is important for the present purposes, given that the 
assessment of an (intended) EU legislative measure on private enforcement, 
for instance on any of the abovementioned issues (protection of leniency 
applicants, punitive damages, settlements, collective redress), often largely 
depends on which of the two objectives in question is identified as the prin-
cipal one that the legislature wishes to achieve. For this may well have a 
bearing on the need for and the design of those measures. It can also be of 
relevance when determining whether and if so, to which extent the EU’s 
intended action meets the ‘three-step-test’ under the principles of conferral 
(i.e. a sufficient legal basis), subsidiarity and proportionality.
12.3.2. Four inherent limitations and points of attention
512. Turning more in particular to the inherent limitations and points of 
particular attention connected to private enforcement generally and EU leg-
islation thereon specifically, a first remark relates to the conceived role of 
private parties as ‘law enforcers in the general interest’, mentioned above. 
Implicit in the foregoing is that these parties can generally only be expected 
to act as such only up to a certain point, i.e. the point at which the general 
interest and the individual interests of the private parties concerned no lon-
ger coincide. In many instances this point might never be reached, in light of 
the parallelism that often exists between both interests. But even apart from 
the abovementioned situations where these two interests may fundamen-
tally be at odds with each other, many other factors can also lead a private 
party to conclude that its interests are not served by initiating or continuing 
to pursue legal proceedings for an (alleged) infringement of EU law before a 
national court. An evident and particularly important factor is the costs 
involved, seen in light of the possible gains of a private enforcement 
action.219 Yet several other factors can also affect the cost/benefit analysis 
that an affected private party will typically make. They include, as the case 
may be, a fear of harming an existing business relationship or of retaliatory 
measures, a possible preference to invest in more forward-looking matters 
rather than in litigation, limited awareness of the law, emotional or psycho-
logical considerations (stress, distraction, uncertainty) and culturally deter-
mined views on litigation.220
None of this should be taken to mean that a private enforcement model 
cannot properly function or that the EU legislative measures discussed in 
this study are necessarily ineffective. In many respects these measures can 
218 Ibid.
219 See subsection 11.2.2 above.
220 See subsection 10.3.2 above.
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be understood as attempts to prevent the said point from being reached. The 
easier it is for a private party for instance to have access to relevant evi-
dence, to quantify the harm suffered or to have its legal costs reimbursed, 
the more likely it is that this party will deem it in its interest to bring an 
infringement of EU law to the attention of a national court. Even if these 
measures can thus certainly make a significant difference in practice, the fact 
remains that several of the abovementioned factors can be difficult or even 
impossible to influence through the adoption of legislation. Moreover the 
private parties involved are autonomous when taking their decisions in this 
respect. As the Court of Justice has observed, “in a civil suit, it is for the parties 
to take the initiative”.221 It held to reflect “fundamental conceptions prevailing in 
most Member States as to the relations between the State and the individual”.222 
That implies that the EU legislature may encourage, lure or facilitate private 
parties into bringing and continuing to pursue a private enforcement action, 
but that the latter can in the end not be guided, instructed or forced to do so. 
This evidently limits the extent to which private enforcement can be used as 
an instrument for the enforcement of EU law in the general interest.
513. Second, not all fields of EU law may be equally well suited for private 
enforcement, in light of practical as well as legal considerations. To start 
with the former, and building on the previous point, in certain fields it can 
be particularly difficult to provide incentives for the private parties con-
cerned to initiate private enforcement proceedings. A good example is EU 
consumer protection law. Here the private parties concerned, i.e. consumers, 
by definition do not act in a professional capacity.223 That means that their 
resources and expertise might be relatively limited. Some of the other afore-
mentioned factors may also carry particular weight for these parties, such as 
a lack of awareness of the law and emotional and psychological consider-
ations. Besides, and at least as importantly, the harm caused by infringe-
ments of EU consumer protection law may well be comparably modest 
when considered at the level of the individual consumer (‘scattered dam-
age’). This can thus tilt the said cost/benefit analysis in favour of not taking 
legal action when an infringement occurs. Distinct yet related issues can 
arise for legal reasons. It has already been seen how a private enforcement 
model essentially seeks to build on the parallelism between the general 
interest and the individual interests of the parties concerned. The concept of 
a ‘right’ constitutes a crucial link between the two. A private party will nor-
mally only be able to bring a private enforcement case where the rule of EU 
221 CoJ joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel, para. 21. See e.g. also Opinion AG 
Geelhoed joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, para. 31.
222 Ibid., para. 21.
223 For in EU consumer protection law the term ‘consumer’ is normally defi ned as a natural 
person acting for purposes falling outside his trade, business, craft or profession. See 
subsection 5.1.2 above.
para. 514 Chapter 12. Summary and conclusions p. 563
law at issue is capable of conferring rights.224 If not, there may simply be 
nothing to privately enforce. It follows that, in situations where the interests 
at stake are ‘diffuse’ in nature, i.e. hard or even impossible to capture in 
terms of individual rights, there may be limited or no scope for private 
enforcement. This can be the case for instance with respect to (certain) 
infringements of EU environmental law.225
It is true that certain particular approaches could help to address the 
above difficulties. One could think of facilitating collective redress, notably 
in situations where EU law does confer rights on private parties but where 
the damage caused by the infringements at issue is ‘scattered’. The Collec-
tive Redress Recommendation suggests that in those cases legal proceedings 
could be brought either by ‘representative entities’ or by certain public 
authorities.226 This approach is thus comparable to the one found in the 
Consumer Injunctions Directive, which relies on ‘qualified entities’ or public 
authorities for initiating legal proceedings in the collective interest of con-
sumers.227 Similarly, where ‘diffuse’ interests are at stake, relatively gener-
ous rules on legal standing could allow certain non-governmental organisa-
tions or other third parties to act upon infringements. It appears that such 
approaches tend to enjoy increasing interest at EU level.228 But relying on 
third parties can lead to certain complications of its own, for example as 
regards their funding, case-selection, oversight and the distribution of pos-
sible damages awards. Indeed, views can differ as to whether this actually 
constitutes private enforcement properly speaking. After all these parties 
may generally act through civil law means, but they essentially act in the 
public – or at least not in a strictly individual – interest. The more these par-
ties are made subject to specific rules and public oversight to address the 
said possible complications, the less this constitutes private enforcement in 
a ‘pure’ sense and the more it becomes a sort of ‘public enforcement by pri-
vate means’.
514. Third, private enforcement might in some cases lead to less expendi-
ture on public enforcement, but it is certainly not cost-free.229 There evidently 
are direct costs in the form of expenditure by the national courts seised as 
well as the legal and other costs incurred by the parties to the dispute. In 
addition there may also be less visible and more indirect costs, such as 
224 Cf. recitals 6 and 7 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396, where the question 
whether or not EU law grants rights to private parties is put at the forefront when indi-
cating in which fi elds private enforcement could take place.
225 See subsection 11.2.3 above.
226 Points 5-7 Collective Redress Recommendation 2013/396.
227 Art. 1(1) and 3 Consumer Injunctions Directive 2009/22.
228 See e.g. Commission, Proposal for a regulation on the protection of individuals with 
regards to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
COM(2012) 11, p. 90 (Art. 76(1) and (2)); Art. 11(3) Posting of Workers Enforcement Direc-
tive 2014/67.
229 See subsection 11.2.3 above.
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opportunity costs and costs related to possible ‘over-deterrence’ and ‘chill-
ing effects’ on parties that may decide not to engage in certain not evidently 
illegal activity out of fear of being sued nonetheless.
A related, more general concern is that of creating or encouraging a ‘liti-
gation culture’. This term refers to a situation where private enforcement liti-
gation takes place to an extent that is deemed to be undesirable, harmful or 
even abusive. Even apart from the possible direct and indirect financial costs 
of such ‘excessive’ litigation, it may also imply costs in societal terms more 
broadly. Over the decades especially this latter concern has regularly been 
voiced in relation to EU legislative measures of the type at issue in this 
study, particularly from the side of the parties that might be defendants in 
private enforcement cases and the European Parliament.230 There can evi-
dently be a degree of tension between the ambition to facilitate a ‘healthy’ 
degree of private enforcement and the fear that this may lead to ‘excessive’ 
litigation, even if it were possible to capture both forms of litigation in neat 
categories of this kind. This tension may to some extent be unavoidable. It 
results in particular from the aforementioned autonomy of the private par-
ties concerned and the related limited scope for the EU legislature to guide 
or control these parties’ actions in this respect.
That said, this study suggests that there generally seems little reason for 
concerns of this kind. Both as it now stands and in the foreseeable future EU 
law is far off from providing for the “toxic cocktail”231 of private enforce-
ment-related measures (punitive damages, intrusive pre-trial discovery, 
class action, contingency fees) that are deemed to have led to excesses in this 
regard in the United States. Practical experience with acts such as the Pro-
curement Remedies Directives, the IPR Enforcement Directive and the Prod-
uct Liability Directive show that – certainly where damages claims are con-
cerned – the degree of private enforcement litigation in the EU can by no 
means be called excessive.232 The Commission therefore seems largely cor-
rect in its assessment that in the EU undercompensation is at present prob-
ably more of a concern than possible overcompensation.233 And where this 
is nonetheless deemed a realistic concern, the EU legislature has certain 
measures at its disposal to address it. Examples of measures of this kind 
assessed in the foregoing include the threshold amounts set out in the Prod-
uct Liability Directive,234 the inclusion of rules on the allocation of legal 
230 E.g. European Parliament, Resolution on the white paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules, P6_TA(2009)0187, para. 9; European Parliament, Resolution on 
towards a coherent European approach to collective redress, P7_TA(2012)0021, para. 2. 
See also subsections 5.1.5 and 6.2.2 above.
231 Commission, Questions and answers regarding the green paper on consumer collective 
redress, MEMO/08/741, p. 4.
232 See subsection 7.1.1 above.
233 Commission, Impact assessment report on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules, SWD(2013) 203, p. 18.
234 Art. 9 Product Liability Directive 85/374.
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costs based on the ‘loser pays’ principle,235 the Competition Damages Direc-
tive’s rule prohibiting overcompensation236 or the IPR Enforcement Direc-
tive’s general requirement of safeguards against abuse.237
515. Finally, private enforcement typically – although by no means neces-
sarily, as especially the Procurement Remedies Directives illustrate – takes 
place ‘horizontally’, i.e. in legal relationships between private parties. This 
is thus a difference as compared to public enforcement, which normally 
works ‘vertically’, i.e. in legal relationships between the State and a given 
private party. As such the increased and increasing possibilities for the pri-
vate enforcement of EU law created by the EU legislature in the legislation 
at issue both exemplify and extend a gradual trend towards the ‘horizontali-
sation’ of EU law.238 This can be seen as transposing and giving further effect 
to the principle of horizontal direct effect in the procedural and remedial 
sphere. In the words of the Commission, this is thus a “logical extension” of 
the EU’s involvement with the substantive law that applies in these horizon-
tal legal relationships.239
This given can in turn have several important implications in the pres-
ent context. For one thing, the point of departure in civil litigation is the 
equality of the parties to the dispute. As a matter of fundamental rights 
(more specifically the right to a fair trial), in private enforcement proceed-
ings brought under the EU legislation at issue here the principles of equality 
of arms and adversarial proceedings must be respected.240 This means for 
instance that a private party can only be allowed to carry out searches at the 
premises of an alleged infringer, as the IPR Enforcement Directive permits, 
where adequate safeguards have been provided for.241 For another thing, 
the more private enforcement is made akin to public enforcement by grant-
ing the private party-applicants concerned powers to investigate or to 
penalise (alleged) infringements of EU law, the more likely it is that the par-
ties that are subject to these powers may be able to rely on fundamental 
rights that apply in criminal proceedings, such as the privilege against self-
incrimination and the ne bis in idem principle.242 Given that the question 
whether or not proceedings are ‘criminal’ in nature is determined on the 
substance, the fact that private enforcement proceedings are often qualified 
235 See subsection 8.2.5 above.
236 See in particular Art. 2(3) Competition Damages Directive.
237 Art. 3(2) IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48. See also Commission, Proposal for a trade 
secrets directive, COM(2013) 813, pp. 19-20 (Art. 6(2)).
238 See subsection 11.2.1 above.
239 Commission, Proposal for IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48, COM(2003) 46, p. 5. Cf. 
e.g. also European Parliament, Resolution on consumer redress, OJ 1987, C 99/203, recital 
C: “the substantive rights conferred by [EU] legislation on the consumer must be supplemented 
by appropriate procedural mechanisms to ensure their enforcement”.
240 Art. 47 Charter. See section 2.3 and subsection 11.2.5 above.
241 Art. 7 IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/28.
242 Art. 48-50 Charter. See section 2.3 and subsection 11.2.6 above.
p. 566 D. Broader aspects, perspectives and conclusions para. 516
as ‘civil’ under national law does not, in and by itself, mean that these latter 
rights cannot be invoked. Therefore also these latter fundamental rights can 
conceivably come into play here, for instance in relation to the aforemen-
tioned ex parte search orders, measures on the disclosure of evidence243 or 
possible punitive damages.244
Generally speaking, there currently seems little reason to believe that 
the EU legislation assessed in this study is such as to raise serious concerns 
in terms of fundamental rights. Adequate safeguards tend to be provided 
for to ensure respect for the right to a fair trial that applies in civil proceed-
ings, while the nature and effects of the measures under consideration do 
not appear to justify the conclusion that the proceedings in which they are 
applied must be qualified as criminal. Still the foregoing implies that there 
are limits to the extent to which the EU legislature can seek to facilitate pri-
vate enforcement proceedings, in particular where this consists of granting 
private party-applicants certain special powers to fulfil their role as ‘law 
enforcers in the general interest’. Too strong and too one-sided a focus on 
improving the position of the applicant might well lead to concerns as 
regard the position of the defendant in these ‘horizontal’ situations. This 
arguably applies even more so where the private enforcement proceedings 
also involve certain third parties. It is noticeable that little, if any, attention 
tends to be paid to questions of this kind when EU legislation of the type at 
issue in this study is enacted.
12.3.3. Towards an EU policy on private enforcement?
516. That brings us to the last subsection of this study. It departs from the 
observation that at present no EU policy on private enforcement to speak of 
exists. Overlooking the foregoing, it appears that only very few general lines 
can be discerned where the EU’s law-making activities in question are con-
cerned. It is evident that in some instances the EU legislature has deemed it 
necessary to take measures to facilitate private enforcement. It also seems to 
be accepted that on the one hand these measures can entail the introduction 
of a range of remedial or procedural provisions, while on the other hand the 
legal systems of the Member States should not be affected more than neces-
sary and that even then the Member States should often be left considerable 
flexibility. Although this is not always clearly articulated and there can be 
considerable variations, there further appears to be an inclination to see pri-
vate enforcement principally as an instrument to contribute to the effective-
ness of EU law per se, more so than as a manner to ensure effective judicial 
protection for the private parties concerned. One of the better articulated 
points on which common ground appears to exist is the view that, when 
enacting these legislative measures, anything that might lead to the excesses 
that are perceived to exist in the United States is to be rejected. To the extent 
243 See subsection 8.2.2 above.
244 See subsection 7.1.5 above.
para. 517 Chapter 12. Summary and conclusions p. 567
that the EU has a policy on private enforcement, it can thus be described as 
a non-policy, in that it seems to be characterised mainly by agreement on 
what it should not entail.
517. It is submitted that there are good reasons for establishing such a policy 
that is worthy of the name. Issues of enforcement and compliance have long 
been, and continue to be, a matter of particular concern in the EU’s legal 
order. The assessment that “it is not enough to pass laws and simply to hope that 
they will be applied evenly in all Member States” seems as valid today as it was 
over two decades ago.245 Indeed, a recent study found that “it would be a 
mistake to hold that the enforcement issue is ‘solved’, far from it”.246 This state of 
affairs evidently concerns not only the effectiveness of EU law per se, but 
also the rights of the private parties concerned. The European Parliament 
has noted in this connection that “citizens and companies must not only enjoy 
rights, but must also be able to enforce those rights effectively and efficiently”.247 In 
the words of the Commission, “rights which cannot be enforced are 
worthless”.248 Thus, in an EU that is founded on the rule of law249 and that 
moreover aspires to have a positive impact on the lives of the citizens of its 
Member States, not in the last place through its extensive ‘language of 
rights’, ensuring that the rules of substantive EU law are capable of actually 
having an effect in practice must be a matter of priority. Facilitating private 
enforcement may be only one of a range of measures that can conceivably be 
taken to this effect. Yet it is undoubtedly an important on, especially because 
it can be a manner to empower the private parties concerned as well as to 
help ensure the effectiveness of EU law generally. It is hard to see how this 
can be realised in a credible and effective manner without elaborating a spe-
cific EU policy on private enforcement.
That applies all the more so given that effectiveness is not the only con-
cern in this respect. Improving coherence and consistency in relation to the 
EU’s legislative measures on private enforcement is another one. The more 
frequently and extensively the EU acts on private enforcement-related mat-
ters, the more this emerges as a particular concern. It has already been seen 
earlier that as it stands the EU legislation at issue leaves much to be desired 
in this respect. For legal as well as political reasons the EU may not have a 
free hand in designing and implementing an all-encompassing policy on the 
enforcement by private parties of their rights derived from EU law before 
the courts of the Member States. Yet enacting an over-arching policy regard-
245 Sutherland Report (1992), p. 5.
246 Study Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2012), p. iv. See e.g. also UK Single Market Report 
(2013), p. 43, where it is concluded that “much of the evidence to this report suggests that there 
is a signifi cant problem with enforcement across the Single Market”.
247 European Parliament, Resolution on towards a coherent European approach to collective 
redress, P7_TA(2012)0021, recital A.
248 Commission, Public consultation towards a coherent approach to collective redress, 
SEC(2011) 173, p. 2.
249 Art. 2 TEU.
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ing the situations where it does act is arguably the best manner to address 
and reconcile the complex and sometimes contradictory issues that can arise 
in this connection. For this is not only a matter of ensuring a coherent and 
consistent approach at EU level, it also relates to fundamental questions of 
differentiation in terms of enforcement possibilities for private parties and 
therefore to questions of fairness and equal treatment. Questions of this kind 
inevitably arise where private enforcement-related action is taken in some 
sectors covered by substantive EU law, but not in others. They extend to the 
situation at national level, notably in relation to differences that may exist 
between national jurisdictions in the absence of EU legislative action in this 
regard as well as in relation to fragmentation within national legal systems 
where action of this type is taken.
To be clear, this is not a plea for necessarily establishing uniform rules on 
private enforcement, which apply without distinction in all sectors covered 
by EU law. As the law stands this would not do justice, it is submitted, to the 
abovementioned complexities and the specificities of the EU legal order 
more generally. Even apart from the apparent absence of political will and 
the legal basis issues that might arise in this connection, full uniformity in 
terms of private enforcement-related measures – across the various fields of 
EU law or across or within the various jurisdictions in the EU – is not 
required as a matter of EU law.250 A ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy would more-
over not seem to be in place, given that specific enforcement challenges may 
well call for specific solutions. For instance, as was explained above, only 
where infringements have a ‘contractual dimension’ can it be helpful to pro-
vide for contractual remedies. Likewise certain private enforcement-related 
measures, such as facilitating the bringing of actions for damages, may not 
be suitable in all areas. One could think of situations where damages tend to 
be ‘scattered’ or where there are other reasons for presuming that the private 
parties concerned will remain hesitant to initiate legal proceedings. Even 
apart from that it can be questioned whether such uniformity would be in 
place in light of the variations in the degree of EU involvement with sub-
stantive law.
Therefore the point here is rather that, even without aiming for full uni-
formity, a clear and coherent over-arching EU policy on private enforcement 
could make a valuable contribution on many points that can arise in this 
connection. In light of the foregoing it is suggested that such a policy should 
address in particular the following four key issues.
518. To begin with, an EU policy on private enforcement should address 
the question of the scope of the EU legislative action in this regard, i.e. clarify in 
which fields private enforcement-facilitating measures are to be enacted or, 
at a more detailed level, specify precisely which substantive rules of EU law 
are to be complemented by specific remedial and procedural rules as a mat-
250 See subsection 10.4.3 above.
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ter of secondary EU law. If we depart from the presumption that – for legal, 
political or policy reasons – there is no scope or justification for enacting 
such rules across the board, i.e. in all sectors covered by substantive EU law, 
then criteria need to be established for determining which fields and which 
substantive rules are to be singled out. Careful consideration and explana-
tions on this point appear to be in place, not only in light of the inevitable 
fragmenting effects at national level but also because, as was observed ear-
lier, this choice implies giving preferential status to certain private parties 
that derive rights from EU law while denying it to other private parties 
whose rights happen to derive from other, non-selected provisions of sub-
stantive EU law or from ‘purely’ national law.
An appropriate starting point for this exercise would seem to be an 
assessment of whether in a given field particular enforcement-related prob-
lems exist. The next question could then be whether these problems are such 
that the EU can and should enact legislative measures, in light of consider-
ations that include the scale of the problems identified, their possible effects 
on the internal market or other EU policies as well as possible alternatives. 
In case of a confirmative answer, it remains to be determined whether facili-
tating private enforcement is a suitable means to address the said problems. 
The granting of rights to private parties under the substantive rules of EU 
law at issue seems a necessary prerequisite, as was explained above. Yet also 
beyond that it should be assessed whether it is seen as desirable and more-
over realistic to expect the typical private parties concerned to bring legal 
proceedings upon being confronted with an infringement of EU law – if 
necessary with some encouragement in the form of certain facilitating mea-
sures, but without fundamentally altering the basic characteristics of the 
means through which this is to take place and without unduly affecting the 
rights of those that may be at the ‘receiving end’ of those proceedings.
519. A second point is that any such policy relating to the EU’s legislative 
activities should clearly establish which objective (or objectives) the EU wish-
es to achieve by facilitating private enforcement. This may sound self-evi-
dent, but, as been extensively discussed in the foregoing, there still appears 
to be considerable ambiguity in this regard. This concerns especially the 
question whether private enforcement is primarily seen as an instrument for 
strengthening overall levels of enforcement of and compliance with EU law 
per se, or rather as a manner to help the private parties concerned to enforce 
the rights that they derive from that law for its own sake. This is evidently 
not to say that both objectives cannot be pursued at the same time. Quite to 
the contrary, it has been discussed almost equally extensively above that the 
insight that in most cases this may well be possible – and that there may in 
fact well be mutually reinforcing effects in this regard – lies at the very heart 
of the concept of private enforcement. The point is rather that the parallel-
ism that often (although by no means always) exists between the general 
and the individual interest is no justification for, rather lazily or confusingly, 
mixing and blurring both rationales and the arguments related thereto when 
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addressing the matters at issue in this study. Clearly and correctly identify-
ing the objective(s) pursued by each EU legislative initiative related to pri-
vate enforcement is not only important for its own sake, it also determines 
to a high extent which measures are to be enacted precisely, and which not, 
as was indicated below. In addition it can be of importance for correctly 
identifying the required legal basis for the intended EU legal act in question 
and for an assessment under the principles of subsidiarity and proportional-
ity. Providing for analytical clarity on this point is therefore also a prerequi-
site for establishing the correct balance between EU ‘interference’ and Mem-
ber States’ ‘autonomy’.
520. As a third point, in function of the objective(s) pursued, a clear line 
ought to be formulated as regards the means employed, i.e. the remedies and 
procedural provisions for private enforcement purposes set out in the acts of 
secondary EU law at issue. This is not merely a matter of ‘technicalities’, 
such as the manner in which the relevant provisions of EU law are drafted, 
although that certainly is an important aspect as well. It also extends to 
more fundamental matters, notably the basic principles and assumptions 
underlying those provisions. This concerns questions such as whether the 
damages awards are deemed to serve only compensatory purposes or also 
(partially) a punitive and deterrent function; whether and if so, to which 
extent the finding of an infringement of EU law should be reason to termi-
nate or otherwise affect contracts concluded between private parties; when 
a private party is sufficiently ‘concerned’ for him to be entitled to initiate 
private enforcement proceedings under the EU legislation at issue; how 
active a role the national court seised is expected to play in private enforce-
ment proceedings; and where and how the dividing line is to be drawn 
between a ‘healthy’ and an ‘excessive’ degree of private enforcement litiga-
tion. Another aspect is outlining the criteria on the basis of which it is decid-
ed which remedies are to be provided for in which situations. As has been 
set out above, at present it seems far from clear, for example, why the EU’s 
legislative action is sometimes limited to facilitating actions for damages or 
why in some acts rules on the disclosure of evidence or on legal costs are 
included, while in others they are not. Some differentiation may well be in 
place, but that does not mean that the available options and the resulting 
choices made in this regard should not first be properly assessed and 
explained; quite to the contrary. In other words, this is a matter of deciding 
as well as explaining which ‘tool’ from the private enforcement ‘toolbox’ is 
to be used in which situations.
521. Finally, even apart from questions as to the main objective(s) and the 
means employed, it is suggested that the EU’s policy on private enforce-
ment should address these matters from an overall enforcement perspective. 
This involves in particular elaborating on the relationship and interaction 
between public and private enforcement. One aspect is the need to address, 
in a balanced manner, the aforementioned tensions that can exist between 
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both forms of enforcement in specific cases. More generally, the possible 
existence of, suitability and scope for public enforcement in a given situa-
tion can be a relevant factor in determining in which cases the EU is to enact 
which types of private enforcement-related measures, and vice versa. For, as 
has been set out above, the relationship between the two can be as much one 
of substitution as one of complementarity, particularly where private 
enforcement is seen as an enforcement instrument in the general interest. 
There may thus be less reason for encouraging private enforcement in areas 
where strong public enforcement mechanisms exist, just as, conversely, pub-
lic enforcement efforts could conceivably be concentrated on infringements 
that are not or insufficiently addressed through private enforcement alone. 
There may further be nothing against trying to coordinate and optimise the 
relationship between both forms of enforcement in procedural terms where 
possible, for instance by allowing amicus interventions by public authorities 
in private enforcement proceedings or by encouraging the resolution of dis-
putes between the private parties concerned in the context of public enforce-
ment proceedings.
At the same time it is equally important to acknowledge that there are 
clear limits to the extent to which the distinction between both forms of 
enforcement can and should be blurred, both in terms of objectives and the 
means employed to achieve those objectives. For all the possible parallelism 
in the interests at stake and the mutual reinforcing effects that might exist in 
this regard, public and private enforcement mostly have different objects, 
aims and effects. Put differently, the vigilance of private parties might 
“amount to an effective supervision” in addition to the relevant public enforce-
ment structures, as the Court of Justice held over half a century ago in Van 
Gend en Loos.251 But, as the Court made clear already in that very same judg-
ment, this only applies with respect to the private parties “concerned” and 
moreover the vigilance of these parties serves only “to protect their rights”.252 
Indeed, around the same time the Court observed that legal actions brought 
by private parties under EU law are “intended to protect individual rights in a 
specific case”, whilst an action in infringement proceedings – and by exten-
sion public enforcement more generally – “has as its object the general and 
uniform observance of [EU] law”.253 Therefore, while private parties can 
undoubtedly make a valuable contribution to achieving this latter objective, 
the fact remains that their vigilance concerns, first and foremost, their own 
individual interests.
251 CoJ case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, p. 13.
252 Ibid.
253 CoJ case 28/67, Firma Molkerei, p. 153.

Summary (abstract)
The vigilance of individuals: how, when and why the EU legislates to facilitate the 
private enforcement of EU law before national courts
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enforcement of EU law, i.e. the enforcement of that law by private parties in 
legal proceedings before the courts of the Member States. The relevant EU-
level legislative developments in four fields of law are assessed in detail, 
namely those relating to EU public procurement law (in particular Procure-
ment Remedies Directives 89/665 and 92/13), EU intellectual property law 
(in particular IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48), EU consumer protection 
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Dit proefschrift spitst zich toe op EU wetgeving die de private handhaving 
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